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Survey of Florida Law
Keynote Address at the 1991 Nova Law Review
Banquet
Justice Gerald Kogan*
I know tonight is a busy program. However, there are some com-
ments that I want to make to you. I haven't really discussed these mat-
ters at all today, despite my four previous speeches. These are matters
that are very close to my heart and something that I have always been
concerned about-and quite frankly, more concerned now than ever
before. You know, one of the classes I taught when I was here at Nova
was Professional Responsibility. I remember the key question I used to
love to ask. I'd look at the class and I'd say "you're sitting in your
office. You're a practicing lawyer and this well known drug dealer
marches :in and puts down right in front of you $250,000 in cash, all in
one, five and ten dollar bills and asks you to represent him in a drug
case. And you know where the money came from. Undoubtedly he
made most of it in the local school yards in your community. Would
you take that money to represent this man?" And in the true spirit of
the legal profession, everyone said "yes." After all, even a drug dealer
is entitled to have proper representation and as far as where the money
came from, I remember an incident that once took place when I was in
a place called Petticoat Lane. It's a flea market, and it operates only on
Sunday mornings. I remember shopping and looking around when a
man spoke to this fellow with a Cockney accent and said to him, "You
know, I'm wondering if these are hot goods you're selling here." And
his comment was, "Sir, you don't ask me where I get my merchandise
and I won't ask you where you get your money from." And so it is that
lawyers are faced with this kind of a decision almost daily in one form
or another, whether you're doing civil work or criminal work, the main
question arises and the one problem we all face in the profession is
simply the matter of what is our professional responsibility. Very sim-
ply, what are we talking about when we talk about legal ethics? What
* Justice, Florida Supreme Court.
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is the responsibility that we owe not only to the courts and our fellow
lawyers but also to our clients, and what do we owe to the general
public? I like to look upon the law as being a high minded profession. I
like to look upon the law as being a way that we, as lawyers, can do
service to society; to better society, no matter what field we happen to
go into. I am chagrined and I am disturbed when lawyers go to law
school for one purpose and one purpose only, and that is to see how
much money they can make in the practice of law. Now making a lot
of money is not a bad thing to do. It brings a lot of the conveniences
and enjoyment that are out there like the food that you have to buy.
But at the same time the ones that spend their entire professional life
after the pursuit of money is not, in my opinion, what being a lawyer is
all about. Because when money becomes the sole object we begin to
forget our purpose in society and our purpose is to help our system of
justice proceed in an orderly manner where justice is brought to all
those who are served by our court system and by our attorneys. If we
forget that, we are without any question in deep trouble.
We have a situation now that pervades our profession that, quite
frankly, causes me to be ashamed. We know of instances, for example,
where the biggest and most important thing that now prevails in the
legal profession is what is known as the billable hour. Now for those of
you who are not yet in practice, you will pretty soon be introduced to
that billable hour. Your entire legal career, if you're in a particular law
firm, will be dedicated to the billable hour. That simply means you
have to put in the work because we have to make the money in this law
firm to pay your salary, to pay our overhead and to pay for all the
employees that we have in this particular office, and that's the most
important thing that you can possibly do. As a result, what has hap-
pened is we have a generation of lawyers that have gone out there and
have worked like dogs trying to meet their billable hours, and as a re-
sult of working many, many hours in excess of what they need, we've
seen that their families have been affected, we've seen marriages that
have broken up. We've seen all sorts of horrors take place. We've seen
lawyers who have become alcoholics, lawyers who have become ad-
dicted to drugs. Much of that stems from the type of hours that law-
yers put in trying to satisfy the billable hour.
We see other horribles that are occurring. The other horribles are
a lawyer takes three files down to the courthouse and works on those
three files from nine until twelve. Then when the lawyer gets back to
the office, instead of apportioning the three hours amongst the three
files the lawyer charges client A for three hours, client B for three
[Vol. 16
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hours and client C for three hours. Now that's outrageous. And these
are things that clients are becoming more and more aware of. As a
matter of fact, for those of you who aren't aware of this, house counsel
have now become a fact of life with many of our large corporations.
They feel why should I spend all this money by hiring lawyers outside
the corporation who I know are going to charge me for every stamp
that goes on a letter, for every sheet of paper they put through a fax
machine: or through the word processing machine. Every time I turn
around I get another bill for something else when I can do that a lot
more cheaply by having my own lawyers and use them in my corpora-
tion as house counsel, and they find that they do as good a job as the
law firms.
What we have effectively done in our pursuit of the almighty dol-
lar in our profession is price the average citizen out of the legal services
market. The average wage earner in America today cannot afford to
hire a lawyer. It is an absolute impossibility unless it's on a contingency
basis. If' they want ordinary routine legal work done, they just can't
afford it. And as a profession we have fought mandatory pro bono. I
have heard lawyers and law professors argue before our courts and say
to force lawyers to do pro bono work is equivalent to ignoring the exis-
tence of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Now I do think that goes a little bit too far and I told that particular
law professor, when he argued in front of us several months ago, that
he was going way overboard, and he kept saying to me that the found-
ing fathers have nothing to do with the Thirteenth Amendment. That
came later and the Thirteenth Amendment was not to free lawyers
from involuntary servitude. This amendment was not passed to prevent
you from having to do pro bono work. As lawyers we take a great deal
out of our society, and as lawyers we must put back into that society in
proportion to what we take out by service to our community, by doing
pro bono work, we have to put back in that which we take out. I know
a lot of lawyers who are really going to get angry when they hear
something about that but, quite frankly, I just don't care because I
think that we owe this to society and we better start doing it because as
lawyers we don't have a very good reputation anyway in the commu-
nity. If you ask somebody out there, a lay person, where lawyers rank,
you'll find that we rank just above the used car salesmen as far as
respect goes. We were talking at the table earlier when it was acknowl-
edged that doctors are really heading in our direction as well, and it's
time that all of us turned around and started reconsidering where we're
going.
1991]
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So I commend all of you when you go out into the practice of law,
whenever it may be, realize that you have a privilege to practice law.
You're in a unique situation. When you pass that bar exam and you're
sworn in as a member of any bar anywhere, you gain a license that
allows you to have privileges that the average citizen does not have,
and because you have these privileges, expect to give something back to
the community. I think this is the biggest problem that, as lawyers, we
are currently facing and it certainly demands our attention. I just want
you to know that I'm not just picking on lawyers. I'm going to pick on
judges a little bit while I'm standing up here.
One thing that I've always cited to and that is the fact that we are
judges does not put us in a category where all of a sudden on the day
we put the robe on there ascended down from the sky wisdom that we
never had before and embedded itself in our skulls. We have the same
brain power and, in some cases, lack of brain power when we got on the
bench as we had the day we were practicing law, the day before we
ascended to the bench. We are very, very dependent on the lawyers,
quite frankly, to aid us and assist us in doing what we should do when
deciding cases. If we ever say that we've learned everything, then our
system is headed for deep trouble. So let's not dicker with that one. I
think the problem with our judges, as with the attorneys, is that we
have come to expect certain things by judges that many of them are
unwilling to give us. Hopefully, our judges, through a better system to
select judges than we may have now or systems that we ought to de-
velop, will bring us judges who can essentially do what I consider the
three major things that a judge has to do to be effective. First of all, he
can be a Phi Beta Kappa in undergraduate school, you know graduate
summa cum laude, with highest honors, be an editor to a law review
and all that sort of stuff, but quite frankly that doesn't mean very
much when you take the bench unless you have the three qualities I'm
about to tell you about.
The number one quality is in order to be a judge you've got to be
able to make decisions. If you can't make a decision you don't belong
on the bench. Number two, you must have a deep understanding of the
human condition, and by that I simply mean you must understand
what makes people tick. You must understand about cultural differ-
ences, about ethnic differences, about how various groups react to vari-
ous situations and that not everybody reacts the same in the same set
of circumstances. Not everybody had the same background. Not every-
body looks at the world like you may look at it, and that doesn't mean
that they're looking at it and their view is wrong. Their view may be
[Vol. 16
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just as right as your view and their view may be right and your view
may be wrong. So you must understand what these people have to say,
why they say it and where they're coming from to understand what the
human condition is all about. And thirdly, you have to have courage.
And that is the courage to be able to do what you feel is right, regard-
less of the political or personal consequences that you, as a judge, may
suffer. If you're the type of judge who's going to sit on the bench and
say "well, if I rule this way it's going to hurt me in the next election,"
and then don't rule that way because you want to save yourself all that
aggravation, then you quite frankly do not belong on the bench. And
that you as attorneys have got the right-and the members of our com-
munity and our society-have got the right to demand that our judges
do just that, and that is make the courageous decisions when they feel
in their heart and their mind and in their conscience that is the right
thing to do. And if it is the right thing to do and they believe it to be
right, then they must go ahead and do it regardless of the effect it may
have on them politically or personally.
It's going to be up to you as lawyers, when you're out there prac-
ticing, to make sure that you hold the judge's feet to the fire. Do not
ever be afraid to speak up against injustice. Do not ever be afraid to
take a judge to task if that judge is not doing the job that they should
be doing, because as I said before, our system cannot survive unless we
require that of our judges.
These are some very simple things that I like to talk to law stu-
dents about, about your ethical responsibility and about the judge's
ethical responsibility. If we all get our acts together, then maybe some-
day we can have a better perception by the public as to what we law-
yers and judges are all about. So it's been a great day for me. I've
enjoyed being with you and I want to congratulate the law review staff
on the fine job they've done. I wish the new law review staff good luck.
And contrary what you may believe, we do occasionally read law re-
view articles, especially when we have to because we're researching
that particular problem. So it doesn't go completely in vain, although I
must admit when I get all the law reviews from the State of Florida the
reading [ have to do can become difficult, but at least I peruse them
and I put them aside and I remember, strangely enough, when a prob-
lem comes up that we've got a law review article somewhere. They are
very, very helpful, so they're not written for naught. Judges do look at
them and researchers do examine them, they can be very, very helpful,
and they do from time to time have an instrumental part in creating
our opinions. So everybody keep up the good work. Thanks for having
1991]
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me down here and again, to those of you who are going to graduate
pretty soon, good luck on your bar examination and good luck in the
practice of law. Remember give back to the community that which you
take out of it as an attorney, whether it be in the form of community
service, whether it be in the form of pro bono. And if any of you ever
aspire to the bench, remember those three things; you make decisions,
understand the human condition, and have the courage of your convic-
tions to make the right decision regardless of the personal conse-
quences. If you do all of those things, I'll be very, very happy and all of
us will be on our way to making our profession what it should be.
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[T he delegation of broad and undefined discretionary power from
the legislature to the executive branch [and independent adminis-
trative agencies] deranges virtually all constitutional relationships
and prevents attainment of the constitutional goals of limitation on
power, substantive calculability, and procedural calculability.'
Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion
may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice,
either reasonableness or arbitrariness.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies, whether we approve or not, have become
1. Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Ad-
ministrative Power, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 295, 296 (1987). See generally THEODORE J.
Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d
ed. 1979).
2. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3
(Illini Books ed. 1971).
[Vol. 16
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the primary institutions for creating and implementing governmental
policy. Understanding how the administrative process operates and the
nature of both substantive and procedural constraints the law imposes
on the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies has become an
essential part of the modern lawyer's repertoire. This article is designed
to assist lawyers in keeping themselves abreast of recent developments
in the complex and diverse area of administrative law by providing an
overview of administrative law decisions8 by the Florida appellate
courts during the survey period."
3. Cases concerning the Workers' Compensation system generally are not ad-
dressed in this article, because its administrative hearing system is not subject to the
Florida Administrative Procedure Act. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(l)(c) (1991) [hereinafter
"the APA"] ("A judge of compensation claims shall not, in the adjudication of work-
ers' compensation claims, be considered an agency or part of an agency for the pur-
poses of this act.").
4. As in past years this article perhaps errs on the side of comprehensiveness.
Most of the cases discussed do not, in and of themselves, raise some new and/or impor-
tant development in administrative law. However, I continue to firmly believe that such
a comprehensive approach is justified because each appellate court decision augments
our knowledge of how the courts are interacting with administrative agencies, and thus,
is valuable.
Most of the decisions discussed in this article appear in volumes 554 to 583 of the
Southern Reporter, Second Series. Earlier articles on Florida administrative law have
appeared in a variety of books and law reviews. See, e.g., FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE (The Florida Bar 3d ed. 1990); ARTHUR J. ENGLAND & L. HAROLD LEVIN-
SON, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE MANUAL (1979); Johnny C. Burris, The
Failure of the Florida Judicial Review Process to Provide Effective Incentives for
Agency Rulemaking, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 661 (1991) [hereinafter Burris IV]; Patri-
cia A. Dore, Florida Limits Policy Development Through Administrative Adjudica-
tion and Requires Indexing and Availability of Agency Orders, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
437 (1991) [hereinafter Dore III]; Patricia A. Dore, Seventh Administrative Law Con-
ference Agenda and Report, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 703 (1991) [hereinafter Dore II];
L. Harold Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act After 15 Years, 18
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 749 (1991); Stephen T. Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and
Judicial Review in Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 767 (1991); Johnny C. Burris, Ad-
ministrative Law, 1989 Survey of Florida Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 583 (1990) [herein-
after Burris III]; Johnny C. Burris, Administrative Law, 1988 Survey of Florida Law,
13 NOVA L. REV. 727 (1989) [hereinafter Burris II]; Johnny C. Burris, Administrative
Law, 1987 Survey of Florida Law, 12 NOVA L. REV. 299 (1988) [hereinafter Burris I];
Patricia A. Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST. UL. REV.
965 (1986) [hereinafter Dore I]; Murray H. Dubbin & Samuel J. Dubbin, Administra-
tive Law: .Access to Review of Official Action-Standing Under the Florida Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815 (1981); Joseph Z. Fleming & David
L. Mallory, Administrative Law, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 735 (1979); Arthur J. England
& L. Harold Levinson, Administrative Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749 (1977); L. Har-
11
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. The Delegation Doctrine5
"There is no doubt that the development of the administrative
agency in response to modern legislative and administrative need has
placed severe strain on the separation-of-powers principle in its pristine
formulation." Most courts at both the federal and state levels early on
abandoned their efforts at rigorously enforcing separation of powers re-
quirements in the context of delegation of authority to administrative
agencies. However, Florida courts resisted this course. In Askew v.
Cross Key Waterways,7 the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed a com-
mitment to rigorously enforce the delegation doctrine through a very
formalistic approach to these issues. The decision in Cross Key cast
considerable doubt on the validity of many statutory delegations of au-
thority to administrative agencies.8
However, beginning in 1981, Florida courts gradually abandoned
the formalist approach to the delegation doctrine outlined in the Cross
Key decision that threatened the constitutional validity of many ena-
bling statutes which delegated substantial authority and discretion to
administrative agencies. The courts, while never formally abandoning
the Cross Key philosophy on delegation issues, nonetheless functionally
old Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975
Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617 (1975); L. Harold Levinson, A Comparison of
Florida Administrative Practice Under the Old and the New Administrative Procedure
Acts, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.-72 (1975). See generally A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE RULE MAKING (1986) (an excellent general discussion of state administrative law
issues); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1978-84) (five vol-
ume set offering one of the most comprehensive overviews of administrative law).
5. This constitutional doctrine traditionally has been labeled the non-delegation
doctrine. This clearly is a misnomer, as courts, contrary to the result suggested by the
label, almost never find the delegation of quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial authority, or
the aggregation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in one administrative
body to be constitutionally flawed. The non-delegation doctrine designation occurred
because strongly worded dicta in early United States Supreme Court cases which ad-
dressed these issues indicated a hostility in principle to such actions by Congress, even
though the delegations in these cases were held constitutionally sound. In keeping with
legal reality, rather than myth, I have labeled this section "The Delegation Doctrine,"
rather than "The Non-Delegation Doctrine." See Burris I, supra note 4, at 302 n.15.
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 280-81 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
7. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
8. See Burris I, supra note 4, at 304-07.
[Vol. 16
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adopted a pragmatic approach to delegation issues similar to that used
in the federal courts.9
Under the pragmatic approach, which has been imposed under the
Cross Key rubric, the critical inquiry in delegation cases is "whether
the statute contains sufficient standards or guidelines to enable the
agency and the courts to determine whether the agency is carrying out
the legislature's intent."10 The degree of specificity required will vary
with "the subject matter dealt with and the degree of difficulty involved
in articulating finite standards."" The courts found that a substantial
degree of flexibility and uncertainty should be tolerated so that the leg-
islature can delegate authority to an administrative agency "with the
expertise and flexibility needed to deal with complex and fluid condi-
tions .. .which . ..make direct legislative control impractical or in-
effective . . .[and] make the drafting of detailed or specific legislation
impractical or undesirable. 1 2 Standardless delegation of authority to
an administrative agency will not be condoned, but it takes very little
in the way of direction from the legislature for a statute to move from
the standardless category to the category of constitutionally sufficient
minimum guidance. While courts continue to ritualistically refer to the
Cross Key decision, the nature of the inquiries made under the delega-
tion doctrine are now pragmatic, designed to assure in a minimalistic
fashion that the legislature and not administrative agencies are making
fundamental policy decisions. 8 The net result has been a decline in the
use of the delegation doctrine to declare statutes unconstitutional.",
9. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (the first modern statement of the "intelli-
gible principle" approach to delegation issues); Amalgamated Meat Workers v. Con-
nally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). But see American Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Dono-
van, 452 U.S. 490, 546-47 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rigorous application of
the delegation doctrine would require holding these statutes an unconstitutional form of
delegation); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
10. Department of Ins. v. Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So. 2d 815, 819
(Fla. 1981).
11. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 918.
12. Jones v. Department of Revenue, 523 So. 2d 1211, 1214 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
13. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 730-31; Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, &
F, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S699 (Fla. 1991) (Overton, J., concurring).
14. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 585-87; Burris II, supra note 4, at 729-30;
see also Burris I, supra note 4, at 302-12.
Of course, a different result may be achieved if the attempted delegation was
1991]
13
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
In fact, the process of abandoning or ignoring the requirements set
out in the Cross Key decision has progressed to the point that during
this survey period only one case was decided which involved a signifi-
cant discussion of whether a delegation of authority to an administra-
tive agency was unconstitutional. 15 In Young v. Broward County,' 6 the
viewed by the court as concerning the relatively rare circumstance of a power which
was not delegable. See Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S699. The first part of the opinion
in Chiles treated budget cutting as a matter which must be decided by the legislature;
but in the latter part of its opinion, the court apparently qualified its earlier position by
indicating that if it was a possibility for the legislature to adopt sufficiently detailed
guidance for the exercise of budget cutting authority, then the Administrative Commis-
sion could exercise some delegated authority in this area. Id.
In Barry v. Garcia, 573 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), the court con-
sidered whether the Ad Hoc Independent Review Panel of the City of Miami was prop-
erly delegated the power to issue subpoenas. The Panel was created by the City Com-
mission of the City of Miami for the purposes of investigating the relationship between
the police department and the Overtown area, and was directed to report its findings to
the City Commission. Id. at 933. The City Commission resolution creating the ad hoc
panel granted it the power to issue subpoenas.
Two individuals were subpoenaed by the Panel, but refused to testify or appear
before the Panel. The Panel petitioned the circuit court to hold these individuals in
contempt unless they could show cause why they should not be so found. The circuit
court "found that as a matter of law, the Ad Hoc Independent Review Panel did not
have the authority to issue subpoenas and to compel attendance of witnesses to its
proceedings." Id. at 934. The City of Miami Charter provided that the Commission or
any committee thereof are the only bodies authorized by the Charter to exercise the
investigative subpoena power. Id. at 937; City of Miami Charter § 14. It was clear that
any investigative subpoena could be issued either by the body carrying out the investi-
gation or by a court, but if the investigative body wished to enforce its subpoena, then
it must apply through the courts for an order concerning the matter. Because the City
Charter did not currently authorize anyone other than the City Commission or a com-
mittee composed of City Commissioners to exercise the subpoena power, the City Com-
mission acted inappropriately in delegating this power to the Ad Hoc Independent Re-
view Panel. Garcia, 573 So. 2d at 938. "Generally, a city commission, which is a
legislative body of a city, possesses no power to delegate their authority as prescribed in
their charter. Municipal officials can only act in accordance with an express grant in
their charter and not any implied grant of power." Id. at 939. Therefore, the Ad Hoc
Independent Review Panel had no power to issue a subpoena, and accordingly, the
circuit court properly determined that it could not enforce any subpoena issued by the
body with a contempt citation. See generally Florida Administrative Practice § 1.9-.12
(The Florida Bar 3d ed. 1990).
15. Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S699, was decided too late for a full discussion in
this survey article. Five other cases briefly alluded to delegation doctrine matters. See
State v. Carswell, 557 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (A statute did not
violate the delegation doctrine by incorporating by reference existing federal standards.
The court did note in dicta, however, that any attempt to incorporate by reference
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court addressed the issue of whether the Broward County ordinance
regulating when the Broward County Animal Control Division may de-
clare a dog to be vicious and order it destroyed involved an invalid
delegation of authority.17 The court concluded the ordinance could not
be characterized as creating a circumstance where the administrative
agency could engage in arbitrary decision making. The ordinance pro-
vided sufficient guidance to the administrative agency, because the or-
dinance contained an adequate definition of what constituted a vicious
dog. 8
However, Chief Judge Hersey in his dissent, while not directly
mentioning it, apparently followed both the letter and the spirit of the
Cross Key decision when noting the ordinance was constitutionally
flawed. The ordinance was flawed because the choice of which penalty
may be :imposed after a determination that a dog was vicious as a re-
sult of one attack, humane disposal or an opportunity for the owner to
properly provide for adequate security, was "vested solely in the unbri-
dled discretion of the individual who, from time to time, may hold the
post of Director of the Animal Control Division of Broward County."' 19
Such a delegation of unbridled discretion was a violation of the delega-
tion doctrine, because it left the fundamental policy choice of what was
the appropriate response to the problem to the administrative agency. 0
future changes in the federal standards would violate the delegation doctrine.); St.
Johns County v. Northeastern Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 642 (Fla. 1991);
Pittman v. State, 570 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Blizzard v.
W.H. Roof Co., 556 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); cf. Barber v.
State, 564 So. 2d 1169, 1172 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (vesting the prosecutor
with the discretion to choose among competing statutory provisions in a criminal case
was not an invalid delegation of discretion to the executive branch).
16. 570 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
17. The court noted in dicta that the ordinance also did not violate any other
tenets of constitutional law such as the due process of law guarantee. Id. at 310.
18. See Young, 570 So. 2d at 309; see also St. Johns County v. Northeastern
Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 642 (Fla. 1991); Pittman v. State, 570 So. 2d
1045, 1046 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Blizzard v. W.H. Roof Co., 556 So. 2d
1237, 1239, (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
19. Young, 570 So. 2d at 310-11 (Hersey, C.J., dissenting).
20. There [wa]s absolutely no guidance in the ordinance, no standards or
guidelines to control the discretion of the director of animal control as to
whether, after a first bite, a dog owner [wa]s to be given the opportunity to
confine his dog and to provide security as required in one section of the
ordiEiance, or, whether the owner [wa]s simply to be advised that the dog
will be disposed of under another section of the ordinance.
Id. at 310 (Hersey, C.J., dissenting). See Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 918-21;
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B. Separation of Powers: Prohibiting the Usurpation of
Functions
Florida courts have, for now at least, ceased to rigorously apply
the delegation doctrine, but they remain particularly attentive to sepa-
ration of powers concerns in other contexts. In addition to providing the
foundation for the delegation doctrine, the separation of powers doc-
trine also prohibits one branch of the government from invading the
core powers of another branch. 21 This principle was illustrated in sev-
eral cases during the survey period concerning whether the core judicial
functions were improperly delegated to nonjudicial officers.
In Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v.
Bonanno,22 the court held, in part, that the legislature could delegate to
a hearing officer the power to make an initial determination of the
amount of just compensation to be paid for citrus trees destroyed dur-
ing the citrus canker eradication program, as long as this determination
was subject to judicial review. The court noted that the ultimate deter-
mination of whether just compensation was paid for private property
taken by the government was a core function of the judiciary. There-
fore, by providing a right to judicial review of the initial determination
made by a hearing officer, the legislature exercised its constitutional
power to provide for a means of determining just compensation without
improperly invading the core of judicial functioning.2
In this area the issue of appropriate delegation does not always
involve another branch of government invading a core judicial function.
On some occasions it is the judiciary that delegated its powers. In
Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S699.
21. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 699; Locke v.
Hawkes, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716 (1991). The government also cannot delegate its
police powers to a private party. Such action is beyond the legislature's authority,
whether done by statute or contract. See P.C.B. Partnership v. City of Largo, 549 So.
2d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
22. 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
23. Id. at 28-29. Further, in Lampley v. State, the court noted that the initial
determination of whether a person was mentally incompetent and should be hospital-
ized was a core judicial function which could not be delegated to an administrative
agency. 555 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see Bentley v. State, 398
So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). However, once the initial determination of
incompetency and involuntary hospitalization had been made by the appropriate court,
then a hearing officer may determine whether the involuntary hospitalization should be
continued. Lampley, 555 So. 2d at 1245; see Liebman v. State, 555 So. 2d 1242 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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Bradley v. State,24 the court reaffirmed 25 that trial court delegation to
the probation and parole officer of the power to determine the appropri-
ate amount of restitution owed by a criminal defendant was an imper-
missible delegation of a core judicial function. 6 The determination of
all elements of a sentence for a defendant involves the exercise of judi-
cial power which may not be entrusted to an executive branch
employee. 7
The issue of whether the legislature invaded judicial core functions
can be a particularly vexing one in the area concerning the distinction
between substantive law making and matters of practice and proce-
dure." The former is within the legislative power sphere while the lat-
ter is within the scope of the judicial power. In Haven Federal Savings
24. 581 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
25. See Hamrick v. State, 532 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
26. Bradley, 581 So. 2d at 246; see also Weckerle v. State, 579 So. 2d 742, 743
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 1.12 (The Flor-
ida Bar 3d ed. 1990).
27. "However, once the court has rendered its decision, it may assign the per-
formance of ministerial details necessary to the implementation of its decision to an
executive branch employee." Burris III, supra note 4, at 590 (emphasis added). cf.
Citizens of Florida v. Wilson, 567 So. 2d 889, 892 (Fla. 1990) In Wilson, while ex-
pressly disapproving of the process, the court nonetheless held that the Public Service
Commission, in delegating some authority to staff to draft a revised supplemental ser-
vice rider, did not inappropriately forfeit its statutory duties, because it properly set
forth the conditions which it expected to see in the revised supplemental service rider.
567 So. 2d at 892. Thus, the staff was merely carrying out a ministerial task to see that
these conditions were met in the revised supplemental service rider. The court found
that all of the conditions which were set forth for approval of the revised supplemental
service rider were addressed by the staff, so they did not exceed the scope of the minis-
terial duties which had been assigned to them. Id.
28. Cf. Jarrell v. State, 576 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (The
court, in dicta, noted that a statute which imposed mandatory consecutive sentences for
some offenses was not an unconstitutional invasion of the core judicial function by the
legislature.). The legislature is also prohibited from usurping the authority of the exec-
utive branch. In Chiles v. Public Service Commission Nominating Council, 573 So. 2d
829, 832-33 (Fla. 1991), the court noted that the Public Service Commission was a
legislatively created entity exercising legislative powers, and the statute governing the
selection of individuals to fill unexpired terms on the Public Service Commission did
not encroach upon the governor's constitutional appointment powers in such cases. See
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(f); Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 16 Fla. L. Weekly
S699 (Fla. 1991) (McDonald, J., dissenting) (In part, the argument was over whether
budget reductions required by a shortfall in revenue was a legislative or executive
function.).
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and Loan Ass'n v. Kirian,29 the court found that a statute requiring the
severance of counterclaims for a separate trial in a foreclosure action
concerned a procedural matter.30 The court noted that practice and
procedure matters concern the method of conducting litigation, not the
establishment or regulation of rights or elements of a cause of action.8 1
The court held that the procedural aspects of the statute were unconsti-
tutional to the extent they were inconsistent with rules adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court which made severance of a counterclaim a
matter within the trial judge's discretion.32
Of course, these same principles prohibit the courts from exercis-
ing the core functions of other branches, but the precise lines of what
constitutes core functions has not always been clear. This is especially
so in light of the substantive law-practice and procedure dichotomy.
In State v. Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n,33 the court observed that
the separation of powers doctrine did not "preclude[] the judicial
branch from addressing the constitutionality of the acts of the other
branches" of government.3 4 The court noted that no special policy rea-
sons, based upon separation of powers concerns, existed for excluding
appropriation legislation from the power of the judiciary to determine
the constitutionality of legislation. 5 In Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.,36 the
29. 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1991).
30. The court rejected the argument that this statute concerned substantive
rights, because it offered greater protection to mortgage lenders. The court found no
evidence that the legislature believed it was substantially altering the rights of the
mortgage lenders. Rather, the legislative history demonstrated that this statute was
adopted as a mere administrative convenience for the mortgage lenders. Id. at 733; see
FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1989).
31. Kirian, 579 So. 2d at 732.
32. Id. at 732-33; accord Curenton v. Chester, 576 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (following Milton v. Leapai, 562 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990)); In Re Adoption of a Minor Child, 570 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (harmonizing a statutory time limit with the Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure); Milton v. Leapai, 562 So. 2d 804, 807 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (time
frame established in settlement offer statute was procedural, and encroached on the
Florida Supreme Court's rule making authority).
33. 580 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 620.
35. Id.; see Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S699. But see In re Order on Prosecu-
tion of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Cir. Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130,
1136 (Fla. 1990) (strongly asserting that judicial review of appropriation statutes
should be limited to law making procedural issues, and not reach the merits of the
appropriation decisions.); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Serv. v. Brooke,
573 So. 2d 363, 368-71 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (expressing great doubt about
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court further noted that the common law process of evolving tort reme-
dies in light of new experiences and circumstances did not impermissi-
bly invade the legislative function of regulating the elements of causes
of action.37
C. Accountability: Was the Agency Acting Within the Scope of
Its Authority
The general rule is that administrative agencies may not exercise
any powers not expressly delegated to them, nor exceed the scope of the
authority delegated to them by the legislature. If administrative agen-
cies exceed their limited authority or powers, then their actions are ul-
tra vires, However, the courts have recognized that there are some lim-
ited circumstances when an administrative agency can successfully
claim some implied powers not explicitly provided for in the enabling
statute. ]During the survey period, the courts consistently rejected such
claims and reinforced the limited scope of this exception due to the
possibility that it could be used to impermissibly enlarge or modify the
scope of authority delegated to an administrative agency.38 As the
the courts reviewing budgetary decisions the legislature delegated to the executive
branch). cf. Florida Assoc. of Counties, Inc. v. Department of Admin., 580 So. 2d 641,
644 & n.9 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting any strong presumption that non-
contemporaneous interpretation of constitutional provisions by implementing legislation
was constitutionally correct).
36. 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
37. Id. at 283-84.
38. The implied power argument cannot be used to expand the scope of authority
delegated to an administrative agency. It can only be "used to provide additional pow-
ers for implementing agency policy in an area already clearly within its delegated area
of authority. Burris III, supra note 4, at 594; see Rabren v. Department of Professional
Regulation, 568 So. 2d 1283, 1288-89 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that
while the statute does not specifically authorize the Board of Commissioners to adopt
policy through its exercise of adjudicatory power, it is an appropriate implied power
incident to its authority to enter orders as part of its disciplinary actions.). But see
Willner v. Department of Professional Regulation, 563 So. 2d 805, 806-07 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (The court noted that an order containing a requirement of a
payment of $60,000 to the Department of Legal Affairs for Consumer Protection Ac-
tivities was an unlawful administrative penalty. While the Department of Professional
Regulation was delegated authority by the Florida legislature to impose conditions on
any grant of probation, it was a "general grant of authority to the ... Department of
Professional Regulation, lacking in sufficient specificity to evince a legislative intent to
authorize . . . [the Department of Professional Regulation] to exact monetary penal-
ties as conditions of probation." (emphasis in original)).
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court noted in Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil
Co., 9 when an administrative agency files an untimely response to a
petition, the hearing officer cannot use his or her discretionary author-
ity to grant or deny permission to file an untimely response as a means
of sanctioning the agency for failing to strictly adhere to the rules.'0
Hearing officers have not been delegated authority to impose such sanc-
tions in any case other than enforcement of discovery orders or "failure
to comply with the pleading requirements of the statute."' 1 Even the
power to impose sanctions in the case of discovery orders was limited."2
Hearing officers cannot dismiss a petition or otherwise functionally de-
prive a party of its right to a hearing as a means of enforcing a discov-
ery order.'
In Cataract Surgery Center v. Health Care Cost Containment
Board," the court held that the administrative rules" proposed by the
Health Care Cost Containment Board concerning the "collection of
data from freestanding ambulatory surgery centers"' 6 were an invalid
39. 577 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
40. The court stated:
[N]o statutory authority, either expressly or reasonably implied therefrom,
empowering DOAH to set a jurisdictional time limitation on the right of
an agency to respond to a petition for fees and costs. To the contrary, we
consider that the division's power to permit a late-filed response is reasona-
bly implied from the very statutes that rule 221-6.035 referenced as au-
thorizing its adoption: Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1989), specifically
subsection (1)(b)4, authorizing parties "to respond, to present evidence
and argument on all issues," and sections 57.111(4)(c) and (d), allowing a
state agency against which a small business party has prevailed to oppose
an application for attorney's fees and costs by affidavit, and requiring the
hearing officer to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application.
Clearly the two statutes, which the rule was designed to implement, imply
that the agency shall be given a fair opportunity to defend against an ap-
plication for fees and costs. We find nothing in the statutes reasonably
suggesting that if an agency fails to comply with the time limitations re-
quired for its response, a summary final order, regardless of any mitigating
circumstances, must thereafter be entered.
Id. at 992.
41. Id. at 993.
42. Id. at 992-93.
43. Id. at 993.
44. 581 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
45. The challenged proposed rules were 1ON-6.002-06. See FLA. STAT. §
120.54(4) (1989) (permits challenges to proposed rules as ultra vires acts); FLA. AD-
MIN. WEEKLY 1378-83 (March 23, 1990).
46. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360.
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exercise of the authority delegated to it by the legislature. The Board
claimed that the proposed rules were designed to enable it to collect the
data necessary for advising the legislature and the Governor on what
impact the shift from institutional to ambulatory care was having on
health care costs. 47 The court noted that "[a]ny attempt by an [admin-
istrative] agency to extend or enlarge its jurisdiction beyond its statu-
tory authority . . . [must] be declared . . . invalid." '48 In order to as-
sure tha.t administrative agencies do not exceeded its delegated
authority the courts must independently evaluate an administrative
agency's claim that it was acting within the scope of its delegated au-
thority." In reviewing the statutes to determine the scope of an admin-
istrative agency's authority, the courts must look not only at the spe-
cific statutory sections cited by the administrative agency, but also at
the whole statutory scheme which the administrative agency was dele-
gated authority to administer.5 0
The court characterized the rule making authority delegated to the
Health Care Cost Containment Board as limited to where other specific
sections of the statute "confer such rulemaking power."'" The court
47. i'd.; see FLA. STAT. §§ 407.03, .07-.08 (1990).
48. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1361.
49. See Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360-61 (characterizing the judi-
cial review process as only slightly different from the usual deferential approach to an
administrative agency's interpretation of its enabling statute); Burris III, supra note 4,
at 590-94.
50. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360-61. In doing so, the court assumes
it is authorized to examine other statutory sections not noticed in the rule making pro-
cess as the source of the administrative agency's rule making authority for the proposed
rule. This opens up the possibility that a defective notice of a proposed rule, because it
failed to state the appropriate source of statutory authority, could be saved by the court
noting the appropriate statutory section during the judicial review process and declar-
ing the defect in the notice to be harmless error.
51. Id. at 1361. Compare FLA. STAT. § 407.03(1) (1989) ("Adopt, amend, and
repeal rules respecting the exercise of the powers conferred by this chapter which are
applicable to the promulgation of rules.") with Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306
So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that an agency
may "make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act," the validity of regulations promulgated there-
under will be sustained so long as they are reasonably related to the pur-
poses of the enabling legislation, and are not arbitrary or capricious."
Although not explicitly considered by the court, the APA provision that "[n]o agency
has inherent rulemaking authority" may have influenced how the court read these stat-
utory provisions. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(15) (1989).
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rejected the claim that the Board was granted general rule making au-
thority in all areas addressed in its enabling statute. The court also
rejected the Board's claim that other statutory provisions 52 authorized
it to promulgate these information gathering rules. The court found
that when those statutory provisions were read in conjunction with the
rest of the enabling act" it was clear the legislature intended that these
information gathering provisions should apply only to hospitals and
nursing homes. 4 The court observed that the only time any meaningful
mention was made of ambulatory care facilities in the statute was in
the section of the statute that required the Health Care Cost Contain-
ment Board to report to the legislature and the governor on the impact
the shift from institutional to ambulatory care may have on health care
costs. Without more than this mere mention of ambulatory care facili-
ties, the court "decline[d] to infer that an [administrative] agency may
require detailed and expensive reporting from any business which may
have information relevant to the agency's purpose in situations where
the agency is given no other regulatory authority, and where there is no
specific legislative authority to require the collection of such data." 55
Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Board
of Professional Land Surveyors5 concerned the issue of whether a pro-
posed rule was within the scope of authority delegated to an adminis-
trative agency by the legislature. 5' The Board of Professional Land
Surveyors proposed rules designed to establish a uniform system for
determining the ordinary high water line or mark used in determining
the "demarcation between privately-owned uplands and sovereign sub-
merged lands."'5 8 After a hearing was held, the hearing officer entered
a final order finding "most of the contested rules invalid but concluding
that certain specified rules constituted a valid exercise of the Board of
52. FLA. STAT. § 407.03, .07-.08 (1989).
53. See FLA. STAT. §§ 407.02, .025, .05, .09 (1989) (information gathering con-
cerning hospitals); FLA. STAT. §§ 407.30-.34 (1989) (information gathering concerning
nursing homes).
54. "Chapter 407 provides a detailed framework of regulation and reporting re-
quirements for hospitals and nursing homes, but there is no indication of legislative
intent to allow the [Health Care Cost Containment Board] to exercise jurisdiction over
freestanding ambulatory surgery centers." Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1362.
55. Id. at 1363.
56. 566 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
57. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1989) (permits challenges to proposed rules as ultra
vires acts).
58. Board of Professional Land Surveyors, 566 So. 2d at 1359.
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Surveyors' delegated legislative authority."59
The court held that all of the proposed rules were ultra vires acts,
because they exceeded the statutory authority delegated to the Board
of Professional Land Surveyors by the legislature. The legislature dele-
gated to the Board the power to promulgate rules concerning the mini-
mum technical standards designed "to ensure that surveys are accu-
rately measured, complete, and of sufficient quality in those respects to
provide legally defensible real property boundaries." 60 The legislature
never delegated to the Board of Surveyors the power
to define any . . . fixed point [such] as the ordinary high water line
or to circumscribe thereby the legal consequences that flow from
the fixing of such a point. The determination of rights of parties to
a riparian boundary dispute is instead a matter subject ultimately
to judicial resolution under all applicable law. 1
The Board was limited to promulgating rules which assured that the
boundary lines for riparian property are properly recorded by survey-
ors. The Board was never delegated the authority to promulgate these
proposed rules, even if they did precisely recodify the case law concern-
ing the drawing of a line between privately owned land and sovereign
submerged land.62 It is clear, in light of the limited scope of authority
delegated to the Board, that the court correctly concluded that this was
a classic case of an administrative agency acting beyond the scope of
its delegated authority."
59. Id. The hearing officer held that some of the rules were an invalid exercise of
delegated authority, because "they did not precisely restate or embody the case law of
Florida relating to the scope of sovereign submerged land ownership and the concept of
ordinary high water line." Id. at 1360. Conversely, those few rules which the hearing
officer found to be a valid exercise of delegated authority were an accurate restatement
of the decisions of Florida courts concerning the determination of the ordinary high
water line. Id.
60. Id. at 1361 (emphasis in original).
61. Board of Professional Land Surveyors, 566 So. 2d at 1361.
62. Id. The court specifically noted that it was not passing on the hearing of-
ficer's determination of whether the administrative rules properly or improperly re-
stated the case law in Florida concerning where the ordinary high water mark should
be located. Id.
63. "If an [administrative] agency has exceeded its grant of rule making author-
ity or if the rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law imple-
mented, such infractions are among those requiring a conclusion that the proposed rule
is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." Id. at 1360.
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In Browning v. Department of Business Regulation,64 the court
held that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mo-
bile Homes had exceeded the scope of its delegated authority in at-
tempting to enforce contractual recision agreements between a devel-
oper and purchasers. 65 The Division was authorized by statute to seek
and enforce cease and desist orders, impose civil penalties and invoke
other appropriate remedies as authorized by Florida Statutes chapter
498.
In this case, the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums
and Mobile Homes had successfully entered an order compelling the
developer, Browning, to offer all purchasers a right of recision:
It is apparent . . . that once the developer has made an agreement
to rescind with the purchaser, the applicable provisions of Chapter
498 denominate the purchaser as the proper party to resort to court
action to enforce the agreement for recision. The prevailing pur-
chaser is protected against the expense of attorney's fees and litiga-
tion costs incurred in such action. Chapter 498 does not contain
authority for the Division to file suit in court to compel the con-
summation of an agreement for recision made between the pur-
chaser and the developer, and to so construe its provisions would
exceed the authority delegated to the Division by statute. [Admin-
istrative a]gencies do not have the inherent power to enforce pri-
vate consumer remedies unless that authority is clearing apparent
from the statutes.66
Nothing in the final judgment indicated that the Division "ha[d] au-
thority to compel consummation of the recision agreement on behalf of
a lot purchaser after he accepted Browning's offer to rescind. Nor could
the judgment validly have so provided, as such a provision would ac-
64. 574 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
65. The court stated:
[T]he only issue we must decide is whether the trial court, on an applica-
tion to enforce judgment by its contempt proceedings, is authorized to
compel the developer to refund the purchase price to the rescinding pur-
chasers or whether each purchaser must personally seek enforcement
before the court once they have accepted the developer's offer to rescind.
Resolution of this issue depends on the nature and extent of the remedy of
recision upon which the [administrative] agency order and, consequently,
the final judgment was entered in this case.
Id. at 192.
66. Id. at 193.
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cord to the Division powers beyond that authorized by statutes. '67 In
this case, Browning complied with the administrative order. He did so
by "offering recision and entering into private recision agreements with
those accepting that offer, enforcement of these private agreements re-
mains up to the purchaser as authorized in [section] 498.061." 68 Ac-
cordingly,, the circuit court did not have authority to grant the Division
of Florida, Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes' request that
the court use contempt powers to enforce the recision agreements
reached between Browning and the purchasers. 9
In Schiffman v. Department of Professional Regulation,0 the
court held that the Board of Pharmacy exceeded its delegated authority
when it attempted through a nonrule policy to permanently bar Schiff-
man from petitioning for reinstatement of his license as a pharmacist.7 1
The court relied upon Beam Distilling Co. v. Department of Profes-
sional Regulation,2 which interpreted a similar statute that regulated
the licensing of nurses, in reading the statute as having only delegated
67. Id. at 194. The court noted that if the Division of Florida Land Sales, Con-
dominiums and Mobile Homes was concerned that the developer would not comply
with the recision agreements, then it should have required the developer to establish a
trust fund for that purpose. Id. at 194 n.2.
68. Browning, 574 So. 2d at 194.
69. Id. The court noted that,
the circuit court in this case was empowered to decline enforcement of any
conditional penalty imposed by the . . .[Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums and Mobile Homes'] order that it found was inappropriate
in view of the circumstances shown to exist at the time the matter came
before it, including changes that occurred since the administrative order
had been entered.
Id. The circuit court had the power to do this, because it was expressly authorized by
statute to determine whether the penalty imposed was appropriate. Such is not the case
when an administrative order is being reviewed by an appellate court. Compare FLA.
STAT. § 120.69(5) (1989) with FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1989). When the circuit court
exercised this power, then the standard of judicial review for an appellate court was
"whether the [circuit] court abused its discretion under the circumstances shown by
the evidence." Browning, 574 So. 2d at 195. Clearly, the circuit court had the authority
to determine whether Browning still had the means to carry out the recision imposed
by the administrative order.
The court also noted that in appellate review of a contempt citation order issued to
enforce an administrative order, the decision of the circuit court to impose or deny the
contempt request should only be overturned when it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 195.
70. 581 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
71. See infra notes 259-97 and accompanying text (discussion of nonrule policy
issues).
72. 5.30 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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to the Board of Pharmacy the power to regulate pharmacist licensing
for the purpose of protecting the public from those who are not quali-
fied to practice the profession. This legislative purpose was not fur-
thered by permanently banning a rehabilitated and qualified individual
from seeking reinstatement of his license. The court made it clear that
any attempt by the Board of Pharmacy to impose such a sanction,
whether by nonrule policy or by administrative rule, would be an act
beyond its delegated authority.73
In Department of Natural Resources v. Wingfield Development
Co.,74 the court considered whether the Department of Natural Re-
sources rules75 concerning what constitutes "under construction" were
a valid exercise of delegated authority.76 The administrative rules pro-
vided that a project was considered under construction as long as there
was continuous physical activity on the project and no period of inactiv-
ity longer than six months. The court found that these requirements
imposed by administrative rules were an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority.77 The statute specifically exempted from the re-
quirements associated with a coastal construction control line any pro-
ject under construction prior to its establishment. The statute permitted
the Department of Natural Resources to make a determination of
whether a project was under construction only once-at the time it es-
tablished the coastal construction control line. The statute did not au-
thorize the Department to continually reexamine the question of
whether an exempt project was under construction. Because the admin-
istrative rules, especially as interpreted by the Department, authorized
such a continual process of review, they were an ultra vires exercise of
delegated authority that "enlarge[d] and modifie[d]" the scope of au-
thority delegated to the Department by the legislature. 78 The legisla-
ture must act before the Departure can impose such a scheme on ex-
empt projects.79
73. Schiffman, 581 So. 2d at 1379.
74. 581 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
75. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r.16B-33.002(56), .004(1) (1991).
76. Wingfield Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d at 197. The court also considered a nonrule
policy issue. See infra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
77. Wingfield Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d at 197.
78. Id. at 198; see FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(c) (1989).
79. Judge Schwartz argued, in his dissent, that the term "under construction," as
used in the statute, envisioned an ongoing process of review to determine if the exemp-
tion from the coastal construction control line permit requirements was justified. He
concluded that the legislature could not have intended for the statute to allow a con-
[Vol. 16
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Burris
The decisions in Puckett Oil Co., Cataract Surgery Center, Board
of Professional Land Surveyors, Browning, Schiffman, and Wingfield
Development Co. are examples of courts independently evaluating the
question of whether administrative agencies have appropriately limited
themselves to those powers specifically delegated and reasonably im-
plied from the statutory scheme.80 The non-deferential approach to ju-
dicial review in this area is designed to assure that the ultra vires doc-
trine does not become as ineffective a check on the exercise of
discretion claimed by administrative agencies as the delegation doctrine
has on the scope of discretionary authority the legislature can delegate
to administrative agencies. 8'
D. Procedural Due Process"2
The constitutional guarantee of procedural due process is designed
to assure that the government does not arbitrarily deprive a person of a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. This is accom-
plished by requiring the government, in many cases, to provide an indi-
vidual with an opportunity for a hearing to determine the validity of
the government's decision. 3
The initial issue in all cases involving procedural due process
claims is 'whether a constitutionally protected liberty or property inter-
est is at stake which requires some type of hearing. If no such interest
is at stake, then procedural due process requirements do not constrain
the government's ability to act. The process of identifying a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest is a relatively easy task, because it
usually involves a determination of whether a fundamental right such
tractor to remain secure in its exemption by "merely begin[ning] construction on the
day before the line . . . [was] fixed, cease [construction] the day after, and wait, pre-
sumably for decades, until it secure[d] financing to complete the structure." In re-
jecting this absurd result the Department of Natural Resources merely interpreted the
statute in a reasonable manner. The court should defer to such a reasonable interpreta-
tion. Wingfield Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d at 199 (Schwartz, J., dissenting); see infra 576-83
and accompanying text (discussion of when courts should defer to an interpretation of
a statute adopted by an administrative agency).
80. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
81. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 590-94.
82. See generally FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 1.21-1.46 (The Florida
Bar 3d ed. 1990)
83. Of course the government may statutorily grant hearings in cases when none
would be required by the Florida or United States Constitutions. E.g., FLA. STAT. §
120.54(3), (4) (1989).
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as freedom of speech or privacy is at stake in the governmental decision
making process." However, determining whether a constitutionally
protected property interest exists is more complex, because it turns on
whether state laws or procedures recognize a property interest of con-
stitutional magnitude:
Property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. [T]hey
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits. 85
On this basis, state law or governmental conduct only creates a
constitutionally protected property interest when the Roth/Sindermann
mutuality of expectation test is satisfied: 86 "To have a property interest
in a [governmental] benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must . . . have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it. '' 87 "A legitimate entitlement is established (1) by the state's uni-
lateral promise of benefit in its laws or administrative rules or (2) by
the conduct of the state and the individual which creates 'mutually ex-
plicit understandings that support . . . [the] claim of entitlement.' "88
In two cases during the survey period, Florida courts apparently used
these principles in finding there was or was not a constitutionally pro-
tected interest at stake. What was remarkable about these cases was
not their outcomes, but rather, that the courts did not make explicit
reference to these well-established principles in resolving the issues in
84. Burris I, supra note 4, at 323 n.167. However, in some circumstances even
the determination of whether a constitutional protected liberty interest was at stake can
be difficult, because the degree of deprivation may not be sufficient to persuade the
court that an invasion of a constitutionally protected liberty interest occurred. Compare
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) with Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
85. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600-01 (1972) (patterns of conduct between the parties can
establish a constitutionally protected property interest); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).
86. Roth, 408 U.S. at 564; Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 593.
87. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
88. Burris III, supra note 4, at 595 (quoting Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601.).
This standard is not always easily satisfied. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976).
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this area. 9
In Spiegel v. University of South Florida,90 the court found that
the University of South Florida's contract with Dr. Spiegel, providing
that he was to be Chair of the Department of Orthopedics and Reha-
bilitation, was sufficient to create a constitutionally protected property
right.9 1 The court noted that his removal from that position might well
stigmatize him and harm his reputation and ability to obtain employ-
ment in other places. The court considered this to be an infringement
on his constitutionally protected liberty interests.92 Therefore, he was
entitled to a hearing prior to being deprived of this benefit. The court
ordered him reinstated as Chair of the Department, but left the door
open for the University to try to remove him after it gave him notice
and an opportunity to be heard.9"
In Man Poyck v. Dugger," the court recognized that a prisoner
had a constitutionally protected liberty interest" "in not being arbitrar-
ily removed from the general prison population," '96 and placed in a high
security cell under twenty-four hour lockdown status.97 Because Van
Poy, in his habeas corpus petition alleged that no administrative hear-
ing was ever held, the court held that the trial court must hold an evi-
dentiary hearing to determine whether the prison officials acted arbi-
trarily in placing Van Poyck in special confinement or whether it was
done for legitimate penological reasons. 8
89. See Florida Sugar Cane League v. State, 580 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1991).
90. 555 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
91. 1d. at 429.
92. 1d.; see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (constitutionally
protected liberty interest at stake in cases of reputational injury). But see Paul v. Da-
vis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (such harms will not be assumed to exist, they must be al-
leged, and if disputed, proved).
93. Spiegel, 555 So. 2d at 429-30.
94. 582 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
95. The court also recognized that the conduct of the prison officials could consti-
tute an unconstitutional form of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 109.
96. Id.
97. Because Van Poyck was sentenced to death for murdering a correctional of-
ficer while aiding in a prison escape, the relevant prison population was death row.
However, death row prisoners were not normally subject to the special administrative
treatment Van Poyck was receiving. Id.
98. See Id. at 109-10. The right to such a hearing is dependent on state law
creating constraints on the discretion of prison officials in making such decisions. If
there are none, then there is no need to hold a hearing. See Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215 (1976).
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If the court finds there was a constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest at stake, it must determine whether the procedural
protections, if any, provided by the state were constitutionally suffi-
cient. Perhaps the relatively few cases addressing the threshold issue of
whether a constitutionally protected interest was at stake, and the con-
clusory analysis applied by the courts when ignoring these established
doctrinal inquiries, can be explained by the fact that courts and the
State of Florida generally are willing to concede the existence of such
an interest, and focus primarily on whether the procedural process of-
fered was constitutionally sufficient."' The nature of the constitutionally
mandated procedural due process protection will vary depending on the
context. In Mathews v. Eldridge,10° the Supreme Court formally
adopted a balancing approach to this question:
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of
the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration
of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be af-
fected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and the proba-
ble value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.101
During the survey period, the courts decided only a few cases concern-
ing the constitutional adequacy of the procedure provided by the state.
Again, as in other survey periods, "[w]hat is remarkable about these is
not the results in each instance, but the fact that the courts ignored the
Mathews v. Eldridge paradigm for deciding such questions."102
Clearly, if no hearing was held, either pre- or post-deprivation, of
a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest, then a violation
99. The decline in the number of cases which raised significant procedural due
process issues could also be attributed to the limited success such claims have had in
the appellate courts at both the state and federal levels. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW,
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 30 & n.80 (1985).
100. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
101. Id. at 334-35.
102. Burris III, supra note 4, at 597. See, e.g., Florida Sugar Cane League v.
State, 580 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Conservancy, Inc. v. A.
Vernon Allen Builder, Inc., 580 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); J.B.
Coxwell Contracting, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 580 So. 2d 621, 624 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process has oc-
curred.10 3 But if an emergency exists, then a post-deprivation hearing
may be all that procedural due process requires.1 04 In Garcia v. Depart-
ment of Professional Regulation,"0 5 the court summarily concluded
that the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, governing the
emergency suspension of professional licenses,10 6 on their face did not
violate the constitutional requirements of procedural due process.07
While not explicitly stated by the court, this result occurred because in
light of the emergency, the APA'06 offered an adequate post-depriva-
tion remedy.
Procedural due process further requires that a party receive ade-
quate notice of the charges so he or she may prepare a defense.' 0 9 In
Willner v. Department of Professional Regulation,'" the court noted
correctly that an administrative agency may not impose fines or other
sanctions, for violations which were not charged in an administrative
complaint."' The court failed to explicitly set forth the reasons why a
procedure which did not provide notice was constitutionally and statu-
torily defective, but it is clear that the APA"2 and the due process
clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions require such
notice."'
Procedural due process also requires that a party have an opportu-
nity to present his or her defense to an impartial decision maker.1 4 In
Ridgewood Properties, Inc. v. Department of Community Affairs,"5
103. See Brevard County v. Hammel, 575 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
104. See e.g., North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
105. 581 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
106. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(9), .60(8) (1989).
107. Garcia, 581 So. 2d at 961.
108. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.73 (1989).
109. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
110. 563 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
111. The court also noted that any attempt by an administrative agency to im-
pose an enhanced fine structure for violations which occurred prior to the date that the
new fine structure became applicable was a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
United States and Florida Constitutions. Id. at 806; see U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 10; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
112. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(2) (1989).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
114. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271; see Burris I, supra note 4, at 330-31.
115. 562 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1990); see Burris III, supra note 4, at 596-97 (brief
discussion of the decision by the First District Court of Appeal in this case).
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the Florida Supreme Court considered a certified question from the
First District Court of Appeal of whether it is "a violation of a party's
due process rights in an administrative hearing for the head of a de-
partment to appear as an expert witness when that same department
head later enters the final order in the case?"11 The Department of
Community Affairs notified Ridgewood Properties that it must submit
a required impact statement for approval before proceeding with a
planned office park development on a piece of property in Maitland,
Florida. Ridgewood Properties responded that it did not need to file the
required impact statement for two reasons."' At the administrative
hearing, the Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs testi-
fied as an expert witness. He was the only witness for the Department
of Community Affairs. The hearing officer relied upon his testimony in
the recommended order to resolve disputed factual issues. The Secre-
tary adopted as the final order essentially all of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the hearing officer's recommended order.
The supreme court acknowledged that aggregation of functions in
administrative agencies meant that the judicial model for an impartial
decision maker in administrative hearings need not be followed. The
aggregation of functions was not constitutionally fatal to an adminis-
trative agency head performing the role of impartial decision maker in
most cases." 8 However, this was anything but a normal case. The court
characterized the role played by the Secretary of the Department of
Community Affairs as that of "prosecutor, witness, and ultimate judge
of the facts and the law. Most significantly, . . . [the] Secretary...
necessarily passed upon his own evidence." 9 To approve the hearing
116. Ridgewood Properties, Inc., 562 So. 2d at 322.
117. First, "the development rights in the land had vested prior to the passage of
the [Development of Regional Impact] Statute" so this new statutory requirement
should not govern the development of the land. Id. Second, the Department of Commu-
nity Affairs' policies concerning when a landowner must file a development regional
impact statement for approval were unpromulgated rules found in a series of letters to
other developers, and were invalid because they had never been adopted as administra-
tive rules, as required by the APA. Id. at 322-23 & n.2.
118. Combination of "the fact-seeking and judicial functions in the same office
does not automatically violate due process." Id. at 323. Nor would such a combination
violate the principle of separation of powers. See, e.g., McDonald v. Department of
Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Florida Motor Lines,
Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 129 So. 876 (Fla. 1930).
119. The court noted that the Secretary of the Department of Community Af-
fairs had "signed the notice of violation," "was in charge of the attorneys prosecuting
the alleged violation," "was the Department's only witness in its case in chief," "re-
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officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law, he had to conclude that
his own testimony was competent and substantial. 120 Even with the best
of intentions, this can hardly be characterized as an unbiased, critical
review. "12 1 Rather, it was clear the Secretary had a predisposition to
reject the contravening evidence and this deprived him of the attributes
of an impartial decision maker as required by the procedural due pro-
cess clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions. As a gen-
eral rule, if the head of an administrative agency testified at the hear-
ing about a disputed material issue of fact, then the recommended
order must be reviewed by a neutral third party, not the head of the
administrative agency nor one of his employees.2
1. Access to Transcripts of Administrative Hearings
One final aspect of due process touched upon during the survey
period concerned the availability of hearing transcripts. The APA pro-
vides that an administrative agency must maintain an accurate and
complete account of all testimony and other evidence that makes up the
record in a formal administrative hearing. 23 In two cases during the
survey period, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether an indi-
gent party in an administrative hearing had a statutory or constitu-
tional right to a free transcript of the hearing so that he or she could
seek judicial review of the decision by the administrative agency. 2 4
Gretz v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission12 5 con-
viewed the hearing officer's findings," and "issued the final order." Ridgewood Proper-
ties, Inc., 562 So. 2d at 323.
120. The Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs testified at the
hearing over objections, and his testimony provided the only basis for finding compe-
tent, substantial evidence to support the position ultimately adopted in the final order,
rejecting the contravening evidence offered by the opposing party. Id. at 324.
121. Id.; see also McIntyre v. Tucker, 490 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
122. Ridgewood Properties, Inc., 562 So. 2d at 324 & n.4. The APA provides
that when a head of an administrative agency has been disqualified from performing
this review function, then the governor should appoint an individual not associated with
the administrative agency to serve as a substitute decision maker. Id. at 324; See FLA.
STAT. § 120.71 (1989).
123. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.57(l)(b)(6), (7) (1989); see FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2)(b)
(1989) (nature of the record in an informal hearing).
124. Without a record, judicial review of an administrative order is, in most
cases, precluded. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(4) (1989).
125. 5,72 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1991).
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cerned whether administrative rules126 which required a person seeking
unemployment compensation to pay a fee for the preparation of a tran-
script so that he or she could seek judicial review of the administrative
agency's order was a valid exercise of the authority delegated to it by
the legislature. The court found the rules were invalid because they
were contrary to a provision in the enabling statute governing the un-
employment compensation system.1 27 The court read the statute as
prohibiting the Unemployment Appeals Commission from charging
fees for any service it provided. 2 This was very broad language
designed to assure that claimants had adequate access to the unemploy-
ment compensation system. 29 The court reasoned that the duty im-
posed on administrative agencies by the APA to make transcripts avail-
able to a party upon request at no more than the actual cost of
reproducing such transcript,130 and the enabling statute which provided
that Unemployment Compensation Appeals Commission may not
charge a fee for its services,18 1 established the actual cost of a tran-
script for claimants in an unemployment circumstance as zero.132
In Smith v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 33
the court considered the issue of whether a statute or the Florida Con-
stitution required that an indigent party in a non-criminal administra-
tive hearing was entitled to a free transcript of the administrative pro-
ceeding so that he or she could seek judicial review of the
administrative order. " Prior to 1980, the courts interpreted Florida
Statute section 57.081 as not granting an indigent party a right to a
free transcript in either a judicial, civil, or an administrative proceed-
ing.185 In 1980, the legislature amended this statutory provision; how-
126. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. 38E-3.003(2), .009(3) (1991).
127. Gretz, 572 So. 2d at 1385; see FLA. STAT. § 443.041(2)(a) (1987).
128. Whether the service was mandated by statute or voluntarily undertaken did
not matter. Both were covered under the statute. Gretz, 572 So. 2d at 1386.
129. Id.
130. FLA. STAT. § 120.571(1)(b)(6) (1985) (currently codified as FLA. STAT. §
120.57(1)(b)(7) (1987)); see Gertz, 572 So. 2d at 1386.
131. FLA. STAT. § 443.041 (1985).
132. Gertz, 572 So. 2d at 1386. "It is illogical to assume that the legislature
prohibited charging the claimant for some fees in order to facilitate their ability to
obtain judicial review, but intended to allow charging of a fee that would essentially
prevent the claimant from pursuing that review." Id.
133. 573 So 2d 320 (Fla. 1991).
134. Id. at 321-22; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (due process); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21
(access to courts); FLA. STAT. § 57.081 (1985).
135. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 322; Harrell v. Department of Health & Rehabilita-
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ever, the exact effect of the amendment was unclear.18 6 The court
found that the purpose of the statute was to assure that any indigent
person before an administrative agency received the services of the jus-
tice system without charge. The obligation of an administrative agency
to maintain a complete record of a proceeding'8 7 was one of those at-
tributes of the justice system which section 57.081(1) meant to be
available without charge.'3 8 "Thus, . . . [administrative] agencies must
supply transcripts, and as indigents, the petitioners are entitled to re-
ceive them without charge."' 8 9
Concerning the due process claim, the court noted in dicta that
there was no reason to read the Florida Due Process Clause differently
from that in the United States Constitution. The United States Su-
preme Court in Ortwein v. Schwab,140 found that requiring an indigent
person to pay a modest filing fee was rationally related to off-setting
the expense of operating a court system, and as such, it was not a viola-
tion of due process. The Florida Supreme Court saw no reason to dis-
tinguish between the payment of a modest filing fee and payment of
the cost of a transcript. Thus, the court concluded that the indigent
parties who had received an evidentiary hearing on their claims without
cost would not "be constitutionally entitled to be furnished with a free
transcript to assist in the prosecution of their appeals.""' Essentially,
this dicta invited the legislature to reconsider its statutory policy, by
making it clear that there was no constitutional requirement compelling
the current policy.
tive Servs., 361 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Bower v. Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
136. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 322.
137. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(7) (1989).
138. The court believed this was a different rationale from Gretz which it read as
limited to those circumstances where the legislature, by statute, had established the
value of the service rendered in providing a transcript was zero. Smith, 573 So. 2d at
323.
139. Id. But see id. at 325 (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The court also noted that this meant indigent parties seeking judicial review of
an administrative hearing order had greater rights than when they were appealing from
a trial court judgment in a civil case. The court noted that this disparity was a matter
of legislative concern. Id.
140. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
141. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 324; see id. at 325 (McDonald, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The court also noted that filing fees, or the costs incident to
seeking judicial review such as preparing a transcript, would not be unreasonable re-
straints on the access to the courts. Id. at 323; see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
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Justice Ehrlich agreed with the majority's conclusion concerning
the reading of section 57.081, but dissented from the majority's conclu-
sion that there was no constitutional guarantee that an indigent party
was entitled to a free transcript of an administrative proceeding so that
he or she could seek judicial review of the administrative agency's or-
der. 142 He noted that there was a critical distinction between the fed-
eral constitutional requirement of due process and the due process
guarantee found in the Florida Constitution. The Florida Supreme
Court has consistently held that when the legislature chooses an admin-
istrative decision process, it must also include a right to judicial review
in order to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. 4 Be-
cause judicial review of an administrative order can occur only if the
transcript of the appropriate portions of the administrative hearing are
available, the transcript becomes a necessary element of access to the
judicial review process. An indigent person would be functionally pro-
hibited from seeking judicial review unless there was a constitutional
guarantee to a transcript of the proceedings; the majority erred in not
so holding.' 44
142. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 325 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
143. Id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Scholastic
Systems, Inc. v. Leloup, 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974)).
144. Id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ehrlich
also believed that the right of reasonable access to courts guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution would be denied if an indigent party did not have a transcript of the ad-
ministrative proceeding made available at no charge. Without the transcript, an indi-
gent party is deprived of any meaningful form of judicial review. When an indigent
party wanted to seek judicial review but could not because of the cost of obtaining a
transcript of the administrative hearing, then an unreasonable burden was placed on
his or her right of access to the court system. Because the judicial review process pro-
vided for under the APA is the first opportunity for the individuals participating in an
administrative process to have access to the courts, if they are deprived of a free tran-
script, they are deprived of all access to the courts. Such is not the case when individu-
als have access to a trial court as an initial matter, and the sole question is whether
they should have access to an appellate review process. In such a case, the individual
has had access to a court under the Florida Constitution, but in the case of an adminis-
trative hearing, such initial access does not occur until the appellate process. Id. at 326
(Erlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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E. Standing 45
1. Formal Administrative Hearing
There continues to be a substantial amount of litigation over
whether a party has standing to invoke the APA formal hearing pro-
cess." 6 Perhaps this is explained by the fact that standing constraints
permit administrative agencies, and sometimes others, to avoid many
difficult substantive issues.147 Whatever the reason for the continued
litigation of these issues, the test for judging when a person is entitled
to a formal hearing is well-settled. 4 8 The two part test set forth in
Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental Regulation"9
for resolving standing issues remains the standard used by courts in
determining whether a person has standing to request a formal hearing
145. See generally Dore I, supra note 4; Dubbin & Dubbin, supra note 4; Burris
III, supra note 4, at 601-06; Burris II, supra note 4, at 742; Burris I, supra note 4, at
334-43. In City of Destin v. Department of Transportation, the court held, in part, that
the question of standing to invoke a formal hearing under the APA can be waived by
an administrative agency failing to object on that basis in a timely fashion. 541 So. 2d
123, 127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
146. Any question concerning standing may be waived if a party failed to prop-
erly preserve the issue for judicial review. See Florida Assoc. of Counties, Inc. v. De-
partment of Admin., 580 So. 2d 641, 646 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Friends of the
Hatchineia, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 580 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (by implication).
147. Cf Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1267 v. Benevolent Assoc. of
Coachmen, Inc., 576 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam). In Amal-
gamated, the court concluded that the Florida Public Employees Relation Commission
improperly permitted the Benevolent Association of Coachmen, Inc. to initiate a com-
plaint against Broward County's Division of Mass Transit concerning the collection of
a special assessment from employees' wages. The court reached this decision, because
the Association of Coachmen failed to allege, establish, or approve that it was being
harmed, or that its members were being harmed by the alleged unlawful special assess-
ments. The court noted that while the record in this case properly established the spe-
cial assessment was in fact illegal, because the action was brought by a party who
lacked standing, the decision of the Florida Public Employees Relation Commission
must be reversed. Id. at 380.
148. A party is entitled to a formal hearing under the APA if "the substantial
interests cf a party are determined by an agency . . . whenever the proceeding involves
a disputed issue of material fact." FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1989). The formal hearing
requirement does not govern student disciplinary action in the state universities. FLA.
STAT. § 120.57(5) (1989).
149. 406 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied, 415 So. 2d 1359
(Fla. 1982).
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under section 120.57. This test requires that a party,
must show (1) that he will suffer injury in fact which is of suffi-
cient immediacy to entitle him to a section 120.57 hearing, and (2)
that his substantial injury is of a type or nature which the proceed-
ing is designed to protect. The first aspect of the test deals with the
degree of injury. The second deals with the nature of the injury. 10
After a person has established that he or she standing, then he or she
must also allege and prove that there is a disputed issue of material
fact to resolve before an administrative agency is required to hold a
formal hearing. 151 Two cases which applied this test in determining
standing issues during the survey period are worthy of special note.
Town of Palm Beach v. Department of Natural Resources152 con-
cerned the decision by the Department of Natural Resources that no
permit was needed for the 2000 Condominium to carry out its plan for
trimming and maintenance activities of salt water resistant dune vege-
tation on property located seaward of the coastal construction control
line.15 3 The two adjacent property owners'" and the Sierra Club 55
challenged this decision, and petitioned for a hearing under section
120.57 to resolve the dispute. The Department of Natural Resources
denied the petition, holding that these parties "lacked standing to re-
quest a formal hearing because they had failed to show a substantial
interest in the outcome of the hearing . . .[as they] had failed to show
how they were affected by the Department [of Natural Resources'] de-
termination of its jurisdiction." 56
150. Id. at 482.
151. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1989). If there is no disputed material factual issue,
then the person is entitled only to an informal hearing. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2) (1989).
152. 577 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
153. Id. at 1384-85. Finding a lack of jurisdiction was premised on the determi-
nation that the planned activities did not "involve excavation or removal and destruc-
tion of native salt resistant vegetation." Id. at 1385. The court rejected this reading of
the scope of the jurisdiction of the Department of Natural Resources. Id. at 1385-86.
154. The Town of Palm Beach and Mr. Darwin both alleged that they owned
property which would be adversely effected by the trimming and maintenance activities
of salt water resistant dune vegetation by 2000 Condominium. Id. at 1385.
155. The Sierra Club alleged that its members used the beaches adjacent to the
property, were interested in preserving beaches, and that the trimming and mainte-
nance activities of salt water resistant dune vegetation would adversely effect these
interests. Id.
156. Town of Palm Beach, 577 So. 2d at 1385.
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The: court held that the Department of Natural Resources erred in
concluding that these parties lacked standing to invoke the section
120.57 hearing. The court applied the Agrico Chemical Co. two part
test. The court found that the first element, whether the necessary de-
gree of injury in fact was alleged, was satisfied because the denial of
jurisdiction would allow the planned trimming and maintenance activi-
ties to immediately go forward without any further governmental re-
view or permits at either the state or local level, 15 7 which allegedly
would result in an adverse impact on the adjacent property and the
beach areas themselves. 158 The court found that the second element,
whether the nature of the alleged injury was within the zone of interest
protected by the statute, was satisfied, because the statutes and admin-
istrative rules were designed to protect the beaches and dunes from
harm, which was exactly what the parties alleged was about to hap-
pen.' 59 The court noted that given the scope of the jurisdiction granted
the Department of Natural Resources by the legislature, the determi-
nation of whether the Department of Natural Resources properly found
it did not have jurisdiction in this case was dependent on disputed fac-
tual issues which a section 120.57 hearing could resolve. 60°
While the test in Agrico Chemical Co. generally governs standing
issues in some circumstances, the statutorily designated status of a per-
son or entity will confer standing even if the requirements of Agrico
Chemical Co. could not be satisfied. In Phibro Resources Corp. v. De-
partment' of Environmental Regulation,'6' the court reversed the order
157. Id. at 1387-88.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1388. The court distinguished Town of Palm Beach from Grove Isle,
Ltd. v. Bayshore Homeowners' Ass'n, 418 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
rev. denied, 430 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1983), where the court held that a party lacked
standing to challenge an administrative agency's determination that it lacked jurisdic-
tion, when the injury alleged would arise from completion of the project, not the ad-
ministrative agency's decision. The court read the decision in Groves Isle, Ltd. as lim-
ited to circumstances where the actual activity which was alleged would cause injury,
would be subject to further state or local review or permit requirements. Only in such
cases did the denial of jurisdiction have such an attenuated relationship to the alleged
injury so that the party would lack standing. However, such was not the case in Town
of Palm Beach, because the court found that the denial of jurisdiction would allow the
planned trimming and maintenance activities to immediately go forward without any
further governmental review or permits on either the state or local level. 577 So. 2d at
1387-88.
160. Id. at 1386.
161. 579 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (modified on denial of motion
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of the Department of Environmental Regulation denying Phibro Re-
sources and Solomon, Inc."' a formal administrative hearing concern-
ing consent orders which the Department of Environmental Regulation
intended to enter into with Mobil and Conserv.
Three different corporations, Mobil, Phibro Resources, and Con-
serv, operated a facility at different periods over several years. In 1985,
the Department of Environmental Regulation notified them "that pol-
lutants exceeding levels permissible in class II groundwaters had been
detected" at the facility.16 In 1989, the Department notified Phibro
Resources that it "intended to enter into consent orders with Conserv
and Mobil" concerning liability for the remedial measures needed at
the facility.1 4 Phibro Resources requested a formal hearing on the ade-
quacy of these consent orders. The Department held that Phibro Re-
sources lacked standing, because it "had failed to show a substantial
interest sufficient to warrant the initiation of a section 120.57 proceed-
ing in that it had neither demonstrated injury in fact of sufficient im-
mediacy to warrant a hearing, nor . . . shown that its affected interest
was of the type or nature . . [the statute] was designed to protect."'"
The Department claimed that any injury allegation was specula-
tive for two reasons. First, Phibro Resources would suffer no injury un-
less three contingencies occurred: 1) the consent orders, at some un-
known time in the future, would fail to resolve the pollution problems;
2) the Department would seek to hold Phibro Resources liable at that
point; and 3) the Department would succeed in doing so. Second, any
defenses or objections that Phibro Resources could raise to the consent
orders could be asserted at a hearing held after the first two contingen-
cies had occurred.' 6" The court observed that the Department's position
would be correct but for the fact that it did not properly understand
the nature of the proceeding at the time of its decision. Phibro Re-
for rehearing en banc). On rehearing, the court refused to withdraw its opinion, even
though the parties had reached a settlement of all the issues and requested a voluntary
dismissal while the rehearing petition was pending. Id. at 125.
162. Solomon, Inc. was the corporate parent of Phibro. The court held that the
request by Solomon, Inc. for a hearing was not untimely filed, and even if it was, that
there was no prejudice to any party in permitting it to file a petition for a hearing
twenty-one days late. Id. at 124; see infra notes 313-328 and accompanying text.
163. Philbro, 579 So. 2d at 119.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 120.
166. Id. But see id. at 125, 126-27 (Barfield, J., dissenting) (finding that this
offered more than adequate protection of Phibro's interests).
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sources was not seeking access to the administrative process. It was
already a party, because it,
was made a party to the proceeding by statute, in that it was
served with a written notice of a warning which specified the provi-
sion of the statute and rule alleged to have been violated and the
facts alleged to constitute a violation. [Both the statute and admin-
istrative rules] provide that a person served with a notice of viola-
tion . . . shall be entitled to a section 120.57 administrative hear-
ing, within twenty days following service of notice; otherwise the
person's right to an administrative hearing shall be deemed
waived.1 1
7
Having been designated a party, Phibro Resources did not need to
demonstrate that its interests would be "determined in the proceeding
(the execution of the two consent orders), so long as the interests of a
specific party or parties were there determined." 1 8 Clearly the consent
orders would determine the interests of Mobil and Conserv, and there
was no reason for holding that Phibro Resources, a party, lacked stand-
ing.6 9 Further, because the consent orders assumed there was the pos-
sibility of future liability for Phibro Resources, the orders "had the po-
tential of affecting the substantial interests of Phibro [Resources]. '' 17°
The Department of Environmental Regulation thus erred in concluding
to the contrary.17 1
167. Philbro, 579 So. 2d at 122. The court specifically rejected the claim by the
Department that the notice of violation had no impact on Phibro Resources Corpora-
tion's substantial interests. The notice served as a warning and triggered the time
frame for requesting an administrative hearing.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 123. The court noted that the claimed interests were not just potential
economic injury. It included potential administrative and criminal liability for any
wrongs it may have committed. As such, it had a real interest in assuring that the
consent orders provided an adequate means for "stem[ming] further migration of con-
taminated groundwater" from the facility. Id.
171. The court suggested, in a portion of the opinion deleted on rehearing, that if
the Department of Environmental Regulation wanted to proceed with its consent orders
without implicating the interests of Phibro, then it should dismiss the notice of violation
against Phibro with prejudice, or provide it with an "unconditional release from any
future liability." Philbro, 579 So. 2d at 124; see id. at 125.
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2. Standing in Other Contexts
a. Certificate of Need
The decision in AMISUB v. Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services 17 concerned whether a hospital located in another dis-
trict could challenge the certificate of need decision by the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services for an adjoining district.17 3 The
statute provided: "Existing health care facilities may initiate [proceed-
ings challenging the issuance of a certificate of need] upon a showing
that an established program will be substantially effected by the issu-
ance of a certificate of need to a competing facility program within the
same district."' 4 The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices rejected AMISUB's challenge to the certificate of need issuance
in the adjoining district, because AMISUB's health care facility,
Northridge Medical Center, was physically located in another district.
AMISUB admitted its facility was located in another district, but
claimed that it operated a program in both districts because its facility
was located near the line dividing the two districts. Because of its loca-
tion, the Center in fact functionally served patients from both districts,
and therefore should have been considered an established program in
both districts.
The court rejected this claim for the following reasons. First, the
purpose of this statute was to limit the number of health care providers
who could challenge certificate of need decisions. The court believed
the reading of the statute suggested by AMISUB would be contrary to
this statutory purpose, as it would expand, not limit, the circumstances
under which a health care facility would have standing to challenge a
certificate of need decision.
Second and more importantly, the court noted that an administra-
tive agency's interpretation of a statute which it was primarily respon-
sible for administering was entitled to great weight. It should not be
overturned by a court unless the interpretation is "clearly errone-
172. 577 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
173. The court also rejected the request by the Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services for an award of attorney's fees for pursuing a frivolous appeal of the
administrative order. The court found that the appeal was not frivolous, because it was
not so devoid of merit on the face of the record that there was little or no prospect of
success. Id. at 650.
174. FLA. STAT. § 381.709(5)(b) (1989).
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ous."'17 5 Both the hearing officer and the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services had interpreted the statute as not authorizing a
challenge to a certificate of need just because a facility in an adjacent
district may have its patient pool diminished. The court considered this
"a permissible interpretation of the statutory language."'1 6 As such,
the interpretation adopted by the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services was not clearly erroneous; rather, it was reasonable.
Third, the court found that the definition of "program" used in the
statute should be that ordinarily and commonly used, because neither
the legislature nor the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices had given it a special definition. Under the ordinary definition of
"program," AMISUB's Northridge Medical Center would not qualify
because it was not physically performing procedures anywhere within
the adjacent district. 7 Therefore, Northridge Medical Center did not
have standing to contest the certificate of need decision by the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
St. Joseph Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,17 8 concerned the issues of whether the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services properly denied St. Joseph Hospital's re-
quest for an administrative hearing on a certificate of need application,
and whether the order granting such a certificate of need for Fawcett
Memorial Hospital for the same district, after St. Joseph Hospital was
denied its opportunity to participate in the proceeding, was appropriate.
The court agreed with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services that St. Joseph had failed to timely apply for a certificate of
need, and thus, had waived its right to be a part of the decision process
concerning Fawcett Memorial Hospital. St. Joseph Hospital attempted
to intervene very late in the process concerning Fawcett Memorial Hos-
pital's application. 17 The court found that St. Joseph Hospital also
175. AMISUB, 577 So. 2d at 649.
176. Id. at 649-50; see infra notes 576-83 and accompanying text.
177. Id. at 650.
178. 559 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
179. Id. at 596. St. Joseph Hospital did not petition to intervene until after the
certificate of need controversy concerning the 1987 batching cycle had reached a settle-
ment among those parties which had originally participated in the process. Id. at 596-
97. Having been denied permission to intervene, St. Joseph Hospital then filed a re-
quest for a. comparative review of its application for certificate of need with that of the
Fawcett Memorial Hospital certificate of need application. The Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services denied this request as untimely, because it was not an ap-
plication which occurred during the same batching cycle. Id. at 597; FLA. STAT. §
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lacked standing to intervene in the Fawcett Memorial Hospital certifi-
cate of need decision process, because it did not have a current pro-
gram which would compete with the one to be granted to Fawcett Me-
morial Hospital. 180 Further, the court noted that even if St. Joseph
Hospital was entitled to intervene because its substantial interests were
effected by the certificate of need decision process, it waived such an
opportunity by not attempting to intervene until well after the parties
came to an agreement and the case was being remanded to the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services for implementation of the
settlement terms concerning the issuance of certificates of need for the
1987 batching cycle.1 81
b. Declaratory Statements
In Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Department of Professional Regu-
lation,' the court considered whether optometrists had standing to in-
tervene in a declaratory statement proceeding conducted before the
Board of Opticianry. The petition for a declaratory statement con-
cerned whether an optician was permitted to use a Titmus Vision Tes-
ter to check a consumer's visual acuity with and without corrective
381.709(5)(b) (1987).
The court found that this decision was correct, and that the letter of intent to
participate in the certificate of need batching cycle sent by St. Joseph Hospital was
insufficient to constitute an application for that batching cycle. St. Joseph, 559 So. 2d
at 597. The court noted that while the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices did fail to properly publish the fixed need pool for the 1987 batching cycle, it did
make available to all applicants the information concerning the fixed need pool cycle
for purposes of determining whether it was appropriate to apply for a certificate of
need and the likelihood of success in the comparative review process. Given this infor-
mation, any applicant could have determined whether it was appropriate for it to apply
for the 1987 batching cycle. Id. at 597-98. The failure of St. Joseph Hospital to apply
during this batching cycle could not be excused because of the failure of the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services to make these determinations for it. Id. at
598.
180. Id. St. Joseph Hospital engaged in the treatment of general cardiac
problems. This did not create a sufficient competing program which would be substan-
tially affected by the issuance of a certificate of need to Fawcett Memorial Hospital for
a cardiac catherization program. Id. In so concluding the court clearly was indicating
that the first element in the Agrico Chemical test was not satisfied. See supra notes
146-60 and accompanying text.
181. St. Joseph, 559 So. 2d at 598.
182. 567 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
[Vol. 16
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Burris
lenses. 188 Optometrists petitioned to intervene in this declaratory state-
ment proceeding, and also sought a formal hearing under APA section
120.57(1). The Board denied the request to intervene, holding that the
optometrists did not have standing, because there was no allegation
that their substantial interests were going to be affected by any resolu-
tion of the declaratory statement request.184
The court reversed the Board's decision, holding that in order to
have standing to intervene in the declaratory statement proceeding, a
person must satisfy the Agrico Chemical Co. two-part test. 185 The
court found that the optometrists had standing to intervene in the de-
claratory statement proceeding and to request a formal hearing under
section 120.57. The court relied on Florida Medical Ass'n v. Depart-
ment oJ Professional Regulation86 because it presented an almost
identical battle between professions concerning the scope of their exclu-
sive practice areas, except that in this case it was set in a declaratory
statement context. The court agreed with the optometrists that but for
the declaratory statement, patients would be required to seek their
counsel in order to have the Titmus Vision Tester administered. Thus,
the first element of standing was satisfied by demonstrating a sufficient
degree of injury in fact. The second element of standing, the zone of
interest requirement, was also satisfied by the allegation that the legis-
lature intended for only licensed optometrists to administer such a test,
because it was instrumental in the process of prescribing or treating
diseases or ailments of the human eye, which opticians were prohibited
183. Id. at 931.
184. Id. at 932.
185. The elements of the test are that the person has "suffer[ed] injury in fact
which is of sufficient immediacy to entitle him to a [section] 120.57 hearing, and...
that . . . [the] injury is of a type or nature which the proceeding is designed to pro-
tect." Id. (quoting Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 406 So.
2d 478, 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied, 415 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1982));
see supra text accompanying notes 146-60.
186. 426 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In Florida Medical Ass'n,
the first element of the standing test, necessary degree of injury in fact, was satisfied
when it was alleged that the proposed rule would potentially deprive a professional
category of patients who now would have the option of seeking treatment through an-
other profession. The court also found that the second element of the standing test, the
zone of interest requirement, was satisfied because an allegation was made that the
legislature had determined that the authority to prescribe drugs was exclusively within
the scope of a licensed physician's authority and that it should not be carried out by
any other, including optometrists. Id.
1991]
45
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
from carrying out.' 8 7
3. Intervention in the Administrative Decision Process by
Third Parties
Manasota-88, Inc. v. Agrico Chemical Co.188 concerned the issue
of when a third party could intervene in a case where a default permit
was issued by the Department of Environmental Regulation for the
mining of phosphates within state wetland areas.' 89 Agrico Chemical
filed a permit application with the Department of Environmental Regu-
lation requesting permission to mine phosphates within state wetland
areas. The relevant statutes provided that such an application must be
ruled upon by the Department within ninety days after the application
was submitted.9 0 If the Department failed to do so, then it must issue
a default permit. However, the Department of Environmental Regula-
tion may later impose conditions to assure that the project was properly
managed for purposes of mitigating any adverse impact on state
wetlands.
Manasota-88, Inc., a third party, attempted to intervene in the ad-
ministrative process associated with issuance of the default permit. The
court held that the Department properly determined that Manasota-88,
Inc. could intervene in the permit process even though the permit was
187. Florida Optometric Ass'n, 567 So. 2d at 932-33. The court distinguished
this case from Florida Society of Ophthalmology v. Board of Optometry, 532 So. 2d
1279 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988), based upon the fact that in that case there was no
allegation that an exclusive area of practice at stake. Thus, the zone of interest aspect
of the Agrico Chemical standing test was not satisfied. Florida Optometric Ass'n, 567
So. 2d at 933.
188. 576 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
189. The court also addressed several other issues. First, the court noted that the
decision of the Department of Environmental Regulation was supported by substantial
competent evidence; and there was no factual error committed by the Department of
Environmental Regulation in this case. Second, the court noted that Manasoto-88, Inc.
was not denied any procedural rights when the hearing officer denied its motion for a
continuance in order to study the modified mitigation plan submitted by Agrico Chemi-
cal Company. The hearing officer granted Manasota-88, Inc. an additional three weeks
to study the plan as modified and to submit any additional evidence concerning the
feasibility of the modified plan. Manasota-88, Inc. failed to offer any such evidence. Id.
at 782-83. Third, because Manasota-88, Inc. did not request a stay, the project had
gone forward during the appellate process, and even if an issue was presented in terms
of denial of procedural rights, it was moot as soon as the wetlands in question in fact
no longer existed. Id. at 783.
190. FLA. STAT. § 120.60(2) (1989).
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issued by default. The court concluded that it was impossible for a
third party intervenor to act before the Department gave notice of its
intent concerning a permit application. This point was the first opportu-
nity any third party intervenor had to respond to the Department's de-
cision to issue a default permit. As such, it was the only appropriate
point in time to file for intervention. It was, in fact, the only point
where a third party had an opportunity to intervene in the process.' 91
Further, once an intervenor had properly filed a response to the notice
of intent to issue a default permit, a hearing must have been held to
resolve any disputed factual issues concerning what mitigative steps
should be taken. 192
We do not agree with Agrico [Chemical Company's] position that
a default permit issues automatically without further [administra-
tivel agency inquiry. Nothing in the statute prevents [the Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation] from holding a hearing to de-
termine reasonable mitigative conditions necessary to protect the
interest of the public and the environment, prior to which we need
the default permit. The party who finds conditions placed on de-
fault permit owners are unreasonable, may resort to the appellate
process for relief.18
Thus, it i.s the process of determining the mitigative conditions in which
the third party intervenor may participate either informally or in the
context of a formal hearing."
F. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
"As a general proposition, where an administrative remedy is pro-
vided by statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
before the court will act."' 9 5 Generally, this is not a jurisdictional re-
191. An administrative agency must provide an affected person, "within a speci-
fied time after some recognizable event in investigatory or other free-form proceeding,
[to request] formal or informal proceedings under section 120.57." Capeletti Bros. v.
Department of Transp., 362 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 368 So.
2d 1374 (Fla. 1978); see FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 2.30 (The Florida Bar
3d ed. 1990).
192. Manasota-88, Inc., 576 So. 2d at 783.
193. Id.
194. Clearly, the default decision had already been made. The third party may
not intervene in that decision process. Id. at 784.
195. Halifax Area Council v. City of Daytona Beach, 385 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla.
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quirement, 196 but rather, a prudential one, 197
designed to assure: (1) that courts do not stray from their limited
role of judicial review in the administrative process; (2) that agen-
cies have an opportunity to perform the duties delegated to them
by the legislature; and (3) that agencies have the initial opportu-
nity to correct any errors that occurred during the administrative
process.198
During the survey period, the courts decided several cases applying
these considerations.
A classic application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is Department of Revenue v. Brock.'"9 Brock concerned a
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). If the legislature clearly has left the selection of the judicial
process to the parties, then there is no requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. See Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 580
So. 2d 267, 273 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that when the legislature pro-
vided for two independent means of seeking a remedy for erroneous administrative
agency action, suit in the appropriate circuit court or administrative hearing, there was
no requirement that a party chose one or the other means). cf. Van Poyck v. Dugger,
582 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that when a prisoner ex-
hausted all of his administrative appeals, then the trial court must hold a hearing on
his habeas corpus petition in which he alleged prison officials acted arbitrarily in plac-
ing him in a high security cell under 24 hour lockdown status).
196. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
197. See Howlett v. Rose, 571 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting
that exhaustion of state administrative remedies was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). But see Park v. Dugger, 548 So. 2d 1167, 1168
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies was
a jurisdictional prerequisite to a circuit court having jurisdiction to issue a writ of man-
damus); Leonard v. Morgan, 548 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (not-
ing that exhaustion of administrative remedies may be required where the legislature
has given an administrative agency exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the matter
initially).
198. Burris I, supra note 4, at 344. Because the exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirement is prudential, courts may waive it in appropriate cases. One ex-
ception to this requirement occurs when the case involves constitutional issues which an
agency cannot address in its administrative proceeding. Mann v. City of Oakland Park,
581 So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) (noting that when a
party alleged that an administrative system was unconstitutional on its face, exhaustion
of administrative remedies should not be required before a court may appropriately
exercise jurisdiction); see also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Fuller, 551 So. 2d 1210, 1212-
13 (Fla. 1989); FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 7.3 (The Florida Bar 3d ed.
1990).
199. 576 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
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suit brought by the Florida Hotel and Motel Association and three ho-
tel operators in circuit court to enjoin the Department of Revenue from
"collecting gross receipts tax on all local and long distance telephone
services separately billed to their tenants." 200 The Department of Reve-
nue interpreted the statute which provided that "charges made by a
hotel and motel . . . or local telephone service or toll telephone service,
when such charges occur incidentally to the right of occupancy of such
hotel or motel"' 20 1 shall be exempt from the gross receipt statute, as not
applying to any such charges which are separately billed, because they
are not incidental to the right of occupancy.202 After the circuit court
suit was filed, the plaintiffs in this case also filed a challenge to the
proposed rule which was to codify this interpretation 03 The rule chal-
lenge was ultimately unsuccessful and was dismissed. 20 4 Even though
the plaintiffs had pursued the administrative remedy of the rule chal-
lenge, the circuit court, after the rule challenge had been administra-
tively dismissed, permanently enjoined the Department of Revenue
from collecting the gross receipts tax on "telecommunication service
from operators of transient rental facilities."20 1 After this decision, the
plaintiffs dismissed their appeal from the administrative order which
dismissed their rule challenge. 0
This was a fatal mistake, as the court held that the circuit court
did not have jurisdiction to enjoin the Department of Revenue's policy.
The court noted that the purpose of the prudential requirement of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies was "to assure that an [adminis-
trative] agency responsible for implementing a statutory scheme ha[d]
a full opportunity to reach a sensitive, mature, and considerate decision
upon a complete record appropriate to the issue.1207 This goal would be
accomplished when 1) the administrative agency was permitted to fully
develop a factual record upon which it could then exercise its adminis-
trative discretion, and 2) the administrative agency, charged by the leg-
islature: with primary responsibility for administering a statutory
scheme, had a full and fair opportunity to initially resolve the issues.2 0 8
200. Id. at 849.
201. FLA. STAT. § 203.012(2)(b)(3) (1989).
202. Brock, 577 So. 2d at 849.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 850.
205, Id.
206. Id.
207, Brock, 577 So. 2d at 850.
208. Id.
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The court noted that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not an
absolute requirement. In some cases, such as when there was no factual
dispute and it was alleged the administrative agency exceeded its dele-
gated powers by acting in an ultra vires manner, exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies was not required.
However, this exception did not apply in this case, because
whether the administrative agency appropriately exercised its delegated
discretion depended upon factual determinations made by the adminis-
trative agency. It was appropriate in this circumstance to require ex-
haustion of administrative remedies "[a]lthough statutory construction
[wa]s ultimately the provence of the judiciary, it should not be under-
taken without first giving the [administrative] agency an opportunity to
explain its interpretation and to create a record in an administrative
form. ' 20 9 In such a case, it was clearly inappropriate for the circuit
court to preempt the normal judicial review process associated with the
administrative rule challenge process. The plaintiffs should have pur-
sued the judicial remedies associated with the administrative rule chal-
lenge rather than continuing to press their suit in the circuit court. 210
Marks v. Northwest Florida Water Management District"1 ' is also
a classic case of how a party who failed to avail himself of the adminis-
trative hearing process lost the right to judicial review of an adminis-
trative order. Marks sought judicial review of an administrative order
which held that he had performed repair work on a dam without the
necessary permits. Repairs were needed because the dam was in an
unsafe condition which created a risk of catastrophic failure. After re-
ceiving notice of the administrative complaint Marks failed to request a
hearing under section 120.57(1) of the APA. Having heard nothing
from Marks, the Northwest Florida Water Management District en-
tered a final order directing him to either pump out the water behind
the dam and cease using the dam for retaining water, or obtain the
appropriate permits and repair the dam. Marks claimed that the ad-
ministrative order was remedial in nature, and that Florida law re-
quired a complaint for a remedial order be served upon the owner of
the property. Marks also claimed he was not the owner of the
property. 12
The Northwest Florida Water Management District claimed that
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 566 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
212. Id. at 47; FLA. STAT. § 373.436 (1989).
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the administrative order was a corrective one. In the case of corrective
orders, the administrative complaint must be served upon the alleged
violator."' The court refused to take judicial notice of the property
records concerning the dam which were offered to prove Marks' asser-
tion that he was not the property owner. If Marks wished to assert this
factual defense, then he should have invoked the administrative hearing
process. Having failed to invoke this process, he waived his rights to
challenge the factual conclusions reached by the Northwest Florida
Water Management District. 1' While the court never explicitly char-
acterized the case as concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies,
the net effect of its decision was to hold that Marks failed to raise a
factual issue with the appropriate administrative agency, and was
therefore precluded from raising the same issue in the courts.
If an administrative agency was acting strictly in an advisory ca-
pacity, then exhaustion of administrative remedies will not be required,
because none of the policy reasons for requiring it are present. In Ujcic
v. City of Apopka,21 5 the court held that before bringing suit under the
Whistle-Blower's Act, a police officer was not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies before a review board. This result was accept-
able because any decision of the review board would be advisory and
non-binding on the city or the police officer, and the proceedings before
the circuit court are de novo, with no need for an administrative hear-
ing to develop a record for judicial review.21 6
The courts have made it clear that a person need not exhaust his
or her administrative remedies under section 120.56 which provides for
rule challenges before raising the validity of a rule in the other admin-
istrative proceedings. United Health, Inc. v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services 17 involved a challenge by long term health
care providers to the validity of the administrative rule authorizing a
rate freeze for the services they provide. The Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services denied the long term health care providers
both a formal and informal hearing under the APA,2 18 claiming that
213. Marks, 566 So. 2d at 47; FLA. STAT. § 373.119 (1989).
214. Marks, 566 So. 2d at 47.
215. 581 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
216. Id. at 220; accord Hill v. Monroe County, 581 So. 2d 225, 226-27 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The court also noted that Ujcic should be permitted to amend his
complaint to include the allegation that the exhaustion of administrative remedies was
not necessary in this case. Ujcic, 581 So. 2d at 220; see also Hill, 581 So. 2d at 227.
217. 579 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
218. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1), (2) (1989).
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the only method available to challenge a rule is through the APA rule
challenge provision in section 120.56.219
The court held that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services erred in not holding a hearing, because the long term health
care providers have substantial interests which were "affected by [the
administrative] agency action . . . [, and] seek monetary relief which
is not available in a section 120.56 proceeding. '220 The court noted that
nothing in the APA required the long term health care providers to
exhaust the rule challenge process before proceeding with a request for
a section 120.57 hearing. 21 If a rule challenge was the appropriate fo-
rum for resolving some of the issues raised in the petition for a section
120.57 hearing, then it may be filed, and the section 120.57 hearing
stayed until it was resolved.222
In Lloyd Citrus Trucking v. Department of Agriculture and Con-
sumer Service,2 3 the court interpreted Florida Statute section 601.65
which provides:
If any licensed citrus fruit dealer violates any provision of this
chapter, such dealer shall be liable to the person allegedly injured
thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of
such violation. Such a liability may be enforced either by proceed-
ing in an administrative action to and before the Department of
Agriculture and pursuing such actions with ultimate termination if
desired, or by filing of a judicial suit at law in a court of competent
jurisdiction.2 24
The court read this statute as providing that a party had a choice of
either pursuing an administrative process or direct access to the courts,
but not both. "The statutory wording is clear. The legislature described
the kind of remedies only. Once Lloyd Citrus pursued its chosen
219. United Health,Inc., 579 So. 2d at 342-43; FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1989).
220. United Health, Inc., 579 So. 2d at 343.
221. Id.; accord J.B. Coxwell Contracting, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 580
So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (The court noted that a party may
challenge the validity of a rule in an administrative agency enforcement proceeding.
There was no requirement in such a case that the party must file a separate rule chal-
lenge in order to exhaust administrative remedies.).
222. United Health, Inc., 579 So. 2d at 343. The court also noted that any other
approach was impractical given the time frames for filing a petition requesting a sec-
tion 120.57 hearing. Id.
223. 572 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
224. FLA. STAT. § 601.65 (1979).
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course, suit in circuit court to resolution, the Department was without
jurisdiction to hear the matter .... ,,22' Lloyd Citrus correctly con-
cluded that the only way it could preserve its opportunity to pursue the
administrative hearing process was by dismissing its lawsuit prior to its
ultimate resolution. 26 However, where the voluntary dismissal of the
lawsuit occurred ten years after it was filed, but before any ultimate
resolution of the issues by the circuit court, the administrative remedy
was foreclosed, apparently based upon estoppel principles.2 27
In Board of Regents v. Armesto,22 8 a circuit court granted the re-
quest of a Florida State University law student for a permanent injunc-
tion enjoining Florida State University from falsely charging the stu-
dent with violations of the Student Code of Conduct. The injunction
was granted by the circuit court because of alleged improper conduct
by Florida State University in conducting its investigation of the
allegations. 29
The district court of appeal noted that primary jurisdiction doc-
trine requires that "circuit courts . . . abstain from exercising their eq-
uitable jurisdiction over administrative proceedings where adequate ad-
ministrative remedies have not been exhausted. An exception exists
where threatened agency action is so egregious or devastating that ad-
ministrative remedies are either too little or too late. ' 280 The law stu-
dent alleged that the nature of irreparable injury which she would suf-
fer was that The Florida Board of Bar Examiners "might refuse to
admit her to practice even if she were acquitted [of the allegedly false
charges] at the University hearing."' 23' The court characterized this al-
leged irreparable injury as mere speculation, and insufficient to
"demonstrate that her administrative remedies were inadequate" where
she had the right to request that the charges be dismissed and to de-
fend herself in a fair university hearing concerning the matter.23 2 "The
possible [collateral] consequence[s] ...[are] not a basis to bypass the
administrative process. ' 233
225. Lloyd Citrus Trucking, 572 So. 2d at 978.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 979.
228. 563 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
229. Id. at 1080-81.
230. Id. at 1081.
231. Id.
232. Id. The court found that the allegation of the likelihood of false charges
being filed was not supported by sufficient evidence. Id.
233. Armesto, 563 So. 2d at 1081.
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The court also rejected the due process challenge to the adminis-
trative process provided by Florida State University, because the alle-
gation was not a facial attack on the structure of the administrative
hearing process, but one concerning how it was going to be applied to
her particular circumstances. It is well established in Florida that such
an allegation is insufficient to warrant bypassing the administrative
process. In such a case, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is
appropriate so that the administrative agency has the first opportunity
to resolve the disputed issue. 34
G. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Res judicata principles are designed to conserve the resources of
administrative agencies, courts, and the parties by precluding needless
relitigation of issues.2"5 In Nelson & Co. v. Holtzclaw, 236 the court
noted that administrative orders issued by judges of compensation
claims "are subject to the same principles of res judicata as applied to
judgments of courts. 237 In discussing prior precedent in the area, the
court noted two items of interest. First, res judicata principles were
designed to prevent relitigation of issues over which there was likely to
be little change over time. Second, res judicata principles did not pre-
clude relitigation of issues where there was a likelihood of change over
time.
In Massie v. University of Florida,8 the court noted that the in-
terests of justice on a few occasion might require a court to abandon
the traditional rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel. An appel-
late court has inherent power to correct its own prior erroneous deci-
sions in order to prevent injustice, even when this involves review of an
administrative hearing decision which has become final after appropri-
ate appellate review. This discretion must be exercised only in the most
unusual circumstances, and is not as a matter of right, merely a matter
of grace.23 9 When a court finds that such circumstances exist, its "duty
in reviewing worker's compensation cases to administer justice under
the law outweighs its duty to follow an earlier decision of the court in
234. Id. at 1081-82.
235. Nelson & Co. v. Holtzclaw, 566 So. 2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
236. 566 So. 2d 307.
237. Id. at 308.
238. 570 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
239. Id. at 974-75.
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the same case when, due to an error in reviewing the evidence, doing so
resulted in . . . injustice to a party."2 " The court concluded, after re-
viewing the record, that the deputy commission was presented with "a
legally sufficient petition for modification . . based on a complete ab-
sence of evidence to support [an essential] finding of fact [and] []which
absence of evidence [was] now conceded by the deputy commissioner
"9241.
Thus, the court in Massie recognized that in extraordinary cir-
cumstances, it is possible to overturn a prior appellate ruling affirming
an administrative agency's decision. It is limited to the very unusual
circumstances of when the earlier decision was based upon erroneous
factual premises, and the trier of fact confessed that there were no
facts in the record to support his conclusion which was critical to the
decision he ultimately reached in the case. 2
III. GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE
The Public Records 248 and Sunshine " statutes are designed to as-
sure that the public has access to the decision making processes and
records of governmental institutions.24 5 As a result of these statutes, the
operation of Florida governmental institutions is open to public scru-
tiny. In response, the courts have rigorously enforced the requirements
of these statutes.
During the survey period, one interesting case, News-Press Pub-
lishing Co. v. Lee County,2" was decided concerning the Sunshine
240. Id. at 975.
241. fd. at 977; see id. at 977-78 (Ervin, J., concurring).
242. Cf Full Circle Service, Inc. v. Department of Agric., 556 So. 2d 757, 758
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that when a case was remanded after judicial
review to the administrative agency, it did not permit parties to re-litigate issues which
were properly decided by the court initially).
243. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-.14 (1989); see also FLA. STAT. § 120.53(3) & n.1
(1991) (text of subsections (2) and (4) as of March 1, 1992); FLA. STAT. §§ 120.532-
.533 (1991).
244. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1989).
245. See also FLA. STAT. §§ 120.53, .55 (1989) (APA provisions requiring public
access to orders and rules, public notice of administrative agency meetings, and the
subject matter to be discussed).
246. 570 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
One very significant case was decided too late for discussion in this survey article.
Locke v. Hawkes, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716 (1991). The decision in Locke may signifi-
cantly limit the power of the legislature to impose the requirements of the Sunshine
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Statute. The Sunshine Statute provides that official action taken by
state and local agencies must occur only at "public meetings open to
the public at all times" unless the Florida Constitution provides other-
wise.247 In News-Press Publishing Co.,24 the issue was whether the
mediation process entered pursuant to a circuit court order could be
lawfully closed to the public. The statute authorizing court sanctioned
mediations specifically provided that any party or person participating
in the proceeding may, as a matter of right, prevent the disclosure of
any communication made during the proceeding.249 On this basis,
News-Press Publishing Co. involved court sanctioned mediation be-
tween two governmental entities concerning where a bridge should be
located. Because of the nature of these entities, negotiations would oth-
erwise have been covered by the Sunshine Statute and open to the pub-
lic. However, the court ordered mediation statute presented a situation
where the mediation would be closed to the public. The court avoided
resolving the broader issue about this conflict between the Sunshine
Statute and the court mandated mediation statute by specifically noting
that court sanctioned could not result in any final settlement if the par-
ties choose not to send anyone to the mediation conference with the
authority to make such a decision. The court held that given "the nar-
row scope of the mediation proceedings in this case . .. [it did not
result in] a substantial delegation effecting the decision-making func-
tion of any board, commissioner, agency, or authority sufficient to re-
quire that this mediation proceeding be opened to the public."25 The
decision in News-Press Publishing Co. clearly indicates that the Sun-
shine Law would require, when governmental parties do send author-
ized representatives capable of making binding decisions upon govern-
mental entities to the mediation process, that the mediation be open to
the public.25'
Statute on other constitutionally created institutions. This decision is not final because
the court has granted a motion for reconsideration.
247. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1989). The purpose of the law is to insure that shap-
ing of public policy by governmental institutions occurs in the public realm. Courts
have generally interpreted the statute very broadly in order to allow full achievement of
its purpose.
248. 570 So. 2d 1325.
249. See FLA. STAT. § 44.302(2) (1989).
250. News-Press Publishing Co., 570 So. 2d at 1327.
251. The decision in Locke, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716, indicates that possibly the
legislature could not require the courts to open the mediation conference to the public.
If the mediation process is open to the public, then it may result may limit the effec-
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IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
In order for an administrative agency to escape the requirements
of the APA, the agency must be excluded from coverage pursuant to
the terms of the APA, 5 ' or expressly excluded from APA coverage by
a subsequent statute. 53 Courts are reluctant to find that such an ex-
press, subsequent statutory exemption was created, and will not imply
one in order to further efficiency or conservation of the limited re-
sources available to an administrative agency. To do so would under-
mine the legislative commitment to general administrative process and
structure for all administrative agencies, imposed through the APA.254
As the court noted in Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation,5 one of the primary goals of the
APA was "to expose policy errors in an [administrative] agency's free-
form routine, and to subject agency heads 'to the sobering realization
[that] their policies [may] lack convincing wisdom.' "258 To this end,
the legislature used a strong process oriented approach2 5 in the APA
to govern the exercise of administrative agency power, by guaranteeing
that the public and/or effected persons would: 1) receive notice of ad-
ministrative agency proposed actions; 2) have an opportunity to present
contrary points of view and evidence; 3) receive an adequate statement
of the facts and policy reasons supporting the administrative agency's
final action; 4) have an adequate opportunity for judicial review of ad-
ministrative agency actions; and 5) receive notice of and access to past
administrative agency policy decisions .25 Further, if an administrative
tiveness of court mandated mediation where governmental entities are involved. See
generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (1981).
252. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 120.50 (1989) (exclusion of courts and legislature);
FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1)(c) (1989) (exclusion of judges of compensation claims). The
decision in Locke, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716, re-opens the question of whether the legis-
lature may impose the requirements of the APA on constitutionally created govern-
mental institutions. Compare Locke, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716 with McDonald v. De-
partment of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 577-78 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
253. FLA. STAT. § 120.72(l)(a)-(b) (1989).
254. See Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation,
580 So. 2d 267, 273 n.6 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
255. Id. at 267.
256. Id. at 271 (quoting McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin. 346 So. 2d
569, 583 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
257. See, e.g., Burris IV, supra note 4, at 667-68; Levinson, supra note 4, at
750-55, 765; Maher, supra note 4, at 770-98.
258. Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc., 580 So. 2d at 271.
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agency was exempted from the APA, then, unless the legislature cre-
ated an alternative administrative process, the courts would have to de-
termine what procedure the administrative agency would have to follow
to exercising its delegated authority. This judicial decision process
would involve the constant resolution of constitutional issues concerning
procedural due process and separation of powers.
A. Rules Versus Orders
While it is relatively clear that the legislature preferred that ad-
ministrative agencies develop public policy through the rule making
process,2" the courts permitted administrative agencies to develop
many controversial and important public policy positions via the adju-
dicatory process. 6 0 The net result has been that administrative agen-
cies can create legally binding policy of general applicability by either
using their rule making authority or by properly developing policy posi-
tions in adjudicatory proceedings." 1 The former process' results are
259. There are primarily two processes which administrative agencies can
use in developing legally binding public policy-rule making and adjudica-
tion. In theory, administrative agencies should use the rule making process
to establish legally binding public policy of general applicability. The adju-
dication process to determine the substantial interests of parties under the
relevant statutes and administrative rules and only incidentally to develop
legally binding public policy . . . . The distinction between these two
means for exercising administrative agency authority to develop public pol-
icy was diminished in the APA by providing in some cases for additional
procedural protection during the rule making process. In cases where these
procedural protections are invoked during the rule making process it would
closely resemble adjudication. Despite the procedural convergence of rule
making and adjudication there still was a general consensus that adminis-
trative agencies, at least in theory, should prefer the rule making process
over adjudication as the means for developing public policy, because the
rule making process was designed to maximize public participation and
fairness through its notice, hearing, and publication requirements.
Burris IV, supra note 4, at 665-66; see FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1989). But see Dore II,
supra note 4, at 708-09 (legislature never made its preference for the rule making
process sufficiently clear in the statute). Any dispute about whether there was a legisla-
tive preference for rule making as compared to nonrule policy making has been re-
solved in favor of rule making. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1) (1991) (required rule making;
effective March 1, 1992).
260. See McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (leading case supporting concept of nonrule policy making); Bur-
ris IV, supra note 4, at 673; Dore II, supra note 4, at 710-11.
261. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393 So.
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promulgated as administrative rules and found in the Florida Adminis-
trative Code. The latter's results are characterized by the courts as in-
cipient rules or nonrule policies,262 because they are developed in the
case by case adjudicative process through a series of orders. These re-
sults are generally found in the Florida Administrative Law Reporter
or administrative agency files. 68
To date, a substantial amount of litigation concerning whether the
nonrule policy was properly documented and supported in the adjudica-
tory record has occurred. 6 This continual relitigation of the validity of
nonrule policies is a waste of the limited resources of the administrative
agencies, the courts and private parties, because many, if not most, of
the nonrule policies should have been adopted through the more cost
efficient rule making process. 66 Several cases during the survey period
demonstrated the perils of an administrative agency relying on nonrule
policy.
Rabren v. Department of Professional Regulation2 66 concerned an
order issued by the Department of Professional Regulation dismissing
the administrative charges against Rabren, a licensed pilot. The court
affirmed the dismissal of the charges against Rabren and reversed the
finding that certain docking facilities in the Tampa Bay area were
ports.2  Florida statutes required that vessels which were not exempt
or which drew less than seven feet of water "shall have a licensed pilot
on board when entering or leaving ports of this state," '268 and that it
was improper for a pilot licensed in the State of Florida to delegate his
or her responsibilities to any person who he or she knew or should have
known was not qualified "by training, experience, or license to perform
them." '269 This latter statutory provision clearly prohibited a state li-
2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Burris IV, supra note 4, at 677-85.
262. See Burris IV, supra note 4, at 670 & n.36.
263. See id. at 693-96; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 120.53-.533 (1991); Dore III,
supra note 4, at 450-54.
264. See, e.g., Ganson v. Florida Dep't of Admin., 554 So. 2d 516, 520 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989). In Ganson, the court noted that if administrative agencies chose
to rely upon nonrule policy, then when a hearing was held, a "record foundation for the
policy decisions in its orders, by expert testimony, documentary opinion or other evi-
dence appropriate in form to the nature of the issues involved" must be offered. Id. The
court found that the administrative agency had failed to do so in this case. Id.
265. Burris IV, supra note 4, at 696-97.
266. 568 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) [hereinafter Rabren I1].
267. Id. at 1284.
268. FLA. STAT. § 310.141 (1987).
269. FLA. STAT. § 310.101(1) (1987).
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censed pilot from delegating his or her responsibilities to a pilot who
holds only a federal license. Any violation of this section may result in
a reprimand, fine, suspension, or revocation of license. °
Based on this statute, the Board of Pilot Commissioners accused
Rabren of assigning pilots, who held only a federal license, to shift two
vessels from one port to another in the Tampa Bay area when a state
licensed pilot was required. Rabren admitted that these events had oc-
curred. 17 1 However, he claimed that the shifts involved transfers within
the port of Tampa Bay, and, relying upon Rabren v. Board of Commis-
sioners,272 that such actions did not require a state pilot. The hearing
officer agreed, holding that while the Tampa Bay area may functionally
consist of four ports for purposes of the statute, it was actually consid-
ered one port. Thus, any shifting of vessels between the ports located
within the Tampa Bay area did not require the presence of a state li-
censed pilot, because such shifting did not involve a vessel leaving and
entering the Tampa Bay port area.27
The Board of Pilot Commissioners reversed the decision of the
hearing officer, finding that as a matter of law the hearing officer had
erred. The Board concluded that the statute had been misinterpreted
by the hearing officer, because the shifting of a vessel between ports in
the Tampa Bay area was an act that involved leaving one Florida port
and entering another, which required a state licensed pilot.27 ' In an-
nouncing this policy, the Board functionally adopted a nonrule policy
interpreting the statute.
The court noted that the Board of Pilot Commissioners had the
270. Rabren 1H, 568 So. 2d at 1285. The Board of Pilot Commissioners was dele-
gated the authority by the Florida legislature to enforce Florida Statutes Chapter 310.
FLA. STAT. § 310.185(1) (1987).
271. Rabren 11, 568 So. 2d at 1286.
272. 497 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 508 So. 2d 13
(Fla. 1987) [hereinafter Rabren 1]. The court held that the Board of Pilot Commission-
ers had exceeded its delegated authority in promulgating a rule which required a state
pilot on board when a vessel was shifted from one docking facility to another while in
port, because the Florida House of Representatives had rejected a similar provision as
part of Chapter 310. However, in that case, the court noted that the Tampa Bay area
included four ports, and that the rule might well have been a proper exercise of dele-
gated authority when a vessel is shifted from a docking facility in one port to another
facility in another Tampa Bay area port. Id. at 1249; see Rabren II, 568 So. 2d at
1285-86.
273. Rabren 11, 568 So. 2d at 1287.
274. Id. The Board of Pilot Commissioners completely accepted the hearing of-
ficer's factual conclusions set forth in the recommended order.
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authority to promulgate nonrule policy through adjudicatory orders.
Whether to adopt certain public policy positions through the rule mak-
ing or adjudicatory process was within the scope of discretion delegated
to the Board of Pilot Commissioners by the legislature. However, when
an administrative agency chooses to rely upon nonrule policy adopted
in an adjudicatory context, the adjudicatory record must provide ade-
quate support for that policy, both in law and fact. In this case, be-
cause the parties chose not to make the factual records available to the
court on appeal, there was no such factual basis for the nonrule policy
before the court. Further, the court noted that the order failed to "offer
an explanation or justification for the policy. 12 75 The Board of Pilot
Commissioners' finding that these facilities in the Tampa Bay area
were each ports under the statute was a bare assertion unsupported by
any factual predicate.
Similarly, in Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America v. De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services,2 7 7 the court noted:
[W]lhen an [administrative] agency seeks to validate its action
based upon a policy that is not recorded in rules or discoverable
precedents, that policy must be established by expert testimony,
documentary opinions, or other evidence appropriate to the nature
of the issues involved and the agency must expose and elucidate its
reasons for its discretionary action.27 8
In this case, the court found that the nonrule policy was merely stated
as a bare assertion during the course of the administrative hearing . 79
275. Id. at 1289.
276. "If the [Board of Pilot Commissioners] wishes to avoid rulemaking and opt
for policy development through adjudication, then it must accept the procedural safe-
guards that apply in formal hearings . . . ." Id. at 1290.
277. 559 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
278. Id. at 667-68 (citing St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs., 553 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
279. See also Bajrangi v. Department of Business Regulation, 561 So. 2d 410,
415-16 (Ma. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In Bajrangi, the court noted that the testimony
concerning the usual penalties, which apparently were based upon informal guidelines
that did not appear in any statute or administrative rule and were not adequately docu-
mented as nonrule policy, cannot constitute a basis for rejecting a hearing officer's
decision. id. The error committed by the administrative agency was that it failed to
provide actual testimony which would prove the factual predicate necessary for the
adoption of such a nonrule policy. The witness just testified in a conclusory fashion that
this was the usual penalty. Id.
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The nonrule policy was not discoverable in any administrative agency
precedent. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services also
failed to adequately document the nonrule policy during the course of
the administrative hearing by providing expert testimony, documents
and other evidence to support its nonrule policy. Without adequate doc-
umentation to support the nonrule policy, the decision of the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services was not supported by com-
petent substantial evidence. Further, it may well be that it was
inconsistent with prior administrative agency practices, a deviation
from which has not been adequately explained on the record.2
80
In Schiffman v. Department of Professional Regulation,281 the
court concluded that the decision of the Board of Pharmacy imposing a
permanent revocation of license was an invalid nonrule policy, because
it lacked adequate evidentiary support in the administrative hearing
record. 282 The Board of Pharmacy was authorized by the legislature to
adopt administrative rules concerning revocation of a license. 2 3 The
Board of Pharmacy did not adopt administrative rules and relied upon
nonrule policy developed in the adjudicatory hearing process. While the
Board of Pharmacy was free to chose to develop its policies concerning
sanctions in this manner, it may not do so without establishing the fol-
lowing requirements in each order: 1) an explanation of the nonrule
policy; 2) adequate factual support in the record for the nonrule policy;
and 3) an explanation of how the nonrule policy was within the scope
of the administrative agency's delegated authority.28" In Schiffman, the
Board of Pharmacy failed to provide any policy reasons justifying the
nonrule policy which it applied. 288 Further, the order of the Board of
Pharmacy was unclear, because one part of the order could be read as
finding that Schiffman would never be eligible for reinstatement, while
another part of order could be read as indicating that he may be eligi-
ble for reinstatement if he offered some, albeit undefined, evidence of
rehabilitation. Such an internally inconsistent order was not an ade-
quate explanation of the nonrule policy. 86
280. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 559 So. 2d at 668. The court
remanded the case for further action in light of its opinion. See FLA. STAT. §
120.68(12) (1989).
281. 581 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
282. Id. at 1376.
283. See FLA. STAT. § 465.016(4) (1989).
284. See Schiffman, 581 So. 2d at 1377; Burris IV, supra note 4, at 676-77.
285. Schiffman, 581 So. 2d at 1377.
286. Id. at 1378.
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In Beverly Enterprises-Florida v. Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services,28" the court held, in part, that the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services acted improperly in altering its
nonrule policy without adequately supporting it in the administrative
hearing record. 88 The court found that when an administrative agency
takes a position adverse to the party's understanding of the administra-
tive agency's prior position in a matter, then the agency has effectively
denied the party's request for action. When a party requested a formal
administrative hearing in response to this decision, then the hearing
must be de novo in nature to the extent that it addressed the formula-
tion of the new administrative agency nonrule policy and was not a
review of' any action taken earlier based upon pre-existing administra-
tive agency nonrule policy. 89 The court found that the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services had abandoned its prior interpreta-
tion of the statute during the course of this proceeding without offering
sufficient support in the evidentiary record or a reasonable explanation
for its shift in policy. 9
However, one case suggested that in some circumstances the
courts might compel an administrative agency to adopt its policy posi-
tions through the rule making process. In Department of Natural Re-
sources v. Wingfield Development Company,2 91 the court considered
whether a letter from the Department of Natural Resources requiring a
287. 573 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
288. Id. at 23.
289. Id.
290. Id. The court stated:
When an [administrative] agency seeks to validate agency action based
upon a policy that is not recorded in rules or discoverable precedents, that
policy must be established by expert testimony, documentary opinions, or
other evidence appropriate to the nature of the issues involved and the
agency must expose and elucidate its reasons for its discretionary action.
The agency may apply incipient or developing policy in a section 120.57
administrative hearing, provided the agency explicates, supports and de-
fends such policy with competent, substantial evidence on the record in
such proceeding. [Whenever an administrative agency's] policy does not
simply reiterate a legislative mandate and is not readily apparent from a
literal reading of the statutes involved . . . [it is] required to show the
reasonableness and factual accuracy of its policy [in the administrative
hearing record].
Id. at 22-23 (quoting in part St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 553 So. 2d at 1354 (citation
omitted)).
291. 581 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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developer to make periodic reports on construction progress, not cease
making significant construction progress on any part of the project for
a period of six or more months and complete the resort project within
two years or lose its exemption from the modified coastal construction
control line permit requirements for those parts of the resort project
located seaward of the modified line was a valid exercise of administra-
tive discretion. 92 These constraints on exempt status from the permit
requirements imposed by the adoption of a coastal construction control
line did not appear in the statutes or the administrative rules. The
court agreed with the hearing officer that the Department of Natural
Resources letter containing these limitations was an "illicit rule not
adopted in the manner required by law." 9'
The court further noted that "any agency statement is a rule
[under the APA294] if it purports in and of itself to create certain rights
and adversely affect others, or if it serves by its own effect to create
rights, or to require compliance, or otherwise to have the direct and
consistent effect of law."29 The court read the Department of Natural
Resources letter as easily qualifying as a rule under the APA, because
it "implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, describes proce-
dure or practice requirements of the [administrative] agency, and im-
poses requirements or information not specifically required by statute
or by existing rule."2 96 As such, the letter was an invalid exercise of
delegated authority, because it was not adopted through the rule mak-
ing process mandated by the APA.2 97 This opinion is of special note
because the language indicates that these requirements could only be
imposed through the rule making process. Thus, it implicitly rejects the
possibility that these requirements could be imposed through the
nonrule policy route.
During the last legislative session the hesitancy of the courts to
require administrative agencies to engage in rule making rather than
292. Id. at 194-95 (extensively quoting the specific language of the letter). The
Department of Natural Resources imposed these limitations to assure that exemption
from the coastal construction control line permit requirements "was obtained in good
faith and that the builder intends to go forward with the construction in a timely man-
ner." Id. at 195.
293. Id. at 196.
294. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1989).
295. Wingfield Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d at 196.
296. Id.
297. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1989); see also supra notes 74-79 and accom-
panying text.
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rely upon nonrule policy was addressed. The legislature amended the
APA to require administrative agencies in most circumstances to adopt
policy positions298 through the rule making process." An administra-
tive agency can escape the rule making preference only if 1) the policy
at issue is not a matter within the scope of the definition of a rule,300 or
2) it is not feasible or practicable to currently adopt the policy through
the rule making process.301 The burden is on an administrative agency
to prove that it should be exempt from the rule making preference.302
If a hearing officer determines that an administrative agency should
have adopted the nonrule policy or statement as a rule, then the admin-
istrative agency "shall immediately discontinue all reliance upon the
statement or any substantially similar statement as a basis for agency
action." '0 If an administrative agency nevertheless continues to rely
upon the nonrule policy or statement in agency action, then the person
whose substantial interests were affected by the agency action may re-
cover attorney's fees and costs,304 unless an administrative agency is
engaged in a good faith attempt to adopt the nonrule policy or state-
ment as a rule. 05
These amendments to the APA should impact on the administra-
tive process in four ways. First, the threat of attorney's fees and costs
awards should create a substantial incentive for administrative agencies
to promulgate their policy positions through the rule making process.
298. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4,
at 450-54.
299. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4, at
450-54.
300. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4,
at 450-54.
301. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.535(1)(a), (b) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra
note 4, at 450-54.
302. If the party meets its initial burden of showing that it is substantially af-
fected by the nonrule policy or statement which meets the definition of a rule, but has
not been adopted as a rule, then an administrative agency has the burden of offering
persuasive proof that the nonrule policy or statement is not within the scope of the
definition of rule and/or that it is not feasible or practicable to adopt it as a rule at this
time. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)(b) (1991); see FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)(a) (1991). See
generally Dore III, supra note 4, at 450-54.
303. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(4) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4, at
450-54.
304. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(6) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4, at
450-54.
305. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.535(5), (6) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4,
at 450-54.
19911
65
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
Second, the courts should no longer tolerate the use of nonrule policies
by administrative agencies, except in very rare circumstances, because
administrative agencies will no longer be able to merely assert it is not
feasible or practical to adopt a policy as a rule; they will have to prove
it. 306 Third, there should be a dramatic increase in the use of the rule
making process1 7 and challenges to proposed and promulgated rules.308
Fourth, once administrative agencies have promulgated most of their
nonrule policies and statements as rules, the legislature should be able
to better exercise its oversight function and assure that administrative
agencies are exercising their delegated authority in a manner consistent
with the legislative purpose and intent.30 9
B. Adjudicatory Structure and Procedure
The courts decided several cases during the survey period which
generally concerned the structure of the adjudicatory process and the
procedures used.
In Southeast Grove Management Inc. v. McKiness,310 the court
reversed and remanded a nonfinal administrative order, in part, be-
cause the hearing officer improperly allocated the burden of persuasion
and failed to appreciate that the hearing concerned an administrative
order which had already been rendered, not the original complaints."
In such a case, the party requesting the hearing has the "burden of
showing by competent, substantial evidence that . . [the] findings [in
the administrative order] were incorrect."3 13
306. See Burris IV, supra note 4, at 683-85. See generally Dore III, supra note
4, at 450-54.
307. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. in H.R. BILL
No. 1879 (Fla. May 22, 1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4, at 450-54.
308. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1991) (administrative challenges to proposed
rules); FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1) (administrative challenges to adopted rules). See gener-
ally Dore III, supra note 4, at 450-54.
309. See Burris IV, supra note 4, at 667-73. See generally Dore III, supra note
4, at 450-54.
310. 578 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
311. Id. at 886-87. The court found that the notice given concerning the com-
plaints and right to request an administrative hearing was sufficient even though it
never mentioned whether a hearing request was made-the right to a hearing on the
complaint was waived. Id. at 887 n.6. The other issues concerned estoppel claims. See
id. at 885-86.
312. Id. at 887 (also noting that the factual findings in the order carried a rebut-
table presumption of correctness).
[Vol. 16
66
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Burris
The courts in two cases addressed the question of when adminis-
trative agencies and private parties could successfully use procedural
errors as a basis for seeking default orders. In Coon Clothing Co. v.
Eggers,"'1 the court noted that public policy considerations required
that, whenever possible, the merits of a case should be the basis for its
resolution, rather than procedural default mechanisms. When notice of
an administrative hearing arrives only three working days prior to the
hearing, there was evidence that the party was absent from the place
where the notice was served, and there was no evidence of any
prejudice to the administrative agency arising from the delay in the
response by the party, then a default order should not be entered, and
the case should be reopened with a hearing.814
Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co.3 15 is
consistent with the Eggers case. Puckett Oil Co. concerned under what
circumstances it was appropriate for a hearing officer to enter a sum-
mary final order.3 16 In this case, the hearing officer entered a "sum-
mary final order awarding $15,000 in attorney's fees and costs to Puck-
ett," because the Department of Environmental Regulation failed to
respond in a timely fashion to the petition filed by Puckett Oil, waiving
its right to a hearing on the petition and admitting that there was no
material issue of fact involved in resolving the petition.3 17 The court
held that the hearing officer erred in doing so. The court found that the
use of the word "shall" in the administrative rule establishing the time
for filing a response to a petition was not designed to create a circum-
stance where every failure to respond in a timely fashion should be
treated as depriving the hearing officer of jurisdiction to entertain a
request for permission to file a late response to the petition. Rather, the
mandatory language was used for the purpose of only generally provid-
ing for "the orderly conduct of business." 8' In such cases the use of
the word "shall" was not intended as mandatory, but directory. Be-
cause the word "shall" was used in this way, the trier of fact retained
jurisdiction to determine whether to exercise his or her "discretion to
313. 560 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
314. Id. at 1357-58.
315. 577 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
316. The court avoided deciding under what circumstances a party should be
permitted to escape any adverse consequences for failing to timely respond to a
petition.
317. Id. at 990-91.
318. Id. at 991.
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extend the time for the filing of a responsive pleading." 319 The hearing
officer cannot refuse to exercise its discretionary authority to grant an
administrative agency permission to file an untimely response as a
means of sanctioning the administrative agency for failing to strictly
adhere to the rules.
Of course, there are circumstances where it is appropriate for a
hearing officer to conclude that the administrative agency's failure to
file a response was a waiver of its right to a hearing.320
But, in order for waiver to be applied based on the passage of time,
we consider it essential for a showing to be made that the party
against whom waiver is asserted has received notice sufficient to
commence the running of the time period within which the re-
sponse is required. Thus, if it is clearly established that a party has
received notice informing him or her of the requirement of taking
certain action within a specified period of time, and such party de-
lays for a protracted length of time in taking the required action,
319. Id. The court noted that any contrary reading of the rule would require it to
hold that the rule was an ultra vires exercise of delegated authority. Id. at 991-92. The
court stated:
[N]o statutory authority, either expressly or reasonably implied therefrom,
empowered DOAH to set a jurisdictional time limitation on the right of an
agency to respond to a petition for fees and costs. To the contrary, we
consider that the division's power to permit a late-filed response is reasona-
bly implied from the very statutes that rule 221-6.035 referenced as au-
thorizing its adoption: Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1989), specifically
subsection (1)(b)4, authorizing parties "to respond, to present evidence
and argument on all issues," and sections 57.111(4)(c) and (d), allowing a
state agency against which a small business party has prevailed to oppose
an application for attorney's fees and costs by affidavit, and requiring the
hearing officer to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application.
Clearly the two statutes, which the rule was designed to implement, imply
that the agency shall be given a fair opportunity to defend against an ap-
plication for fees and costs. We find nothing in the statutes reasonably
suggesting that if an agency fails to comply with the time limitations re-
quired for its response, a summary final order, regardless of any mitigating
circumstances, must thereafter be entered.
Id. at 992; see supra notes 38-81 and accompanying text.
320. In circumstances in which no response whatsoever has been filed, the
division obviously has the right, in its supervision of orderly administrative
proceedings, to conclude that a party has waived his or her right to re-
spond, as more fully discussed infra, and to thereafter enter a summary
final order, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 221-6.030.
Puckett Oil, 577 So. 2d at 992.
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we consider that the party may be deemed to have waived his or
her right to so act.821
However, because waiver of a right to a hearing should not be lightly
implied, it should be imposed only where a party clearly has waived its
right to a hearing, or any delay in the filing of a timely response results
in prejudice to another party's interests.3 22
The hostility of the courts toward the use of procedural default
mechanisms for resolving cases also can be seen in the one case during
the survey period that concerned the legal sufficiency of notice given by
an administrative agency. In Baker v. Office of the Treasurer,23 a fire-
fighter, Baker, appealed the final order which revoked his fire-fighter
certification, claiming that he was not given appropriate notice of an
opportunity to seek a hearing challenging the allegations in the com-
plaint. The State Fire Marshal sent Baker notice of the complaint by
certified mail. The notice was returned to the Marshal's office, noting a
forwarding address. The Marshal again mailed the complaint to the
forwarding address, but it was returned. The Marshal then employed a
private investigator who looked for Baker at the first address and also
checked an address listed in the telephone book, none of which led him
to Baker. The Marshal, after taking these steps, published notice of the
complaint against Baker in the Orlando Sentinel on four consecutive
Wednesdays. Baker never did respond to these notices, and a final or-
der revoking his certification was issued by default.
Baker claimed that the State Fire Marshal's office failed to make
a diligent search before resorting to notice by publication. The APA
provided that an administrative agency, prior to revoking any license
based upon an administrative complaint, shall serve the person with
notice of the complaint either by personal service or certified mail. If
both personal service and certified mail service are unsuccessful, then
the agency may publish notice in an appropriate newspaper.$2 4
The resolution of whether the State Fire Marshal's office properly
resorted to the use of notice through publication turned on whether the
private investigator made a diligent search for Baker. 23 The court
found that the private investigator's affidavit did not demonstrate what
321. Id. at 993 (citation omitted).
322. Id. at 993-94.
323. 575 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
324. FLA. STAT. § 120.60(7) (1989).
325. Baker, 575 So. 2d at 728.
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steps he had taken in attempting to locate Baker. Rather, the affidavit
evidenced a mere conclusory statement that the investigator had visited
one address in an attempt to locate Baker, and that his present address
remained unknown. Based upon the affidavit, the court could not know
what steps the private investigator took in attempting to locate Baker's
other addresses.2 6
The court held that "the requirements of the statute authorizing
service by publication were not met in this case in that there was an
absence of diligent inquiry and a conscious effort to locate appellant
reasonably employing knowledge known by or readily available to the
appellee." 327 Because there was no proof that notice by publication was
necessary in this case, Baker was denied his opportunity to request a
hearing and contest the allegations contained in the complaint. 328
Two cases during the survey period concerned the question of
when the jurisdiction of the administrative agency or hearing officer
was terminated. New v. Department of Banking and Finances29 con-
cerned an agreement reached between New and the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services just prior to the commencement of
a section 120.57 formal hearing. The agreement provided for repay-
ment of an overpayment of certain amounts via an electronic funds
transfer. The hearing officer closed the file and discontinued the hear-
ing at that point. However, the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services was unable to persuade the Comptroller that it had law-
fully appropriated funds for the purpose of making its portion of the
repayment, and therefore, the settlement agreement was not
implemented.
The court noted that a settlement agreement did not deprive a
hearing officer of jurisdiction when the hearing concerning the case was
merely discontinued as a result. The hearing officer loses jurisdiction
over the matter only after the case is dismissed. When, for reasons un-
forseen by the parties at the time, the settlement agreement was not
implemented, then the case must be re-opened, and the formal adminis-
trative hearing process should be resumed for the purpose of entering
326. Id. at 729. The court noted that there were several obvious steps which
should have been taken including seeking his address from his employer, the City of
Orlando Fire Department. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 729-30. The court ordered that the case be remanded and a hearing
date set in compliance with the requirements of the APA.
329. 554 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
[Vol. 16
70
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Burris
an order adopting the terms of the settlement agreement. 8 0 The Comp-
troller erred in unilaterally entering a final order requiring repayment
by New.s38
In Kalbach v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices,13 1 the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and
Kalbach "had agreed that the arrearage owed for [child support] as of
March 22, 1988, was $1,020.40. ' s33 This was adopted as a finding of
fact in the final order by the Department. In a subsequent letter, the
Department asserted that the correct arrearage amount for child sup-
port "was actually $2,084.97 as June 15, 1988. ' ' 3M After a second
hearing, the hearing officer determined that the Department was bound
by its earlier finding that the arrearage in child support was $1,020.40,
even though this figure was in conflict with the circuit court's order
concerning child support obligations. The Department rejected this
finding in its final administrative order, and held that any error in the
determination of arrearages in child support, whether the error is an
over- or under-statement, should be corrected at the point in time when
the error is discovered.
The court rejected this position, finding that after an administra-
tive order became final and the time for judicial review had passed, the
Department of Health of Rehabilitative Services was precluded from
modifying the order. "While administrative agencies do have inherent
power to reconsider final orders that are still under their control ... [,
where the] order .. .passed out of . . . [their] control . .. [it] be-
330. Id. at 1207. This may appear nonsensical. However, it is necessary so that
the parties can seek enforcement of the settlement agreement in court.
331. The court noted that the Comptroller incorrectly concluded there were no
appropriated funds available to repay the amount of the overpayment. Id.
The court also granted New's motion for attorney's fees and costs because,
the agency's actions which precipitated this appeal was gross abuse of
[the] agency's discretion. The Comptroller who was a mere party to a
valid section 120.57 proceeding took charge of the proceedings and without
jurisdiction or authority entered a void order adversely affecting the sub-
stantive rights of New. It was necessary that she appeal the order in order
to protect her rights.
Id. The Division of Administrative Hearing was directed to hold a hearing on the mat-
ter of the appropriate amount of attorney's fees and costs if the parties were unable to
agree on the amount. Id. at 1208.
332. 563 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
333. Id. at 810.
334. Id.
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came final and was no longer subject to modification."335 The only oc-
casion when the agency might successfully argue for an exception to
this general rule occurs where it is able to demonstrate that modifica-
tion of the order is necessary due to a "change in circumstances or any
demonstrated public need or interest." 36 No such showing was offered
in this case.
It is clear that the APA requires an administrative agency to
maintain an accurate transcript of any section 120.57(1) hearing. 37 In
Citrus Central v. Gardner,338 the court noted that when circumstances
required a hearing de novo to be held, because the record of the origi-
nal hearing was not available, then "the presentation of new and addi-
tional evidence, by which the matter might be determined as if it had
not been previously addressed" was admissible.33 9
Further, in E.H. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vice, 40 a hearing was held by the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services pursuant to section 120.57(1), but because the court re-
porter who kept the transcript of the record had left the jurisdiction,
and all efforts by the parties to contact the court reporter had failed, no
record was available for the appeal. 41 The remedy in such a case was
for both parties, along with the hearing officer, to submit their recollec-
tions of what transpired at the hearing, and this would constitute the
record on appeal.342 An administrative agency was not considered exon-
erated from this duty by mere allegations that it made a good faith
attempt to preserve the record. While in this case the failure of the
agency to maintain the transcript of the proceeding did not result in its
being unable to meet its burden of showing that there was substantial
and competent evidence to support its decision, in some future case it
may well do so.""
Generally, under the APA, ex parte communication is prohib-
ited.344 But in Citizens of Florida v. Wilson,45 the court noted that
335. Id.
336. Id. at 811; cf. supra notes 235-42 and accompanying text.
337. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(7) (1989); see supra notes 123-44 and accompa-
nying text.
338. 569 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
339. Id. at 937.
340. 571 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
341. Id. at 50.
342. Id. at 51; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 9.200(b)(4).
343. E.H., 571 So. 2d at 51.
344. FLA. STAT. § 120.66 (1989).
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this prohibition was not designed to forbid contact between Public Ser-
vice Commission members and their staff during the course of a rate
hearing. The Court found that section 120.66 was limited to circum-
stances where a hearing officer was involved, or after an administrative
agency had received a recommended order. Neither of these circum-
stances were present in this case. The court also noted that the commu-
nication occurred during the course of a public hearing and, therefore,
lacked the characteristic of an ex parte communication which generally
is contact made outside of the public hearing context.846
C. Licensinge47
In Patmilt Corp. v. Department of Business Regulation," ' the
court held that where the Department of Business Regulation had
orally agreed to accept a lesser penalty than revocation of a license,
and where the licensee relied upon that oral agreement, the Depart-
ment of Business Regulation cannot enter a default order revoking the
license because of the Department's perception that the licensee was
late in submitting a completed copy of the written agreement based
upon the prior oral agreement. The process used by the Department
was not fair and constituted a material error, because it failed to give
the licensee specific notice of the possible consequences of not timely
submitting an executed copy of the written agreement.34 9 The court in-
dicated that the Department may adopt such an approach if it provides
adequate notice to a licensee so that the licensee knows it must submit
the agreement in a timely fashion, or, in a timely fashion, request an
administrative hearing, or otherwise risk having waived the right to a
hearing.350
345. 569 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1990).
346. Id. at 1270.
347. Several other cases concerning licensing are discussed elsewhere in this arti-
cle. See, e.g., supra notes 70-73, 103-113, 266-76 and accompanying text.
348. 581 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
349. Id. at 998-99. The court also noted that the written agreement provided by
the Department of Business Regulation stated that if the agreement was not accepted
by the director, then it would constitute notice of a request for an administrative hear-
ing on the matter.
350. But see supra notes 313-28 and accompanying text.
1991]
73
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
D. Contract Bidding
Only one decision during the survey period directly concerned the
contract bidding process. Mercedes Lighting and Electrical Supply Co.
v. Department of General Services5 1 concerned an appeal from a final
order issued by a hearing officer awarding attorney's fees to the De-
partment of General Services and Marpan Supply because Mercedes
Lighting had filed a "frivolous bid protest. ' 52 Mercedes Lighting's low
bid was rejected, because it did not include a list of in-state service
representatives, as required by the invitation to bid issued by the De-
partment of General Services. Mercedes Lighting contended that it
filed a bid with in-state service representatives named,'35 or, in the al-
ternative, that the omission of an in-state service representative from
the bid was a minor irregularity which could be waived.35 4
The hearing officer rejected both contentions finding that naming
of manufacture's sales employees could not reasonably be understood
as having designated an in-state service representative, and holding
that the minor bid irregularity claim was waived, as it was not asserted
in a timely fashion.355 The hearing officer characterized the protest as
frivolous, because it had no basis in law or fact. The hearing officer
specifically found that Mercedes Lighting had simply forgotten to in-
clude the in-state service representative information in its bid, and that
the bid protest was filed merely to provide an opportunity for it to cor-
rect this oversight. The hearing officer considered this an inappropriate
use of the bid protest process35 6 and awarded attorney's fees and costs
to the parties to the bid protest. 5
The court, when interpreting under what circumstances attorney's
fees and costs could be awarded under section 120.57(l)(b)5, drew
351. 560 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
352. Id. at 273.
353. Mercedes Lighting maintained that the names were found among the plant
manufacturer's sales employees listed in their bid. Id. at 274.
354. Id.
355. The hearing officer found that Mercedes Lighting would gain an advantage
if it was allowed to re-open its bid to correct the deficiency, because it could choose to
withdraw its bid by failing to correct the deficiency-an opportunity not offered to
other bidders on the contract.
356. Id. at 275. The hearing officer did not find that the bid protest was insti-
tuted for the purpose of creating unnecessary delay or to establish an advantage.
357. Mercedes Lighting, 560 So. 2d at 276. "The hearing officer entered a final
order granting the Department $24,312.00 in fees plus costs, and Marpan $20,281.00
plus costs." Id.
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upon the policy arguments underlying Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 58 The APA provision concerning awards of attorney's
fees and costs provided that an award should occur only when the ac-
tion was filed for an improper purpose, such as a frivolous bid protest.
The APA provision did not require that the party or attorney signing
the papers, which were the basis for the administrative action believe
that "the paper is well-grounded in fact, and is . . .warranted by ex-
isting law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law."35 9
The court reasoned that if the legislature intended to have these
factors considered in the decision process concerning awards of attor-
ney's fees, it would have listed them explicitly in section
120.57('1)(b)5.3 60 The court found that the hearing officer erred in con-
cluding that the bid protest was frivolous, because there was no clear
binding precedent which established a position contrary to that asserted
by Mercedes Lighting during the bid protest process. 6 A critical ele-
ment in this decision process was that the administrative agency always
had an opportunity to change its mind as a result of the hearing in the
case before it. The fact that the hearing officer ultimately chose to re-
ject the position advocated by Mercedes Lighting was not sufficient jus-
tification for holding that the bid protest was frivolous, especially where
there was a reasonably clear legal justification for bringing the pro-
test. 62 In dicta, the court noted that there were other remedies availa-
358. Id. at 276-77.
359. Id. at 277; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)5 (1989)
The signature of a party, a party's attorney, or a party's qualified repre-
sentative constitutes a certificate that he has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper and that, to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper pur-
poses, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous pur-
pose or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
360. Mercedes Lighting, 560 So. 2d at 277. The court noted that it is appropri-
ate for the legislature to make clear its intent if it wished to have the two-prongs of
Rule 11 apply in this statutory circumstance. The court's imposition of this require-
ment in this instance would violate the tenets of the separation of powers doctrine. Id.
at 277-78.
361. Id. at 278. The Department of General Services did not move to dismiss the
bid protest petition "on the grounds that it was baseless or filed for an improper pur-
pose." Id. at 274.
362. The court noted that a decision by a hearing officer should not normally be
given the effect of stare decisis, as in the case of judicial decisions, because such deci-
sions turn on the specific facts of each case and are easily distinguishable. It would be
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ble to a hearing officer besides an awarding of attorney's fees and costs.
A hearing officer also had authority to order a pleading struck if it was
filed for an improper purpose, or to order it withdrawn or amended. 63
E. Emergency Rules and Orders
In Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v.
Lewis,364 the now infamous Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna-
tional 68 (BCCI) appealed the final administrative order by the Comp-
troller denying BCCI's petition for renewal of a license to operate an
office in Miami, Florida. 66 Despite a very checkered past operation,3 67
the Comptroller granted BCCI a renewal of its Miami office license for
the year ending on March 4, 1990. In that renewal order, the Comp-
troller stated that "BCCI has satisfactorily demonstrated that the stat-
utory requirements for renewal of its license have been met." 3' 8
After this renewal was granted, BCCI and the Comptroller en-
tered into another agreement further detailing monitoring and compli-
ance requirements. In early January 1990, BCCI entered a guilty plea
to money laundering charges and agreed to pay a civil forfeiture of
approximately $15,000,000. Although the plea agreement was subject
to a gag order, the Comptroller was given permission to review the
terms of the plea agreement and the details of BCCI's compliance with
its terms. In February 1990, BCCI timely filed another application for
renewal of its license for the Miami office. Notice of the renewal was
published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 2, 1990.
contrary to the purpose of the bid protest proceedings, as these were designed to pro-
vide "a person, whose substantial interest ha[d] been determined by agency action, an
opportunity to attack the agency's position by appropriate means, subject to judicial
review under § 120.68, Florida Statutes." Id. at 278. But see Burris IV, supra note 4,
at 693-97.
363. Id. at 279.
364. 570 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
365. BCCI has been labeled the sleaziest bank in the world by both Time and
Newsweek. See 138 TIME July 29, 1991, at 42-47.
366. BCCI, 570 So. 2d at 384.
367. BCCI was indicted in October of 1988, had been subject to an emergency
order calling for it to cease all unsafe and unsound banking practices and activities,
and had entered into a subsequent agreement with the Comptroller in which BCCI
promised to operate using safe and sound banking practices, to cease violation of any
laws, to maintain adequate monetary reserves, and to make periodic reports concerning
compliance with these requirements. Id.
368. BCCI, 570 So. 2d at 384.
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"On March 5, 1990, three days after publication, Lewis issued a final
order denying the renewal of BCCI's Miami agency license."3 69 The
order concluded that "(a) the [$15,000,000] civil forfeiture affect[ed]
the financial condition of BCCI so as to constitute an unsafe and un-
sound banking practice; (b) the activities described in the indictment
constitute[d] criminal violations of law; and (c) renewal of the Miami
agency license [was] not in the public interest. ' 70 The Comptroller no-
tified BCCI that it could challenge the order through an administrative
hearing process or by seeking appellate review within thirty days.
Under the APA, summary orders should be issued only in an
emergency situation. In all other situations, the APA requires that a
party which will be adversely effected should be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard before any final order or action is taken.3 71 The
court re jected any claim that the legislature had totally abrogated a
pre-deprivation hearing right of applicants for a banking license. The
court found that the APA guaranteed an applicant, as well as any
other person, the opportunity to request a hearing within twenty-one
days of publication of the notice of the license renewal request. 1 The
court concluded that "[t]his statute, by its own terms, gives an appli-
cant, as well as other parties, [twenty-one] days to request a hearing.
We find nothing in the statute which authorizes the [D]epartment [of
Banking and Financing] to issue a final order prior to giving the appli-
cant a reasonable opportunity to request a hearing. 3 73 If an adminis-
trative agency chooses to rely upon the presence of an emergency to
justify summary action, then it must explain how the circumstances
present an "immediate danger to the public health, safety or wel-
fare. '" 37' In this case, the Department of Banking and Financing failed
to properly demonstrate, on the face of the order, that such an emer-
gency existed as required by a section 120.59(3).?
In Allied Education Corp. v. Department of Education,37 6 the
court noted that a cease and desist order entered against a post-second-
ary vocational school and ordering that it cease operations, presented
an appropriate circumstance for interlocutory judicial review, "because
369. Id. at 385.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. FLA. STAT. § 120.60(5)(a)2 (1989).
373. BCCI, 570 So. 2d at 385.
374. FLA. STAT. § 120.59(3) (1989); see FLA. STAT. 120.60(8) (1989).
375. BCCI, 570 So. 2d at 386.
376. 573 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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review of final agency action would not provide an adequate rem-
edy."'377 The court entered an order quashing the cease and desist order
without prejudice, because the Department of Education did not allege
and was unable to substantiate "any threat or danger to the public
health, safety, or welfare." '78 The court rejected the attempt by the
Department of Education to remedy these defects by alleging and of-
fering evidence on these issues during the hearing conducted by the
Division of Administrative Hearings as untimely, because these allega-
tions and findings should have been set forth in the emergency order
itself.3 79
In dicta, the court noted that Florida Statute section 246.2265,
which delegated to the Department of Education the authority to sus-
pend the license of educational institutions in an emergency,380 did not
require the Department of Education to comply with any of the proce-
dural safeguards which normally are applicable when an emergency
suspension, restriction, or limitation of a license is imposed.38' Without
these procedural safeguards, the "emergency action taken by an agency
prior to providing an opportunity for the effected person(s) to be heard
would run afoul of well-established constitutional guarantees of proce-
dural due process."38 ' In order to assure that section 246.2265 was not
unconstitutional, the court found that the procedure provided for in the
APA for emergency suspension of a license was required in any action
under the section. The court found that the action of the Department
of Education did not comply with this procedure, because its cease and
desist order "did not set forth specific facts and reasons for finding an
immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare, nor did it
state why the action taken was only that necessary to protect the public
interest, nor did it give reasons for concluding that the procedures uti-
lized were fair under the circumstances. 383
377. Id. at 960. The court noted that Allied Education sought interlocutory re-
view through a notice of appeal process. This was not considered the proper method for
invoking the appellate court's jurisdiction based on an interlocutory circumstance. Al-
lied Educational should have filed a petition for review of a non-final agency action
pursuant to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(c). The court treated the notice of appeal filed by
Allied Educational as such a notice for purposes of this case. Id. at 960 n.1.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 961.
380. FLA. STAT. § 246.2265 (1989).
381. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(9) (1989); FLA. STAT. § 120.60(8) (1989).
382. Allied Educ. Corp., 573 So. 2d at 961.
383. Id. at 961. The court also noted that Allied Education was not offered an
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Similar principles constrain the power of administrative agencies
to issue emergency rules.384 The decision in Little v. Coler385 concerned
a challenge to emergency rules promulgated by the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services.8 86 Under the APA, in order for an
emergency rule promulgated by an administrative agency to be valid,
the agency must publish "the facts and reasons for finding an immedi-
ate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for
concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances. '38 7
In this case, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, in
its published notice concerning these emergency rules. stated that the
reduction in appropriations for the aid to families with dependent chil-
dren program required an immediate implementation of cost reduction
plans, or the program would have insufficient funds to continue opera-
tion until the end of the fiscal year. The Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services asserted in its notice that the process being
adopted was fair, because it was impossible to promulgate a permanent
rule in time to implement the savings required by the reduced
appropriation. 88
The court held that reduction in appropriation for the program
qualified as an emergency circumstance under the APA.389 The court
found that the possibility of a transfer of funds from state trust funds
by the Governor, if an excess of those funds existed, was not a sufficient
basis for holding that no emergency existed as result of the reduced
appropriation. 9 The emergency rules were justified as long as they
were needed to assure compliance with the appropriate statutes gov-
evidentiary hearing concerning the matters alleged in the emergency cease and desist
order. Id.
384. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9) (1989).
385. 557 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
386. The court noted that initially the case was properly before it, because when
a petitioner asserts that emergency rules will have a real and substantial impact on him
or her, then rules may be challenged in a direct appeal to the court. Id. at 158; see FLA.
STAT. §§ 120.54(9), .68 (1989).
387. Little, 557 So. 2d at 158.
388. Id. The reductions implemented by the rules chiefly concerned methods by
which the amount of benefits paid out would be reduced through delays in the first
benefit payments to new applicants. Id. at 159.
389. Id. at 160.
390. Id. at 159. The court specifically found that the transfer of such funds was
far too contingent to be relied upon in avoiding the possible shortfall in the funding of
the program as it was currently constituted. Id.
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erning the program."' The failure of the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services to notify, as suggested by Florida Administra-
tive Code Rule 28-3.037, major wire services and other effected persons
of the purpose of the emergency rule was not a basis for invalidating
the emergency rules which were ultimately promulgated. The language
of rule 28-3.037 is not mandatory, so providing these types of notice is
a matter left to administrative discretion. Discretionary decisions of
this nature should be overturned by the courts only when an abuse of
discretion has occurred. The court found no evidence in this case to
support the claim that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services abused its discretion.892
F. What Counts As Evidence In An Administrative
Proceeding?
Part of what makes the hearing processes under the APA unique
is that the traditional complex rules of evidence do not constrain what
evidence may be admitted at a hearing. "Irrelevant, immaterial, or un-
duly repetitious evidence shall be excluded, but all other evidence of a
type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the con-
duct of their affairs shall be admissible, whether or not such evidence
would be admissible in a trial in the courts of Florida. ' 393 Under this
statutory scheme, hearing officers have "considerable discretion in de-
termining what evidence should be admitted at an administrative hear-
ing." 394 However, there are limits to this discretion both as to the ad-
mission and exclusion of evidence.
For example, in Conservancy, Inc. v. A. Vernon Allen Builder,
Inc., 95 the court held that it was reversible error for the hearing officer
to exclude evidence of secondary impact in determining cumulative im-
pact of a dredge and fill permit. The court found that this was relevant
non-repetitive evidence on a critical issue. 9 However, in Faucher v.
391. Little, 557 So. 2d at 160.
392. Id.
393. FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1989). But see Martin Marietta Corp. v. Roop,
566 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that administrative proceed-
ings under Chapter 120 are exempted from the rules of evidence, but that the workers'
compensation system of adjudication is governed not by the APA, but by the Florida
Rules of Evidence).
394. Burris II, supra note 4, at 755; see also Burris III, supra note 4, at 623.
395. 580 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
396. Id. at 779.
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R.C.F. Developers,39 7 the court noted that when medical records and
documents are not legible, then such medical documents and records
"cannot be regarded as competent and substantial proof of anything,
and will be disregarded in the evaluation of the evidence in the record
on appeal." ' 98 The court was clearly indicating that such information
should never have been admitted as evidence.
1. Hearsay
Hearsay evidence is generally admissible in an administrative pro-
ceeding, but the use of hearsay evidence to support an administrative
agency decision is significantly restricted under the APA. 99 Standing
alone, hearsay evidence cannot constitute competent substantial evi-
dence, but it can "be used for the purpose of supplementing or explain-
ing other evidence."' 00 In Doran v. Department of Health and Rehabil-
itative Services, °1 the court held that "[tihe documents presented
before the hearing officer were hearsay and did not come within any
recognized exception which would have made them admissible in a civil
action."'0 2 Because the documents offered in this case were uncorrobo-
rated hearsay evidence, the APA provides that such evidence cannot by
itself constitute competent and substantial evidence in a case.' 0 3 Be-
cause there was no other evidence offered in this case to prove the criti-
cal disputed factual issues, the order of the Office of Public Assistance
Appeals Hearings was reversed.' 0 However, if the hearsay evidence of-
fered had been admissible in a civil action, then it may have by itself
397. 569 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
398. Id. at 798 n.2.
399. Cf. Nowicki v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 558 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1990). In Nowicki, the court noted once again that judges of compensation
claim are required to follow the rules of evidence more closely than hearing officers in a
normal APA adjudicatory proceeding. In such a case, documents which are hearsay
must be excluded from evidence unless they are qualified for admission under one of
the hearsay exceptions. Id. at 183.
400. FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1989). "The use of hearsay evidence in this
limited manner, supplementing or explaining other evidence, is often erroneously cited
by boards or commissions in reversing the decisions of referees [or] hearing of-
ficers . . . ." Burris III, supra note 4, at 624.
401. 558 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
402. Id. at 88.
403. See FLA. STAT. § 120.58(l)(a) (1989).
404. Doran, 558 So. 2d at 88.
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constituted competent substantial evidence. 03
G. An Agency Must Follow Its Own Rules
Administrative agencies may not take action which is inconsistent
with their own rules.? 6 Generally, if an administrative agency does so,
then the reviewing court must remand the case to the agency for pro-
ceedings consistent with the agency rules. 0 7
The court used this basic principle in resolving the issue presented
in Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Department of Professional Regula-
tion.4 0 8 In Florida Optometric Ass'n, the court considered whether the
Board properly determined that the petition for intervention was filed
untimely. The structure of the APA and the Florida Administrative
Code clearly envisions that a person who may be affected by declara-
tory statements must be offered a clear point of entry into the formal
proceeding, allowing that person to contest the possible resolution of
the matter to be addressed.
The court noted that this required a notice which was "sufficient
to give persons with standing to initiate [section] 120.57 proceedings a
clear point of entry to either initiate [section] 120.57 proceedings or
intervene in already existing proceedings directed to the same agency
decision. ' 40 9 Because no statute or rule superseded the notice timing
requirements found in Administrative Code Rule 28-5.111,
the Board was required to comply with the requirements of Rule
28-5.111 in giving notice of the declaratory statement proceedings.
The published notice of the declaratory statement petition obvi-
ously failed to comply with Rule 28-5.111, in that it neither speci-
fied the time limit for requesting a hearing, nor referenced the rele-
vant procedural rules. Further, even if the published notice of the
petition for declaratory statement had complied with rule 28-5.111,
the optometrists' petition would have been timely, because it was
filed just eleven days following the April 21, 1989 publication [of
405. See FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1989); Burris III, supra note 4, at 625.
406. See Phibro Resources Corp. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 579 So. 2d
118, 123 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The court was troubled by the failure of the
Department of Environmental Regulation to follow its own rules concerning consent
orders. Id.
407. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12)(b) (1989).
408. 567 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
409. Id. at 935.
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the notice concerning the declaratory statement proceeding]. 10
The court also noted that normally, petitions for declaratory state-
ment do not concern anyone other than the particular petitioner, be-
cause they are limited to the petitioner's circumstance only. In such a
case, there is no right to a section 120.57 hearing. But if a petition for
a declaratory statement is not so narrowly drawn, it will affect "the
substantial interest of other parties," or have the potential to affect the
substantial interest of other parties so that an opportunity for a section
120.57 hearing must be offered in order to provide them with a clear
point of entry into the declaratory statement proceeding.41'
However, when the deviation from the requirements of the admin-
istrative rules has been slight or minor, then the courts have been un-
willing to reverse an administrative agency decision. Cases along this
line apparently rely on a harmless error rationale to justify the decision
not to reverse.' 12 In State v. Donaldson,13 the court noted that the
410. Id. Further, the court noted that there was no indication here that the filing
of the petition for intervention was occurring after a waiver of the right to a clear point
of entry had occurred. The court also stated that the optometrists could not have been
held to have waived their right to a clear point of entry, because they never received
adequate notice under Rule 28-5.111 that a section 120.57 hearing was going to be
held concerning the declaratory statement petition. Id.
411. Id. at 936. The court declined to address the issue of whether the declara-
tory statement sought in this case would be invalid due to the attempt to promulgate a
rule via a non-rulemaking process. In doing so, the court noted that,
although the line between the two is not always clear, it should be
remembered that declaratory statements are not to be used as a vehicle for
the adoption of broad agency policies. Nor should they be used to provide
interpretations of statutes, rules or orders which are applicable to an entire
class of persons. Declaratory statements should only be granted where the
petition has clearly set for specific facts and circumstances which show
that the question presented relates only to the petitioner and his particular
sets of circumstances. Thus, petitions which provide only a cursory factual
recitation or which use broad undefined terms . . . should be carefully
scrutinized. Similarly, petitions by associations rather than individuals,
should be inherently suspect. When an agency is called upon to issue a
declaratory statement in response to a question which is not limited to
specific facts and a specific petitioner, and which would require response of
such a general and consistent nature as to meet the definition of a rule, the
agency should either decline to issue the statement or comply with the
provisions of section 120.54 governing rulemaking.
Id. at 937.
412. Cf. Krischer v. School Bd., 555 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In
Krischer, the court held that a technical violation of the notice requirements provided
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legislature did not intend for minor deviations from the requirements
set forth in the administrative rules concerning storage and mainte-
nance schedules for a breathalyzer machine, which do not impact on its
reliability, 1 " to prohibit the use of the test results in court."15
H. Rule Making Process
Generally, courts will rigorously enforce the procedural require-
ments of the rule making process. In Martin County Liquors v. De-
partment of Business Regulation,"16 the Division of Alcoholic Bever-
ages and Tobacco challenged the decision of the hearing officer who
"found the Department's requirements that applicants for quota liquor
licenses provide documentation supporting financial arrangements and
demonstrate 'right of occupancy' are an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority.""' 7 The hearing officer found that the attempt to
for in the Florida statutes did not require reversal of an otherwise appropriate order
terminating a teacher's employment absent a showing that the teacher was prejudiced
by the failure to comply with the notice requirements. There was more than adequate
documentation that the teacher had received numerous notices concerning her inade-
quate performance, and that she was offered many opportunities to attempt correction
of this unsatisfactory performance. Any technical violation of the notice requirement
was considered harmless error. Id. at 437; see also School Bd. v. Weaver, 556 So. 2d
443 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In Weaver, the court noted that when an adminis-
trative agency failed to timely act upon a recommended order, such failure was not
grounds generally for reversal of the final order. A violation of the time frame for
rendering a final order as provided for in the APA did not require reversal "if the
fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action taken is found to have been
impaired by virtue of the statute's violation." Id. at 446. The court found in this case
that there was no evidence showing that the delay "impaired the fairness of the pro-
ceeding nor the correctness of the action." Id.
413. 579 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1991).
414. The court agreed that when no evidence was offered by the prosecution that
the breathalyzer machine was reliable, then the results of the breathalyzer test must
not be admitted. Id. at 729.
415. Id.
416. 574 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The rule challenge was filed
under section 120.56. FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1989). This case also involved a section
120.57 formal hearing in which the rule was applied concerning quota liquor licenses to
deny the application of Martin County Liquors, Inc. Id. at 172.
417. Id. at 172. Martin County Liquors, Inc. was denied its liquor license be-
cause it had failed to file with its application a right of occupancy certification for the
location where it planned to operate its business. Martin County Liquors filed a rule
challenge concerning the Department of Beverage Regulations rule 700L and 710L,
alleging that "they were not filed with the Office of Secretary of State, as well as the
84
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Burris
impose the requirements of rule 700L was an invalid exercise of dele-
gated authority, because it was not filed with the Secretary of State, as
required by the APA.41 8 The hearing officer also concluded that section
302 of the manual was an attempt to promulgate a rule without com-
plying with the rulemaking process, and was an invalid exercise of dele-
gated legislative authority.4 19 The court agreed that the failure to file
rule 7001L with the Secretary of State's office rendered it an invalid
exercise of delegated legislative authority. The court found that this
was a material failure to follow the applicable process concerning rule
making. 10
In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida
Medical Center,421 the court addressed the issue of what remedy was
available when a proposed rule, which was substantively amended, was
renoticed by the administrative agency rather than beginning the rule
making process anew. While the APA provides that an administrative
agency may adopt rules "only after the public has been notified of the
content of proposed rules and reasonable opportunity for public com-
ment has been given, 4 2 it also provides that an administrative agency
in several circumstances need not begin the rule making process again
validity of [section] 302 of the Division's, a policy and procedure since it constituted a
rule and was not properly promulgated as such." Id. at 173.
418. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(11), (13)(a) (1989).
419. Martin County Liquors, Inc., 574 So. 2d at 173.
420. Id. The court noted in dicta that there was no statutory requirement con-
cerning the items listed in rule 700L, but that if the agency had properly promulgated
such requirements through its rule making authority, they could be legally imposed on
all applicants. Id. The court also found that the manual provision of section 302 was an
attempt to impose the requirements of a rule on license applicants without complying
with the rule making process:
Applicants for quota liquor licenses are initially approved or disapproved
based on the requirements established in the DABT's policy section 302.
No other standard definition of the complete application exists, and it is to
be applied uniformly and generally to the public at large. It clearly does
not fall within the exceptions under section 120.52(16)(a). Thus, we find
that DABT's assertion that section 302 was irrelevant to their denial of
Mari:in County Liquors' application because their field office accepted the
incomplete application to be without merit. DABT's policy section 302
meets the definition of rule pursuant to section 120.52(16), and because it
was not promulgated as such, it constitutes an invalid exercise of delega-
tive legislative authority.
Id. at 174.
421. 578 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
422. Id. at 354.
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because it amended a proposed rule.423 Rather, all that is required in
those circumstances is that the amended proposed rule be renoticed.
The court noted that administrative agencies may,
make changes during the course of the rulemaking process without
the necessity of beginning the process anew, so long as the changes
(1) are supported by the record of public hearings held on the rule,
(2) are merely technical and do not affect the substance of the rule,
(3) are in response to written material contained in the record and
submitted to the agency within [twenty-one] days following the
first publication of notice of the proposed rule, or (4) are in re-
sponse to a proposed objection by the Administrative Procedures
Committee.424
423. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(13)(b) (1989); see J.B. Coxwell Contracting, Inc. v.
Department of Transp., 580 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In Coxwell, the
court noted that under the APA, an administrative agency need not re-notice its pro-
posed rule before promulgating, it even if it was amended, so long as the rule amend-
ment was adopted as "a result of testimony presented at a public hearing prior to the
rule's adoption." Id. at 623-24. The court rejected the rule challenge and held that this
was exactly what happened in this case. Id.
424. Florida Medical Ctr., 578 So. 2d at 353. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(13)(b)
(1989) provides:
After the notice required in subsection (1) and prior to adoption, the
agency may withdraw the rule in whole or in part or may make such
changes in the rule as are supported by the record of public hearings held
on the rule, technical changes which do not affect the substance of the
rule, changes in response to written material relating to the rule received
by the agency within 21 days after the notice and made a part of the
record of the proceeding, or changes in response to a proposed objection by
the committee. After adoption and before the effective date, a rule may be
modified or withdrawn only in response to an objection by the committee
or may be modified to extend the effective date by not more than 60 days
when the committee has notified the agency that an objection to the rule is
being considered. The agency shall give notice of its decision to withdraw
or modify a rule in the first available issue of the publication in which the
original notice of rulemaking was published and shall notify the Depart-
ment of State if the rule is required to be filed with the Department of
State. After a rule has become effective, it may be repealed or amended
only through regular rulemaking procedures.
See also FLA. STAT. § 120.54(11)(a) (1989) which provides:
After the final public hearing on the proposed rule, or after the time for
requesting a hearing has expired, the adopting agency shall file any
changes in the proposed rule and the reasons therefor with the committee
or advise the committee that there are no changes. In addition, when any
change is made in a proposed rule, other than a technical change, the
[Vol. 16
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However, it is equally clear that the APA provides: "[S]ubstantially
affected persons [must have] a reasonable opportunity to challenge pro-
posed rules prior to their adoption."' 25
When an administrative agency materially amends or modifies the
proposed rule after the time for challenging the rule has run"26 and the
opportunity for public comment has passed,'2 7 then interested persons
are effectively deprived of any meaningful point of access to the rule
making process. The court held such a result is contrary to the funda-
mental structure of the APA rule making process, because it would
permit an administrative agency to circumvent all meaningful public
input into the rule making process, as well as foreclosure any challenge
to the validity of the proposed rule prior to its promulgation.2 8 Clearly,
adopting agency shall provide a detailed statement of such change by cer-
tified mail or actual delivery to any person who requests it in writing at the
public hearing. The agency shall file the change with the committee, and
provide the statement of change to persons requesting it, at least 7 days
prior to filing the rule for adoption.
425. Florida Medical Ctr., 578 So. 2d at 354 (emphasis omitted).
426. The APA provides:
(4)(a) Any substantially affected person may seek an administrative deter-
mination of the invalidity of any proposed rule on the ground that the
proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
(b)The request seeking a determination under this subsection shall be in
writing and must be filed with the division within 21 days after the date of
publication of the notice. It must state with particularity the provisions of
the rule or economic impact statement alleged to be invalid with sufficient
explanation of the facts or grounds for the alleged invalidity and facts suf-
ficient to show that the person challenging the proposed rule would be sub-
stantially affected by it.
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1990).
427. Under the APA,
[i]f the intended action concerns any rule other than one relating exclu-
sively to organization, procedure, or practice, the agency shall, on the re-
quest of any affected person received within 21 days after the date of pub-
lication of the notice, give affected persons an opportunity to present
evidence and argument on all issues under consideration appropriate to in-
form it of their contentions . . . .The agency may schedule a public hear-
ing on the rule and, if requested by any affected person, shall schedule a
public hearing on the rule.
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). Thus, any affected person has an absolute
right to a public hearing on a proposed rule, if a timely request was made.
428. lAin agency need only publish notice of an innocuous proposed rule,
wait 21 days so that the time for demanding a public hearing under
120.5.4(3) or petitioning for a determination of invalidity under 120.54(4)
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in this case the amendment of the proposed rule was substantial, be-
cause it fundamentally changed the criteria for awarding certificates of
need. 29 Therefore, the rule making process must begin anew and the
parties must be offered an adequate point of entry. 30
In Florida Medical Center, the court also noted that any time an
administrative agency publishes notice of a change in a proposed rule, a
substantially affected person has a new twenty-one day period within
which to file notice of a rule challenge under section 120.54(4) claim-
ing that the administrative agency violated the limitation imposed by
section 120.54(13)(b) on the amendment or modification of a proposed
rule.481 Any successful challenge to the amended proposed rule under
this process will require the administrative agency to withdraw the
amended proposed rule, or begin the rule making process anew."3" The
court specifically found that this reading of the time frame for filing a
section 120.54(4) challenge to a proposed rule was required, because
the post-promulgation rule challenge provisions are not as complete or
adequate a set of safeguards as the pre-promulgation rule challenge
provision under section 120.54(4) .4
has passed, and then simply change the rule however it wishes. The fact
that such changes might be in excess of the limitations of Section
120.54(13)(b), and might bear no resemblance to the original proposed
rule, would not matter, at least so far as the public right to be heard prior
to rule adoption. In our view, such a holding would not comport with the
legislative intent. Rather, it would effectively defeat the legislative pur-
poses undergirding Section 120.54.
Florida Medical Ctr., 578 So. 2d at 354 (emphasis in original).
429. The original proposed rule provided that certificates of need should be is-
sued in a manner to assure that "unnecessary duplication of services" did not occur in
the area of adult cardiac catheterization programs. Id. at 353. The amended proposed
rule dropped this focus and substituted a concern for "fosterling] competition among
[adult cardiac catheterization] providers." Id.
430. Id. at 354-55.
431. Id. at 355.
432. Florida Medical Ctr., 578 So. 2d at 355. The court found that competent,
substantial evidence existed that the proposed rule amendment in this case was
designed to give effect to private negotiations between the administrative agency and a
substantially affected person who had filed a section 120.54(4) challenge to the original
proposed rule. These negotiations and the subsequent amendment of the proposed rule
were not within the permitted scope of amendments authorized under section
120.54(13)(b). Id.
433. Id. at 355. Judge Miner dissented because once the rule became effective,
as it had in this case, section 120.56 should have been used to bring a rule challenge,
not section 120.54(4). Id. (Miner, J., dissenting). If the limitations found in section
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In an unusual case concerning a challenge to an administrative
rule, the court addressed the question of when the Division of Adminis-
trative Hearings could legitimately reject a rule challenge as a pretext
for circumventing the prohibition against prisoners filing section 120.57
petitions challenging the administration of rules by prison officials. 43 4
In Ramadanovic v. Department of Corrections,35 a prisoner chal-
lenged a rule adopted by the Bureau of Prisons. His rule challenge was
dismissed by the Director of the Department of Administrative Hear-
ings, because it did not comply with the requirements of section 120.56
for a rule challenge. The court found that when Ramadanovic made
specific allegations in his petition about how the rule was being applied
to his particular circumstance, it was not cause to hold that the petition
was an attempt to file a section 120.57(1) petition in the guise of a
section 120.56 rule challenge. The court noted that any rule challenge
petition under section 120.56 must "state with particularity facts suffi-
cient to show the person seeking relief is substantially effected by the
rule. '43 6 Thus, the fact that Ramadanovic's petition contained allega-
tions about how the rule applied to him was not sufficient evidence to
show that he had filed a section 120.57(1) claim in the form of a sec-
tion 120.56 rule challenge.437
1. Economic Impact Statement
In Cataract Surgery Center v. Health Care Cost Containment
Board, s3 the court, in what it admitted was the most flagrant dicta,43 9
120.54(13)(b) on amending a proposed rule were violated, then a basis for declaring
the rule invalid in a section 120.56 rule challenge existed. Id. at 356.
434. Prisoners are prohibited under the APA from participating in any adminis-
trative proceeding other than rule challenges. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(12)(d) (1989).
435. 575 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
436. IFLA. STAT. § 120.56(2) (1989) quoted in Ramadonovie, 575 So. 2d at 1335.
437. Ramadanovic, 575 So. 2d at 1334-35. The court remanded the case to the
Department of Administrative Hearings "for entry of an order stating with specificity
grounds warranting dismissal of Ramandanovic's petition, or for further proceedings on
petition, pursuant to section 120.56(2)." Id. at 1335.
438. :581 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
439. The court held that the proposed rules were invalid ultra vires acts. See
supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text. The discourse on the adequacy of the eco-
nomic impact statement was wholly unnecessary. The issue should have been dismissed
as one which the court need not reach, as it did concerning at least one other issue
raised by the parties. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360 n.l. Not only did the
court not need to decide the issue in order to resolve the case, it also acknowledged that
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noted that the inadequate economic impact statement was a possible
independent basis for declaring the proposed rules invalid. The court
found that the economic impact statement prepared by the Health
Care Cost Containment Board was grossly insufficient and violated the
APA rule making requirements concerning such statements. The court
correctly noted both the purpose of an economic impact statement and
the limited circumstances under which any defect in an economic im-
pact statement justified holding a rule or proposed rule invalid:
The purpose of an economic impact statement is "to promote
agency introspection in administrative rulemaking; to ensure a
comprehensive and accurate analysis of economic factors, which
factors will work together with social factors and legislative goals
underlying agency action; to direct agency attention to key consid-
erations and thereby facilitate informed decision making."
Preparation of an economic impact statement is a procedural re-
quirement, and any defect in its preparation will not defeat an oth-
erwise valid rule as long as evidence proves that an agency fully
considered the economic impact of its action or if it is established
that the agency's proposed action will have no economic impact
... [or the] deficiencies in the economic impact statement [did
not] impair the fairness of the rulemaking proceedings. "4
The hearing officer in this case determined, after an extensive con-
sideration of the evidence, that the weight of the evidence demon-
strated that any deficiencies in the economic impact statement were
harmless error. The court rejected this conclusion, because the Health
Care Cost Containment Board had "ignored its statutory duty" when it
failed to evaluate whether there would be substantial ongoing costs in
complying with the proposed rules."41 The court found that "these costs
were reasonably ascertainable[,] . ..the board took no action to dis-
cover that information .. . [and] had the board been fully aware of
these costs, that knowledge may have had an impact on the board's
decision as to what data to require and what method to utilize in col-
probably no one had standing to raise the issue. As the court noted, "it is unnecessary
for us to rule on this issue or the standing of the appellants in regard to the small and
minority business issue." Id. at 1365.
440. Id. at 1363-64 (quoting Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Wright, 439 So. 2d 937, 940 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
441. Id. at 1364.
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lecting that data."" 2
The court also criticized the Health Care Cost Containment Board
for failing to follow the required procedures to assess whether the pro-
posed rules would have an impact on small and minority businesses. By
failing to determine whether such an impact existed, the Health Care
Cost Containment Board effectively circumvented the APA rule mak-
ing requirement that when such an impact exists notice must be sent to
the Small and Minority Business Advocate, the Minority Business En-
terprise Assistance Office, and the Division of Economic Development
of the Department of Commerce," 8 and further, that each of these en-
tities must be given an opportunity, prior to final agency action on the
proposed rule, "to present evidence and argument and to offer alterna-
tives regarding the impact of the rule on small business.' The court
believed that these procedural requirements were not designed as a fu-
tile process offering little or no hope for the amendment of the proposed
rule, because the administrative agency must adopt the proposed alter-
natives or file with the Administrative Procedures Committee a written
statement explaining why it did not adopt the alternatives."8 By failing
to properly assess any impact on small and minority businesses, the
Health Care Cost Containment Board "precluded these parties from
providing input essential to protecting small businesses" as mandated
by the statute." 6
This aspect of the decision in Cataract Surgery Center is a classic
example of a court offering its opinion on an issue which was totally
irrelevant to the resolution of the case. It was particularly offensive in
this case, as the discussion of the small and minority businesses re-
quirements was totally gratuitous, because the parties before the court
in all probability lacked standing to raise the issue. Finally, the court
did not offer a persuasive explanation of why it should reject the fac-
tual findings of the hearing officer on the economic impact statement
issues. While the court concluded that the Health Care Cost Contain-
442. 1d.
443. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(b) (1989).
444. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(b)l (1989); see Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d
at 1364. The author knows of no case, nor did my informal survey of individuals who
practice in the area disclose any cases, where any of these entities has offered any
comment as a result of receiving notice.
445. See Health Care Cost Containment Bd., 581 So. 2d at 1365 ("It cannot be
assumed that the Board would have rejected the input from these representatives.");
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(b)2-3 (1989).
446. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1364-65.
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ment Board had failed to make any reasonable attempt to develop a
legitimate economic impact statement, the hearing officer found suffi-
cient evidence to reach a contrary result. The court, in rejecting the
findings of the hearing officer on these factual issues, was engaged in
substitution of judgment.
The APA provides that judicial review of factual issues is very
limited:" "
If the agency's action depends on any fact found by the agency in a
proceeding meeting the requirements of [section] 120.57, the court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact. The court
shall, however, set aside agency action or remand the case to the
agency if it finds that the agency action depends on any finding of
fact that is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the
record.4 8
In this case, the court ignored the limited scope of judicial review, or
attempted to avoid it by characterizing the factual issues as a question
of law-whether the Health Care Cost Containment Board had filed an
economic impact statement. The former was as gross a violation of the
requirements of the APA as the court accused the Health Care Cost
Containment Board of committing, while the latter was a subterfuge
given the fact that the Health Care Cost Containment Board had pre-
pared an economic impact statement.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Preservation of the Right to Review
The APA449 and the Florida Constitution'5" guarantee the right to ju-
dicial review of administrative decisions. However, this right is not ab-
solute,'51 and there are several ways in which a party may lose or
447. See infra notes 552-75 and accompanying text; Burris III, supra note 4, at
633-36.
448. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1989).
449. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1989); see FLA. STAT. § 120.69 (1989).
450. See FLA. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 9, 18, 21; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1).
451. Any party seeking judicial review must satisfy standing requirements. Fail-
ure to do so is generally, but not always, fatal to obtaining judicial review. See Cat-
aract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1365 (discussing issue concerning the adequacy of
the economic impact statement without first determining whether any party had stand-
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waive, either intentionally or unintentionally," 2 its right to judicial re-
view," 53 or fail to qualify for judicial review.
If a party failed to timely request or fulfill the statutory prerequi-
sites for judicial review, then the right to judicial review may be lost. 4 4
However, in Stewart v. Department of Corrections,8 5 the court noted
that even though a party had failed to timely file a notice of appeal
concerning an administrative order, it should not preclude the judicial
review process from going forward. The court found that such time
limitations, especially where, as here, there was only a one day viola-
tion, may be avoided by the application of the doctrine of equitable
tolling. In such a case, the burden was on the party seeking the benefit
of the equitable tolling doctrine to show either "excusable ignorance of
the limitations" or a lack of prejudice to the administrative agency
arising from the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. The court
found that there was no evidence here that the administrative agency
had been prejudiced, and permitted the late filing of the notice of ap-
peal to preserve the rights to judicial review. 56
Besides a timely filing of a petition for judicial review, other fac-
tors must also be satisfied before judicial review can occur. In Rabren
v. Department of Professional Regulation,457 the court noted that in
order for judicial review to be available, the following must be shown:
ing to raise the issue); City of Destin v. Department of Transp., 541 So. 2d 123, 127
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding, in part, that the Department of Transportation
waived its right to question whether the City of Destin had standing to invoke a formal
hearing under the APA by not raising the issue before or during the formal hearing.)
452. See Prestressed Decking Corp. v. Medrano, 556 So. 2d 406, 409 (Fla. 1st.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (When a party fails to properly raise an issue as part of the
administrative hearing process, the hearing officer is precluded from considering that
issue in its recommended order.).
453. Without a stay of enforcement of the administrative agency decision, judi-
cial review may result in a correction of a wrong that may not have an adequate rem-
edy. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.68(3), .69(5) (1989); Stables v. Rivers, 559 So. 2d 440
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that filing a motion for protective order did not
constitute an automatic stay for any scheduled depositions).
454. Markham v. Moriarty, 575 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, Abundant Life Ctr. v. Markham, 112 S. Ct. 440 (1991) (per curiam); see also
Machin v. Lumber Transp., Inc., 556 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(noting that while there may be circumstances under which the requirements for timely
filing notice of appeal may be tolled, a judge of compensation claims cannot grant a
time extension when he no longer has jurisdiction over the matter).
455. 561 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
456. Id. at 16; cf. supra notes 313-28 and accompanying text.
457. 568 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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"(1) the action is final; (2) the agency is subject to the provisions of the
APA; (3) he was a party to the action which he seeks to appeal, and
(4) he was adversely affected by the decision."' "5
During the survey period, several decisions considered the question
of what constitutes final administrative agency action. In Friends of the
Hatchineha, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation,"" the
court noted that before a person is entitled to a formal administrative
hearing "there must be final agency action affecting the petitioner's
substantial interests, coupled with a disputed issue of material fact. ' 60
A variety of decisions can satisfy this requirement of final agency ac-
tion. In Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc., the court held that a letter
granting an agricultural exemption constitutes final agency action when
it was used to justify the dismissal of a complaint filed by the Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation concerning the building of an access
road or driveway through wetlands.461 The court found that the De-
partment of Environmental Regulation "exercised its discretion by de-
termining that no permits were required. The exercise of such discre-
tion constituted final agency action.' 62
Palm Springs General Hospital v. Health Care Cost Containment
Board " concerned an agreement between the Health Care Cost Con-
tainment Board and Palm Springs General Hospital on how medicaid
reimbursement pays should be calculated. This agreement was the ba-
sis for termination of the administration hearing concerning the dis-
pute. However, after the matter was removed from the hearing officer's
docket, the Health Care Cost Containment Board notified Palm
Springs General Hospital by letter that it would not honor the written
agreement settling the dispute. Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc.
sought judicial review of the decision contained in the letter notifying it
that the Health Care Cost Containment Board would not honor the
written agreement concerning this matter.' 6' The court held that al-
though the letter was a form of informal administrative agency action,
it was final for purposes of judicial review. The court reversed and re-
458. Id. at 1288.
459. 580 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
460. Id. at 269.
461. Id. at 271. The court properly noted that a long line of cases had estab-
lished that a decision by an administrative agency that it lacked jurisdiction was a form
of final agency action. Id. at 271-72; see supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
462. Id. at 272.
463. 560 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
464. Id. at 1348-49.
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manded the matter to the Health Care Cost Containment Board for
implementation of the settlement agreement."65
Under some circumstances, even interlocutory orders may be con-
sidered final administrative agency action. In Holland v. Courtesy
Corp.,6 the court noted that where a matter was decided which effec-
tively precluded consideration of any other issues in the case, even
though the order may resemble a nonfinal decision, it shall be treated
as final for purposes of seeking judicial review. "[Iln the classic sense,
• . . [an interlocutory] order . . . is a final order . . . [when] it dis-
posed of all matters then pending before the . . . [judge of compensa-
tion claims or administrative hearing officer]. ' '"40
B. Scope of Hearing Officer's Authority Over Factual Issues,
Penalties and Questions of Law
The dichotomy between factual and legal issues directly effects
how courts approach the judicial review process, especially when an
administrative agency's final order overturned the recommended order
of a hearing officer .4' The APA provides that the discretion of an ad-
ministrative agency to reject the factual findings and penalty recom-
mendation of a hearing officer in a recommended order is very limited.
The agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions
of law and interpretation of administrative rules in the recom-
mended order, but may not reject or modify the findings of fact
unless the agency first determines from a review of the complete
record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings
of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that
the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply
with essential requirements of law. The agency may accept the rec-
ommended penalty in a recommended order, but may not reduce or
increase it without a review of the complete record and without
stating with particularity its reasons therefor in the order, by citing
465. .d. at 1349-50. The court also awarded attorney's fees to Palm Springs
General Hospital, finding it was a gross abuse of discretion for the administrative
agency to renounce the settlement agreement. It remanded the case to the Division of
Administrative Hearings for determination of the appropriate amount of attorney's
fees. Id. at 1350 n.2.
466. 563 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
467. 1d. at 789-90.
468. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)10 (1989); see FLA. STAT. § 120.68(7) (1989).
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to the record in justifying the action. 69
A number of cases addressing these issues during the survey period
demonstrated how administrative agencies continue to struggle with the
limited scope of their discretion in these areas.
In Clay County Sheriffs Office v. Loos,7 0 the court held that the
Unemployment Appeals Commission erred in finding that a memo pro-
vided a basis for overturning the factual conclusions reached by the
appeals referee. The memo, from the sheriff to all personnel, indicated
that any employee who did not receive permission to enroll in a train-
ing course would have been required to pay for the training course,
rather than the Department. The appeals referee denied unemployment
benefits to Loos who was terminated from his position as a deputy sher-
iff, because he attended a radar training course in direct disobedience
of a superior officer's denial of his request to attend such a course, as
set forth in the memo.7 1
The Unemployment Appeals Commission found that the memo
created confusion on the part of employees concerning whether they
would suffer any other disciplinary action besides having to pay for the
training course themselves. 4' The court found that there was compe-
tent substantial evidence to support the appeals referee's finding that
direct disobedience of the order of a superior officer not to attend this
training program showed an intentional and substantial disregard by
the employee of his duty and obligation to the employer, as defined by
a superior officer's command. 4' The memo was considered by the ap-
peals referee and the Unemployment Appeals Commission was merely
substituting its factual judgment for that of the appeals referee-a
practice forbidden by the APA.'7 '
469. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)10 (1989); see FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)10 &
n.1 (1991) (further restrictions on the discretion of an administrative agency to reject
the findings of a hearing officer).
470. 570 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
471. The appeals referee found that Loos had engaged in misconduct by enroll-
ing in the course in the face of instructions to the contrary, and that successful comple-
tion of the course would have increased the employee's salary by $20 per month. Id. at
395. Misconduct is defined by statute as "carelessness or negligence of such a degree
. . . as to . . . show an intentional and substantial disregard . . . of the employee's
duties and obligations to an employer." FLA. STAT. § 443.036(26) (1989).
472. Loos, 570 So. 2d at 395.
473. Id. at 395-96.
474. The court also concluded that the Unemployment Appeals Commission
erred in concluding that as a matter of law, the definition of misconduct did not cover
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Kan v. P.G. Cook Assocs.475 was another example of an adminis-
trative agency overstepping its authority by reweighing or reevaluating
the evidence heard by the hearing officer or appeals referee. In this
case, the Unemployment Appeals Commission reversed a decision of
the appeals referee which had granted Kan unemployment compensa-
tion benefits. The appeals referee found that Kan was promised addi-
tional training, if necessary, to enable him to meet his employer's ex-
pectations concerning the number of bicycles he should assemble per
hour. The employer had failed to provide the additional training, and
as a result, Kan's earnings were substantially diminished. In such a
circumstance, the appeals referee found that a reasonable "average
able-bodied qualified worker" would give up his employment as a re-
sult. 47 '6 The Unemployment Appeals Commission found that Kan un-
derstood that the initial eighty hours of instruction would permit him to
assemble the requisite number of bicycles per hour, and that his em-
ployer had never guaranteed him a minimum wage. Because of these
factors, which the Unemployment Appeals Commission believed were
overlooked by the appeals referee, it reversed and held that Kan was
not entitled to unemployment compensation.
The court reversed the decision of the Unemployment Appeals
Commission. The court noted that the Commission may reverse the de-
cision of an appeals referee concerning factual findings only if it could
demonstrate that such factual findings were not supported by compe-
tent substantial evidence.47 The court found no indication in the record
that any information had been improperly ignored or overlooked by the
appeals referee, and the decision of the appeals referee was supported
by competent substantial evidence. As a result, the court found that the
Commission had improperly reweighed the evidence in overturning the
appeals referee's order.47 8
In Freeze v. Department of Business Regulation,479 a final order
by the Department of Business Regulation, revoking an alcoholic bev-
erage license, was reviewed by the court. The court noted that the De-
partment of Business Regulation had "no authority to reject the find-
the circumstance that the hearing officer found present in this case. See id.
475. 566 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
476. Id. at 933 (quoting Uniweld Prod., Inc. v. Industrial Relations Comm'n,
277 So. 2d 8,27, 829 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
477. Id. at 933.
478. Id. at 934.
479. 556 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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ings of fact of the hearing officer which were supported by competent,
substantial evidence. Factual issues susceptible of ordinary methods of
proof that [were] not infused with policy considerations . . . [were] the
prerogative of the hearing officer as finder of fact."' 8 An administra-
tive agency errs when it rejects "the hearing officer's findings of fact
and . . . substitut[es] its own where there was conflicting evidence, or
sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer's findings. An agency
may not reject the hearing officer's findings unless there is no compe-
tent, substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be
inferred.""8"
The court reviewed the evidence concerning whether smoking
pot 82 on the porch of the establishment occurred, and affirmed the
hearing officer's findings of fact on this issue, stating that the Depart-
ment of Business Regulation had properly relied on it in its final order.
As to the other factual findings, the court merely asserted that the De-
partment of Professional Regulation improperly rejected the hearing
officer's findings, because it did so based upon credibility of the testi-
mony offered. In doing so, the Department exceeded its review author-
ity and improperly substituted its judgment for that of the hearing of-
ficer.' 83 While these errors required the court to remand the case, the
court clearly indicated that the same penalty may be imposed for the
"pot smoking" incident. 4
480. Id. at 1205 (citations omitted).
481. Id. (emphasis in original).
482. Also known as marihuana.
483. Freeze, 556 So. 2d at 1206.
484. Id. Judge Gershon, in his dissent, argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence to prove that the owners of the establishment had notice of illegal drug transac-
tions, or that consumption of illegal drugs was occurring on the premises, because there
was no evidence that either of the owners were present at the time these transactions
occurred, or that their employees were aware of these illegal transactions. Id. Further,
the Department of Business Regulation erred in disagreeing with the hearing officer's
findings that the owners were incapable of determining whether marijuana was being
used on the premises, and that the owners had taken adequate steps to diligently police
the possibility of such use. "Clearly, the Department rejected the hearing officer's find-
ings and substituted its own findings based upon its re-evaluation of the evidence. Just
as clearly, the Department had no authority to reject the hearing officer's finding of
fact because the findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence." Id. at
1207. Judge Gershon concluded by stating that the Department of Business Regulation
erred in substituting its judgment on these factual issues, and that the case should be
remanded with instructions to reinstate the alcoholic beverage license of these individu-
als. Id.
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In Greseth v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices,4 5 an employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services was suspended for "willful violation of rules, regulations, or
policies of the Department."486 The hearing officer found that Greseth
was the only investigator in her unit which was supposed to have three
investigators, and that she was overworked in terms of her case
assignments.
In the case of L.Y.'s report, Greseth relied on the initial report
from the hospital, after it had been confirmed by L.Y.'s grand-
mother that the baby would not be released for at least two weeks.
Therefore, from the information available to Greseth, the baby was
not in immediate danger. Greseth intended to contact the hospital
to verify the information on January 9, but became ill and was out
of work for a week. 87
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services policies re-
quired their investigators to contact the mother of the child within
twenty-four hours of the abuse report, or to initiate an out-of-town in-
quiry if the parties involved in the abuse report were not in the vicinity.
Greseth was also required by Department policy "to contact the hospi-
tal and clarify the abuse report during her initial investigation.' 88
"The hearing officer concluded that Greseth did not wilfully violate
policies because she was assigned, with the Department's knowledge, to
more cases than she could physically handle.' 8 9 The hearing officer
485. 573 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
486. Id. at 1005. Greseth was assigned a neglect child report for investigation.
The concern was that the child was being medically neglected by its parents. The
child's grandmother contacted Greseth and informed her that when the child was re-
leased from the hospital, both the mother and baby would live at the grandmother's
residence. The grandmother further reported that the child would not be released from
the hospital for some time. Greseth reported these facts to her supervisor and asked for
advice on how to proceed. The supervisor did not respond to her inquiry, and soon
thereafter, Greseth became ill and was absent from her job for a period of nine days.
During this time, the supervisor failed to review her files or in any way take steps to
provide for further investigation of her files during her absence. Upon returning to
work, Greseth soon learned that baby L.Y. had been released from the hospital the day
before she had become extremely ill. The baby subsequently died, and the death was
considered "unrelated to any action or inaction on Greseth's part, or for that matter, as
a result from any neglect on the part of the mother." Id. at 1005-06.
487. Id. at 1006.
488. Id.
489. Id.
1991]
99
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
further found that Greseth had acted appropriately, based upon the in-
formation she had available, in determining that the case of L.Y. was
low priority because of the fact that the child was hospitalized, and
that she did not act negligently in reaching such a decision.
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services accepted
the hearing officer's findings of fact, but concluded that Greseth had
actually acted either negligently or willfully in violating these policies
by not making "a few phone calls which it claimed would have satisfied
[the] regulations.""9" The Department remanded the case to the hear-
ing officer for consideration of mitigating circumstances. The hearing
officer again noted that there was insufficient evidence that Greseth had
acted either willfully or negligently in violating the Department's pol-
icy, given her case load, the need to prioritize the cases, and the lack of
her supervisor's assistance, and recommended that Greseth receive the
lightest suspension possible.
Greseth argued that the Public Employees Relation Commission
acted improperly in agreeing with the Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services that her conduct constituted negligent or willful
violation of Department policy. "An administrative agency may not re-
ject the hearing officer's findings unless there is no competent, substan-
tial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred.""9"
The court noted that decisions concerning whether negligent or willful
misconduct had occurred are findings of fact traditionally within the
scope of a hearing officer's discretion, absent a showing that there was
a lack of competent and substantial evidence to support them. The ad-
ministrative agency may not simply reweigh the evidence and reach
contrary conclusions where the record does provide competent and sub-
stantial evidence to support the hearing officer's findings on these two
issues. 492
The court held that the administrative agency could not avoid this
limitation on the scope of its authority to overturn the hearing officer's
recommended order by merely labeling its contrary findings of fact as
conclusions of law. "Substituted factfinding, thinly disguised as a con-
clusion of law, is wholly improper. ' 493 There was no indication that the
Public Employees Relation Commission was making a decision "in an
490. Greseth, 573 So. 2d at 1006.
491. Id.
492. Id. (citing Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277,
1281-82 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
493. Id. at 1006-07.
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area of special expertise, and therefore [the court] need not defer to
. . . its special knowledge."49 " The record amply supported the hearing
officer's finding that Greseth did not engage in negligent or willful con-
duct given the case load that she was assigned, lack of support from
her supervisor, and her unexpected illness. The court reversed and re-
manded the case to the Public Employee Relation Commission so that
it could enter an order "vacating her suspension and granting her lost
wages, attorney's fees, and expenses as a result of the proceeding
below." 495
Smith v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 96
concerned the appeal of a final order issued by the Public Employees
Relation Commission which accepted the decision by the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services to suspend the employee for
twenty days, even though the hearing officer had found that no penalty
should be imposed in the case. The hearing, officer had issued a recom-
mended order finding that the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services had failed to prove that Smith was negligent in carrying
out her duties.497 The Public Employees Relations Commission ac-
cepted the hearing officer's findings of fact, but disagreed with the
hearing officer's inference that such facts demonstrated non-negligence
on Smith's part. The court found that while it may have been a close
case, the inferences reached by the hearing officer were reasonable.
Where reasonable people may differ over the issue of what inferences
should be drawn, then the Public Employees Relation Commission
must affirm the decision of the hearing officer. In such cases, the find-
ings of the hearing officer are considered supported by competent and
substantial evidence. 9 8
While on most occasions the restrictions on administrative discre-
tion found in section 120.57(1)(b)10 are violated by administrative
agencies improperly overturning factual findings made by hearing of-
ficers, in a few cases, administrative agencies erred in refusing to over-
turn the factual findings of a hearing officer when it was appropriate to
do so.499 Department of Professional Regulation v. Wise5°0 concerned
494. Greseth, 573 So. 2d at 1007.
495. Id.
496. 555 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
497. Id. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services found that Smith
had failed to make arrangements for children so that they would not have to spend the
night in the screening area of the Dade County Juvenile Detention Center.
498. Id. at 1256.
499. Cf. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. Department of Health &
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the appeal of a final order by the Board of Medicine which dismissed
disciplinary complaints against Dr. Wise. The Board specifically relied
on factual findings made by the hearing officer. The complaint against
Dr. Wise alleged that he had influenced several female patients to have
sexual relations with him. Dr. Wise maintained that these events had
never occurred.
At the hearing, five former patients testified on how Dr. Wise had
influenced them to have sexual relations with him. Over the objection
of the Department of Professional Regulation, the hearing officer per-
mitted Dr. Wise to offer evidence concerning the entire sexual history
of each witness. The hearing officer ultimately concluded in his recom-
mended order that "the testimony of the former patients was not
clearly convincing," 50 1 and recommended that no disciplinary action be
taken against Dr. Wise. The hearing officer offered no explanation as to
why the testimony of the former patients did not constitute clear and
convincing evidence.
After an initial review of the hearing officer's recommended order,
the Board of Medicine remanded the case to the Division of Adminis-
trative Hearings for reconsideration in light of whether the sexual his-
tory of the patients should have been admitted. On remand, the same
hearing officer concluded that the evidence of sexual history was rele-
vant as to credibility, and explained why, in light of this information,
he found that the former patients did not present credible clear and
convincing evidence of misconduct by Dr. Wise. The Board of
Medicine again reviewed the officer's recommended order, and con-
cluded that the findings of fact were, in part, based upon what it con-
sidered to be inadmissible evidence. However, in light of the Division of
Administrative Hearings' position, it concluded that it had no choice
but to accept the hearing officer's recommended order, and dismissed
the complaint.
In Wise, the court held that admission of the sexual history evi-
dence was reversible error. 50 2 The court found that the testimony con-
Rehabilitative Servs., 559 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that a
record may not provide competent, substantial evidence to support a hearing officer's
factual findings when he misread the application being reviewed).
500. 575 So 2d 713 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
501. Id. at 714.
502. The Department of Professional Regulation also argued that the determina-
tion of admissibility of evidence was a question of law which, under the APA, was left
to the administrative agency. The Board of Medicine was correct in its initial review of
the hearing officer's decision, and in remanding the case to the Department of Admin-
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cerning the sexual history of the patients was irrelevant and did not
bear on their credibility.503 The court noted that "evidence of a witness'
relationship with a person other than the accused, standing alone,
ha[d] no probative value in the credibility determination. '"50 4 The only
time that sexual history would be relevant in determining the credibil-
ity of a witness was when the defendant claimed that it explained the
witness' motive for testifying falsely against him. Because the sexual
histories in this case did not concern sexual relationships with Dr.
Wise, they were not relevant to any claim that the witnesses were moti-
vated to testify falsely against him. The sexual relationships related in
these histories were completely unrelated to those which occurred with
istrative Hearings for the exclusion of what it viewed as irrelevant testimony, because
the Board of Medicine was acting within the scope of its delegated authority and not
interfering with the factual finding process by the hearing officer. When the case was
remanded to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Division erred in refusing to
comply with the direction from the Board of Medicine concerning the admissibility of
the irrelevant sexual history evidence. Id. at 716-17. The court refused to address this
issue because it was moot given its resolution of the admissibility issue. The court noted
it would have been a different case if the Department had petitioned the court for a
writ of mandamus when the Division of Administrative Hearings refused to comply
with its request on remand. Id. at 717.
However, the position of the Department of Professional Regulation on this issue
was not sound for three reasons. First, the hearing officers are generally the triers of
fact, and if anybody in the APA administrative process has expertise on admissibility
questions, it would be the hearing officers who deal with these issues on a day-to-day
basis, not the administrative agencies performing their review function prior to issuing
final orders. See FLA. STAT. § 120.65(4) (1989) (requiring hearing officers to be exper-
ienced members of the Florida Bar); FLA. STAT. § 120.58 (1989) (hearing shall be
conducted by the presiding officer, in most cases a hearing officer). Second, if adminis-
trative agencies do have the authority to overrule the decisions of hearing officers on
admissibility questions, then their role as the initial finders of fact would be substan-
tially undermined, and potentially, the APA preference for using initial fact finders
who are independent of the administrative agencies would be functionally destroyed.
See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(a) (1989). Third, it would become another device for ad-
ministrative agencies to use in attempting to avoid the limited scope of their discretion
to reject the factual findings of hearing officers. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(10) (1989).
503. The court rejected the Department of Professional Regulation's position
that the rape shield statute prohibited admission of evidence concerning the patient's
sexual history. FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1989). The court noted that the rape shield stat-
ute was designed to reach only prosecutions under the criminal statutes. FLA. STAT. §
794.011 (1989). Because this was not a criminal prosecution for sexual battery, the
rape shield statute was not applicable to this administrative hearing which concerned
whether Wise should be disciplined by the Board of Medicine. Wise, 575 So. 2d at 715.
504. Wise, 575 So. 2d at 715.
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Dr. Wise.505 It was therefore error for the hearing office to admit this
irrelevant evidence in such a case,506 and the court ordered the case
remanded to the Board of Medicine.
505. Id. The court noted that the Department of Professional Regulation agreed
by stipulation to the admission of medical records which did contain information con-
cerning the sexual histories of the witnesses for purposes of proving that they were Dr.
Wise's patients. This did not in any way waive the Department of Professional Regula-
tion's objection to the use of these medical histories in trying to impeach the credibility
of the patients. The court also noted that the medical records did not contain much of
the information which was brought out at the hearing, and therefore the records could
not be said to have been the source of most or even the majority of the objectionable
testimony. Id.
506. The court went on to note that just because irrelevant testimony had been
permitted in the hearing, reversal of the Board of Medicine's decision is not necessarily
justified. "Where unfairness has not otherwise infected the fact-finding process, find-
ings which are founded solely upon evidence which is competent and substantial will
not be disturbed on appeal." Id.; FLA. STAT. § 120.68(8) (1989). It was clear in this
case that the irrelevant testimony concerning the witnesses' sexual history played a
critical role in the hearing officer's determination of their credibility. This precluded
the court from being able to determine whether there was competent, substantial evi-
dence supporting the hearing officer's findings independent of the irrelevant testimony.
"Under these circumstances, we cannot say with any certainty that the improper ad-
mission of irrelevant evidence did not impair the fairness or correctness of the fact-
finding process. We, therefore, determine that remand for clarification of the recom-
mended findings is required." Wise, 575 So. 2d at 716. The court also noted that the
Board of Medicine, given the status of the record with the irrelevant testimony playing
what was apparently a key role, was also precluded from finding whether the hearing
officer's determinations were supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id.
507. The court remanded,
with directions that the Board further remand the case to the hearing of-
ficer. The hearing officer shall review the record from the hearing previ-
ously held before him and enter a new recommended order, either on the
record before him, taking into account only the legally relevant evidence
previously admitted, or he may, at his option, consider additional evidence
in deciding the issue. We direct that the new recommended order shall set
forth a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts of record
supporting the findings of fact.
Id. at 717. The court also found that the Department of Professional Regulation was
correct in arguing that the factual finding by the hearing officer that "the testimony of
L.H. was no more persuasive in this case than it was before the psychiatric society, was
not supported by competent substantial evidence." Id.
Judge Ervin, in his concurring opinion, noted that the court should have resolved
the question of whether the Board of Medicine had the power, on the initial remand, to
direct the Division of Administrative Hearings that it not consider certain evidence
which it had concluded was irrelevant. Id. at 717-18. Normally, an administrative
agency may:
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Perhaps the most controversial APA restriction on administrative
agency authority to overturn a hearing officer's conclusions concerns
recommended penalties.50 8 The restriction "generally denies ... [an
administrative] agency authority to vary the penalty once it accepts the
hearing officer's factual conclusions as supported by substantial compe-
tent evidence." 50 9
In Bradley v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commis-
sion,51° after an administrative hearing, the hearing officer recom-
mended that Bradley, a certified correctional officer, receive a six
month suspension of his certificate. The Criminal Justice Standards
and Training Commission rejected this recommended penalty, and re-
voked Bradley's correctional officer certificate. The Commission offered
adopt the recommended order as its final order, or the agency, in its final
order may reject or modify the recommended conclusions of law, but only
if it determines from the record and states with particularity that the find-
ings were either not based on competent, substantial evidence, or that the
proceeding in which the findings were based did not comply with the essen-
tial requirements of law.
Wise, 575 So. 2d at 718. Judge Ervin indicated that absent a showing of prejudice on
the part of the hearing officer, it was not appropriate for administrative agency to re-
mand a case for a new hearing or reevaluation of the record by another hearing officer.
However, Judge Ervin noted that nothing in this scheme precluded the Board of
Medicine from remanding to the hearing officer for clarification of the recommended
order, if it determined that it was unable to, based upon the original recommended
order, determine whether there were erroneous conclusions of law or whether the rec-
ord adequately supported the findings of fact by the hearing officer. Judge Ervin noted
that there was no specific statutory authorization for this clarification remand, but he
believed ihat it was a reasonable inference to be drawn from section 120.57(1)(B)l0)
and section 120.59(2) of the APA. Id. This was so because without the remand, the
Board would have been unable to determine "whether the recommended order would
have been entered without such evidence, could hardly be expected to comply with its
statutory obligation either to adopt, reject, or modify the submitted findings of fact, or
to recite its final order explicit and concise statements of underlying facts of record in
support of its findings." Id. at 718-19. He noted "that [administrative] agencies have
the same authority as appellate courts to remand for clarification in circumstances
where it is uncertain whether a finder of fact would have reached the same result if the
evidence which the finder of fact incorrectly admitted had not been received." Id. at
719. The Board of Medicine was correct in remanding the case for clarification.
508. "The [administrative] agency may accept the recommended penalty in a
recommended order, but may not reduce or increase it without a review of the complete
record and without stating with particularity its reasons therefore in the order, by cit-
ing to the record in justifying the action." FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(10) (1989).
509. Burris III, supra note 4, at 629.
510. 577 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (motion for certification).
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no new grounds or policy reasons for why it rejected the hearing of-
ficer's recommended penalty. In fact, the, Commission's decision was
based solely on the factors specifically considered by the hearing officer.
The court found that this was a classic case of the administrative
agency imposing a higher penalty by substituting its judgment for that
of the hearing officer. The only basis for the substitution of judgment
offered by the Commission was that it simply disagreed with the hear-
ing officer's assessment of the seriousness of the offense committed by
corrections officer Bradley. Under the APA "[a]n [administrative]
agency should not reject the recommended penalty without properly re-
jecting, amending, or substituting at least one recommended finding of
fact or conclusion of law." '511 The Commission thus violated this dictate
by enhancing the penalty in this case.51"
Bajrangi v. Department of Business Regulation"1 3 also concerned
the validity of a punishment imposed in a final administrative order.
Bajrangi was charged by the Department of Business Regulation with
having sold an alcoholic beverage to an underage individual without
first requesting identification. The Department issued a notice of viola-
tion, and requested that Bajrangi "show cause why his license should
not be suspended or revoked.""1 " After a formal administrative hearing,
"[tlhe hearing officer. . . found as fact that[,] '[t]he usual penalty for
a licensee selling to an underage person is [a] $1,000 civil penalty ac-
companied by a [twenty] day license suspension.' "515 However, in the
section of the hearing officer's recommended order concerning conclu-
sions of law, he found that there were no rules promulgated concerning
appropriate penalties for a first offense violation. Lacking such rules or
guidelines from the administrative agency, the hearing officer con-
cluded that a twenty day suspension and $1,000 fine were inappropriate
for a first offense, and not supported by any evidence or argument. The
hearing officer instead recommended a penalty consisting of a three day
511. Id. at 639.
512. The court acknowledged that this decision was in conflict with Allen v.
School Board where the Third District Court of Appeal approved of an administrative
agency imposing a penalty beyond that imposed by the hearing officer, even though the
agency had fully adopted the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
571 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). The court certified the question to the
Florida Supreme Court, noting that its decision and that of the Fifth District Court of
Appeal conflicted with the decision in Allen. Bradley, 577 So. 2d at 639.
513. 561 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
514. Id. at 411.
515. Id. at 412.
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license suspension and a $1,000 fine.516
The final order entered by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco adopted the decision of the hearing officer, except that it
found a three day license suspension inappropriate, and it imposed the
twenty day suspension originally suggested. The Division characterized
the hearing officer's conclusion concerning the appropriate number of
days for license suspension as a conclusion of law. The Division found
in fact that there were penalty guidelines in existence, and pointed to
the Raney's testimony asserting that the appropriate penalty for a first
time offense was a twenty day suspension and $1,000 fine.517
Since 1984, the APA has provided that an administrative agency
"may no longer reduce or increase a recommended penalty without a
review of the complete record and without stating with particularity its
reasons in the order, by citing to the record 'in justifying the ac-
tion.' "5" Thus, the court read the decision by the supreme court in
Department of Professional Regulation v. Berna 19 as merely reaffirm-
ing thait the APA required an administrative agency to state on the
record valid reasons for disregarding the recommended penalty con-
tained in the hearing officer's recommended order. The decision in
Bernal did not indicate when an administrative agency's "rationale for
increasing a penalty [was] 'legally insufficient' or 'valid' and there is
some disagreement concerning the circumstances in which an appellate
court should invalidate agency orders that alter penalties recommended
by hearing officers."52 In this case, it appeared that the Division of
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco and the hearing officer "simply disa-
gree[d] about the appropriate penalty for the . . . single act of sale of
a beer to a minor." 5 1 Such disagreement did not fall within the area
where an administrative agency's expertise can be used to justify im-
posing an enhanced penalty. Any other scheme would threaten the in-
dependence of the hearing officer, which the APA envisioned.5 22
516. Id.
517. Id. at 411-12.
518. Bajrangi, 561 So. 2d at 413 (emphasis in original).
519. 531 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1988).
520. Bajrangi, 561 So. 2d at 414; Department of Professional Regulation v.
Bernal, 521 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1988).
521. 561 So. 2d at 415.
522. The APA makes clear that:
[T]he virtue of neutrality is greater than the virtue of expertise. Given that
the hearing officer and the agency should always be working from the
same record, the circumstances under which the agency would be justified
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Both Bradley and Bajrangi demonstrated continued approval of a
two track approach to an administrative agency overturning recom-
mended penalties. To overturn the recommendations, the administra-
tive agency can state the particular reasons for rejecting it and cite to
support in the record for its position, or the agency can claim it is a
policy matter within the agency's expertise. The former is an approach
which parallels that adopted for rejecting factual findings by a hearing
officer. An administrative agency can review the complete record and
state with particularity its reasons for deviating from the hearing of-
ficer's recommended penalty. However, if the agency merely disagrees
with the assessment of the seriousness of the offense by the hearing
officer in a particular case, then it is not an adequate justification for
rejecting the hearing officer's recommended penalties.
The latter approach closely resembles a non-rule policy in that it
permits a general claim of expertise to establish a policy which justifies
imposing a penalty not recommended by the hearing officer. The dan-
ger posed by this approach is three fold:
First, it opens the door for [administrative] agencies to rejecting
recommended penalties as long as they used the magic words 'gen-
eral policy disagreement' to characterize why they rejected the rec-
ommended penalty of the hearing officer. This may be permitted
even though the nature of the penalty to be imposed in a case is
generally a fact specific determination. Second, it invites a general
abuse of the law/fact dichotomy by approving of the characteriza-
tion of what in most cases is a factual issue as a legal or policy
matter.528
Third, it permits an administrative agency to avoid providing adequate
explanation and documentation of a nonrule policy governing the na-
ture of penalties to be imposed for certain administrative offenses.524
While an administrative agency's discretion to reject a hearing of-
ficer's findings of fact is limited, no such constraint is imposed on its
discretion regarding findings concerning questions of law. In Ritenour
in substituting its judgment concerning the appropriate penalty for that of
the hearing officer should not arise except where one or more of the hear-
ing officer's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law are prop-
erly rejected, substituted or amended by the [administrative] agency.
Id.
523. Burris III, supra note 4, at 632-33.
524. See supra notes 258-309 and accompanying text.
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v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,25 a referee, after hearing ex-
tensive testimony, concluded that the employee had not voluntary left
her employment, but rather, had been forced out for good cause due to
the irrational if not abusive treatment.52 The Unemployment Appeals
Commission reversed the appeals referee, holding that given the facts
of the case, the good cause legal standard had not been met.52
The court stated that the appeals referee was the trier of fact in
unemployment compensation cases. It was thus the duty of the appeals
referee to weigh and reject conflicting evidence. On this basis, questions
of whether a person left his or her employment voluntarily clearly were
questions of fact, including whether a person left for good cause. How-
ever, before questions of fact can be properly addressed, the appeals
referee :must correctly understand the legal standard of good cause.
This focuses on the question of whether the circumstances "would im-
pel the average, able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his employ-
ment."528 Thus, the court stated:
While the appeals referee found that a good cause to terminate
existed because of the employer's irrational or abusive conduct,
there was no finding (except perhaps by inference) that this irra-
tional, abusive conduct would cause the average, able-bodied, qual-
ified worker to quit his or her employment.529
It was this very question of what the average person would do in
response to the conduct of the employer which caused the Unemploy-
ment Appeals Commission to reverse the findings of the appeals refe-
ree. This was considered a legal error by the appeals referee. Under the
APA, it is clearly permissible for an administrative agency to overturn
an erroneous legal interpretation adopted by an appeals referee or hear-
ing officer.530 "The commission in this case, basing its decision on the
appeals referee's facts, concluded that the appeals referee's conclusion
of law was erroneous. The legislature had given the Commission that
authority." 531
525. 570 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
526. Id. at 1107.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(10) (1989).
531. Ritenour, 570 So. 2d at 1108.
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Harloff v. City of Sarasota 32 concerned an appeal of a final order
of the Southwest Florida Water Management District which granted
Harloff a consumptive use permit for water allowances which were sub-
stantially less than the amounts he had requested.53 The District ac-
cepted the factual findings of the hearing officer,5" ' but rejected the
hearing officer's legal conclusions and adopted those which had been
advocated by its staff.535
The issue before the hearing officer was whether the District had
properly determined the extent to which Harloff should have been per-
mitted to withdraw water in order to safeguard the interest of the City
of Sarasota which had a pre-existing water use permit.8 6 Chapter 373
of the Florida Statutes required that an applicant for a water use per-
mit demonstrate the following: 1) that the use must be a reasonable
and beneficial one; 2) that granting the application will not interfere
with any pre-existing permitted water use; and 3) that granting the
permit would be consistent with the public interest.537 Everyone in-
532. 575 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
533. Id. at 1328.
534. The hearing officer found that the City of Sarasota had maintained a
wellfield since 1966 adjacent to Harloff's farm land. Until January 1991, the wellfield
was permitted by the Southwest Florida Water Management District to withdraw be-
tween six and seven million gallons per day. Id. at 1325-26. Since 1966, the water table
at the wellfield site had been substantially lowered. By 1989, the water table dropped
to such an extent that the wellfield could not pump the maximum number of gallons
per day authorized by District. This threatened the continued viability of the wellfield
until steps were taken to adequately preserve the water table level in the future.
Harloff used a semi-closed ditch irrigation system in order to water his 8,500 acres
of farm land. A drip irrigation system, which would have been more expensive to oper-
ate, would have resulted in substantial water savings, but the officer made no finding as
to whether it was economically feasible for Harloff to adopt this system. Harloff re-
quested that District grant him a permit authorizing him to withdraw 26 million gal-
lons per day as a seasonal average and 32 million gallons per day as a seasonal daily
maximum with 15 million gallons per day as an annual average. The District granted
him 15.6 million gallons per day as a seasonal average, 21 million gallons per day as a
daily maximum, and 11.1 million gallons per day as an annual average. The District's
staff had specifically found that the Harloffs withdrawal of water would effect the
continuing viability of the wellfield for the City of Sarasota. Id. at 1326.
535. The staff recommendations were specifically rejected by the hearing officer.
536. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1326.
537. See FLA. STAT. § 373.019(4) (1989) (A "'reasonable-beneficial use' means
the use of water in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization
for a purpose and in a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the public
interest."); FLA. STAT. § 373.223 (1989).
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volved agreed that Harloff's agricultural enterprise was a reasonable
and beneficial use. However, the City of Sarasota contested whether
the request was consistent with the City's existing permit for water
use.53 8 The City also alleged that any threat to the City's existing water
use posed by Harloff's request would be inconsistent with the public
interest.5 39
The hearing officer concluded that if Harloff's request for water
consumption was granted, substantial damage to the functional ability
of the City's wellfield would result. Despite this factual finding, "the
hearing officer recommended that Mr. Harloff receive a consumptive
use permit for the entire allowance of water that he had requested. 540
The District rejected this legal conclusion based upon the findings of
fact, and ruled that Harloff had failed to establish that his requested
consumptive use would not interfere with any existing permitted water
use, and that the requested use was not inconsistent with the public
interest.
The court "affirm[ed] the decision because the District's board
was free to substitute its own legal conclusions for those of the hearing
officer, so long as competent substantial evidence supported the substi-
tuted legal conclusions. "541 The final order of the District essentially
required that Harloff substantially curtail his agricultural activities, or
alter those activities, in order to provide adequate protection to the
wellfield permitted for water supply to the City of Sarasota."' The
court found that the District failed to point to or explain what legal
error was committed by the hearing officer.
Nonetheless, the court concluded "[o]n full review of the record,
however, we are convinced that the District correctly found errors of
law in the hearing officer's proposal and that the District's final order
[was] supported by competent, substantial evidence."5 ' The court rea-
soned that while an administrative agency may be required to ade-
quately explain its reasons with particularity concerning any rejection
of a proposed penalty, there was no such requirement when an agency
rejected a conclusion of law that did not involve the imposition of any
538. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1326-27.
539. Id. at 1327.
540. Id.
541. Id. at 1325.
542. Id.
543. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1327.
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penalty. 4" The court noted that the District had been granted broad
powers by the legislature to implement the water management plan for
that area. An essential element in the exercise of those powers was that
they be carried out in a logical and consistent fashion.
If the legal interpretation of these policies were left to various
hearing officers, the concepts would inevitably receive different
meanings before different hearing officers. Because agency boards
are charged with the responsibility of enforcing the statutes which
govern their area of regulation, courts give great weight to their
interpretation of those statutes.5 45
Thus, determinations of what constitutes a reasonable and beneficial
use, an interference with existing permanent water use, or what is in
the public interest are matters which involve important policy ques-
tions. It would be impossible to maintain consistent policies if individ-
ual hearing officers were allowed to exercise their discretion in inter-
preting the legal concepts and their meaning. 46 The court noted that
such decisions involved both questions of law and fact. However, the
court determined that "[a]n agency's decision on such a mixed question
is entitled to 'increased weight when it is infused by policy considera-
tions for which the agency has special responsibility.' -" The court
concluded that the District, in reaching its decision, concerning the
scope of permitted water use that Harloff was entitled to, engaged in
an interpretation of the statute, not a substitution of its judgment con-
cerning factual matters.54 8
The court went on to note that the hearing officer made two errors
in interpreting the scope of the law:
First, the hearing officer's recommended order appears to place the
burden of proof on the City or the District staff to establish that
Mr. Harloff's requested permit would interfere with the water sup-
ply at the ...wellfield. The statute, however, clearly places the
burden on Mr. Harloff to prove that his request would not
interfere.549
544. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)10 (1989).
545. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1327.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 1328 (quoting Santaniello v. Department of Professional Regulation,
432 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
548. Id.
549. Id.
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In light of this allocation of the burden of proof, Harloff failed to
demonstrate that his requested permit use would not substantially in-
terfere with the continued viability of the wellfield and the City of Sar-
asota's preexisting use permit.55 While the court did not explicitly find,
it clearly indicated that Harloff had failed to carry his burden of per-
suasion on this point.
Second, the hearing officer erred in concluding that the City of
Sarasota should take steps to improve the ability of a wellfield to re-
trieve water from the lowered water table. This may well have been an
issue if the City of Sarasota's permit for use of the wellfield was before
the District, but it was not an issue when considering Harloff's request
for a water use permit. The statute made it clear that the City's prior
permit for water use was entitled to non-interference in its current con-
dition, and that the hearing officer erred in imposing any additional
burden on the City to modify the wellfield in order to permit Mr.
Harlofl" to use water at the level he requested."'
C. Deferential Judicial Review of Factual Issues
The competent and substantial evidence standard of judicial re-
view for factual determinations made by administrative agencies 552 is
designed to restrain reviewing courts from reweighing the evidence and
substituting their judgment for that of the administrative agency on
factual issues.553 "[Clourts will not review conflicting evidence, or
550. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1328.
551. Id.
552. The competent and substantial evidence standard of judicial review does not
apply in every case. It is limited to those records developed in hearings which meet the
requirements of section 120.57. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1989). If the record of the
administrative hearing is destroyed, then generally the appropriate remedy is to vacate
the order and remand to the agency for a de novo hearing. Gay v. Department of State,
550 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
553. See, e.g., Department of General Serv. v. English, 534 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (courts are prohibited from making credibility judgments or
substituting their own judgment for that of the administrative agency, hearing officer,
or referee). The prohibition against reweighing of the evidence also applies when there
has been no administrative agency hearing. In such a case, the reviewing court may
order an administrative agency to conduct a "factfinding proceeding under this act" in
order to resolve disputed factual issues necessary to determining whether an adminis-
trative agency's action in the case was valid. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(6) (1989). After an
administrative agency has made the necessary factual findings, the reviewing court is
restricted to setting aside, modifying, or ordering agency action when "the facts compel
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make any determination with respect to the weight of the evidence, as
these are usually matters for administrative agency determination."5 "
This is a very deferential standard of judicial review which generally
requires courts to construe the record in the light most favorable to the
administrative agency decision. 555 Also, the courts will not permit par-
ties, during the judicial review process, to supply facts not found in the
administrative record. 56 In Hillsborough County School Board v. Wil-
liams,55 7 the court noted that a disputed factual issue which was not
resolved at the hearing may not be "supplied at the appellate level." 58
In such a case, the reviewing court must remand the case to the admin-
istrative agency for a determination of the disputed factual issue. 5 9
The burden is on the party attacking the agency's factual determi-
nations to demonstrate that these determinations are not supported by
competent substantial evidence in the record.560 This burden cannot be
a particular action as a matter of law, or it may remand the case to the agency for
further examination and action within the agency's responsibility." FLA. STAT. §
120.68(11) (1989). Because this standard of judicial review appears to foreclose any
judicial overturning of the factual determinations made by an administrative agency, it
is even more of a deferential standard of review than that imposed on the court under
the competent and substantial evidence standard. While this approach is both time
consuming and in some cases wastes the limited resources of administrative agencies
and the courts, it does insure that an administrative agency has made the initial factual
determinations and that the reviewing court is not free to reject the administrative
agency's factual determinations or independently evaluate the record to reach its own
factual conclusions.
554. Rolling Oaks Utils. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 533 So. 2d 770, 772 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (clarified on rehearing).
555. See Faucher v. R.C.F. Developers, 569 So. 2d 794, 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (noting that in reviewing a record under the competent and substantial
evidence standard of review, the evidence should be interpreted and construed in light
of the whole record for the purpose of "findfing] as much consistency as possible in the
testimony of the various witnesses, and determine what irreconcilable conflicts remain
in the evidence").
556. Cf. Palm Beach Community College v. Department of Admin., 579 So. 2d
300, 302-03 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) (where parties to an adminis-
trative proceeding have agreed to a stipulated set of facts, then it was reversible error
for the administrative agency to base the decision on new findings of facts).
557. 565 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
558. Id. at 854.
559. See Schultz v. Mr. Donut of Am., 564 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
560. Administrative "[algency determinations may be set aside if the . . . court
finds that the agency's conclusions are derived from findings of fact not supported by
competent record evidence." Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am. v. Department
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met if the administrative record is not before the court, or if the admin-
istrative agency never resolved the disputed factual issue. In City of
Sarasota v. AFSCME Council 1979,51 the court noted that a party
seeking judicial review of a decision by an administrative agency had
the burden of providing the court with an appropriate record so that
the judicial review process could go forward. When a party is seeking
judicial review of an administrative order relating to an automatic stay,
"[a]t a minimum . . . this court [should receive] . . . a copy of the
final order, any pleadings regarding the stay and the lower tribunal's
order on the stay.""' Without a record for review, the court must af-
firm the administrative agency's decision to deny the automatic stay,
because it had no basis for determining that the decision was an abuse
of discretion." 3
Similarly, in Rabren 11,56' the court noted that it was the duty of
the Department of Professional Regulation, as the party seeking judi-
cial review in this case on the issue of the appropriateness of the recom-
mended penalty, to provide a transcript of the proceedings. Because it
failed to do so both before the Board of Pilot Commissioners and also
on appeal before the court, there was no basis for overturning the rec-
ommended penalty, because an administrative agency is prohibited
from "deviating from the recommended penalty without reviewing the
'complete record . ... " ,,51 The failure to provide a transcript in such
a circumstance cannot be characterized as harmless error, because
there may well have been evidence in the record indicating whether
these docking facilities should or should not have been characterized as
independent ports within the Tampa Bay port area.5 66
The net result is that in most cases, the reviewing courts write
opinions demonstrating how agency factual determinations were ade-
quately supported by the record. 567 For example, in Manasota-88, Inc.
v. Agrico Chemical Co.,568 the court noted that the decision of the De-
of Health and Rehabilitative Serv., 559 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Rolling Oaks Utils., 533 So. 2d at 772.
561. 563 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam).
562. Id. at 830.
563. Id. at 830-31.
564. 568 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
565. Id. at 1289-90; see FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)10 (1989).
566. Rabren II, 568 So. 2d at 1290.
567. See Martin County Liquors v. Department of Business Regulation, 574 So.
2d 170, 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
568. 576 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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partment of Environmental Regulation was supported by substantial
competent evidence, and that it would not reweigh such evidence. Ac-
cordingly, no factual error was committed by the Department in this
case.
569
Also, Citizens of Florida v. Wilson,570 after extensively reviewing
the testimony of the only witness before the Public Service Commis-
sion, the supreme court concluded that the record provided competent
and substantial evidence in support of the Commission's decision con-
cerning the facts, and that its order was not arbitrary as a matter of
law. In doing so, the court reaffirmed that the competent and substan-
tial evidence standard of review should be applied in reviewing the
records of hearings before the Public Service Commission. This stan-
dard of judicial review prohibited the court from reevaluating or re-
weighing the evidence heard by the Commission. This prohibition was
considered to extend to any inferences that should have been drawn
from the testimony that the Commission heard during the course of the
proceedings. 571
These cases, and others, do not imply that convincing a court to
reject an administrative agency's findings of fact is an impossible
task.5 72 However, they do require a record that clearly demonstrates
that the factual findings of the administrative agency were not sup-
ported by competent substantial evidence, which is a relatively rare
circumstance.673
Burd v. Division of Retirement5 74 is a classic example of the type
of record which will convince an appellate court to reject an adminis-
trative agency's findings of fact. In Burd, the court noted that it was
appropriate for it to reverse and remand an administrative order when
the fact finder overlooked unrefuted testimony on the central factual
issue in the case. In such cases, there was no inappropriate substitution
of judgment by the court on a factual issue, but rather an appropriate
reversal, because the factual finding of the administrative agency was
569. Id. at 782-83.
570. 569 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1990).
571. Id. at 1270.
572. One of the best arguments is that the administrative agency improperly re-
jected the factual findings of the hearing officer. See supra notes 468-551 and accom-
panying text.
573. Far too often the courts are presented with arguments by counsel which
essentially are requests for the courts to reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credi-
bility of witnesses.
574. 581 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
[Vol. 16
116
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Burris
not supported by competent substantial evidence. 75
D. Deferential Judicial Review of Questions of Law
The power of an administrative agency to interpret a statute or
rule could be viewed as an invasion of the core judicial function of
interpreting the law.576 However logical this extreme position may be,
it has never enjoyed much support. 57 7 The principle is well settled "that
administrative agencies are necessarily called upon to interpret stat-
utes. ''5 78 Courts have gone even further; not only can an administrative
agency interpret statutes, "agency determinations with regard to a stat-
ute's interpretation will receive great deference [from reviewing courts]
in the absence of clear error or conflict with legislative intent. ' 57 9
The . . . general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide dis-
575. See id. at 974; cf. Faucher v. R.C.F. Developers, 569 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) In Faucher, the court noted that in order for the judge of com-
pensation claims to reject the medical opinions offered by doctors who testified during
the course of the hearing, an adequate demonstration on the record must be made that
such opinions were based upon false or incomplete medical history given by the claim-
ant to these doctors. In order to demonstrate this, the record must reflect that questions
were addressed to the doctors "specifically inquiring about the effect of the false or
admitted information on the doctor's previously expressed opinion." 569 So. 2d at 801.
But see id. at 804 (Nimmons, J., dissenting).
576. Perhaps the most famous statement along these lines is found in Marbury v.
Madison; "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
577. Rather, the position has been that the courts must always retain the power
to determine whether the administrative agency acted within the scope of its delegated
authority. See supra notes 38-81 and accompanying text; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) ("The judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.").
578. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So. 2d 1160,
1162 (Fla. 1989).
579. E.g., Martin County Liquors v. Department of Business Regulation, 574 So.
2d 170, 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Florida Sugar Cane League v. State, 580
So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("We are disinclined to disturb their
conclusions based on the established principle that [administrative] agency policy de-
terminations should be accorded deference by a reviewing court."); accord Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 n.1 1 ("The court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construc-
tion, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had
arisen in a judicial proceeding.").
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cretion in the exercise of their lawful rule making authority, clearly
conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' gen-
eral statutory duties. An agency's construction of the statute it ad-
ministers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned
unless clearly erroneous. [Moreover,] [t]he agency's interpretation
of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the
most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible
interpretations.5 80
This approach generally results in the courts affirming agency interpre-
tations of statutes.58 Similarly, a court will defer to an administrative
agency's interpretation of its rules "unless the interpretation is clearly
erroneous." 582 The classic circumstance that will satisfy this standard
of judicial review occurs when a court finds that an administrative
agency's interpretation was "contrary to the plain and unequivocal lan-
guage" of the statute or rule.583
E. Nondeferential Judicial Review of Questions of Law
Courts most often abandon the deferential approach of judicial re-
view when it involves an administrative agency's interpretation of the
law.5 84 During the survey period, the courts consistently held that two
circumstances justified abandoning the usual deference given to admin-
istrative agency resolution of questions of law. 585 First, if the adminis-
580. Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
581. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 636-38. The degree of deference courts
should extend to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute has been much
debated in both the federal and state courts. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-
45, the Supreme Court explained its current position on this question.
582. Eager v. Florida Key Aqueduct Auth., 580 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam); see also Meridian, Inc. v. Department of Health & Re-
habilitative Servs., 548 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
the court must affirm an administrative agency's interpretation of agency rules unless
"arbitrary, capricious, or not in compliance with the ... [relevant statutory
provisions]).
583. See id.; see also Town of Palm Beach v. Department of Natural Resources,
577 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
584. The courts in some cases have abandoned the deferential approach of judi-
cial review of factual issues. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 635-36; Burris II, supra
note 4, at 776-78.
585. There are few examples of other circumstances when the courts will not
defer to an agency interpretation of the law. See Cataract Surgery Ctr. v. Health Care
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trative agency's interpretation of a statute or administrative rule was
contrary to express language or purpose, then the court will not hesi-
tate to overturn the interpretation.586 Second, if the interpretation
adopted by the administrative agency would result in the court's decla-
ration that the statute was an impermissible delegation of authority or
that the administrative rule was an ultra vires act, then, if-it is reasona-
ble to do so, the court will reject the administrative agency's interpreta-
tion and impose one which avoids these problems." 7
In Elmariah v. Department of Professional Regulation,588 the
court considered the issue of whether the hearing officer correctly con-
cluded that the false and deceptive statements made by Dr. Elmariah
in his application for staff privileges at various hospitals were not suffi-
ciently related to the practice of medicine to justify disciplinary action
by the Board of Medicine. The Board was delegated the authority to
discipline doctors for "making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent repre-
sentations in the practice of medicine . . . .""' The Board rejected the
hearing officer's conclusion and found that staff privileges "directly re-
lated to the practice of medicine or to the attempt to practice
medicine." '
The court noted that:
Although it is generally held that an agency has wide discretion in
interpreting a statute which it administers, this discretion is some-
what more limited where the statute being interpreted authorizes
sanctions or penalties against a person's professional license. Stat-
utes providing for the revocation or suspension of a license to prac-
tice are deemed penal in nature and must be strictly construed,
Cost Containment Bd., 581 So. 2d 1359, 1364-65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); St.
Johns N. Util. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 549 So. 2d 1066, 1069-70 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (noting that an "agency bears the burden of providing a reasonable
explanation for inconsistent results based upon similar facts;" if the explanation is rea-
sonable, then the court must affirm the agency's interpretation); Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 537 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
a court in reviewing constitutional challenge to an agency decision will give no defer-
ence to the agency's resolution of such constitutional claims).
586. See, e.g., Town of Palm Beach v. Department of Natural Resources, 577
So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
587. See Department of Envtl. Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So. 2d 988
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
588. 574 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
589. FLA. STAT. § 458.331(k) (1983).
590. Elmariah, 574 So. 2d at 165.
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with any ambiguity interpreted in favor of the licensee.59 1
The practice of medicine for purposes of Florida Statutes Chapter 458
is defined as "the diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription of any
human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or other physical or mental
condition."592 While common sense may have indicated that staff privi-
leges bore some relationship to the practice or the attempt to practice
medicine, the court found that the statutory definition of the practice of
medicine clearly prohibited the Board of Medicine from punishing a
doctor for this type of misconduct, because the responses did not con-
cern any form of a diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription for
any human disease, and as such could not form the basis for discipli-
nary action.59 3
F. Judicial Review of Agency Rule Making Activity
While much of the decision in Cataract Surgery Center v. Health
Care Cost Containment Board" " may be criticized,5 95 the court did
avoid the pitfalls associated with trying to apply the new paradigm for
judicial review announced in Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation.596 In Cataract Surgery Center, the
court echoed the decision of Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of
Environmental Regulation" " when it noted that the standard of judi-
591. Id.
592. FLA. STAT. § 458.305(3) (1983).
593. The misrepresentations made by Dr. Elmariah were somehow related to his
practice or attempt to practice, but it cannot be said that they were made "in" the
practice of medicine. Elmariah, 574 So. 2d at 165; see FLA. STAT. § 458.331(k)
(1983).
594. 581 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
595. See supra notes 438-48 and accompanying text.
596. 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
597. 365 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 74 (Fla
1979). In Agrico Chemical Co., the court described the conceptual approach and stan-
dard of judicial review for administrative agency rule making activity:
Given a proposed rule within the general area of regulation delegated by
the legislature to an [administrative] agency, the test of arbitrariness is the
same for the proposed rule as it would be for a statute having the same
effect.
Rulemaking by an [administrative] agency is quasi-legislative action and
must be considered with deference to that function . . . .The challenge
[to a proposed rule] under [FLA. STAT. ]§ 120.54(4) is a two-step process:
The challenge is first heard before an administrative hearing officer whose
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cial review applied when determining the validity or invalidity of an
administrative agency's rules or proposed rules is very deferential.
An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to
great weight and is not overturned unless clearly erroneous. An
agency is given broad discretion in the exercise of its lawful author-
ity and the burden is on a petitioner to demonstrate that a rule is
arbitrary and capricious. 598
However, such broad administrative agency discretion in the rule
making context was not recognized in Manasota-88, Inc. v. Department
of Environmental Regulation5" where the court embraced the Adam
Smith Enterprises' two tier approach,600 and through its application
order "shall be final [administrative] agency action." That final [adminis-
trative] agency action is subject to judicial review. Both the hearing officer
(acting in a detached quasi-judicial capacity) and this Court should deter-
mine from the evidence presented whether or not there is competent, sub-
stantial evidence to support the validity of the rule.
Thus, in a [section] 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the
legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the pro-
posed rule is encompassed within that grant. The burden is upon one who
attacks the proposed rule to show that the [administrative] agency, if it
adopts the rule, would exceed its authority; that the requirements of the
rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the
requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the pur-
pose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the require-
ments thereof are arbitrary or capricious.
A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or reason or
irrationally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or
despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon com-
petent substantial evidence. Competent substantial evidence has been de-
scribed as such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.
The requirement that a challenger has the burden of demonstrating [ad-
ministrative] agency action to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of
administrative discretion is a stringent one indeed. However, the degree of
such required proof is by a preponderance of the evidence . ...
Id. at 762-63 (citations omitted).
598. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360-61.
599. 567 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 164 (Fla.
1991).
600. ]In Adam Smith Enters.,
[the] court indicated that the standard of judicial review applied in evalu-
ating the validity of a rule depends on how the issue reached the courts. If
judicial review is conducted pursuant to a direct appeal from an adopted
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demonstrated the dangers inherent in the technique of judicial review
urged on the courts in Adam Smith Enterprises. The decision in
Manasota-88, Inc. involved a challenge to the Department of Environ-
mental Regulation amended rules concerning discharge source stan-
dards for groundwater. The primary standards addressed health-threat-
ening contaminants, and the secondary standards addressed aesthetic
factors in judging the effect of a discharge into a groundwater
source."' The amended rules exempted "all existing dischargers from
compliance with secondary standards unless [the Department of Envi-
ronmental Regulation] determined that compliance was necessary to
protect groundwater used or reasonably likely to be used as a potable
water source. '6
0 2
However, even in these latter cases, an exemption was available if
the discharger could "demonstrat[e] that the economic, social, and en-
vironmental costs of compliance outweighed the economic, social, and
environmental benefits of compliance . . . [as long as it involved no
violation of] secondary standards at any private or public water supply
agency rule using the informal rule making procedures, then the standard
of judicial review is arbitrary and capricious. This is a less stringent stan-
dard of judicial review of the factual record than the competent substantial
evidence which is applied in the review of adjudicatory decisions. "Under
th[e] arbitrary and capricious standard . . . an agency is . . . subjected
only to the most rudimentary command of rationality. The reviewing court
is not authorized to examine whether a rulemaker's empirical conclusions
have support in substantial evidence. Rather, the arbitrary and capricious
standard requires an inquiry into the basic orderliness of the rulemaking
process, and authorizes the courts to scrutinize the actual making of the
rule for signs of blind prejudice or inattention to crucial facts. [This re-
quires] the reviewing court . . . [to] consider whether the agency: (1) has
considered all relevant factors; (2) has given actual, good faith considera-
tion to those factors; and (3) has used reason rather than whim to progress
from consideration of these factors to its final decision." However, if judi-
cial review of an administrative rule arises out of the context of adjudica-
tory proceedings used during the rule making process, then the agency's
quasi-legislative rule making process is converted to an adjudicatory pro-
cess and the standard of judicial review for factual conclusions supporting
the rule is the competent substantial evidence standard. This occurs be-
cause the hearing officer's factual conclusions become the basic record for
the court to review.
Burris III, supra note 4, at 645-46 (citations omitted) (quoting Adam Smith Enters.,
553 So. 2d at 1273).
601. Manasota-88, Inc., 567 So. 2d at 896.
602. Id.
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well beyond the discharger's property boundary."603 Manasota-88, Inc.
and other environmental groups were parties participating in the rule
making process. After the amended rules were adopted, they sought
judicial review of their validity. °4
The court noted that because of this procedural posture of the
case, there was no administrative adjudicatory hearing record. In such
cases, the standard of judicial review required that the rule be "reason-
ably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation, and ...not
arbitrary or capricious." 60 5 In such circumstances, all the reviewing
court need do is determine that the administrative agency addressed
"all [the] relevant factors .. .[in] good faith . ..and . . . used rea-
son rather than whim to progress from consideration of these factors to
its final d.ecision."606 The critical question was what constituted an ade-
quate record in a case where no section 120.57 formal adjudicatory
hearing was held.
On this point, the court ruled that a record in such cases consisted
of:
(1) the agency's initial proposal, its tentative empirical findings,
important advice received from experts, and the description of the
critical experimental and methodological techniques on which the
agency intends to rely; (2) the written or oral replies of interested
parties to the agency's proposals and to all the materials considered
by the agency; and (3) the final rule accompanied by a statement
both justifying the rule and explaining its normative and empirical
predicates. 07
[A] statement of the relevant facts considered by the rulemaker
• ..[which] should reveal "if and how the rulemaker considered
each factor throughout the process of policy formation," detailing
for the reviewing court "the actual attention [the rulemaker] gave
to the factors, and explain[ing] his final disposition with respect to
each of them." 608
603. Id. at 896-97.
604. Id. at 897; see FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1989).
605. Id. (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063,
1067 (Fla. 1984)).
606. Manasota-88, Inc., 567 So. 2d at 897 (quoting Adam Smith Enterps., 553
So. 2d at 1273).
607. Id. at 898 (citations omitted) (quoting Adam Smith Enterps., 553 So. 2d at
1270).
608. Id. (quoting Adam Smith Enterps., 553 So. 2d at 1273).
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The court found that there was no detailed explanation of the consider-
ation of each factor or evidence offered concerning each, and the reason
for the ultimate disposition in the record. The court ordered the case
remanded, because, albeit not explicitly stated, the inadequate record
prevented the court from performing its judicial review function. The
court also held that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated au-
thority, because the rule was not supported by an adequate record on
file with the Secretary of State.609 The APA requires that an adminis-
trative agency file "a summary of the rule, a summary of any hearings
held on the rule, and a detailed written statement of the facts and cir-
cumstances justifying the rule."'610
The problem with the reasoning and result in Manasota-88, Inc. is
four-fold. First, the APA does not require administrative agencies to
provide a detailed statement of how each factor was precisely consid-
ered. This requirement was a judicial invention. All the APA on its
face or in the legislative history require is a statement of the facts
found and the circumstances justifying the rule. The court erred in
reaching a contrary conclusion. The statements filed with the rule
should enable the court to determine that all the relevant facts were
considered, as well as that the rule had adequate support in the record
at least for application of the deferential "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review. By requiring more, the court must have envisioned
applying a non-deferential version of the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of judicial review. 611 Further, this case must call into question
thousands of rules which do not have this type of detailed statement of
consideration and resolution of the appropriate factors on file as part of
the rule making record.
Second, the Manasota-88, Inc. decision is another example of the
courts creating a serious disincentive for administrative agency use of
the rule making process. If the rule making process requires an admin-
istrative agency to provide a detailed examination of the evidence pro
and con for each factor considered, an expensive and onerous process,
there would be no reason to prefer it over developing public policy
609. Id. In some cases the filing must be made in the office of the head of the
administrative agency. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1 1)(b) (1989).
610. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1l)(b) (1989).
611. A more diabolical explanation would be that the court may foresee continu-
ally remanding to matter to the administrative agency for more detailed factual find-
ings on the assumption that eventually, the administrative agency will figure out either
that the court is opposed to the rule or wants it adopted only after a drawn out hearing.
See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989).
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through -the use of nonrule policy orders. In fact, because the adjudica-
tory process limits participation, it may will be that it is a more man-
ageable process than that imposed by Manasota-88, Inc.."'
Third, even assuming an administrative agency has adequately de-
tailed its decisions during the rule making process, it is extremely un-
likely that the facts disclosed will provide new relevant information
which will persuade the court to find that the administrative rule is
invalid under the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.
This is so because the court is even more deferential toward adminis-
trative agency findings of fact than the competent substantial evidence
standard of judicial review.
Fourth, the approach offered by the court will paralyze the infor-
mal rule making process because of the uncertainty over the question of
what constitutes an adequate record. Administrative agencies will opt
to hold hearings resembling a section 120.57 proceeding in order to
avoid prolonged litigation over the issue of the adequacy of the state-
ment in support of the rule. This will waste the limited resources of
both the administrative agencies and the courts.
G. Unenlightening Judicial Review613
During the survey period, the courts continued, on occasion, to
render opinions which provided little or no guidance on the nature of
the issue decided, and little or no explanation for why the court
reached its decision. Particularly troubling are those opinions where the
courts provided only a brief cursory discussion of a case, and summa-
rily concluded that an agency's factual findings either did or did not
satisfy the competent and substantial evidence standard of judicial re-
view. For example in Garcia v. Department of Professional Regula-
tion,61 4 the court, after briefly restating the facts as found by the Secre-
tary of the Department of Professional Regulation, summarily
concluded that the "findings . .. [we]re sufficient to establish an im-
mediate danger to the public."61 5
Similarly, in Kan v. P.G. Cook Associates,616 the court recited in
conclusory fashion that the appeals referee heard the evidence, and
612. Burris IV, supra note 4, at 667-73, 677-85.
613. Burris I, supra note 4, at 407-10; Burris II, supra note 4, at 779-81.
614. 581 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
615. Id. at 961.
616. 566 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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that the record provided competent and substantial evidence to support
the findings of fact as reached by the appeals referee.
The shortcoming of . . . [this type] of opinion[] is "that the
court[] ha[s] not engaged in any articulation of the reasons why
these records are sufficient or insufficient to support an agency's
factual findings." Such a failure is inconsistent with the vision of
how a reviewing court would determine the adequacy of the factual
record under the APA. Under the APA an appellate court is re-
quired to "deal separately with disputed issues of agency proce-
dure, interpretations of law, determinations of fact, or policy within
the agency's exercise of delegated authority." The function of [the]
appellate court[] is limited in each of these categories. The only
way to know if an appellate court has remained true to its limited
role is by reviewing its explanation. Where there is no explanation
or it is an unenlightening explanation, one merely stating a conclu-
sion, then there is no basis for making this judgment. Th[is] type[]
of opinion[] [is] also inconsistent with the general role appellate
court opinions are designed to play in our legal system, providing
"a reasoned justification for the result . . . [by] testing the decision
against experience and against acceptability, buttressing it and
making it persuasive to self and others." Such "justification and
elaboration are expected in . . . [any] mature legal system." This
requirement guards against judicial fiat and assures that the law is
known and knowable rather than a body of hidden principles."'
While there may be a few circumstances when it is, for policy reasons,
impractical for the court to provide a full explanation of why it reached
a decision, it occurs far too often in Florida, solely because, for some
unknown reason, the court is unwilling to offer a full explanation of its
reasons for a decision.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
With perhaps the exception of the Adam Smith Enterprises deci-
sion, there has been relatively little fundamental change in administra-
tive law in recent years. However, this period of relative calm and sta-
bility concerning the basic principles of administrative law is about to
pass. The recent amendment to the APA, designed to curtail the use of
nonrule policy, 61 and the likelihood of amendment of the APA rule
617. Burris III, supra note 4, at 650-51 (citations omitted).
618. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(16), .535 (1991).
[Vol. 16
126
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Burris
making process, as a result of the current executive and legislative ef-
forts reconsidering that process, will restructure the administrative pro-
cess in Florida. 19 It will take time for the courts to have an opportu-
nity to examine the new structure. Until then, there will be some
heated arguments over the scope of change brought about, and the
meaning of specific provisions in the new processes. The recent deci-
sions in Chiles62 and Locke62" ' based upon separation of powers also
raise questions which may fundamentally affect the power of the legis-
lature to control executive branch exercise of delegated authority and
the scope of powers which may be delegated to administrative agen-
cies.622 The next five years will be a time of uncertainty in the adminis-
trative law area, as well as an interesting and challenging time for
those who are practicing in this area of the law.
Sadly, during this period we will not have the benefit of the
thoughtful insights of Professor Dore who recently passed away. Pro-
fessor Dore was part of the original group who drafted the new APA in
1974. She zealously followed its implementation and the adoption of
many amendments to the APA in subsequent years. When called upon
she never hesitated to take the time from her busy schedule to offer
advice to the legislative and executive branches of the government. She
also did not hesitate to criticize and praise court decisions concerning
the Florida administrative process. She devoted much of her profes-
sional life to trying to improve the administrative process as well as
other aspects of Florida law. She was never shy about sharing her opin-
ion and was always a source of witty and informative stories concerning
how mary of the changes in Florida law occurred. She will be missed
by all, even those who disagreed with her on many issues.
619. See Dore III, supra note 4, at 454-55 & n.114.
620. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E & F, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S699 (1991).
621. Locke v. Hawkes, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 5716 (1991).
622. See supra notes 5-37, 243-52 and accompanying text.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey collects and discusses Florida admiralty cases that
were reported between October 1, 1990, and June 30, 1991.1 Although
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center. B.A., North-
western University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., New York University. An
early draft of this survey was presented in Orlando to the Admiralty Law Committee
of The Florida Bar during the Bar's 1991 Annual Meeting. The author received many
helpful comments from the members in attendance, and hereby expresses his
appreciation.
1. Not included in this survey are cases that touch only incidentally on admiralty
law. See, e.g., Belcher Oil Co. v. Florida Fuels, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 1104, 1991 AMC
911 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (South Florida fuel supplier that enjoyed dominant market posi-
tion would not be heard to say that it had suffered an anti-trust injury when various
cruise ship operators attempted to create competition by encouraging the formation of
a rival fuel supplier); Carner-Mason Assocs. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 581 So. 2d 1324 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (foreclosure judgment was properly entered in favor of plain-
tiff who lent money to defendant so that it could build a marina on Miami Beach);
Stewart v. Stewart, 581 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (judgment ordering
defendants to turn over their marina to the plaintiffs pursuant to a lease and option
agreement reversed upon defendants' showing that they had terminated properly the
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the survey period generated only a handful of decisions, the ones that it
did produce were among the most unique issued in recent years.
Three opinions, each concerning the professional responsibility of
admiralty lawyers, were particularly noteworthy. The first two dealt
with the reprimanding of individual attorneys, while the third changed
the manner in which those who practice admiralty law may advertise
their services.
In The Florida Bar v. Herrick,' Peter S. Herrick, a seasoned ad-
miralty practitioner,3 received a public reprimand from the Florida Su-
preme Court for attempting to solicit business. Herrick had learned
that the United States Customs Service had taken possession of a ves-
sel4 and was planning to forfeit it unless a claim and bond for $2,500
were posted by the owners by August 15, 1985. 5 He therefore sent to a
couple who had an interest in the boat an unsolicited letter that said in
pertinent part: "Our law firm specializes in Customs laws relating to
vessel seizures. If you have any questions, please call."' ,
Herrick's actions were reported to The Florida Bar. After an in-
vestigation, a Bar referee recommended that Herrick be publicly repri-
manded.' In the view of the referee, Herrick had committed three vio-
lations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 8 First, his unsolicited
lease and extinguished the option); Shofner v. Giles, 579 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (new trial on damages ordered in yacht buyer's fraud suit due to inconsis-
tencies in the jury's verdict form); City of Miami Beach v. Carner, 579 So. 2d 248
(Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1991) (new trial ordered to determine whether City of Miami
Beach and the Miami Beach Redevelopment Authority had violated the terms of a
thirty year lease under which the plaintiffs were to build and operate a marina on city
property); Sheridan v. Deep Lagoon Marina, 576 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (property owners who lived near site of proposed marina expansion project could
challenge state's finding that the project complied with the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act); Black v. Marine Engineering Specialists, 574 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (engineer who had installed air conditioner and generator on yacht
failed to prove that seller of yacht had been acting as the apparent agent of the buyer
of the yacht).
2. 571 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2798 (1991).
3. Herrick received a B.S. from the United States Merchant Marine Academy in
1961 and a J.D. from Georgetown University in 1967. He was admitted to practice in
the District of Columbia in 1968 and in Florida in 1977.
4. The seized vessel was a thirty foot long 1981 Formula Thunderbird racing
boat. Id. at 1304.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1304-05.
8. Because Herrick's letter had been sent in 1985, his conduct was judged by the
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letter did not contain a disclaimer indicting that it was an advertise-
ment.9 Second, Herrick's letter stated that he was a specialist in cus-
toms law, thereby representing that he had competence in a particular
area of law. 10 Third, Herrick's letter claimed that he specialized in an
area of law that had not been recognized by either the Florida Certifi-
cation Plan or the Florida Designation Plan. 1
Upon learning of the referee's recommendation, Herrick appealed
to the Florida Supreme Court." The court, however, in a per curiam
opinion,"t rejected the appeal and entered an order publicly reprimand-
ing Herrick and requiring him to pay the costs of the proceeding. 4
In its relatively lengthy opinion, the court first found that the re-
quirement that all unsolicited letters from attorneys be stamped "Ad-
vertisement" was reasonable and did not violate any of Herrick's con-
stitutional rights.' 5 The court then turned to the question of whether
Herrick had held himself out as a specialist. 6 According to Herrick, he
had not claimed to be a specialist, but had merely indicated that he
specialized in a particular area of law.' As such, Herrick believed that
now superseded Code of Professional Responsibility. Herrick, 571 So. 2d at 1304 n.1.
9. Id. at 1305.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1304.
13. By tradition, the court always issues per curiam opinions in attorney disci-
pline cases.
14. Herrick, 571 So. 2d at 1307.
15. Herrick had claimed that the requirement violated his first amendment
rights. Id. at 1305. The court, however, disagreed. Relying on Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), it explained:
[W)e believe that . . . [the rule] . . . is constitutional as one of these "less
restrictive and more precise means" of regulation envisioned by the Su-
preme Court. The use of the term "Advertisement" printed on the letter
acts to disclose the nature of the letter to the recipient. Its purpose is to
assuage any concerns the recipient may have due to receiving a personal-
ized letter from an attorney.
Herrick, 571 So. 2d at 1305-06.
16. Because it found that the charges against Herrick under count three were
subsumed by those contained in count two, the court elected to treat the two together.
Id. at 1307.
17. Herrick's argument rested on a dictionary definition of the word "specialize."
In the dictionary relied on by Herrick, WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1974),
the word "specialize" was defined as meaning "to concentrate one's efforts in a special
activity or field." Id. at 1306. Thus, Herrick sought to argue that when he claimed he
specialized in customs law, he really was saying only that his practice concentrated on
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he had not violated any ethical prohibition. The court, however, was
not impressed with the tendered distinction. In finding that the refe-
ree's conclusion had been sound, the court wrote:
By prohibiting the general use of the term "specialist," the rule
seeks to restrain advertising which can be false, deceptive, or mis-
leading. By characterizing himself as a specialist, an attorney does
more than merely indicate that he practices within a particular
field. The term "specialist" carries with it the implication that the
attorney has special competence and expertise in an area of law.
We reject Herrick's argument that the word "specialize" carries a
different connotation than "specialist." 18
Peter Herrick was not the only experienced admiralty attorney to
run afoul of the Bar's ethical rules during the survey period. In The
Florida Bar v. Huggett,19 William T. Huggett, a twenty year veteran
of the admiralty bar,20 continued his fight with the Bar over his deal-
ings with two injured seamen.
On December 7, 1989, the Bar had instituted disciplinary proceed-
ings against Huggett by filing a four count complaint.2 1 counts one and
two related to Huggett's solicitation in 1988 of a seaman who had been
injured as a result of an accident involving petrochemical fumes. When
the seaman died, Huggett, through his investigator, continued his at-
tempt to be retained by soliciting the seaman's widow. 2 Counts three
and four grew out of Huggett's representation of Jonathan Chacon, a
seaman who had been injured aboard a cargo vessel in February, 1982.
While representing Chacon, Huggett allegedly advanced funds to
Chacon for living expenses and paid six witnesses for their testimony
contingent upon the outcome of the case.28
such cases. Id.
18. Id. at 1307.
19. 16 Fla. L. Weekly 551 (1991).
20. Huggett received his A.B. from Emory University in 1962 and his J.D. from
the University of Florida in 1965. He was admitted to practice in Florida in 1966.
21. Id. at S51.
22. Id.
23. Id. Although the jury found for Chacon, the judgment was reversed due to
the prejudicial actions and statements of Huggett during the course of the trial. See
Del Monte Banana Co. v. Chacon, 466 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
After the case was remanded for a second trial, the trial court ultimately dismissed the
suit with prejudice because of Chacon's repeated failure to make himself available for
depositions. Huggett then instituted suit in federal court. That suit was found to be
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In February, 1990, the Bar served Huggett with a set of interroga-
tories and a document production request.2' When Huggett refused to
comply fully with the Bar's demands, the Bar filed a motion to compel
discovery.25 In May, 1990, a Bar referee entered an order granting the
Bar's motion.26 When Huggett failed to heed the order, the Bar in
June, 1990 obtained a judgment of contempt that included a recom-
mendation that Huggett be suspended from the practice of law for ten
days and until such time as he had fully complied with the discovery
order.27 Upon receiving the referee's decision, Huggett petitioned the
Florida Supreme Court for a review of the judgment while the Bar
moved for approval and enforcement of the suggested sanction .2
Before the court, Huggett made the same arguments that he had
made before the referee. He contended that the discovery requests were
improper because the information sought by the Bar was protected by
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, the attorney-
client privilege, and the work product rule.29 To buttress his position,
Huggett submitted an affidavit from Adela Molian De Chacon,
Jonathan Chacon's widow, that asserted that she would be put in great
jeopardy if the ultimate outcome of her husband's suit were to become
known in his native Guatemala.30
After a careful and detailed review, the court agreed to an extent
with Huggett. Although it found that most of the Bar's discovery re-
quests were proper, it held that Huggett had a good faith basis for
arguing that three of the Bar's interrogatories were likely to lead to
evidence that Huggett had engaged in the illegal solicitation of legal
time-barred, however, and was dismissed despite Huggett's argument that the state suit
had tolled the running of the statute of limitations. See Chacon-Gordon v. M/V Euge-
nio "C", 1987 AMC 1886 (S.D. Fla. 1987). A short time later, the dismissal of
Chacon's state suit was affirmed. See Costa Line, Inc. v. Chacon-Gordon, 530 So. 2d
312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
24. Huggett, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at 552.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at S51.
29. Huggett, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S52.
30. Id. Although each of the suits instituted by Chacon had been thrown out one
by one, see supra note 23, a partial settlement had been reached in 1986 while Chacon
was still alive. According to his widow, it had been agreed at the time of the settlement
that the terms would remain confidential "to protect the Chacons against extortion,
theft and kidnapping, which . . . are common in Guatemala when it is learned that a
person has acquired wealth." Huggett, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S52.
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business. 31 Since such solicitation, if proved, would constitute a first
degree misdemeanor,8 2 the court reversed the order of contempt.3 3 In-
stead, it directed Huggett to comply with all aspects of the referee's
discovery order, except for the three improper interrogatories, within
twenty days.3 The court further directed that if Huggett failed to do
so within the stated twenty day period, he would be suspended from
practice for ten days and continuously thereafter until he complied."
The final case of the survey period involving attorney ethics was
The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend The Rules Regulating The Flor-
ida Bar-Advertising Issues."6 The case grew out of a petition filed by
the Bar that asked the Florida Supreme court to make a number of
changes in the rules governing lawyer advertising. Following a
lengthy review period and the receipt of numerous public comments,
the court, in an opinion written by Justice Overton and dissented from
in part by Chief Justice Shaw and Justices Barkett and Kogan, granted
the petition with certain modifications.3 8 As modified, the new rules
went into effect on April 1, 1991.11
Because the Bar's petition recommended drastic changes in how
attorneys may advertise on the radio and television,"' almost no atten-
31. Id. at S53. The three interrogatories were numbered 20, 24, and 25g. Inter-
rogatories 20 and 25g asked Huggett about his retention of an investigator and the
matters assigned to the investigator. Interrogatory 24 asked Huggett to "list any sea-
man, religious or benevolence organization" in which he had been involved since 1988
and to identify the specific nature of his involvement. Id,
32. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 877.02(1), 775.15(2)(c) (1987)).
33. Id.
34. Huggett, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S53.
35. Id. In an ironic twist, a short time after the supreme court's decision Huggett
received The Florida Bar President's Pro Bono Service Award for his work with indi-
gent seamen. See Pro Bono Awards, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 1991, at 23, col. 1.
36. 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
37. Id. at 452.
38. Id.
39. The changes originally were scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1991.
This date was extended, however, when it was pointed out that many lawyers, as well
as the Bar itself, would find it difficult to comply so quickly. See Mark D. Killian,
Court Adopts Bar Ad Restrictions, FLA. B. NEWS, Jan. 15, 1991, at 1, col. 1. On April
2, 1991, a lawsuit was filed in federal court in Tallahassee by Professor Bruce S.
Rogow challenging the constitutionality of the changes. See Ad Rule Opponents Seek
Injunction, FLA. B. NEWS, May 1, 1991, at 1, col. 4. The suit remained pending at the
close of the current survey period. See Elizabeth Willson, A Troublesome Fly vs. The
Bar, FLA. TREND, July 1991, at 29.
40. Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452-54 (describing revised rule 4-7.2).
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tion was paid to the remainder of the proposals. As a result, admiralty
lawyers failed to object to the bar's suggested rewriting of rule 4-
7.5(b).
Rule 4-7.5, entitled "Communication of Fields of Practice," had
gone into effect on January 1, 1987, as part of Florida's switch from
the American Bar Association's 1969 Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility to its 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct."1 Like its
predecessors, rule 4-7.5(b) continued to carve out an exception for law-
yers engaged in admiralty practice by permitting such lawyers to call
themselves "proctors in admiralty" and to otherwise identify them-
selves as being admiralty practitioners."2 As the rule noted in its ac-
companying comment, this exception to the general ban on lawyers
holding themselves out as specialists in a given field of law was rooted
in the "long historical tradition associated with maritime commerce
and the federal courts." '
In 1975, Florida instituted a program under which attorneys can
designate themselves as being competent in a given field if they met
(and thereafter continued to meet) certain basic requirements." Later,
in 1982, Florida began a second program through which lawyers can be
certified by the bar as having expertise in certain fields."5
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in the Illinois case of
Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illi-
nois,4" held that attorneys who are certified as proficient in a given area
of law by a bona fide national organization cannot be denied the right
to list such certifications on their letterheads and in their advertising.47
Worried that rule 4-7.5 might be unconstitutional after Peel, the Bar's
petition suggested that it be redrafted as well as renumbered. As
amended, new rule 4-7.6 permits a lawyer who complies with the Flor-
41. See The Florida Bar re Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977,
1074 (Fla. 1986).
42. See id. at 1075. Rule 4-7.5(b) was patterned after canon 46 of the American
Bar Association's 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics as well as Ethical Consideration
2-14 of the Model Code. See generally Robert M. Jarvis, Rethinking the Meaning of
the Phrase "Surviving Widow" in the Jones Act: Has the Time Come for Admiralty
Courts to Fashion A Federal Law of Domestic Relations?, 21 CAL. W. L. REv. 463,
479 n.58 (1985).
43. FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-7.5 comment.
44. See In re The Florida Bar, 319 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975).
45. See The Florida Bar, 414 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1982).
46. 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
47. Id. at 2293.
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ida Certification Plan, "or who is certified by a national group with
substantially similar standards to the Florida Certification Plan," to
state that he or she has been so certified. 48
In their new versions, both the rule and the comment delete all
references to admiralty and the admiralty exception, and neither offers
a single word of explanation for the change. This is troubling for at
least three reasons. First, the Florida Certification Plan does not cur-
rently operate in the area of admiralty law (although the Designation
Plan does).49 Second, there is no national organization that presently
certifies admiralty lawyers. 50 Third, although the admiralty exception
was excised, the similar exception for patent lawyers was retained (al-
though the explanatory comment was not). 51 Despite these facts, by the
close of the survey period admiralty lawyers in Florida had not begun
any efforts to have the exception reinstated.
48. Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d at 454-55.
49. The Florida Certification Plan currently certifies Florida lawyers in the fol-
lowing seven areas: tax, civil trial law, marital and family law, estate planning and
probate, criminal law, real estate law, and workers' compensation. See The Florida Bar
re Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar Chapter 6 (Legal Specialization
and Education), 548 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1989).
50. The Maritime Law Association of the United States, a national bar group
founded in 1899, comes the closest of any existing organization to certifying the compe-
tence of admiralty lawyers. At one time, all lawyers who joined the MLA became
"proctor" members. Since the early 1980s, however, lawyers who join the MLA have
become "associate" members. After four years, they may apply to become proctor
members. In order to move from associate membership to proctor membership, a candi-
date must demonstrate "proficiency" in admiralty. Such proficiency can be shown in a
variety of ways, including attendance at approved continuing legal education seminars,
delivery of speeches or publication of articles on suitable topics, or serving as counsel in
maritime proceedings. There is no written or oral test, however, and once a lawyer
obtains proctor membership there is no further obligation except for payment of a
small annual dues charge. See Maritime Law Ass'n, Articles of Association and By-
Laws-Document No. 684 § III, at 1 (Sept. 1990).
51. Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d at 470. The comment to rule 4-7.5 had stated
that patent law was a specialty because of the "long-established policy of the patent
and trademark office." Although The Florida Bar once tried to challenge the policy, it
was rebuffed by the United States Supreme Court in a landmark case. See Sperry v.
Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). Justice Overton did not offer any
explanation for why the patent law exception was being retained or for why the com-
ment was being deleted.
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II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS
There were three cases during the months under review that in-
volved disputes arising under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA). 2
In Insurance Company of North America v. Empresa Lineas
Maritimas Argentinas, S.A.," a cargo of washing machine parts bound
for Miami was damaged in Buenos Aires when the container in which
they had been packed was dropped while under the control of the de-
fendant, Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, S.A. (ELMA)."4 Sub-
sequently, the Insurance Company of North America (INA), which
had become subrogated to the plaintiff, filed suit to recover
$29,65 3. 11.55
Shortly after the case was started, INA moved for partial sum-
mary judgment. 6 In response, ELMA filed an opposing memorandum
that argued that summary judgment was premature for three reasons:
1) the bill of lading had not been authenticated, 2) an essential para-
graph of the bill of lading had not been translated into English, and 3)
there was no proof that a higher freight rate had been charged. 57
ELMA further argued that even if summary judgment was appropri-
ate, ELMA was entitled to the benefit of COGSA's $500 package
limitation."
In an exceedingly terse opinion, District Judge Moore rejected
52. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1988). Under COGSA shipowners are excused
from liability if goods in their possession are damaged due to certain specified causes.
See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 9-13, at 314-15
(1987).
53. 1991 AMC 1057 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1059. The point of ELMA's third argument was explained by Judge
Moore in the following manner: "In general, when a shipper wants the cargo to receive
a higher value [than is provided under COGSA], the carrier offsets this increased lia-
bility by charging a higher freight rate." Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1991 AMC at
1059. By paying a higher freight rate, the shipper avoids the COGSA package limita-
tion. See infra note 58.
58. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1991 AMC at 1058. The package limitation, found
at 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1988), limits a defendant's liability to $500 per package or
customary freight unit unless the shipper has declared a higher value. If the defendant
can invoke successfully the limitation, its liability will be drastically reduced and the
plaintiff will be only partially compensated for its loss. See generally FRANE L.
MARAIST, ADMIRALTY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 74-77 (2d ed. 1988).
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each of ELMA's arguments and granted INA's motion.5' Finding that
the case was governed by COGSA due to the fact that the cargo had
been bound for an American port and was traveling under a bill of
lading,60 Judge Moore focused his attention on the terms of the bill of
lading. Although largely illegible, both parties agreed that the bill de-
scribed the merchandise as 2,160 gear boxes with a per piece value of
$74.80." As such, the only real issue was whether ELMA could have
the benefit of the package limitation.
Judge Moore found that ELMA was not entitled to the limitation
for the very reasons that it had given in suggesting that the motion for
partial summary judgment was premature. First, Judge Moore ruled
that while the bill of lading was unauthenticated, ELMA had admitted
that it accurately described the cargo.62 Second, although the para-
graph in the bill of lading that ELMA contended might be relevant
had not been translated, ELMA had neglected to offer any explanation
for its failure to provide a translation in its response. 3 Third, while the
record did not contain any proof that INA's insured had paid a higher
freight rate, the lack of such proof, in Judge Moore's view, was "not
determinative inasmuch as charging an increased freight rate is not a
prerequisite to declaring a higher value of cargo."'
°
The next cargo case of the survey period, Z.K. Marine, Inc. v. MI
V Archigetis,65 also involved construction of the COGSA package limi-
tation. In September, 1987, five yachts were shipped from Taiwan to
the United States aboard a vessel known as the M/V ARCHIGETIS.6'
At the time, the ARCHIGETIS was owned by Malvern Maritime, Inc.
(Malvern), and was under charter to Federal Pacific Liberia, Ltd.
(Fedpac). 71 The yachts had been manufactured by Offshore Marine,
59. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1991 AMC at 1059-60.
60. Id. at 1058. This is the threshold inquiry in any COGSA suit, of course,
since the statute applies only to shipments traveling by sea to or from a United States
port under a bill of lading. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300 and 1312 (1988).
61. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1991 AMC at 1058-59.
62. Id. at 1059.
63. Id. With more than a trace of irritation, Judge Moore wrote: "Defendant
fails to indicate why an English translation of this supposedly essential paragraph,
which could have been accomplished quickly and inexpensively, was not included in its
response." Id. at 1059 n.l.
64. Id. at 1059.
65. 1991 AMC 1434 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
66. Id. at 1436.
67. Id. at 1435-36.
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Inc. (Offshore), and were unloaded upon their arrival in the United
States by Continental Stevedoring & Terminals, Inc. (Continental). 8
The five yachts were imported by four different Florida companies:
Z.K. Marine, Inc., Southern Offshore Yachts, Jay Bettis and Co., and
Miller 'Yacht Sales, Inc. (collectively, the plaintiffs). 9
Upon discovering that the yachts had arrived in a damaged condi-
tion, the plaintiffs filed suit against the ARCHIGETIS as well as Mal-
vern, Fedpac, Offshore, and Continental.7 0 In response, Malvern moved
for summary judgment on the ground that the bills of lading clearly
limited the carrier's liability to $500 per package or customary freight
unit or, in this case, per yacht.7 1 Fedpac and Continental then moved
for partial summary judgment and the plaintiffs cross-moved for sum-
mary judgment.7
Electing to resolve all of the motions together, District Judge
Hoeveler held, in a case of first impression, that each yacht was in fact
a COGSA package. As such, he granted the defendants' motions.7 3
Judge Hoeveler began his opinion by first noting that COGSA was
not directly applicable since the yachts had been carried on the
ARCHIGETIS' decks, and COGSA does not apply to on-deck car-
riage .7 He found, however, that since the bills of lading referred to
The Hague Rules, the international version of COGSA, the parties
would be deemed to have "stipulated by contract" to the application of
COGSA.
Having disposed of the choice of law problem, Judge Hoeveler
moved to the central issue: were the yachts COGSA packages? After a
review of the existing caselaw on the subject, he concluded that they
were because the carrier had attached each yacht to a cradle that had
been manufactured by Offshore. According to Judge Hoeveler, by rest-
ing in a cradle, each yacht had become the functional equivalent of a
package during the voyage. For support, he turned to a case in which
Judge Spellman had found that air conditioning equipment that had
been bolted to wooden skids but was not otherwise boxed was a
68. id. at 1436.
69. Id. at 1435.
70. Z.K. Marine, 1991 AMC at 1436.
71. Id.
72. I'd.
73. Id. at 1441.
74. d. at 1437 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1988)). For a general discussion of
the law relating to deck cargo, see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 52, § 9-16, at 322-24.
75. Z.K. Marine, 1991 AMC at 1438.
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COGSA package.7 6 In Judge Hoeveler's view, the cradles were "analo-
gous, for purposes of the package analysis, to skids."'7 Having so
found, Judge Hoeveler summarily dismissed the remainder of the plain-
tiffs' arguments.7 8
The final cargo case also involved the carriage of a yacht. In
Jumbo Navigation, N.V. v. Melchior,79 Jumbo Navigation, N.V.
(Jumbo), an ocean carrier, filed an interpleader action to determine
whether a yacht called the S/Y VALIA belonged to Cigisped, S.R.I.
(Cigisped), an Italian freight forwarder, or to Albert Melchior, a Ca-
nadian citizen.80 In September, 1988, Melchior had agreed to pay
Cigisped $75,000 in ocean freight, plus $1,640 in preparation expenses,
to ship his yacht from Genoa to Miami.81 Cigisped, in turn, retained
Jumbo, and in October, 1988 Jumbo carried the VALIA to Miami
aboard the M/V STELLA PRIMA pursuant to a bill of lading made
out to Cigisped. 2
The STELLA PRIMA arrived in Miami on November 7, 1988,
and discharged the VALIA into the water, during which the VALIA
was damaged.8 3 When Melchior demanded delivery of the yacht,
Jumbo informed him that it was under orders from Cigisped to hold on
to the VALIA until Melchior paid Cigisped and that as a result, the
VALIA was being placed in the custody of the Merrill Stevens Dry
Dock Company, Inc. (Merrill Stevens). 8' Following this exchange,
Melchior filed an emergency motion for the release of the yacht, Mer-
rill Stevens initiated its own interpleader action, and Cigisped filed
cross-claims against Melchior."6
In time, Melchior deposited $80,000 into the registry of the court,
Merrill Stevens completed extensive repairs on the yacht at Melchior's
76. See Marante Forwarding v. C.A. Naviera de Transporte y Turismo, 486 F.
Supp. 636, 1982 AMC 2704 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
77. Z.K. Marine, 1991 AMC at 1440.
78. In particular, Judge Hoeveler rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they had
had no opportunity to declare a higher value because they had purchased the bills of
lading while the ARCHIGETIS was at sea and that Continental, as a stevedore, was
not covered by the COGSA package limitation. Id. 1439-41.
79. 1991 AMC 1518 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
80. Id. at 1518.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1519.
84. Jumbo Navigation, 1991 AMC at 1519.
85. Id.
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request and was paid by Melchior's insurer, the Wausau Insurance
Company (which then brought a suit against Jumbo in state court),
Cigisped, which still had not been paid by Melchior, moved for sum-
mary judgment, and the case was transferred from the docket of Dis-
trict Judge Nesbitt to District Judge Moreno upon the latter's investi-
ture in the fall of 1990.86
In opposing Cigisped's motion for summary judgment, Melchior
argued that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether Cigisped
had agreed that it would not be entitled to collect freight if the yacht
was not delivered to Miami in perfect condition. 7 In just four brief
paragraphs, however, Judge Moreno rejected Melchior's argument as
"unpersuasive."
Relying on a recent decision by the Third District Court of Ap-
peal,88 Judge Moreno found that under both COGSA and Florida state
law Melchior's sole recourse for the damages sustained by the VALIA
was against Jumbo. He explained this result by writing: "Florida law is
well established that a freight forwarder, such as Cigisped, does not
incur liability for cargo damage while such cargo is in the possession
and control of an ocean carrier." 89 As such, Judge Moreno granted
Cigisped's motion and ordered the clerk of the court to release to
Cigisped the money that Melchior had deposited into the court's
registry 90
III. CRIMINAL OFFENSES
As usual, the survey period produced a number of criminal cases
involving ships.91 In the first, National Marine Underwriters, Inc. v.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1520.
88. See Golden Triad Carrier, Inc. v. Paco Am. Corp., 553 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
89. Jumbo Navigation, 1991 AMC at 1520.
90. Id.
91. Some of these cases, however, had only a tangential connection to admiralty
law. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 398 (1991) (defendants who had been arrested as a result of a sting operation in
which federal agents portrayed Colombian drug smugglers with sailboats ready to
transport cocaine into the country had been correctly adjudged guilty, but one of the
defendants was entitled to be resentenced); United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d
652 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1633 (1991) (record sustained the con-
viction of one defendant, but not the other, where both had been found guilty of at-
tempting to smuggle cocaine into the country by means of an air drop to a waiting
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Loring,92 a Chris Craft boat owned by Drs. Richard Krieger and Nolan
Altman was stolen. After Krieger and Altman received payment from
their insurer, Colonial Penn, they executed a release subrogating all of
their rights to Colonial Penn. 93 Thereafter, Colonial Penn gave a power
of attorney to National Marine Underwriters, Inc. (National
Marine). 4 In turn, National Marine sued Keith S. Loring, claiming
that he was responsible for the theft.95
Loring responded to the suit by arguing that National Marine had
failed to obtain a "managing general agent permit," as required under
the Florida insurance code.96 Finding that National Marine had in fact
failed to obtain the permit, Circuit Judge Robinson struck National
Marine's complaint as a sham pleading.97
On appeal, however, District Judges Barkdull, Nesbitt, and Jor-
genson reversed Judge Robinson and remanded the case to him for fur-
ther proceedings. Although the panel agreed that there was some evi-
dence in the record to support Loring's argument,9" it refused to let
him use it. In a short per curiam opinion, the panel wrote: "The claim
brought by National Marine for Colonial Penn is as though Drs. Krie-
ger and Altman had sued Loring. In such a subrogation claim, the
third party causing injury to an insured cannot rely upon defenses that
might have been raised between the insurer and the insured."99
The next two criminal cases of the survey period arose out of Flor-
ida's continuing attempt to track down and seize vessels that are used
in the drug trade. In In re Forfeiture of One 31' Seahawk "Cigarette"
Vessel,1"' the City of Pompano Beach sought to forfeit a vessel that
had been found without a hull identification number.10 1 Circuit Judge
Dimitrouleas dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground that the
ship); United States v. Castillo-Valencia, 917 F.2d 494 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1321 (1991) (evidence supported conviction and sentencing of defendants
who attempted to smuggle into the country 495 bales of marijuana stored in their
ship's hold).
92. 568 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
93. Id. at 1007.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1007-08.
96. Id. at 1007 (citing FLA. STAT. § 626.121(2) (1985)).
97. National Marine, 568 So. 2d at 1007.
98. Id. at 1007 n.1.
99. Id. at 1008.
100. 572 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
101. Id. at 1039.
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City had failed to show that the vessel had been used in the commis-
sion of a felony."0 2 The City then filed an appeal.' 03
In a per curiam decision that provoked a vigorous dissent, District
Judges Glickstein and Oftedal affirmed the dismissal. After a review of
the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act's checkered legislative his-
tory,10 ' they concluded that the statute required an affirmative showing
of wrongdoing:
For the vessel in the instant case to be subject to forfeiture, the
City was required to allege either guilty knowledge or intent. The
verified amended complaint does not allege that the owners "know-
ingly or intentionally" concealed the vessel or misrepresented the
identity of the vessel in violation of [the statute] .. . The City
was given the opportunity to amend further and chose not to do
SO. 
1 0 5
In dissent, District Judge Anstead agreed with the majority that it
had not been the legislature's intention to forfeit the ships of innocent
owners."1) But he argued that the burden was on the owner and not the
government. He explained his position by writing: "[I]t appears to me
that the legislature has put the burden on the innocent owner to estab-
lish his innocence. While there may be constitutional implications to
this scheme, these issues have not been raised in this appeal and were
not addressed below."1 07
Several months later, another vessel forfeiture case made its way
to the Fourth District. In In re Forfeiture of One 1987 Velocity 30' Go-
Fast Vessel,10 8 Broward County Sheriff Nick Navarro filed a complaint
seeking to forfeit a boat and a boat trailer that belonged to Victor
Dessberg because the boat lacked a hull identification number. 09 Cir-
cuit Judge Moriarty denied the petition and Navarro appealed. 10
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1039-40. Shortly after the survey period ended, the Florida Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Barkett, upheld the Act while expressing grave doubts
about its constitutionality. See Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588
So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991).
105. Seahawk, 572 So. 2d at 1040.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 577 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
109. Id. at 679.
110. Id.
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In a brief per curiam opinion, a panel consisting of Chief Judge
Hersey, District Judge Polen, and Senior District Judge Walden af-
firmed the denial. " ' Relying on Seahawk, they wrote: "In a recent
opinion this court ruled that in order to support forfeiture some wrong-
doing must be alleged in addition to mere possession of a vessel with
altered or covered hull numbers. There must be either guilty knowledge
or intent alleged."" 2
The final criminal case of the period also stemmed from the war
on drugs. In United States v. Thompson," 3 a United States Coast
Guard boarding party had discovered 412 kilograms of cocaine during
a documents and safety inspection aboard a cruiser-trawler named the
MOLLY BETH while she was in the Windward Passage, approxi-
mately 500 miles from the United States." 4 Subsequently, James M.
Thompson, who had recently become the owner as well as the captain
of the MOLLY BETH, was placed under arrest and charged with con-
spiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while on an Ameri-
can vessel.115
Thompson moved to have the cocaine suppressed."' When District
Judge Aronovitz denied the motion, Thompson entered a conditional
guilty plea and then appealed the denial of his motion.'1 7 On appeal,
Circuit Judge Cox, in an opinion joined in by Circuit Judge Kravitch
and Senior Circuit Judge Henderson, affirmed the denial of Thomp-
son's motion." 8
Thompson had argued before the trial court and then again on
appeal that the Coast Guard's search had violated his fourth amend-
ment privacy rights under the United States Constitution as well as
Article 24 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone." 9 Judge Cox, however, made short work of both of
these arguments. With respect to the fourth amendment, he ruled that
Thompson had no legitimate expectation of privacy during the Coast
Guard's search because he had consented to the search, the search was
111. Id. at 680.
112. Id. at 679.
113. 928 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 270 (1991).
114. Id. at 1061.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1063.
117. Id.
118. Thompson, 928 F.2d at 1061.
119. Id. at 1063. The Convention, which entered into force in the United States
in 1964, appears at 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
[Vol. 16
144
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Jarvis
undertaken pursuant to statutory authorization, and the search oc-
curred outside the territory of the United States where the strictures of
the fourth amendment apply, if at all, only very slightly. 1 0 Having dis-
posed of Thompson's first argument, Judge Cox devoted even less time
to Thompson's other contention. Although noting that the United
States is a party to the Geneva Convention, Judge Cox found that the
Convention had not created any privately enforceable rights.121 As
such, Judge Cox concluded that any objection based on the Convention
missed the mark because "Thompson does not have standing to protest
an alleged violation of the treaty. 1 22
IV. LIENS
The period under review produced two cases involving maritime
liens. Although both presented rather straightforward fact patterns,
they still made for interesting reading.
In Stevens Technical Services, Inc. v. United States,'23 the plain-
tiff, Stevens Technical Services, Inc. (Stevens) brought suit against the
United States and Atlantic Sandblasting & Coatings, Inc. (Atlantic)
for repairs it had performed on the U.S.S. SEALIFT ANTARCTIC.
The ship, an auxiliary tanker, had been demise chartered to the United
States through the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and was being
operated by Marine Transport Lines, Inc. (MTL)."4 In 1985, she un-
derwent a planned major overhaul at Atlantic's repair facility in
Tampa, with half of the overhaul work being done by Atlantic and the
rest carried out by Stevens.' 2 '
The overhaul was completed as scheduled and, following various
inspections by both MSC and MTL, the SEALIFT ANTARCTIC was
120. Thompson, 928 F.2d at 1063-66. In rejecting Thompson's Fourth Amend-
ment argument, Judge Cox again made it clear that one's rights while on the water are
not the same as those enjoyed on land: "At sea, a person's expectation of privacy may
be severely restricted compared with expectations of privacy on land." Id. at 1064
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 761 F.2d 632, 635 (11th Cir. 1985)). For a further
discussion, see Howard S. Marks, Comment, The Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the
High Seas?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1537 (1983).
121. Id. at 1066.
122. Id.
123. 913 F.2d 1521, 1991 AMC 2497 (11th Cir. 1990).
124. Id. at 1525, 1991 AMC at 2502.
125. Id. The overhaul included "tank cleaning, repainting and coatings and ma-
jor engine and machinery work." Id.
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redelivered to the United States.126 MTL then paid Atlantic in full, for
which it later was reimbursed by MSC.127 Atlantic failed to pay Ste-
vens, however, and Stevens therefore filed suit against the United
States and Atlantic.128
The case was referred to visiting District Judge Alaimo, who con-
ducted a bench trial.12 9 Following the trial, he held that Stevens could
recover against Atlantic,30 but was barred by the Public Vessels Act
(PVA)'31 from recovering against the United States. 82 Upon receiving
the decision, Stevens filed an appeal. 133
The appeal was heard by a panel consisting of Circuit Judges
Vance and Anderson and visiting Senior Circuit Judge Brown. Shortly
after the oral argument, however, Judge Vance was assassinated. The
opinion therefore was issued by Judges Brown and Anderson and was
written by Judge Brown.1 " In it, Judge Brown reversed Judge Alaimo's
conclusion that the PVA barred Stevens' suit against the govern-
ment,1 35 and remanded the case for a determination as to whether Ste-
vens was entitled to assert a maritime lien against the SEALIFT
ANTARCTIC.3 "
Judge Brown began his decision by tracing the history of the
PVA.137 Based on this review, Judge Brown concluded that Stevens had
the right to sue the government for the work it had performed and,
with the exception of being barred from actually arresting the
SEALIFT ANTARCTIC, was entitled to go forward in the same man-
ner as if the vessel had been owned by a private party.138
Having found that the PVA did not bar Stevens' suit, Judge
Brown then turned to Stevens' assertion that the repairs it had per-
formed gave rise to a maritime lien. Here Judge Brown found the rec-
126. Id. at 1525-26, 1991 AMC at 2502.
127. Stevens, 913 F.2d at 1526, 1991 AMC at 2502.
128. Id., 1991 AMC at 2502-03.
129. Id., 1991 AMC at 2503.
130. Id.
131. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1988). The PVA and its sister statute, the Suits in
Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1988), are described in detail in Fritz G.
Faerber, Admiralty Claims Against the United States, 20 FORUM 122 (1984).
132. Stevens, 913 F.2d 1526, 1991 AMC at 2503.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1523.
135. Id. at 1537, 1991 AMC at 2521.
136. Id.
137. Stevens, 913 F.2d at 1526-34, 1991 AMC at 2503-16.
138. Id. at 1534, 1991 AMC at 2515-16.
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ord incomplete. Although it was clear that Stevens had done the work
for which it was seeking payment, 3 9 it was open to dispute whether
Stevens had relied on the credit of the SEALIFT ANTARCTIC, as
opposed to the credit of Atlantic. Noting that reliance on a vessel is a
basic requirement for assertion of a maritime lien, Judge Brown held
that further proceedings at the trial court were necessary." 0
The other lien case of the survey period was Kaleidoscope Tours
v. M/V "Tropicana.""' From December 1, 1988 to May 14, 1989, the
plaintiff, Kaleidoscope Tours (Kaleidoscope), had provided embarka-
tion services to the M/V TROPICANA, a passenger cruise ship, at the
Port of Miami."' These services consisted of collecting money and tick-
ets from passengers, checking passports, embarking temporary crew
members and ship's employees, and accounting for and delivering the
fares to the ship's pier supervisors.14 3 Although Kaleidoscope was paid
for most of its services, it was not paid for those it rendered between
March 27, 1989 and May 14, 1989.'" In order to recover for these
services, which it valued at $20,350, Kaleidoscope asserted a lien
against the TROPICANA and had her arrested."5
Kaleidoscope's case was referred to District Judge Ryskamp, who
conducted a bench trial." 6 After reviewing the pertinent facts, he de-
cided that there were two key questions in the case: 1) was the contract
under which Kaleidoscope had acted "maritime in nature," and, 2)
were the services provided "necessaries" for purposes of the Federal
139. Id. at 1535, 1991 AMC at 2517-18.
140. Id. at 1536-37, 1991 AMC at 2519-21. Because it had not been argued at
the trial court, Judge Brown did not reach the government's argument that the Con-
tract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988), barred Stevens' suit.
In dicta, however, Judge Brown stated that if the argument had been raised in a timely
fashion, he would have rejected it on the ground that the CDA does not control a
party's right to assert a maritime lien. Stevens, 913 F.2d at 1537, 1991 AMC at 2521.
A short time later, in a case that had been held in abeyance pending Stevens, a panel
consisting of Circuit Judges Fay and Edmondson and visiting Senior Circuit Judge
Garza held that the CDA does not affect a party's right to claim a maritime lien. See
Marine Coatings of Alabama, Inc. v. United States, 932 F.2d 1370, 1991 AMC 2487
(11th Cir. 1991).
141. 755 F. Supp. 382, 1991 AMC 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
142. Id. at 383, 1991 AMC at 1463.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Kaleidoscope, 755 F. Supp. at 383, 1991 AMC at 1463.
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Maritime Lien Act (FMLA)? 1 7 In a short and well-reasoned opinion,
he concluded that the answer to both questions was yes:
[T]he collection of and accounting for passengers' fares and tickets
and the checking of passports for immigration services are essential
to the voyage of a cruise ship. "Without these, there can be no
voyage . . . ." This court therefore concludes that the embarkation
services performed by Kaleidoscope are "necessaries" which give
rise to a maritime lien under the FMLA. Thus, the contract pursu-
ant to which these services were performed is a maritime contract,
and the court has jurisdiction to enforce the maritime lien. 14 8
V. PERSONAL INJURY
A. Longshore and Harbor Workers
Cases about longshore and harbor workers do not often make
news, but Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc." 9 proved to be an
exception. Lois Robinson had been a ship welder at two shipyards run
by the defendant, Jacksonville Shipyard, Inc. (JSI).150 She had joined
JSI in September, 1977 as a third-class welder and had been steadily
promoted until she reached the status of first-class welder.15'
While working at JSI, Robinson was constantly surrounded by pic-
tures of nude women and confronted by sexually-suggestive comments
and graffiti. 5 Although she complained about the working environ-
ment at JSI to her superiors, 53 the problems grew worse."' Finally, in
147. Id., 1991 AMC at 1464. The text of the FMLA can be found at 46
U.S.C.A. §§ 31341-31343 (West. Supp. 1990).
148. Kaleidoscope, 755 F. Supp. at 385, 1991 AMC at 1466.
149. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
150. Id. at 1491. Robinson worked at both the Mayport Yard, situated in the
Mayport Naval Station, and at the Commercial Yard, located on the riverfront in
downtown Jacksonville. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1493-94.
153. In addition to complaining to her superiors, Robinson filed a grievance with
her union and registered a complaint with the Jacksonville Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC). The union, however, refused to pursue the matter and the
EEOC sent Robinson a letter informing her that it had found that "no reasonable
cause existed" to believe that she had been discriminated against on account of her sex.
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1516-17.
154. Id. at 1500-01.
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September, 1986, Robinson filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit
against JSI.'5 In her suit Robinson sought to force JSI to implement a
comprehensive sexual harassment policy, pay her money damages, and
delete from her employment record warnings that she had received for
excessive absenteeism. "
Robinson's case was assigned to District Judge -Melton and
culminated in an eight day bench trial in January and February,
1989.157 'Two years later, in March, 1991, Judge Melton issued his final
judgment. In a highly-publicized opinion 15 1 that ran sixty-one pub-
lished pages, Judge Melton ruled that Robinson had been subjected to
a sexually hostile work environment.1 59 After engaging in an exhaustive
review of the voluminous and often-conflicting record, including testi-
mony from Robinson's co-workers and the opinions of expert witnesses,
Judge Melton concluded:
A reasonable woman would find that the working environment at
JSI was abusive. This conclusion reaches the totality of the circum-
stances, including the sexual remarks, the sexual jokes, the sexu-
ally-oriented pictures of women, and the nonsexual rejection of
women by coworkers. The testimony by Dr. Fiske and Ms. Wagner
provides a reliable basis upon which to conclude that the cumula-
tive, corrosive effect of this work environment over time affects the
psychological well-being of a reasonable woman placed in these
conditions.160
Having found that Robinson had been the victim of an illegal
work environment, Judge Melton turned to the question of remedies.
He first concluded that with respect to monetary compensation Robin-
son was entitled to only $1.00 in nominal damages because she had
failed to prove that JSI's conduct had caused her to sustain economic
damages.161 He did find, however, that under federal law Robinson was
155. Id. at 1517. Robinson's suit was based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of gender. Id. at
1490. The Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1988).
156. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1519.
157. Id. at 1490.
158. Judge Melton's decision was reported by such diverse publications as The
Chicago Tribune, The New York Times, Newsday, The Seattle Times, The National
Law Journal, Business Week, Playboy, and Time.
159. Id. at 1491.
160. Id. at 1524.
161. Id. at 1532-34.
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entitled to have JSI pay her attorneys' fees and costs since she had won
nominal damages. 162
Judge Melton then moved to the subject of injunctive relief. Here
he found that Robinson had met her burden of proof. 63 He therefore
ordered JSI to adopt and enforce a policy for preventing sexual harass-
ment. Because he was concerned that JSI's past history made it a poor
candidate for devising an acceptable sexual harassment plan on its own,
Judge Melton set forth in detail the elements that the plan would have
to contain. 6
In justifying his hands-on approach, Judge Melton wrote:
The history of management's condonation and approval of sexually
harassing conditions, together with the past failures to redress ef-
fectively those instances of sexual harassment of which manage-
ment disapproved, argues forcefully for affirmative relief that pro-
vides guidance for all employees regarding acceptable and offensive
conduct, provides confidence to female employees that their valid
complaints of sexual harassment will be remedied, and provides
male employees who transgress the boundaries of sexual harass-
ment with notice that their conduct will be penalized commensu-
rate with the seriousness of the offense.1 65
162. Id. at 1538-39.
163. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1534.
164. Id. at 1538. Recognizing that his plan might need certain modifications in
order to be implemented successfully, Judge Melton gave JSI thirty days "to submit
any specific objections that relate to its ability to implement and enforce the policy and
procedures, as modified." Id. at 1537. Judge Melton cautioned JSI, however, that its
objections were to be based solely on its ability to practically execute the court's man-
date, and were not to "concern the substance" of the court's decision. Id.
165. Id. at 1534. Lois Robinson was not the first female plaintiff to use maritime
law to strike a blow for sexual equality. For other such cases, see Robert M. Jarvis,
Sexual Equality Before the Silver Oar. Lifting the Fog on Women, Ships, and the
Law of Admiralty, 7 CARDozo L. REV. 93 (1985). Shortly after the survey period
ended, however, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a case very similar to
Robinson. In Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1991), Elizabeth
Wilson, a motorhand, brought a Jones Act suit against her employer claiming that it
had permitted a hostile work environment to develop and remain aboard its ships. Like
the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that the claim was time-barrred because it
had been brought more than three years after the sexual harrassment had occurred.
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B. Passengers
The survey period produced three cases involving injuries to ship
passengers. In the first, Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 6 the long-
running saga of Rita Patricia Keefe appears to have finally come to an
end. Keefe, a hairdresser, along with the other members of her bowling
team, had been a passenger aboard the S/S VERA CRUZ during a
two day "Cruise to Nowhere" in June, 1984.167 While dancing on the
ship's outdoor dance floor one night, she had slipped and injured her-
self.'68 A bench trial was held in March, 1988 before District Judge
Kovachevich, who found that Keefe was entitled to recover
$10,657.60.19 The owner of the VERA CRUZ, Bahama Cruise Line,
Inc. (BCL), appealed Judge Kovachevich's decision to the Eleventh
Circuit, and obtained an order remanding the question of liability and
requiring Keefe to pay the costs of the appeal. 70
On remand, Judge Kovachevich readopted her earlier opinion and
again entered judgment in favor of Keefe.' 7 ' BCL then took a second
appeal. This time the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment and or-
dered BCL to pay costs to Keefe. 172 Keefe then filed a motion with
Judge Kovachevich asking her to enter judgment in the amount of
$10,657.60, together with court costs, appellate costs, and interest at an
annual rate of 6.71% from March 31, 1988, the date of the original
judgment. 7 3 In response, BCL argued that interest and costs should
run only from July 17, 1989, the date of Judge Kovachevich's second
judgment. 174
Agreeing with the parties that there was a split in the law among
the circuits, 175 Judge Kovachevich decided to side with Keefe:
166. 753 F. Supp. 349, 1991 AMC 1397 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
167. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1191, 1192 (M.D. Fla.
1988).
168. Id. at 1192.
169. Id. at 1195. Judge Kovachevich awarded Keefe $7,000.00 in compensatory
damages and $3,657.60 for medical costs. Id.
170. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1990 AMC 46 (lth
Cir. 1989). This aspect of the Keefe litigation is discussed in Nathaniel G. W. Pieper
& David W. McCreadie, Cruise Ship Passenger Claims and Defenses, 21 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 151, 175 (1990).
171. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1069 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
172. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 902 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1990).
173. Keefe, 753 F. Supp. at 351, 1991 AMC at 1399.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Chattem, Inc. v. Bailey, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (White, J.,
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In this case, the questions addressed in the first instance and on
remand were resolved in the same manner. This Court found De-
fendant liable, found the claim not to be time-barred, and awarded
identical damages . . . . The damages were meaningfully "ascer-
tained" at the time of the original judgment . . . . The Court con-
cludes that interest in this cause of action should appropriately be
calculated from the date of the original judgment, March 31,
1988.176
The next passenger case was Perlman v. Valdes.11 Sherry Lynn
Valdes had died from injuries sustained when the speedboat in which
she was riding struck an unlighted, unused concrete pier.17" Following
her death her husband, Jose, and her parents, Jack and Linda Newton,
brought a wrongful death suit against George D. Perlman, the trustee
of the City Isles Trust (Trust), the owner of the pier, on the ground
that it had been negligent in failing to light the pier in accordance with
federal regulations. 1 9
The Trust moved for and received summary judgment on the
Newtons' claim.18 0 The remaining claims were then tried to a jury. The
jury found that the Trust was guilty of negligence per se and that Jose
and Sherry had been twenty-five percent negligent.18' Based on these
findings, the jury awarded $250,000 to Sherry's estate and $250,000 to
Jose. 82 Although the Trust moved for a new trial and for remittitur of
the award, Circuit Judge Gale entered final judgment in accordance
with the verdict.18 3 The Trust then took an appeal and the Newtons
filed a cross-appeal.' 8 ' In a brief opinion written by District Judge Bas-
kin and joined in by District Judges Nesbitt and Cope, the judgment
was affirmed in part and reversed in part. 8 5
Judge Baskin began her review by agreeing with the Trust that the
damages won by Sherry's estate were excessive. She therefore reversed
dissenting)).
176. Id. at 351, 1991 AMC at 1400.
177. 575 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
178. Id. at 217.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Perlman, 575 So. 2d at 217.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 218.
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the jury's award and remanded for remittitur or a new trial.186 With
respect to Jose's recovery, however, Judge Baskin decided that it was
supported by the evidence and therefore refused to disturb it.'87
Having disposed of the appeal, Judge Baskin turned to the cross-
appeal. Here she found that Judge Gale had been correct in dismissing
the Newtons' claim because they had not relied on their daughter for
financial support. Recognizing that the question was controlled by a
very recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Judge Baskin
wrote: "The trial court properly granted summary judgment in the
Trust's favor as the parents may not recover under general maritime
law absent a showing of financial dependence on the decedent."' 88
The final passenger case of the survey period was Wilkinson v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.. " Marjetta Wilkinson and Tracie Sanders
had been travelling companions aboard the S/S TROPICALE, a cruise
ship owned by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. (Carnival). 190 On the after-
noon of September 30, 1983, after sunning herself for a short time by
the pool on the Lido Deck, Wilkinson walked barefoot towards an elec-
tronic sliding glass door on the ship's port side."' As she walked
through the door, it closed, running over the toes of her right foot. 19
Wilkinson filed suit against Carnival claiming that it had failed to
maintain the door properly and also had failed to warn her that the
door could close suddenly. 93 The case was assigned to District Judge
Zloch and the parties proceeded to discovery. 94 As the date for trial
neared, Carnival made a motion for summary judgment.'95 Although
the magistrate to whom the motion was referred recommended that it
be granted, Judge Zloch ruled that while the plaintiff's case was weak,
there was sufficient evidence to warrant a trial.' 96
186. Id. at 217-18.
187. Perlman, 575 So. 2d at 218.
188. Id. (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 111 S. Ct. 317, 1991 AMC 1
(1990)). The Supreme Court's decision is commented on in Ross Diamond III, Wrong-
ful Death Remedies After Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 3 MAR. L. REP. 49 (1991), and
C. Taylor Simpson, Note, Sailing the Statutory Seas Toward Uniformity in Maritime
Tort Law: Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 449 (1991).
189. 920 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1991).
190. Id. at 1562.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1562.
195. /d.
196. Id. at 1563.
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Much of the trial centered around the testimony of Sanders. She
had not witnessed the accident, but claimed to have had a conversation
with a cabin steward named Fletcher shortly after the accident. Ac-
cording to Sanders, Fletcher had told her that he had been aware of
the door's propensity to malfunction and had been trying to fix it. 97
Carnival objected to the introduction of his testimony on the ground
that it was inadmissible hearsay. 98 Wilkinson responded by arguing
that it should be let in as a party admission.1 99 After considering the
matter, Judge Zloch concluded that the statement was admissible as a
statement by a party's servant concerning a matter within the scope of
his employment.2"'
The trial also focused on the testimony of several other witnesses
who claimed that after Wilkinson's accident the door that had injured
her was locked in an open position for the remainder of the cruise.21
Initially, Judge Zloch ruled that this testimony was inadmissible be-
cause it constituted evidence of a subsequent remedial measure.20 2 On
the next day of the trial, however, Judge Zloch held that the testimony
was admissible to impeach Rafael Marcialis, the ship's second officer,
who had testified that when he inspected the door he had found it to be
in "normal operating condition." 03
Following the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of Wilkin-
son and awarded her $260,000, less twenty percent for her negli-
gence.20' After Carnival's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, remittitur, and a new trial were denied, Carnival filed an ap-
peal.20 5 On appeal, the judgment was reversed and the case was re-
manded for a new trial in an opinion written by Circuit Judge Fay and
joined in by Circuit Judge Edmondson and Senior Circuit Judge
Tuttle.20 6
Judge Fay turned first to the question of whether Fletcher's al-
leged statement should have been admitted. Noting that neither party
197. Id. at 1562-63.
198. Id. at 1563.
199. Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1563.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1563-64.
203. Id. at 1564.
204. Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1564.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1562.
[Vol. 16
154
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Jarvis
had attempted to depose Fletcher or call him to the stand, °7 Judge Fay
did not question Sanders' contention that Fletcher had told her that the
door had been malfunctioning. Instead, Judge Fay posed the question
as being whether Fletcher was in a position to speak for Carnival about
the door's operation.2 0 8 Relying on an affidavit submitted by Jack
Stein, of Carnival's Operations Department, Judge Fay found that
cabin stewards such as Fletcher were strictly prohibited from being in
any of the ship's "passenger areas. 2 0 9 Since the accident had taken
place in such an area,2 10 Judge Fay concluded that Fletcher's statement
was not a party admission: "The magistrate found, and we agree, that
Stein's affidavit established 'that the statement made by a room stew-
ard to Is. Sanders did not concern a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment,' and therefore was hearsay. "211
Although agreeing with Carnival that as a practical matter the
plaintiff's case was over, Judge Fay noted that there still was a slight
chance that Wilkinson could find a way to get Fletcher's statement into
evidence.212 Since another trial remained a theoretical possibility,
Judge Fay reviewed Wilkinson's impeachment of the ship's second of-
ficer. Once again, he found reversible error. In explaining his conclu-
sion, Judge Fay wrote:
207. Id. at 1562 n.3.
208. Id. at 1565. Judge Fay described the inquiry by writing: "The appropriate
focus is instead upon whether the cabin steward's statement concerned a 'matter within
the scope of [his] agency or employment' with Carnival." Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1565.
209. Id. at 1566.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Judge Fay explained the need to remand the case, rather than simply re-
verse, as follows:
If 801(d)(2)(D) were the only avenue through which plaintiff had at-
tempted to offer the Fletcher statements, then we might well simply re-
verse and enter judgment for Carnival on this issue. Our examination of
the record, however, reveals that following the magistrate's recommenda-
tion . . . plaintiff filed a Notice of Intent to Rely on Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(24) . ...
Because the district court overruled the magistrate's report and ad-
mitted the Fletcher statements as non-hearsay admissions of a party-oppo-
nent under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), it never considered the applicability of
Rule 803(24), the so-called "Catchall" exception to the hearsay rule . . ..
Accordingly, we leave it to the district court to determine whether the
cabin steward's hearsay statements comport sufficiently with the criteria of
Rule 803(24) to justify admission under that exception.
Id. at 1567 n.13.
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Marcialis made no statements concerning the functioning of the
door in the days subsequent to September 30. He did not assert
that the Tropicale's crew or the cruise line had exercised "all rea-
sonable care" in maintaining the door. Nor did he make represen-
tations that the door in question was in the "safest" or the "best"
condition.
In short, the evidence of the subsequent remedial measure in this
case impeached nothing in Marcialis' testimony. Moreover, admit-
ting various witnesses' testimony to the fact of the doors being kept
open likely gave rise to the precise inference of negligence that
Rule 407 was designed to avoid. Accordingly, the evidence should
have remained inadmissible.21
C. Seamen
Two very unusual personal injury cases involving seamen were de-
cided during the time covered by the survey. In Tanker Management,
Inc. v. Brunson,21" Darrel Allen, a merchant seaman, suffered a back
injury in September, 1983 while working aboard the M/V CAROLE
G. INGRAM. 21' Allen was treated by Dr. Bruce C. Brunson, who
signed a certificate in February, 1984 stating that Allen could return to
work in three weeks provided that he did not have to lift anything ex-
ceeding fifty pounds.216 In December, 1984, Brunson signed a second
certificate stating that Allen could resume work in two weeks with no
weight restriction.1 In August, 1985, Allen suffered a second back
injury while working aboard the CAROLE G. INGRAM. 1
Allen subsequently sued Tanker Management, Inc., the operator
of the CAROLE G. INGRAM, for both injuries. In time, Tanker
213. Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1568-69. Having dealt with the evidentiary ques-
tions posed by the appeal and having found that a new trial was necessary, Judge Fay
ended his opinion by disposing of the final issue in short order. Carnival had argued
that Judge Zloch had erred in failing to give one of its requested jury instructions. The
instruction would have informed the jury that it could find that Wilkinson was a hyper-
sensitive victim. Id. at 1569. Judge Fay ruled that the refusal had not been error be-
cause the instruction was covered by another instruction that was given and because
Carnival had been allowed to argue in its closing statement to the jury that Wilkinson's
injuries had been aggravated by a pre-existing condition. Id. at 1570.
214. 918 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1990).
215. Id. at 1525.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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Management settled Allen's lawsuit for $150,000.219 Its counsel then
wrote to Brunson and demanded indemnity for the amounts it had paid
in defending and settling the lawsuit.2"' When Brunson refused to pay,
Tanker Management filed suit against him. According to the com-
plaint, Brunson, who had been paid by Tanker Management to treat
Allen, had intentionally misrepresented Allen's condition (at Allen's
behest) despite knowing that Tanker Management was relying on
Brunson to advise them on whether Allen could return to work.22 1
The case was assigned to District Judge Sharp and a bench trial
was held.. At the close of Tanker Management's case-in-chief Brunson
moved for a directed verdict. Finding that Tanker Management had
failed to make out a prima facie case, Judge Sharp granted the mo-
tion. 22 2 Because Tanker Management had rejected an offer of judgment
from Brunson prior to the start of the trial, Judge Sharp also granted
Brunson's subsequent motion for costs and attorneys' fees.22 3 Tanker
Management then filed an appeal. 2 4
In a rather scholarly opinion, Circuit Judge Clark, joined by Cir-
cuit Judge Hatchett and Senior Circuit Judge Morgan, affirmed Judge
Sharp in all respects.221 5 Finding that Tanker Management's case had
bordered on the frivolous,226 Judge Clark approved the granting of the
directed verdict,22 7 the imposition of costs, 228 and the awarding of at-
torneys' fees,"' as well as Judge Sharp's decision to add The London
Steam-Ship Owner's Mutual Insurance Association Limited, Tanker
Management's insurer, to the judgment so as to make it clear that it
could not relitigate the matter by bringing a new suit in its own
name.
230
The other seaman's suit was Gleneagle Ship Management Co. v.
219. Tanker Management, 918 F.2d at 1525.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1525-26.
222. Id. at 1526.
223. Id.
224. Tanker Management, 918 F.2d at 1526.
225. Id. at 1529.
226. Id. at 1527. Judge Clark observed dryly: "Appellant failed to present any
evidence which supports the inference that Brunson failed to accurately state his opin-
ion as to Allen's condition." Id.
227. Id. at 1526-27.
228. Tanker Management, 918 F.2d at 1527.
229. Id. at 1527-29.
230. Id. at 1529.
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Leondakos.2" Anthony Leondakos had injured himself when he fell off
a stairwell on the M/V BRIDGETON while sailing in the Persian
Gulf.23 2 He and his wife Carol filed a Jones Act suit " 3 in state court
against Gleneagle Ship Management Company (Gleneagle) and Chesa-
peake Shipping, Inc.234 In response, Gleneagle moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction. 3
Before the motion to dismiss could be heard, Leondakos served a
discovery request aimed at determining whether the trial court did have
jurisdiction. When Circuit Judge Farnell ruled that Leondakos could
engage in limited discovery for the purpose of determining whether ju-
risdiction existed,23 6 Gleneagle filed a writ of certiorari. 23 7
In a short per curiam decision, Acting Chief Judge Ryder and Dis-
trict Judges Danahy and Parker denied the petition. 23 8 After reviewing
both federal and state case law on the issue and noting that a conflict
existed between the two, the panel concluded that the discovery was
appropriate: "We believe the federal rule represents the better ap-
proach to the question, and hold that 'jurisdictional discovery' is availa-
ble during the pendency of jurisdictional issues, subject of course to the
supervision of the trial court. 239
VI. PILOTS
The survey period produced two cases involving pilots. In both, ad-
231. 581 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
232. Id. at 223.
233. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). The Jones Act, passed in 1920, reversed traditional
maritime law by giving seaman the right to sue their employers for negligence, See
William B. Milliken et al., Personal Injury and Wrongful Death in FLA. B., MAR. L. &
PRAC. § 2.21, at 38 (1987).
234. Gleneagle, 581 So. 2d at 223.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Gleneagle, 581 So. 2d at 223. In so holding, the panel explicitly rejected the
contrary holding in F. Hoffmann LaRoche & Co. v. Felix, 512 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1987), by writing: "Notably, that panel expressed a preference for the
policy followed in the federal judicial system . . . .The panel apparently considered
itself bound by a previous decision of the same court, Far Out Music, Inc. v. Jordan,
438 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), and lacked support for revisiting that
decision en banc." Id.
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miralty issues took a back seat to administrative law issues as the
courts grappled with the Board of Pilot Commissioners (BPC)24
In Rabren v. Department of Professional Regulation,241 the BPC,
through the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), had
brought professional misconduct charges against a state-licensed pilot
named David E. Rabren. According to the DPR's administrative com-
plaint, Rabren, as President of the Tampa Tri-County Pilots Associa-
tion (TRICO), had on several occasions in 1986 violated a BPC rule
that required state-licensed pilots to be used in vessel shiftings. 242 In
particular, Rabren was accused of having assigned Gary Murphy, a
TRICO pilot who held only a federal license, to shift the vessels M/V
OCEAN LORD, M/V VOMAR, and M/V ASPEN.2 43
Rabren contested the charges and requested a formal hearing,
which was held in January, 1988.2 " At the hearing, Rabren admitted
that the shifts involving the OCEAN LORD and the VOMAR had
taken place. 45 He contended, however, that no penalty was warranted
because: 1) it was his wife, TRICO's business manager, who had given
the assignments to Murphy, and, 2) the shifts had taken place at
anchorages, not ports, and therefore were not covered by the BPC's
rule."
The hearing officer rejected Rabren's first argument on the ground
that it was not supported by any evidence. 47 With respect to his second
defense, however, the hearing officer agreed with Rabren. He found
that:
Gadsden Anchorage, C.F. Industries, Rockport and Big Bend are
all located in the port of Tampa. Accordingly, vessels moving be-
tween these locations are not entering and leaving port, and under
the specific provisions of [Florida Statutes] Section 310.141 do not
require the presence of a licensed state pilot, or a deputy pilot, on
240. For a general discussion of the powers of pilot commissioners, see A. PARKS,
THE LAW OF TUG, Tow, AND PILOTAGE 1086-99 (2d ed. 1982).
241. 568 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
242. Id. at 1286. This was not Rabren's first run-in with the BPC over this issue.
In 1984, Rabren had challenged an earlier BPC rule concerning vessel shiftings. For a
detailed account, see James I. Crowley, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez: Charting
the Course of Pilotage Regulation, 22 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 165, 187-89 (1991).
243. Rabren, 568 So. 2d at 1286.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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board during maneuvers .... .
Based on his finding that Murphy's shiftings were at places that were
not ports, the hearing officer recommended that the charges against
Rabren be dismissed. 49
Several months later, in May, 1988, the BPC adopted the hearing
officer's recommendation in a final order.25 0 The order, however, con-
tained one very important change. Whereas the hearing officer had
found that the anchorages at which Murphy had worked were outside
the statutory definition of ports, the BPC included in its order the fol-
lowing conclusion of law: "In addition to the above Conclusions
adopted from those of the Hearing Officer, the Board concludes that
Gadsden Anchorage, C.F. Industries, Rockport and Big Bend are ports
within the meaning of Section 310.002(4), Florida Statutes." '251 Upon
receiving the BPC's order, Rabren filed a challenge to it in court.252 In
a well-written opinion that demonstrated a mastery over extremely
complicated facts, District Judge Miner, joined by District Judges
Nimmons and Barfield, agreed with Rabren and struck down the con-
clusion that the four facilities were ports. 53
Judge Miner began his opinion by first finding that Rabren had
standing to challenge the BPC's ruling even though the ruling had
adopted the hearing officer's recommendation that the charges against
Rabren should be dropped. Finding that new charges already had been
brought against Rabren based on the order's redesignation of the
anchorages as ports, Judge Miner concluded that Rabren ought to be*
allowed to challenge the order:
In terms of standing, we acknowledge that this is close to the
boundary which separates injury in fact from mere illusory specu-
lation . . . . However, the fact that there are pending charges
against appellant based upon the legal conclusion contained in the
final order serves to distinguish this case . . . . While standing
here is not overwhelmingly clear, we hold that appellant has
standing. 2
54
248. Rabren, 568 So. 2d at 1287.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1287-88.
253. Rabren, 568 So. 2d at 1290.
254. Id. at 1288.
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Having resolved the standing issue, Judge Miner turned to the real
question: had the BPC overstepped its boundaries by deciding that the
anchorages should be considered ports? In doing so, he confronted the
always hazy distinction between agency rulemaking and agency adjudi-
cation. The difference between the two in Florida has been described
by one noted commentator as follows:
Generally, agencies can create legally binding policy by either us-
ing their rule making authority or by properly developing policy
positions in adjudicatory proceedings. The latter have been labeled
incipient rules by the courts, because they are developed in the case
by case adjudicative process through a series of orders. There are
several critical distinctions between the two processes. One such
distinction is the type of record required to support agency policy
developed in an adjudicatory proceeding . . . . [In order to with-
stand judicial challenge, the agency] must support in the record
with competent substantial evidence every factual conclusion that
is necessary to justify the agency's policy choice and detail the le-
gal rationale for such policy choices.a55
Although faced with a difficult question, Judge Miner found the
answer rather easy. After considering the proceedings undertaken by
the BPC and the DPR, he concluded that the record did not contain
nearly enough evidence to support the BPC's redesignations. He ex-
plained his conclusion by writing:
In the instant case, there is no record foundation for the BPC's
conclusion that CFI, Gadsden Anchorage, Rockport and Big Bend
are ports. The transcript of the DOAH proceeding was not availa-
ble, and the factual findings adopted in the BPC's final order tend
to support a contrary conclusion. Neither does the order offer an
explanation or justification for the policy. The BPC simply states in
conclusory fashion that the facilities are ports. We find this conclu-
sion to be unsupported by the record.2B5
255. Johnny C. Burris, Administrative Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 583, 613-14
(1990) (emphasis in original).
256. Rabren, 568 So. 2d at 1289. Although it had no bearing on the case, by the
time Judge Miner's decision was published the statute under which the BPC had pro-
ceeded had been amended. See FLA. STAT. § 310.141 (1990). The amendment, which
will expire on October 1, 1996 unless reenacted, exempts vessel dockings, undockings,
and shiftings from the rule requiring the use of a state-licensed pilot.
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The other pilotage case of the survey period was McDonald v. De-
partment of Professional Regulation.25 7 George H. McDonald, a li-
censed harbor pilot, was fined $500 by the BPC and DPR for allowing
the stern of the M/V KALLIOPE II, a vessel he was piloting with the
assistance of the tugboats TAMPA and ORANGE out to Tampa Bay,
to be towed into the west bank of the Cut D channel.2 58 Following the
imposition of the fine, McDonald appealed the order.25"
On appeal, a divided panel consisting of District Judges Ervin and
Zehmer and Senior District Judge Wentworth produced three separate
opinions. Judge Ervin wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge
Zehmer joined by penning a special concurrence. Judge Wentworth ob-
jected to both the majority opinion and the concurrence in a short
dissent.
Each member of the panel agreed that the issue before the court
was whether the BPC had met its burden of proving that McDonald
had been negligent. In finding negligence, the hearing officer had relied
on an evidentiary presumption borrowed from a federal admiralty case:
in the absence of severe weather conditions or mechanical difficulties,
evidence that a vessel has been navigated outside the channel is prima
facie evidence of negligence. 6" The BPC accepted the hearing officer's
recommendation that McDonald be found negligent, but modified the
presumption to include, in addition to weather conditions and mechani-
cal difficulties, "the absence of any exigent circumstances." '261
In reviewing the BPC's decision, Judge Ervin believed that both
the BPC and the hearing officer had been wrong to rely on the pre-
sumption. He therefore reversed the decision and remanded the case
for further proceedings in which the presumption could not be used.2 2
In setting out the rationale behind his ruling, Judge Ervin wrote:
Under the principle of strict construction applicable to disciplinary
statutes and the principles set forth in the cases cited above, it fol-
lows that without any provision for a legal presumption in the disci-
plinary statutes, the agency lacks authority to adopt a legal pre-
257. 582 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
258. Id. at 661-62.
259. Id. at 662.
260. Id. The case from which the hearing officer and the BPC had borrowed the
presumption was Woods v. United States Department of Transportation, 681 F.2d 988,
1985 AMC 2112 (5th Cir. 1982).
261. McDonald, 582 So. 2d at 662.
262. Id. at 664.
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sumption that effectively relieves it from having to prove specific
acts of misconduct and shifts the burden of proving innocence to
the licensee. We have found no such statutory provision authorizing
DPR or the Board to adopt or apply any presumption like that
applied in this case. Thus, DPR, in urging the Board to adopt the
presumption, and the Board, in applying the presumption to sup-
port the finding of guilt, greatly exceeded their statutorily dele-
gated authority under Florida law.2 68
Although he agreed with Judge Ervin that reliance on the pre-
sumption had been error, Judge Zehmer in his concurrence explained
that he believed that the case against McDonald was so weak that the
order should have been reversed with directions to dismiss the
charges.164
The panel's final opinion, by Judge Wentworth, came to an en-
tirely opposite conclusion. Judge Wentworth concluded that the BPC
had been correct to use the presumption and also had been correct in
finding 'that McDonald had been negligent. 265 Since the presumption
was not a "conclusive" presumption, Judge Wentworth saw no reason
that would bar its use and chastised Judge Ervin for making the BPC's
job more difficult by prohibiting "the use of rebuttable evidentiary de-
vices which are well rooted in the law of the subject matter
regulated."266
VII. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In recent years, the number of marine products liability suits has
been rapidly increasing. The period under study produced two such
cases, both of which turned out to be victories for the manufacturers
and distributors of products that fail.
In Ruano v. Water Sports of America, Inc.,267 Nelson Atan, a
fourteen year old, and his brother rented a jet ski known as a "wave
jammer" from the defendant, Water Sports of America (WSA)"
263. Id.
264. See id. at 1593.
265. Id. at 676.
266. McDonald, 582 So. 2d at 676.
267. 578 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
268. Id. at 385. Unlike other types of jet skis, a wave jammer is driven with the
operator standing. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has found that jet skis are vessels for fed-
eral admiralty purposes. See Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225, 1990 AMC
609 (11th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of Keys, see Jeffrey S. Winder, Note, On the
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Before being allowed to take out the jet ski, the boys were given operat-
ing instructions, provided with rudimentary safety precautions, and told
to stay away from the swimming area.269
David Ruano, a swimmer, was sitting in Biscayne Bay near the
Rickenbacker Causeway approximately five to eight feet from the
shore.270 The area in which he was sitting was part of the established
swimming area.27' In an instant, he was hit in the head by the wave
jammer, knocked unconscious for a few seconds, and sustained injuries
to his ear and to other parts of his body. 72
Following the June, 1988 mishap, Ruano brought suit against
WSA for having negligently entrusted the wave jammer to a minor.
Circuit Judge Turner granted a motion for summary judgment by
WSA and Ruano appealed. 3 In a short opinion, District Judge
Barkdull, joined by District Judges Nesbitt and Jorgenson, affirmed the
decision.27'
WSA had moved for summary judgment on the ground that under
Florida law liveries cannot be held liable for negligent entrustment.
Judge Turner had agreed with WSA, and so did Judge Barkdull. Find-
ing that WSA has complied fully with the law, he wrote:
The trial court properly entered summary judgment because sec-
tion 327.54, Florida Statutes (1987), provides a complete defense,
thus relieving the defendant from liability. The statute provides
that the liability of a commercial lessor ceases upon compliance
with the statutory safety requirements. The statute supplants the
common law theories of vicarious liability and negligent entrust-
ment. Moreover, even if the statute does not constitute a defense
for negligent entrustment, there is no view of the facts which sup-
ports such a claim. 76
A more traditional products liability claim was made in American
Universal Insurance Group v. General Motors Corporation.7 6 In 1985,
Duty to Follow Precedent in Applying the Limitation of Liability Act: Keys Jet Ski,
Inc. v. Kays, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 465 (1991).
269. Ruano, 578 So. 2d at 385.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 386.
274. Ruano, 578 So. 2d at 386.
275. Id.
276. 578 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
[Vol. 16
164
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Jarvis
Robert Cook purchased from Diesel Parts, Sales & Service, Inc. (Die-
sel Parts) a replacement oil pump that had been manufactured and
distributed by the defendant, General Motors Corporation (GMC).2
Diesel Parts subsequently installed the pump aboard Cook's fishing
boat, the F/V CAPTAIN SLEEPY. 78 Two years later, on January 20,
1987, the pump's drive gear failed and burned up the CAPTAIN
SLEEPY's engine while she was being operated off the coast of New
Symrna Beach. 79
Pursuant to its insurance policy, the plaintiff, American Universal
Insurance Group (American), paid Cook and his wife $7,392.91.280
Meanwhile, Cook returned the engine to Diesel Parts, and they re-
paired it. When Cook failed to pay for the repairs, Diesel Parts sued
him. In response, Cook claimed a set-off based upon Diesel Parts' al-
leged breach of its implied warranty of merchantability arising out of
the original sale.18 1 Cook also brought a third-party complaint against
Diesel Parts and GMC.182 American, having become subrogated to
Cook on account of its payment to him, then filed an intervening com-
plaint against both Diesel Parts and GMC.288
The case was assigned to Circuit Judge Beverly. She eventually
dismissed American's complaint against GMC and also dismissed the
negligence count in American's complaint against Diesel Parts. 4 In
response, American filed an appeal with respect to the dismissal of
GMC.280 In a well-crafted opinion, District Judge Smith, joined by
District Judge Booth, affirmed the dismissal.28 6 Although District
Judge Zehmer dissented, he did not write an opinion. 7
After a careful review of the case law, Judge Smith stated what
has become the accepted rule in this state: "Florida law does not per-
mit a buyer under a contract for goods to recover economic losses in
tort without a claim for personal injury or property damage to property
277. Id. at 451.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 451-52.
280. Id. at 452.
281. American Universal, 578 So. 2d at 452.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. American Universal, 578 So. 2d at 455.
287. Id.
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other than the allegedly defective goods. 12 88 Having set out the rule,
Judge Smith turned to American's argument for why the rule did not
apply.
According to American, the oil pump had been the product that
Cook had purchased and the engine was the "other property" that the
product had damaged when it malfunctioned.289 Although the distinc-
tion drawn by American sounded reasonable enough, Judge Smith
found that it did not comport with the facts of the case:
Here the object of the bargain was a repaired engine, not just a
replacement oil pump. The oil pump furnished essential lubrication
and heat protection to the engine-this is the part of the "bargain"
purchased, not just the metal and parts making up the oil pump.
The pump became an integral part of the repaired engine and
when it damaged itself, and the engine parts, this was not damage
to "other property. 2
90
VIII. SALVAGE
There was only one salvage case during the survey period, but it
proved to be a dandy. In Flagship Marine Services, Inc. v. Belcher
Towing Co.,2 91 the tugboat E.N. BELCHER, JR., and her two barges
became stranded on the morning of July 17, 1989, after striking an
unidentified submerged object near Big Shell Island off the Southwest
Florida coast. Realizing that he was in trouble, William Diamond, the
BELCHER's captain, notified the Coast Guard and then began trying
to save his ship. 292 The Coast Guard relayed Diamond's message to the
Ft. Myers Fire Department, the Cape Coral Fire and Police Depart-
ments, and Flagship Marine Services, Inc., a private salvage company
operating under the name Sea Tow Services of Lee County (Sea
Tow).293 Within the hour, help began arriving.2 94
288. Id. at 453 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987)). As Judge Smith noted, this is the same standard as the
one used in federal admiralty proceedings. Id. (citing East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 1986 AMC 2027 (1986)); see also Sympo-
sium, Products Liability in Admiralty, 62 TUL. L. REv. 313 (1988).
289. American Universal, 578 So. 2d at 455.
290. Id. at 454.
291. 761 F. Supp. 792 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
292. Id. at 793.
293. Id.
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When the first of three Sea Tow ships appeared on the scene, Dia-
mond asked the Sea Tow representative how much his company would
charge. Although a discussion ensued, no price was agreed on and Sea
Tow eventually went to Work with the issue left open.2 * After four
difficult hours, during which a diver was deployed to patch a hole in the
BELCHER's hull, Sea Tow managed to save both the BELCHER and
the barges.296
After the rescue, one of Sea Tow's fleet captains, a Captain
Robinson, prepared but then did not send an invoice for $24,281 .2
Instead, Sea Tow filed a suit for salvage against Belcher Towing Com-
pany, Belcher Oil Co., the BELCHER, and the two barges. Following
a four day bench trial in March and April, 1991, Judge Aronovitz
found that Sea Tow was entitled to a salvage award. Although Captain
Robinson's invoice had been found by Belcher in discovery and had
been introduced, Judge Aronovitz decided that it was not important:
"The invoice represents a calculation of what the salvage job would
have cost had it been on a straight time and materials basis. It does not
account for all of the elements of a salvage award."" 8 Judge Aronovitz
also found that the conversation between Diamond and the Sea Tow
representative did not bar Sea Tow's ability to claim salvage: "Further-
more, the conversations that took place between Sea Tow and Captain
Diamond did not rise to the level of either a contract between the par-
ties, or a special oral agreement."2 99
Having concluded that Sea Tow was entitled to claim salvage,
Judge Aronovitz then considered the size of the award. Noting that the
BELCHER and her barges were worth $670,000 and that the equip-
ment that had been used by Sea Tow (and therefore put at risk) was
valued at $250,000, Judge Aronovitz decided that an award of
$125,000 would be "fair recompense."0'
294. Id. at 794.
295. Id.
296. Flagship, 761 F. Supp. at 794-95.
297. Id. at 796.
298. Id.
299. Id. (citing Brown v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1989)).
300. Id. at 796-97. In so holding, Judge Aronovitz did not explain how he had
reached the figure of $125,000.00 or why such an amount was fair. This is not surpris-
ing, however, for rarely is there any logical explanation for the size of a salvage award.
As has been noted elsewhere: "Eventually the trial judge will pull an arbitrary figure
out of the air." GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 8-
10, at 56 (2d ed. 1975). For a very interesting article that decries the current system
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IX. CONCLUSION
As noted in the Introduction, this survey period contained an ec-
lectic mix of the traditional as well as the unusual. Each of the cases
are great reading, and all serve to illustrate the period's single most
important lesson: to be successful in the highly specialized practice of
admiralty law, it helps to be an accomplished generalist. 01
and attempts to provide a mathematical formula for computing salvage awards, see
Note, Calculating and Allocating Salvage Liability, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1896 (1986).
301. The credit for this observation belongs to Mary C. Hubbard, Esq., a mari-
time lawyer with the New Orleans law firm of Phelps Dunbar, who related it to the
author during the Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute's 1991 Annual Continuing
Legal Education Seminar in Savannah, Georgia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This work comprehensively surveys the cases of the Supreme
Court of Florida that considered the bill of rights contained in article I
of the state constitution during 1991.1 It supplements the previous state
constitutional surveys published by the Review,' and adheres to the
same case selection criteria.3
1. Specifically, the survey summarizes all cases that the court released in slip
form during the period January 1 through August 15, 1991.
2. See David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: A Ten-year Retrospective
on the State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REV. 693 (1990) [hereinafter Decade Survey]
(concluding that the court's decisions create a hierarchical order of rights in article I,
with the order dependent solely upon the particular standard chosen to measure the
justification for the state's encroachment; that article I rights are not absolute, despite
rhetoric to the contrary; that article I rights eclipsed protections afforded by the federal
analogues on five occasions during the decade; that litigants should exploit the textual
differences between the state and federal constitutions, thereby advancing constitu-
tional imperatives that are unique to Florida; and that the court has promoted the
independence of the state constitution on several occasions when it eschewed relevant
federal precedent); David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: 1990 Survey of the
State Bill of Rights, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1049 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 Survey] (identi-
fying a variety of doctrinal positions and principles of construction that drive the
court's constitutional logic; concluding that the court has accepted major responsibility
for protecting personal rights from governmental excess; and noting that article I rights
on two occasions surpassed the protections of their federal counterparts).
3. This survey accepts the premise that each opinion citing to the state bill of
rights, whether by principled analysis or passing reference, uniquely contributes to the
development of the Florida Constitution. In profile, the opinion must confirm that the
state constitution was relied upon by one or more members of the court, addressed by a
lower court, or advanced by a litigant in support of a claim. Conversely, an opinion that
generically refers to equal protection, double jeopardy, and the like, makes a less cer-
tain contribution to this body of law. Those cases are selectively included.
These case selection criteria allow one exception. Occasionally, the court simply
cites to another case to dispose of a constitutional issue and fails to mention that its
holding in the case under review has constitutional significance. See, e.g,, Blizzard v.
W. H. Roof Co., 573 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1991) (adopting opinion of district court that
construed three sections of the Florida Constitution, yet failing to indicate that its hold-
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No case more profoundly symbolizes the strength of article I than
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property." This featured
opinion establishes an analytical model for state due process, which
shields several article I rights from state encroachment by utilization of
a heightened level of judicial scrutiny, and illustrates that Florida prop-
erty rights are entitled to a level of protection that eclipses the protec-
tion afforded by federal analogues. Treatment of the decision appears
throughout the following material.' Like Real Property, several other
cases during this survey period granted relief for violations of personal
rights entirely on the strength of state constitutional law. One message
is clear-litigants should be encouraged to rely on article I with the
same confidence that they place on other principled bases of relief.
II. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
A. Basic Rights
Article I, section 2 makes three separate declarations of personal
rights. 'The first declaration expresses the central constitutional concept
that the state must deal with similar persons in a similar manner. The
second provides that all natural persons have inalienable rights, and
specifically enumerates several of those rights. The third expressly pro-
hibits the deprivation of any right on account of race, religion, 6 or
physical handicap.7 During this survey period, the court construed
ing has constitutional stature); Broward County v. LaRosa, 505 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1987)
(approving opinion of district court that construed article I, section 18, yet omitting
reference to the prohibition of administrative penalties in its opinion); State v. Castillo,
486 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1986) (clarifying State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984),
without signifying that it is necessarily deciding a constitutional question). Fortunately
this practice is the exception, not the norm, for subtlety has no place when the court
expounds the state's organic law. Cases of that ilk are included in this survey to the
extent that research successfully identified them.
In all, the court released 49 cases that considered the state constitution during the
seven-and-one-half-month survey period, and addressed 74 state constitutional issues.
Of those, 38 cases and 53 issues directly pertain to article I.
4. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S497, (Aug. 15, 1991) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author)
(mandate issued Dec. 2, 1991).
5. See infra notes 20-24, 71-122, 282-88, 316-20 and accompanying text.
6. ]FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("There shall be no law respecting the establishment of
religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof .... ").
7. There is no express textual basis in the federal equal protection clause for
treating race, religion, and physical handicap different from other classifications. Yet
federal constitutional analysis regards race as a suspect classification, and subjects
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rights guaranteed under each of these three clauses.
1. Equal Protection Clause
All natural persons are equal before the law . . . . FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 2.
Two opinions by Justice McDonald this survey period relied on the
test of reasonableness to uphold various statutes that limited the expo-
sure to liability of certain classes of defendants from negligence suits
by injured plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in Abdala v. World Omni Leasing,
Inc.8 were injured in separate automobile accidents and sued the fi-
nance companies that leased the automobiles to the other drivers. The
plaintiffs proceeded principally on the theory that the lessors were lia-
ble for damages under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine,
which holds that the owners of motor vehicles are liable for injury
caused by the negligent operation of those vehicles by their agents.9
The lessors argued that they were not accountable for the plaintiffs'
injuries because they fell within an exception carved out by the legisla-
ture for long-term lessors of vehicles who maintained certain liability
insurance limits. 10
The court rejected the plaintiffs' common law argument. It ex-
plained that the legislature simply redefined the term "owner" of a mo-
tor vehicle, and excluded long-term lessors of automobiles. Moreover,
the court wrote that the legislative history of the statutory exception
showed that long-term leases were actually alternative methods of fi-
nancing vehicle purchases, which offered tax advantages to the les-
sors.1" It is unclear from the opinion why tax benefits of a long-term
race-based restrictions to "the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Other classifications accorded special scrutiny under federal
analysis are: gender, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976); citizenship, Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); and legitimacy, Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968). By expressly recognizing race, religion, and physical handicap,
the adopters of the state constitution have conferred a unique constitutional status on
those groups and have created an opportunity for Florida courts to extend protections
beyond the federal counterpart. Reason argues that those classifications, unlike classifi-
cations not enumerated, are entitled to a heightened level of scrutiny.
8. 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author).
9. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920).
10. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (1989).
11. Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 334.
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lease should render the financing company less culpable under the dan-
gerous instrumentality doctrine than had it executed a short-term lease.
A reasonable explanation for the holding is that long-term leases do not
retain for the financing company the traditional indicia of ownership
that would warrant holding it accountable under the doctrine for the
negligence of lessees or third parties. 2
Plaintiffs also advanced an equal protection challenge.13 The court
ruled that the statutory exception does not irrationally distinguish be-
tween the class of plaintiffs injured by vehicles leased for longer than
one year, and the class of plaintiffs injured by vehicles leased for less
than one year." Nor does the statute discriminate against the most
severely injured plaintiffs by eliminating long-term lessors as a source
of recovery, for plaintiffs retained the "unlimited ability to recover
from the lessee."'"
The other case, Blizzard v. W. H. Roof Co., Inc.,"8 dealt with stat-
utes of limitation that shortened the period for bringing negligence
suits against an insured tortfeasor whose insurance carrier became in-
solvent, and against the association established by law to cover claims
brought against insolvent carriers.' 7 The statutes reduced the period for
bringing suit from four years to one year, commencing at the deadline
established in the order of liquidation. Blizzard argued that the statutes
impermissibly created a subclass of insureds that was treated differ-
ently from members of the class as a whole.
A unanimous court adopted the opinion of the district court under
review, which ruled that the legislative choice to treat an insured
tortfeasor whose carrier became insolvent different from an insured
whose carrier remained solvent, was reasonably related to the stated
purpose of avoiding financial loss to claimants and policyholders alike.' 8
The statutory scheme assures injured claimants a mechanism for prose-
12. For instance, finance companies and long-term lessors may assume less.con-
trol of the leased automobile than do short-term lessors. Moreover, finance companies
may never see the automobile, or exercise a possessory interest over it during the term
of the lease.
13. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated due process and access
to courts. See infra notes 136, 296 and accompanying text.
14. Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 333-34.
15. Id. at 334.
16. .573 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 95.11(5)(d), 631.68 (1987).
18. Blizzard v. W.H. Roof Co., 556 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
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cuting damage claims that would otherwise go unsatisfied due to the
insolvency of the carrier. Moreover, it safeguards persons who sought
to protect themselves from liability by purchasing insurance policies.1 9
2. Inalienable Rights and Deprivation Clauses
All natural persons . . . have inalienable rights, among which are
the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness,
to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect
property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and
possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may
be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of
any right because of race, religion or physical handicap. FLA.
CoN sT. art. I, § 2.
Property, race, life and liberty were all considered this survey pe-
riod. We begin with property. Article I accords high stature to substan-
tive property rights. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop-
erty20 declared that the rights "to acquire, possess and protect
property" are among the most basic substantive rights protected by ar-
ticle I, section 2. A unanimous court found the procedures employed by
the state to execute a property seizure and forfeiture under the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act2 l were woefully inadequate to protect fun-
damental property rights safeguarded by this and other article I sec-
tions. Those rights are valued so highly that the initial restraint on
property must be accomplished by the least intrusive means under the
circumstances that are necessary to preserve potentially forfeitable as-
sets. 2 Moreover, the state is entitled to forfeiture only when it shows
by no less than clear and convincing evidence that the property was
used in violation of the act.2 3 The court imposed these and other "mini-
mal" due process standards on the state without regard to the particu-
lar type of personal property or real property that the state sought to
restrain. Because state due process is central to the protection of prop-
erty rights in this context, Real Property is treated fully under article
19. Blizzard, 573 So. 2d at 334.
20. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S497 (Aug. 15, 1991) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author).
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-.704 (1989).
22. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S500.
23. Id. at S501.
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1, section 924
The rights "to acquire, possess and protect property" are not enti-
tled to such stalwart protection when subject to state regulation in con-
texts less onerous than forfeiture. In 1990, the court in Shriners Hospi-
tals v. Zrillic" stated that the legislature is prohibited from restricting
property rights unless the restriction is "reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, good order, [and] general welfare." 2 6 This year, the
court returned to that principle in Harris v. Martin Regency, Ltd.,27 a
case that asked whether the legislature could permissibly deny the
owner of a mobile home park the right to evict the tenant mobile home
owners where that owner had decided to allow the land comprising the
park to become vacant. The mobile home park owner relied on section
723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), which specifies limited circum-
stances when a park owner can evict tenant mobile home owners, in-
cluding change in use of the park land.
Martin Regency, the park owner, notified the tenant mobile home
owners of its intent to vacate its mobile home park. It provided the
requisite notice, but omitted any explanation for the anticipated
change. After the mobile home owners failed to timely vacate the park,
Martin Regency initiated proceedings to evict them. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Martin Regency, finding that it
complied with the notice requirements of section 723.061, and that it
was not required to state its intended use of the park, provided that it
did not continue to use the land as a mobile home park.2" The district
court affirmed. 9
In a split decision, a bare majority of four justices agreed to quash
the decision of the district court. The majority noted that mobile home
24. See infra notes 71-122 and accompanying text.
25. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
26. Id. at 68 (citing, in part, Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong, 300 So.
2d 881 (Fla. 1974)). The court wrote in Palm Beach Mobile Homes that the extent of
the personal right to use property must be determined in light of the prevailing social
and economic conditions, rather than as the framers and adopters intended, for the
legislature would otherwise become helpless to regulate and to extend that right to new
conditions, 300 So. 2d at 884 (citation omitted).
27. .576 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 1991) (Barkett, J., author; McDonald and Kogan, JJ.,
and Ehrlich, Senior Justice, concurring; Overton, J., dissented with an opinion; Grimes,
J., dissented with an opinion in which Shaw, C.J., and Overton, J., concurred).
28. Id. at 1296.
29. Harris v. Martin Regency, Ltd., 550 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
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owners and mobile home park owners alike derive substantial property
rights from article I, section 2 of the state constitution. 0 For instance,
mobile home park owners enjoy a protected right to use the land com-
prising the park. Also, they need not accept tenancy of a mobile home
owner indeterminately. However, the court held that mobile home park
owners may offer the park for sale only if the sale is "'consistent with
the total circumstances' " and does not advance an evil sought to be
remedied by state regulation of the sale.31 The state regulates park
sales by imposing on the park owner the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing 2 and requires the park owner to give the home owner the
right of first refusal. 33 Those regulations, the majority agreed, served a
legitimate function by advancing the legislature's aim of protecting mo-
bile home owners from economic servitude and abuse by mobile home
park owners."' The majority regarded the regulations as permissible
only if "'reasonably necessary'" to secure the public welfare.3 5
The court acknowledged that nothing in the legislative scheme re-
quired a mobile home park owner to specify the nature of the proposed
change. It inferred from the statute a requirement that the change of
use must be valid. Because the record was unclear whether Martin Re-
gency intended to sell its land as vacant land (a permissible motive), or
to avoid extending to the home owners the right of first refusal (an
improper motive), the court determined that a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact remained, and therefore the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for Harris Regency was inappropriate.
Three justices charged that the majority impermissibly created a
restriction on the sale of a mobile home park out of "whole cloth."36
Justice Grimes wrote that section 723.061(d) does not forbid the owner
from closing the park and selling the vacant land, and only guarantees
the mobile home owner ample time to relocate should the park owner
decide to change the use of the property. He claimed that the major-
ity's construction effectively provides that the owner may sell his or her
30. Harris, 576 So. 2d at 1296 (citing Stewart v. Green, 300 So. 2d 889 (Fla.
1974)).
31. Id. at 1297-98 (emphasis in original) (quoting Palm Beach Mobile Homes,
Inc. v. Strong, 300 So. 2d 881, 888 (Fla. 1974)).
32. FLA. STAT. § 723.021 (1985).
33. FLA. STAT. § 723.071 (1985).
34. Harris, 576 So. 2d at 1296.
35. Id. at 1297 (quoting Shriners Hosps. v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 68 (Fla.
1990)).
36. Id. at 1300 (Grimes, J., dissenting; Shaw, C.J., and Overton, J., concurring.).
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land only when it is a mobile home park. He argued that such a con-
struction is itself an unconstitutional deprivation on the use of
property.3 7
Other cases addressed the prohibition against deprivation on ac-
count of race. The deprivation issue in Craig v. State3 concerned Palm
Beach County's jury selection procedures, which provided that petit ju-
rors were to be drawn from one of two districts that comprised discrete
geographic areas of the county at large. In a 1989 decision, Spencer v.
State,39 the court struck the districting scheme on two grounds. First, it
ruled that the administrative order creating the scheme "results in an
unconstitutional systematic exclusion of a significant portion of the
black population from the jury pool" of the district from which Spen-
cer's venire was selected."' Second, it held that the procedure violates
the equal protection clause of article I, section 2 of the Florida Consti-
tution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution because a black defendant charged with a crime in the
predominately white eastern district must be tried there, whereas a
white defendant charged with a crime in the predominately black west-
ern district may choose to be tried in the eastern district."' At the time
of Craig's trial, Spencer was pending appeal, and Craig filed a pre-trial
motion to draw the jury from the entire county, rather than from the
eastern district, the situs of his trial. The trial court denied the motion
as untimely, proceeded with the trial, and the jury ultimately convicted
Craig of numerous crimes, including first degree murder.
On direct appeal, the state argued that Craig could not rely on
Spencer, for he failed to reassert the claim after the trial court denied
his initial motion. The court rejected the state's procedural argument,
ruled that Spencer was dispositive, and remanded for a new trial.
Craig reaffirmed the principle of standing expressed in Kibler v.
State42 that a white defendant may challenge a jury selection process
37. Id. Justice Overton added that the majority risks that a federal court would
overturn section 723.061(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), on Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, id. at 1299 (Overton, J., dissenting), although it is doubtful that
a federal court would review Harris itself, for the decision is grounded exclusively on
the Florida Constitution.
38. 583 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (unanimous).
39. 545 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1989).
40. Id. at 1355.
41. Id.
42. 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989).
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that discriminates against racial minorities. 8 Reliance on Kibler for
this purpose is interesting, for the court there construed article I, sec-
tion 16's guarantee of an impartial jury to persons accused of crimes.
Thus, the constitutional right at stake was personal to Kibler. In Craig,
however, the constitutional right at stake was the right of prospective
jurors to be free of race-based discriminatory selection practices, a
right that they lacked standing to assert, and that only Craig could
effectively vindicate on their behalf. The equal protection clause and
impartial jury guarantee of article I protect congruent rights in this
context so that Craig had as much at stake in assuring jury impartial-
ity as the wrongfully-struck jurors. Craig reaffirms Florida's avowed
commitment to rid the courtroom of racially discriminatory jury selec-
tion practices through application of the doctrine of vicarious
standing. 5
Palm Beach County's jury districting scheme was also assailed in
Moreland v. State."' The opinion relies entirely on federal constitu-
tional principles, however, it is included in this survey because its hold-
ing is equally germane to future state constitutional litigation. More-
land, like Craig, was tried and convicted by a Palm Beach County jury
while Spencer was pending in the supreme court. Moreland argued at
trial that the jury plan violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments to
the federal constitution. The trial court rejected his claim, convicted
him of first-degree murder, and imposed a life sentence of imprison-
ment.4 The district court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct
appeal.4 8
Subsequently, the court released Spencer and Moreland relied on
that decision to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in a
post-conviction relief motion. The trial court granted his motion, citing
Spencer. The district court disagreed and reversed. Citing Witt v.
43. Craig, 583 So. 2d at 1020; see also Powers v. Ohio, 59 U.S.L.W. 4268, 4272
(U.S. Apr. 2, 1991).
44. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988).
45. Id.
46. 582 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author).
47. Id. at 619. Moreland also personally attacked the composition of the petit
jury in a pretrial motion by asserting that the county's racially discriminatory bias
against prospective black jurors violated the state constitution, State v. Moreland, No.
86-41-CF-A02 (15th Jud. Cir.) (Motion Relating to Composition of Petit Jury Panel
and Memorandum of Law in Support), however, abandoned the state claim in his mo-
tion for post-conviction relief.
48. Moreland v. State, 525 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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State,"9 which held that only major constitutional law changes warrant
retroactive application in post-conviction proceedings,50 the district
court ruled that Spencer did not establish a new and different standard
of procedural fairness that would entitle Moreland to raise it
collaterally. 51
A unanimous supreme court quashed the opinion of the district
court and approved the trial judge's order granting Moreland a new
trial. Spencer was neither new law nor a major constitutional change in
the law, it said, but represented the first opportunity to apply existing
sixth amendment law to a new situation. 2 Although Witt declared that
the interests in decisional finality generally prohibit the retroactive ap-
plication of decisions of this order, the justices stated that the district
court erred by failing to acknowledge an exception to that principle.
Witt also declared that "'a more compelling objective . . . , such as
ensuring fairness and uniformity in individual adjudications,'" would
warrant abridging the doctrine of finality.5 3 The court applied Witt's
"fundamental fairness" exception in Moreland because it had twice
before granted relief to claimants who raised Spencer claims. Thus, the
"fundamental fairness" exception enables the court to assure decisional
consistency, and to avoid the patent miscarriage of justice that would
result when one post-conviction litigant is entitled to rely on a favorable
constitutional decision issued after the conclusion of direct appellate
proceedings, while another court bars a claim by a similarly situated
litigant.""
Reference to the Florida Constitution is conspicuously absent from
Moreland. There is no doubt that Moreland enjoyed state constitu-
tional rights that awaited vindication-Craig was issued only eight
days earlier on state equal protection grounds, and Spencer, the dispos-
itive case, was principally grounded on state equal protection. However,
the court in Moreland cannot be faulted for failing to peg its decision
on the state constitution. The explanation lies with Moreland's post-
conviction motion, which sought relief assertedly because trial counsel
was ineffective and because the jury violated the federal cross-section
49. 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).
50. Id. at 929-30 (footnote omitted).
51. State v. Moreland, 564 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
52. Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 619 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 620 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at 925).
54. Id.
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requirement.55
Perkins v. State56 considered whether a state statute that made
unavailable the defense of self defense by a person who attempts to
commit a forcible felony violated due process and separation of pow-
ers. 57 The court held that the statute did not bar the defense under
circumstances when the defendant and the decedent were engaged in
attempted cocaine trafficking, and the decedent initiated the use of
deadly force against the defendant. Justice Kogan added in his special
concurring opinion that the right to fend off an unprovoked attack was
equally grounded in article I, section 2, which assures the inalienable
right to defend life and liberty. He wrote that "[the right to fend off
an unprovoked and deadly attack is nothing less than the right to life
itself," which enables a person to mount a reasonable defense or to
meet an unjustified use of force with force.58
B. Freedom of Speech and Press
Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for def-
amation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter charged
as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the
party shall be acquitted or exonerated. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
Two opinions this period bear on the speech and press provision. In
CBS, Inc. v. Jackson59 the court considered a subpoena issued by the
defendant in a criminal proceeding that sought from CBS untelevised
videotapes, or "outtakes," of a law enforcement drug operation, which
depicted physical evidence of the defendant's arrest. CBS argued that
the "outtakes" were protected under the qualified reporter's privilege.
The court held that there existed no impediment under the first amend-
55. State v. Moreland, No. 86-41-CF-A02 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 22, 1989)
(Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, filed Feb. 2, 1989; Amendment to Motion for Post-
Conviction Relief and Memorandum of Law in Support).
56. 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam). Perkins is addressed more fully
under article I, section 9 (due process), infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
57. FLA. STAT. § 776.041(1) (1987).
58. Perkins, 576 So. 2d at 1314 (Kogan, J., specially concurring; Barkett, J.,
concurring).
59. 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
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ment or the state constitution to the compelled discovery of those
tapes. 60 It reasoned that the tapes do not risk drying up sources of in-
formation, and that certain information might eventually become un-
available to the public. Moreover, the disclosure of information con-
tained in the "outtakes" would not otherwise threaten the
newsgathering process.61 The court's holding applies with equal force to
unpublished film footage of an interview with a prison inmate and to
photographs of an automobile accident. 62 The opinion demonstrates
that Florida's speech and press guarantees are closely bound to first
amendment precedent under the circumstances presented.
Without passing on the merits, the court in In re Standard Jury
Instructions (Civil Cases 89-1)" approved standard jury instructions
for use in defamation cases. The Supreme Court Committee on Stan-
dard Jury Instructions (Civil) recommended three alternative jury
charges on liability issues in defamation cases. The court acknowledged
that briefs submitted by media representatives perceived constitutional
and common law deficiencies in the proposals.64
C. Rights to Assemble, Instruct, and Petition
The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct
their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances. FLA.
CONSST. art. I, § 5.
The defendant in Larson v. State65 entered a nolo plea to felony
witness tampering, and the trial court imposed probation, a condition of
which prohibited the defendant from entering Tallahassee for five
years. He argued on appeal that the condition violated his right to peti-
tion government under article I, section 5. Although the justices said
that the claim was procedurally barred for Larson's failure to raise it
60. Id. at 699.
61. Id. at 700.
62. Id. at 700 n.2 (disapproving CBS, Inc. v. Cobb, 536 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1988), and Johnson v. Bentley, 457 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984)).
63. 575 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 195; see also id. at 202 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (cautioning that the
standards do not have the force of law).
65. 572 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1991) (Kogan, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Overton,
McDonald, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Ehrlich, J., concurred in result only
with an opinion).
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initially in the trial court, they reached the merits and concluded that
the condition of probation did not violate his constitutional right of pe-
tition, which assured him the opportunity to petition state government
by telephone or mail, or by contacting state officers outside Tallahas-
see.66 Moreover, Larson remained free to ask the trial court to modify
the condition of probation should he need to personally appear before
state officials in Tallahassee, and the trial court would be obliged to
grant his request.6 7
The right to petition for redress of grievances assures electoral ac-
countability-that persons will have the opportunity to make public of-
ficers and employees accountable for their acts. Writing for a unani-
mous court in Reynolds v. State, 8 Justice Kogan said in dictum that
accountability of public officials forms the bedrock of our democracy,
and partly explains the rationale for requiring the state to justify any
impermissible exercise of peremptory challenges to strike racial minori-
ties from petit jury venires. 69 This personal right turns on the right of
the public, whether members of a minority or not, "to assurances that
our courts are acting to eliminate past abuses. '"7 °
D. Due Process
Florida's due process section combines three categories of rights.
The first category creates the substantive rights of life, liberty, and
property that are safeguarded by procedural due process. The section
also includes two other fundamental guarantees that protect defendants
who are prosecuted criminally by the state. These categories are re-
garded generally as independent of due process-the protection against
double jeopardy, and the protection against self-incrimination.
66. Id. at 1371-72.
67. Id.
68. 576 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1991) (Kogan, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Overton,
McDonald, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring).
69. Id. at 1302; see also Tillman v. State, 522 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1988) (holding
that Neil has an equal protection component that derives from article I, section 2);
State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) (holding that impermissible race-based
strikes of prospective jurors violates a defendant's right to an impartial jury guaranteed
under article I, section 16).
70. Reynolds, 576 So. 2d at 1302.
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1. Life, Liberty or Property
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law . . . .FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Four of the decisions that construed article I, section 9 this survey
period were unanimous, and notably, each rested explicitly, and exclu-
sively on Florida law. The first of those cases, Department of Law En-
forcement v. Real Property,7 1 is a case of singular importance for its
contribution to state constitutional doctrine. Mindful of its role as a
coordinate branch of state government, 72 the court, without dissent, up-
held the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act 73 against multiple constitu-
tional challenges, but resorted to a canon of constitutional interpreta-
tion to impose "minimal" due process requirements on the exercise of
the state's powers of seizure and forfeiture. Without this textual inter-
polation, the Act suffered from defects that were potentially fatal to its
continued existence. The opinion, written for the court by Justice Bar-
kett, deserves careful review.
The Act permits the state to seize property that is used in violation
of offenses enumerated in the Act, "or in, upon, or by means of which
any violation ...has taken or is taking place." 7 After arresting the
defendant on drug trafficking charges, the state initiated forfeiture pro-
ceedings against certain properties.75 The trial judge issued warrants to
seize the properties, based solely on an affidavit executed by a special
agent. As required by the Act, the state petitioned for a rule to show
cause why the properties should not be forfeited, 76 and also filed a no-
tice of lis pendens, which was not required.
The defendant, joined by amicus, moved to dismiss the petition on
constitutional grounds. The trial judge granted the motions, noting that
the defendant had not yet been convicted of any offenses that were
factual predicates for forfeiture, and holding that the Act facially vio-
71. '16 Fla. L. Weekly S497 (Aug. 15, 1991) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author)
(mandate issued Dec. 2, 1991).
72. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (separation of powers).
73. IFLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-.704 (1989).
74. IFLA. STAT. § 932.703(1) (1989).
75. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497. Defendant's properties included a
60-acre tract of land with an airstrip extension, a 40-acre R/V mobile home subdivi-
sion with numerous full recreational vehicle hookups, entire 280 and 100-acre subdivi-
sions platted into separate lots or parcels, and a personal residence and property. Id.
76. Id. at S502 n.2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.704(1) (1989)).
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lated state and federal constitutions." Deciding that the trial judge's
order required immediate attention, a divided panel of the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal certified the matter to the supreme court.78 The
justices reversed the trial judge, and upheld the Act as facially consti-
tutional, provided, however, that it is applied in keeping with "mini-
mal" due process principles articulated in the opinion.
The court began by describing the process that is due under article
I, section 9. State due process includes a substantive and a procedural
component. Substantive due process protects "the full panoply of indi-
vidual rights from unwarranted encroachment by the government.17 9
Procedural due process is a vehicle that protects substantive rights. It
does so by ensuring fair treatment through an orderly procedure that
includes notice, coupled with a real opportunity to be heard and to de-
fend before any judgment is rendered.80 The process that is due varies
with the character of the rights implicated and the nature of the pro-
cess challenged, and admits to no single, inflexible test.81
Turning to the act itself, the court noted several provisions that
potentially affront due process. For instance, the act "can be read to
mean" that a seizure immediately ousts owners and lienholders of their
interest in seized property. 2 It requires the state to "'promptly pro-
ceed'" against the property, once seized, by a rule to show cause, and
empowers the state to have the property forfeited "'upon producing
due proof'" that the property was used in violation of the act, although
it leaves those critical terms undefined. 8- The act bars suits to recover
seized property for ninety days after seizure unless the state fails to
initiate proceedings within that period.8' It restrains owners and
lienholders from defending until after seizure, and imposes on them the
77. Id. The trial judge struck down the act on grounds of substantive and proce-
dural due process, and because it failed to adequately define the scope of the state's
powers, thus rendering it void for vagueness and overbreadth. In re Real Property For-
feiture Proceedings, No. 90-250-CF (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 1990) (order and opin-
ion granting claimant's amended motion to dismiss petitions for forfeiture).
78. FLA. R. App. P. 9.125.
79. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497.
80. Id. at S498 (relying on State ex rel. Gore v. Chillingworth, 171 So. 649, 654
(1936)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at S501 n.7 (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.703(1) (1989)).
83. Id. at S498 (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.704(1) (1989)).
84. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S498 (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.703(1)
(1989)).
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burden of proving in a forfeiture proceeding that they lacked scienter 5
In addition, the act fails to distinguish between real and personal prop-
erty, to :require preseizure notice and opportunity for the property
owner or lienholder to be heard, and to prescribe procedures for the
seizure itself.86
Seve:ral guiding principles direct the course of judicial analysis of
forfeiture statutes. Forfeiture is a harsh exaction that courts generally
disfavor. 7 Forfeiture statutes are strictly construed, but doubts are re-
,olved in favor of upholding them against constitutional attack.88 At-
tentive to its obligations to both establish rules that safeguard constitu-
tional rights and to respect the province of a coordinate branch of state
government,89 the court sought to determine whether the forfeiture act
"can reasonably be construed" to comport with "minimal" due pro-
cess.90 Unanimously, the court found that it could.
Real Property presented an issue untried in Florida. For guidance,
the court turned to federal cases, said to be highly persuasive and ex-
pressing principles embodied in the Florida Constitution. Among them
are the federal due process requirements of notice to the interested
party and an opportunity to be heard at an adversarial proceeding
before the government may seize property containing a residence, un-
less extraordinary circumstances justify postponing notice and hearing
until after seizure." Moreover, the "special significance" of residential
property necessitates " 'special constitutional protection.' "92 In that
85. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 932.703(2), (3) (1989)).
86. Id.
87. Id'. (citations omitted).
88. Id. (citation omitted).
89. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
90. This mode of statutory interpretation is not clearly dictated by precedent.
For instance, the court is disinclined to rehabilitate laws that suffer from vital omis-
sions or impermissible vagueness. See Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312-13 (Fla.
1991) (discussed infra note 138); State ex rel Williams v. Coleman, 180 So. 357, 360
(Fla. 1938) ("We are powerless to read into a statute . . . that which the Legislature
in its wisdom omitted . . . ."). Yet, the court believes that it should consider rehabili-
tative constructions of vague laws. See State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605, 607 (Fla.
1977) (unwilling to abandon its position of judicial restraint to rewrite a statute pro-
scribing "malpractice in office," when the statute is so vague and overbroad that it is
not amenable to a construction that would permit the court to resolve all doubts in
favor of its validity) (citing FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3).
91. Real Property, 16 Fla. W. Weekly at S499 (citing United States v. Premises
& Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989)).
92. Id. (quoting Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1264).
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vein, due process requires preseizure notice and hearing to minimize
the risk of erroneous deprivation. This respects the character of real
property, which unlike personal property, makes it unlikely to produce
exigencies that require means as restrictive as seizure.93
The state has at its disposal less restrictive means than seizure to
preserve potentially forfeitable assets. They include notices of lis
pendens, bonds, restraining orders, or some combination. The issuance
of an ex parte restraining order before notice to the owner or
lienholder, as example, is appropriate when a grand jury indictment
has already established probable cause to believe that property is sub-
ject to forfeiture. The restraining order merely removes assets from
control of the defendant temporarily, pending final judgment, and pro-
vides an opportunity for the state to establish a higher right to those
assets. 94 However, seizure after indictment is no less serious an en-
croachment than seizure before indictment. Therefore, federal due pro-
cess requires that the trial court reexamine probable cause at an adver-
sarial hearing to determine de novo whether continued restraint on the
property is necessary. 95
Florida due process plays a central role in protecting property
rights that are infringed when the state wields its powers of seizure and
forfeiture. Traditionally, courts and legislatures have measured the de-
gree of property protection from unjustified forfeiture based on the la-
bel attached to the forfeiture action itself. Real Property dispenses with
this practice as too "simplistic," and rejects the notion that due process
provides qualitatively different protection that depends on whether the
forfeiture is classified as civil (remedial), criminal (punitive), or quasi-
criminal. Instead, the court wrote, disputes over constitutional rights
must be decided by evaluating those rights, and when necessary, by
balancing the competing interests.96
Floridians have taken great care to make property rights secure
under the state constitution. Property rights are expressly protected by
article I, section 2, and they are numbered among the most basic sub-
93. Id. (citing Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1265).
94. Id. (citing United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991)
(en banc)).
95. Id.; Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1195.
96. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S502 n.15; see also United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) ("The notion of punishment, as we commonly
understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law, and for
the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes multiple punishment
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion where it leads.").
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stantive rights. For this reason, persons whose property the state re-
strains clearly have a compelling interest to be heard at the outset of
forfeiture proceedings to assure that the state has probable cause to
justify any restraint.9 7 Moreover, property rights are "particularly sen-
sitive" when the state seeks to forfeit residential property. This is di-
rectly attributed to several specific article I provisions that form a bar-
rier between the state on the one hand, and the home and personal
autonomy on the other.9 8
Next, due process requires a court to evaluate the justification for
the state; activity. The court said that the state advances "substantial"
state interests when it seizes and forfeits property that is used to facili-
tate trafficking in illicit drugs. Those state interests include punishing
criminal wrongdoers, seeking retribution for society, deterring the con-
tinued use of property to further criminal activity, remedying societal
wrongs, and recovering the costs of law enforcement.9 9 By characteriz-
ing the state's interests as "substantial," the court implies that the state
has satisfied an intermediate level of justification for its activity, one
less demanding than "compelling," 10 but more demanding than merely
"legitimate." 10 1 As it turns out, however, the characterization is not
particularly crucial in the forfeiture context. The defendant did not dis-
pute the strength or importance of the state's asserted aims, and the
thirty-eight page slip opinion lays the matter to rest in a single sentence
without citation.
More crucial to the outcome than the label attached to the state's
interests is the choice of standards by which the court measures the
level of protection due individual rights when the state wields its power.
Generally, when basic rights are at stake, article I, section 9 requires
the state to narrowly tailor the means chosen to accomplish its goals by
97. Id. at S499.
98. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 (inalienable rights), 12 (security in the
home), and 23 (express right of privacy)). The seizure and forfeiture of property also
implicate other provisions designed to limit the exercise of state power. Id. (citing FLA.
CONST. art. I, §§ 17 (prohibition against excessive punishments), 21 (meaningful access
to the courts)).
99. id. at S499.
100. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (requir-
ing the state to show a "compelling" state interest before it intrudes into a person's
right to self-determine his or her medical course).
101. See, e.g., Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990) (upholding anti-
obscenity law, in part, because the state has a "legitimate interest 'in stemming the tide
of commercialized obscenity' ") (citation omitted).
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using the least restrictive alternative. Because means less restrictive
than seizure were available, the state failed to satisfy this burden. Real
Property holds that Florida due process compels the state to employ
means less restrictive than seizure, where feasible, if it intends to pre-
vent the disposition of potentially forfeitable property before trial on
the forfeiture.' The holding underscores the high regard Floridians
have for the rights at stake, for very few article I rights receive greater
protection from state encroachment.'
Because the act failed to adequately shield basic rights from un-
justified ouster by the state, the court issued several rehabilitative pro-
cedural directives.104 Before initially restraining real property (by
means other than lis pendens), the state must provide notice and sched-
ule an adversarial hearing on the issue of probable cause. The state
must initiate proceedings by filing a petition for rule to show cause, and
simultaneously recording a copy of the petition in the official records of
102. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at 5499. Due process also requires the
state to provide notice to those with an interest in the property, and an opportunity to
be heard throughout the forfeiture proceedings. Id.
103. The most stringent standard announced for protection of article I rights re-
quires the state to show "overpowering public necessity" and "no alternative method"
of meeting the necessity. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973) (standard ap-
plied when the state abolishes a right of access to courts protected under article I,
section 21, and fails to provide a reasonable alternative). A standard less rigorous, but
one seldom satisfied, requires the state to show a compelling state interest that it ad-
vanced through the least intrusive means. See, e.g., Hillsborough County Governmental
Employees Ass'n, v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 522 So. 2d 358, 362 (Fla.
1988) (article I, section 6, right to bargain collectively); Palm Harbor Special Fire
Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 1987) (article I, section 2, inalienable
rights (classification based on alienage)); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wager-
ing, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985) (article I, section 23, express right of privacy).
See generally Decade Survey supra note 2 at 856 (maintaining that the court has
created a hierarchical order of article I rights that depends entirely on the standard
used to measure the justification for the state's encroachment).
104. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S499-500. In other instances, the court
has resorted to its rule making authority to craft procedural protection for substantive
constitutional rights newly recognized in an opinion. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of
Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (prescribing procedures under article I, section 23
to safeguard the right of an incompetent patient to self-determine his or her medical
course without prior judicial approval); State v. Stanjeski, 562 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1990)
(finding that statute, which authorized clerk to enter a final judgment by operation of
law when obligor defaulted on support payments, "should be interpreted" to allow the
obligor a hearing and the opportunity to present equitable defenses before entry of
judgment).
[Vol. 16
188
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Hawkins
the cleric. The recordation amounts to a seizure of real property. 10 5 The
state must immediately schedule an adversarial preliminary hearing
and notice all interested persons. In the event the state shows that it
has probable cause to believe that the seized property is subject to for-
feiture, the trial judge may protect the respective interests by order.
The adversarial hearing should take place within ten days of filing of
the petition for rule to show cause, and a decision on probable cause
should be "expeditiously completed.' 0 0
Due process does not require preseizure notice or hearing when the
state initially restrains personal property," 7 however, it does require
the state to send notice to interested persons after making an ex parte
seizure, and to afford them an opportunity to be heard at a postseizure
adversarial hearing. If requested, the adversarial hearing shall be held
"as soon as possible after seizure."' ° The trial judge must expedi-
tiously determine de novo whether the state had probable cause to pro-
ceed with the forfeiture, and whether continued restraint of the seized
property is warranted. 10
The opinion makes several points regarding litigation of property
claims under the act. Claimants are constitutionally entitled to a jury
trial on the ultimate issue of forfeiture, 1 0 a right that is subsumed
within state due process."' The state argued that it should be held to
no more than a preponderance standard of proof at trial on the forfei-
ture claim. However, Florida law expects more. Construing the "due
proof" requirement of the act, the court said that the state must show
by "no less than clear and convincing evidence" that the seized prop-
105. The act makes no provision for seizure of real property, such as by warrant
or writ, although seizure warrants were issued by the trial judge in this case.
106. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S500-501.
107. Accord Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
Justice Brennan wrote that "seizure [of personal property] for the purposes of forfei-
ture is one of those 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing." Id. at 677 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972)).
108. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S500. The opinion is not entirely clear
on this point. See id. (anticipating that the hearing would occur within ten days after
seizure and "as soon as is reasonably possible"). The court also reaffirmed Lamar v.
Universal Supply Co., 479 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1985), which held that due process requires
"reasonably prompt" proceedings in forfeiture actions involving personal property. Real
Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S502 n.16. To the extent that there is disagreement
between Lamar and Real Property, the latter prevails. Id.
109. Id. at S500.
110. Id. at S501 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (access to courts)).
111. Id.
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erty was used in violation of the act before it is entitled to forfeiture.112
The higher standard is justified, the court said, because forfeiture im-
pinges on basic constitutional rights, often those of persons who are
innocent of wrongdoing."'
This is a marked departure from the prevailing practice in Florida
forfeiture cases. Formerly, the state was required to initially proceed by
a mere showing of probable cause that the property was subject to for-
feiture. Once established, the burden shifted to the claimant to rebut
the showing of probable cause. Alternatively, the claimant was required
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that no violation occurred,
or that an affirmative defense entitles the claimant to repossess the
seized property.""
In summary, there is no doubt that the court would have acted
within its prerogatives had it performed last rites on the forfeiture act,
affirming the trial judge and striking the act as sorely wanting protec-
tion for substantive rights. 13 While it may be argued that some justices
would have voted to overturn the act in its entirety, it is doubtful that
all would have concurred in the result. Thus seen, Real Property was
likely the product of compromise, realized through strenuous effort." 6
112. Id. Rather than imposing a fixed standard, the court allowed leeway for the
legislature to establish a higher evidentiary burden, such as the standard that governs
criminal prosecutions.
113. Id. Contra Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683
(1974) (noting that innocence of the property owner has almost uniformly been re-
jected as a defense to a forfeiture).
114. In re Forfeiture of Approximately Forty-Eight Thousand Dollars
($48,900.00) in U.S. Currency, 432 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
Under Real Property, the claimant is still held to a preponderance burden to establish
a defense that defeats a forfeiture action. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S501.
115. The district courts often complained about the procedural shortcomings in
the predecessor versions of the 1989 act under review. See id. at S500 and cases cited
therein.
116. Given an earlier opportunity to consider the act in light of federal double
jeopardy, the court divided four to three. See State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223, 227
(Fla. 1989). The majority never reached the constitutional issue. However, three jus-
tices advocated a minority position that the vehicle forfeiture authorized by the act
violated the federal double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments, as ap-
plied, because the forfeiture penalty exceeded the compensation required to make the
state whole. Id. at 229 (Kogan, J., dissenting, with whom Shaw and Barkett, JJ., con-
curred) (citing Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1897). The rationale behind the double jeopardy
concern strongly parallels the court's proportionality analysis in Real Property, which
limits the state to the property or portion thereof that was used in connection with the
crime. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S501. For a discussion of this aspect of the
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On the one hand, allowing the act to stand served those justices who
might have believed that it satisfied federal constitutional standards,
and that Florida provided no greater protection. On the other hand,
application of a judicial tourniquet of "minimal" due process require-
ments cured some of the potentially fatal defects that concerned those
justices who would have struck the act, partially or entirely.
This remarkable unity has several virtues. The choice permitted
the court to speak with clarity through one voice. Unanimity enhances
the precedential value of a decision, for it reflects the joint wisdom of
the court's membership. This is particularly important because the
opinion addresses constitutional rights of some magnitude. The decision
respects Florida's strong separation of powers doctrine by leaving intact
a forfeiture law, said to advance several "substantial" state aims. Fi-
nally, the result is politically savvy and practically appropriate. The
decision avoided piecemeal litigation that surely would have occurred
had the court overturned the act, leaving to the legislature the task of
enacting "minimal" protections of individual constitutional rights in
the aftermath. 117
Real Property establishes the analytical paradigm for article I,
section 9 due process. The opinion distinguishes substantive and proce-
dural due process as two discrete, functional components. The substan-
tive due process component forms the core of the state bill of rights,
shielding "the full panoply of individual rights" from unjustified inter-
ference by the state's political branches. This is a statement of great
amplitude.
It is beyond dispute that substantive due process protects expressly
declared constitutional rights, such as the rights "to acquire, possess
and protect property" under article I, section 2. Thus seen, personal
rights declared throughout the constitution give substantive content to
case, see infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
Another case decided this survey period suggests that the unanimity reached in
Real Property is an example of collegial accommodation. The justices were irreconcila-
bly split in Smith v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 573 So. 2d 320
(Fla. 1991), over a fundamental principle of due process-whether due process entitled
indigents to a free transcript of an administrative hearing to perfect their appeal.
Smith is discussed infra notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
117. The constant pressure from groups of constituents makes it unlikely that
legislators, and the voters, will care enough about preserving "'the balance of the Con-
stitution' 'to offset the votes of those whose interests will be disappointed." Learned
Hand, The Bill of Rights 12 in THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES (1958)
(citation omitted).
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article 1, section 9 due process. More interesting is the implication that
due process protects unspecified, unenumerated rights.' 8 That the
Florida Constitution should respect essential values that have no spe-
cific textual foundation is not surprising, for article I does not limit the
scope of its protections to rights expressly declared. " 9 In addition,
courts have acknowledged that protected rights derive from non-consti-
tutional sources. Among them are rights of individuals conferred by
state grant or entitlement, such as statute, regulation, ordinance, and
agreement. 120 Less clear is whether individual rights that derive from
relationships, contracts, custom, course of conduct, and the like are
similarly entitled to due process. The statement has the potential for
far-reaching impact and its full import must await the perspective of
later case development.
While a statement of general policy reserves important details for
adjudication in later cases, precedent cautions against ascribing a
meaning to the statement that exceeds the parameters of the decision.
The court has recently refused to be bound by archetypical statements
of constitutional principle outside the factual contexts in which they
were announced.1 2' With that caution Real Property's holding must be
118. See also Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S499 (implying that privacy
protections derive from the inalienable rights clause of article I, section 2).
119. Compare FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 1 with U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
120. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 486, n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (specific rights attach "whether
the State uses a particular form of words in its laws or regulations, or indeed whether it
has adopted written rules at all"); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (declaring that property interests "are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or understandings or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits").
121. Compare In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990)
(describing privacy as a "'physical and psychological zone within which an individual
has the right to be free from intrusion or coercion,' " and deciding that Florida's ex-
press right of privacy protects a person's right to self-determine his or her medical
course, even if it means that death is certain to follow as a result of the choice) (cita-
tion omitted) and In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989) (stating that "'the
right to be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men,'" and declaring that it prohibits the state from requiring a minor female
to obtain parental consent before electing to terminate her pregnancy in the first tri-
mester) (citation omitted) with State v. Stall, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2888 (1991) (relying on precedent predating the adoption of Florida's ex-
press right of privacy to declare that no privacy rights arise in the context of commer-
cial sale or viewing of obscene material).
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seen as grounded on textually enumerated rights in article I, not on
peripheral rights or entitlements.
The procedural due process component requires fair treatment,
which includes notice and a real opportunity to defend before judgment
is rendered, whenever substantive rights are implicated. The applica-
tion of due process is dependent on the character of the interests at
stake, and the nature of the process involved. When fundamental prop-
erty rights are implicated, the state must justify its action to divest
those rights by showing that its action advances a substantial state in-
terest. And the state must employ the least restrictive means to exer-
cise an initial restraint on property, and show by no less than clear and
convincing evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture.
Real Property is a fountainhead of state constitutional decision
making. 'The decision illustrates the court's willingness to dispose of
far-reaching constitutional questions entirely on the strength of the
Florida Constitution. This is no phenomenon, but a result made more
likely by the deliberate litigation of state constitutional claims at trial
and on appeal, by the high regard that Floridians have shown for prop-
erty rights in article I, and by an evolving line of precedent that urged
state law development. 2' If the significance of an opinion is measured
by the care that a state court takes to ground its holding firmly on state
law logic, then Real Property has few equals in the opinions of the
Supreme Court of Florida. The exclusive, explicit, and principled reli-
ance on articulated state law values of property, fairness, notice, and
meaningful hearing renders federal review improbable, and preserves
for Floridians a measure of property security and due process that sur-
passes federal constitution standards.
122. Although the opinion does not make the point, the court's case law suggests
that the time was ripe when Real Property reached the court to confront the state
constitutional claims attacking the forfeiture act. The historical progression begins with
Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1978), where the court abided by express
legislative intent, and wrote that the 1975 version of Florida's contraband forfeiture
statute was to be construed "in uniformity" with its federal counterpart. Then,
Duckham v. State, 478 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla. 1985), suggested the onset of a new era.
Duckham receded from Griffis, indicating that the extensive amendments to the act in
1980 required courts to look to state legislative intent, rather than federal precedent.
Finally, three justices dissented in State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 1989)
(Kogan, J., dissenting, Shaw and Barkett, JJ., concurring), exposing the vulnerability
of the act to constitutional attack. They argued that the forfeiture of the defendant's
car under the act violated the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishment,
because the forfeiture exceeded the compensation needed to make the state whole.
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The second unanimous case this period, State v. Rodriguez,128 like
Real Property, dealt with the notice aspect of due process. The state
charged Rodriguez by information with felony driving under the influ-
ence (DUI),2 4 a crime that is punishable as a felony of the third de-
gree provided the defendant has three or more prior DUI convictions.
The information omitted any reference to Rodriguez's prior convic-
tions. The court determined that proof of prior convictions is an essen-
tial element of the substantive offense of felony DUI.125 Relying exclu-
sively on the Florida Constitution, the court held that the fair notice
aspect requires the state to specifically enumerate in the accusatory in-
strument the defendant's three specific prior convictions for driving
under the influence. 2  The court overturned the felony DUI conviction
because the state failed to provide Rodriguez with any notice of his
prior convictions that it intended to rely on to establish felony DUI. 27
The opinion adds that the record contained insufficient evidence to
establish Rodriguez's prior DUI convictions,1 28 and leaves for another
day the question of whether a tender of proof alone might satisfy the
constitution's fair notice requirement.
The justices further agreed that another due process aspect, the
presumption of innocence, requires the trial court to withhold from the
jury any allegations or facts about the defendant's prior DUI convic-
tions. 29 Once the state proves the elements of the instant DUI offense,
the trial court is then required conduct a separate, non-jury proceeding
to determine the historical fact of the defendant's prior convictions. 30
123. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author).
124. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)(b) (Supp. 1988).
125. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1266.
126. Id. (citing art. I, §§ 9 (due process) and 16 (right of accused in criminal
prosecution to be informed of "the nature and cause of the accusation against him");
see also M.F. v. State, 583 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1991) (due process requires the state to
provide the accused with notice of the allegations in juvenile as well as adult criminal
proceedings, and does not prohibit the state from amending a petition of delinquency to
correct a good faith typographical error before the adjudicatory hearing).
127. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1266-67.
128. Id. at 1266.
129. Id. at 1265-66.
130. Id. at 1266 (applying State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1978)). Harris
explained the due process implications of failing to determine out of earshot of the jury
the historical fact of convictions of similar crimes: "If the presumption of innocence is
destroyed by proof of an unrelated offense, it is more easily destroyed by proof of a
similar, related offense." 356 So. 2d at 317.
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The third unanimous due process decision, Burr v. State,18 1 va-
cated a death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing be-
cause the defendant had been acquitted of collateral crimes that the
trial court earlier relied on to establish three aggravating circumstances
in overriding the jury's recommendation of a life sentence. Finding that
two of the three aggravating circumstances rested "predominantly, if
not entirely," on some of the collateral crimes evidence, the court was
"forced to conclude" that the two circumstances are "reasonably sus-
pect," and inadmissible under article I, section 9 at a resentencing
hearing.13 The court rejected a conclusion that the error could be con-
sidered harmless in the penalty phase of a capital trial.133
Burr's harmless error analysis warrants brief comment. The court
wrote that the error was harmless in the guilt phase of Burr's trial, "in
light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt discernible in our review of
the entire record."' 3' Without clarification, the statement risks its mis-
application. DiGuilio posed the precise harmless error inquiry as
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the ver-
dict, and it expressly rejected the overwhelming evidence test as a basis
for determining harmlessness.3 5 Despite appearances, Burr does not
depart from DiGuilio, and its statement should not be read to imply
that the court will find error to be harmless merely because the record
contained overwhelming evidence of guilt.
In the fourth case, Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc.," 6 the
court rejected a due process attack against a statute that exempted
long-term lessors of vehicles who maintained certain liability insurance
131. 576 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
132. Id. at 280; see also Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (vacating
death sentence when the sole prior conviction relied on by the sentencer to establish an
aggravating circumstance was later overturned).
133. Burr, 576 So. 2d at 280.
134. Id. (citation omitted). Compare Bruno v. State, 574 So. 2d 76, 80 (Fla.
1991) (finding error to be harmless, and stating that the record showed "overwhelming
evidence of guilt"), cert. denied, No. 90-812 (U.S. Oct. 7. 1991) with Dailey v. State,
No. 71,164, slip op. at 8 (Fla. Nov. 14, 1991) (finding error harmless in light of "other
substantial evidence of guilt") and Craig v. State, 585 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1991)
(same).
135. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
23 (1967) (admonishing courts against overemphasizing a finding of overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt as a basis for concluding that error could not have affected the outcome).
136. 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author). The case
is treated more fully under equal protection, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text, and access to courts, see infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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limits. The court said that the exemption bore a reasonable relationship
to a permissive legislative objective. 13 7
In the following three cases, no opinion won majority approval,
although the justices reached unanimous positions. In Perkins v.
State,' the court overturned Perkins' conviction of murder in the first
degree and attempted cocaine trafficking. Perkins and Guy agreed to
buy cocaine through Lazier, their codefendant. Perkins and Lazier ap-
proached Kimble, the prospective seller. Instead of selling them co-
caine, Kimble tried to rob Perkins and Lazier of their purchase money
at gun point. In the ensuing struggle, Kimble shot Perkins, but Perkins
succeeded in seizing Kimble's gun and shot him dead.' 39
The state conceded at trial that Perkins shot Kimble in self-de-
fense, but argued that Perkins was barred from raising the legal claim
of self-defense under the statute, which made the defense unavailable
to a person who attempts to commit a forcible felony. The statute de-
fines "forcible felony" under the catchall clause to be "any other felony
which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against
any individual."' 40 The trial judge granted Perkins's motion to dismiss
the murder charges. However, the third district reversed, finding that
the crime, trafficking in cocaine, qualifies as a "forcible felony" be-
cause it inherently involves a propensity to do violence. 4
The state supreme court quashed the opinion of the district court.
The court began with a fundamental principle of statutory construc-
tion, due process requires a court to strictly construe penal statutes ac-
cording to their literal text, and in a manner most favorable to the
accused. The court ruled that the term "involves" was vague and am-
biguous, and failed to place narcotics trafficking within the conduct
proscribed in the statute.""
Another case, Anderson v. State,"3 borrowed from established
137. Id. at 333-34.
138. 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam). Perkins is also addressed under
article I, section 2 (inalienable rights), supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
139. Id. at 1311.
140. FLA. STAT. § 776.041(1) (1987) (emphasis added).
141. State v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 537, 538-39 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
142. Perkins, 576 So. 2d at 1313-14. The court added that the rule of strict
construction was a necessary rule of self-restraint, equally required by the doctrine of
separation of powers embodied in article II, section 3 of the state constitution. Without
the rule, courts could use "some minor vagueness" to extend the meaning of a statute
beyond the text enacted by the legislature. Id. at 1312-13.
143. 574 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, McDon-
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federal doctrine to declare that the state violates Florida's due process
guarantee when it prosecutes a person on charges known to be based on
perjured material evidence. However, the court rejected Anderson's
claim that his indictment for first-degree murder was based on the per-
jured testimony before the grand jury of his accomplice woman-friend,
turned accuser. The court wrote that her testimony was not materially
false, and thus would not have affected the grand jury's decision to
indict or the petit jury's truth-seeking function. 144
At least three justices believed that state due process provided the
dispositive principles in the following two plurality decisions. However,
the fractured opinions make a less certain contribution to article I. The
court in Smith v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services1 45
accepted review of ,a claim by various petitioners, all of whom were
indigent, that they had a statutory and a constitutional right to receive
without charge transcripts of administrative hearings in order to per-
fect their judicial appeal from unfavorable administrative rulings. Six
justices agreed that indigents were entitled under section 57.081(1),
Florida Statutes (1985), " 6 to receive transcripts of administrative pro-
ceedings at no cost.147
The petitioners also advanced a claim that they were entitled to
receive transcripts under principles of state due process. " 8 Justices,
Overton, Grimes, and McDonald joined in the per curiam opinion and
rejected the constitutional claim, while Chief Justice Shaw concurred
in result. They relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
aid, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Ehrlich, J., concurred with an opinion in which Shaw,
C.J., and Kogan, J., joined; Barkett, J., concurred in part and dissented in part with an
opinion; Kogan, J., concurred in result only).
144. Id. at 91-92.
145. 573 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Overton and Grimes, JJ., con-
curred; Shaw, C.J., concurred in result; McDonald, J., concurred in part and dissented
in part with an opinion; Ehrlich, J., concurred in part and dissented in part with an
opinion in which Barkett and Kogan, JJ., joined).
146. The section provides that indigent parties to an administrative proceeding
shall receive "the services of the courts, sheriffs, and clerks, with respect to such pro-
ceedings, without charge."
147. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 323 (Overton and Grimes, JJ., concurring); id. at 325
(Shaw, C.J., concurring in result); id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part; Barkett and
Kogan, JJ., concurring); see also Gretz v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
572 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1991) (holding that agency rule requiring payment for a copy of
hearing transcript and record violated statute prohibiting the charging of fees).
148. The petitioners advanced a second constitutional argument under the access
to courts provision. See infra notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
1991]
197
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
Ortwein v. Schwab, which had considered a related issue. 149 Ortwein
affirmed an Oregon court, construing Oregon law, which ruled that
welfare recipients were not entitled to a waiver of an appellate court
filing fee to seek judicial appeal of an administrative ruling, following
an evidentiary hearing, that had affirmed an agency decision reducing
their welfare benefits. Federal due process did not require the state of
Oregon to waive costs that would permit an indigent to file an appeal,
and that the existence of the alternative evidentiary hearing, which was
not conditioned on the prepayment of a filing fee, sufficed under the
circumstances. 150 It was "'inconceivable,'" the per curiam opinion
reads, that Florida's statute requiring prepayment of transcript costs is
any less rational.' 5' "We see no compelling reason to construe Florida's
due process clause differently than its federal counterpart with respect
to this issue. Since petitioners received an evidentiary hearing on their
claims without cost, we do not believe that they would be constitution-
ally entitled to be furnished with a free transcript to assist in the prose-
cution of their appeals."'' 5
The per curiam position provoked a strong dissent, and exposed a
deep-rooted division over the meaning of due process. Writing for three
members of the court in dissent, Justice Ehrlich argued that a party
could not be bound personally by an administrative decision until he or
she had meaningful access to a judicial tribunal, which necessarily in-
cluded a transcript of the administrative proceeding. 5 3 Moreover, the
court had earlier declared in an equally applicable equal protection
context that indigents were entitled to challenge their involuntary hos-
pitalization in a manner commensurate with the appellate review avail-
able to nonindigents.154
149. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
150. Id. at 658-59 (relying on United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445-46
(1973) (upholding statutorily imposed bankruptcy filing fees, in part, because Kras'
resort to the bankruptcy court was not his sole path of relief); see also Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (striking state statute requiring prepayment of fil-
ing fee by indigent seeking divorce because Connecticut courts provided the "exclusive
precondition" for obtaining a divorce).
151. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 324 (quoting Harrell v. Department of Health & Re-
habilitative Servs., 361 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 325 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Barkett
and Kogan, JJ., concurring) (relying on Scholastic Sys. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166
(Fla. 1974)).
154. Id. (relying on Shuman v. State, 358 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1978)).
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Smith departs from the well-settled providential rule which states
that the court should avoid deciding a constitutional question when it
can dispose of the issue on nonconstitutional grounds.15 Because six
justices clearly agreed that indigents are statutorily entitled to a tran-
script free of charge, the court had no need to reach the constitutional
claim.15 Despite its dubious precedential importance as a constitu-
tional decision, Smith adds a gratuitous measure of understanding to
the field, and displays a willingness by the justices to share their views,
however disparate. Both results are welcomed by those who follow
carefully the court's labors.
Walls v. State5 7 also produced a plurality decision and three opin-
ions. The state prosecuted Walls for a double homicide. Suspecting that
he was involved in other murders, the state asked a correctional officer
to conduct a surveillance of Walls while he awaited trial in detention.
The officer assured Walls that his comments to her would remain confi-
dential, and discouraged Walls from telling his attorney. The officer
took detailed notes of Walls' statements, which the state gave to its
examining psychiatrists. Following evaluation, two of the state's psychi-
155. See Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1978), receded from on other
grounds, Duckham v. State, 478 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1985); Palm Beach Mobile Homes,
Inc. v. Strong, 300 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 1974); In re Estate of Sale, 227 So. 2d 199,
201 (Fla. 1969).
156. It is not entirely clear why the court issued Smith in violation of the provi-
dential rule. The per curiam opinion, concurred in by Justices Overton and Grimes,
indicates that the constitutional issue was reached because the matter had been "exten-
sively argued." Smith, 573 So. 2d 323. Other recent cases suggest more appropriate
rationale that guide the court to addressing a constitutional claim when other disposi-
tional bases exist. See, e.g., Davis v. State, No. 76,640, slip op. at 3 n.* (Fla. Oct. 31,
1991) (declining to impose procedural bar and reaching merits to emphasize that no
error occurred); Mac Ray Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (Fla. 1991) (revers-
ing convictions on dispositive claim, and addressing other constitutional errors to in-
struct the trial court in the event of retrial); Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167
(Fla. 1991) (reaching the merits of the constitutional challenges on its own, "given the
importance of th[e] case," and even though petitioners failed to show entitlement to
relief, id. at 1171; addressing petitioners' separation of powers claim "for future guid-
ance only." Id. at 1173). But see id. at 1176 (Kogan, J., specially concurring; Barkett,
J., concurring); id. (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Shaw, C.J.,
and Kogan, J., concurring) (arguing that the challenged act violated the single subject
rule, thus disposing of the case, and that the majority inappropriately addressed addi-
tional constitutional claims).
157. 580 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1991) (Kogan, J., author. Shaw, C.J., and Barkett, J.,
concurred. Grimes, J., concurred in result; McDonald, J., dissented with an opinion
with which Overton, J., concurred).
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atrists opined that Walls was competent to stand trial. The trial court
accepted the opinions of the psychiatrists and proceeded to trial. The
jury convicted Walls of murder, and recommended the death sentence,
which the trial court imposed.1 8
On direct appeal, Walls argued that the correctional officer's activ-
ities violated his constitutional rights. A majority of the justices agreed,
although two of the opinions chose different rationale. Justice Kogan
wrote that the state engaged in illegal subterfuge, which required the
court to conduct an "intensive scrutiny" of the particular method used
by police to extract the statements from Walls. 15 9
The state conceded at trial that the police conduct violated Mas-
siah v. United States,60 and further agreed that Walls' statements
were properly excluded from the guilt phase and penalty phase of his
trial. Relying exclusively on Florida due process, Justice Kogan wrote
that the gross deception practiced by the state required the trial court
to exclude the statements from all aspects of Walls' trial, thereby
prohibiting the state from gaining advantage from the subterfuge on
matters relating to Walls' competence to stand trial. 6 ' The practice
violated the due process tenants of fairness and good faith, and degen-
erated from permissible accusation to impermissible inquisition. 6 2 The
court ordered the case remanded for a new trial on all issues, and
barred the use of psychiatric evaluations conducted by the original psy-
chiatrists who received information derived from the Walls' detention
statements.
Justice Grimes concurred in result only, and simply wrote that
Massiah precluded the use of testimony by the mental health ex-
perts.' 63 In dissent, Justice McDonald characterized the police activity
as "inappropriate gathering of facts surrounding one's competency,"
which did not equate to a due process violation. Had the state's action
led to a confession or been introduced as substantive evidence, he
wrote, reversal would more likely be warranted."'
State due process arguments appeared in dictum and a minority
158. Id. at 132.
159. Id. at 133.
160. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
161. Walls, 580 So. 2d at 134.
162. Id. at 133. The police conduct here also interfered with the attorney-client
relationship, protected by article I, section 9. Id. at 134 (citing Haliburton v. State, 514
So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987)).
163. Id. at 135 (Grimes, J., concurring in result only).
164. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting; Overton, J., concurring).
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opinion in the two remaining cases. The court in Clark v. State'6 de-
clined to consider a claim that separate sentences imposed on the same
day and in the same court, but by different judges, resulted in
sentences that combined to violate the recommended guidelines sen-
tence. The court ruled that Clark was procedurally barred from raising
the claim on appeal because he failed to ask the trial court to consoli-
date his sentencing proceedings. Recognizing that the underlying prob-
lem would persist in future cases, the court established a general rule
that one sentencing score sheet must be used for each pending case. It
further recognized an exception to that rule that allowed defendants to
move to delay sentencing of pending cases to permit the use of a single
score sheet. 66 In dictum, the court wrote that due process protects de-
fendants against extreme delay occasioned by a rule that would post-
pone sentencing until all pending cases are ready for sentencing, such
as where the delay results in an unreasonably long period of incarcera-
tion in anticipation of sentencing. 167
A four-justice majority in Espinosa v. State' 8 rejected Espinosa's
claim that he was entitled to be tried separate from his co-defendant on
multiple charges, including murder. The majority reasoned that Espi-
nosa was not entitled to severance simply because he testified and was
cross-examined by his co-defendant's counsel. Moreover, no evidence
was introduced at his trial that could not have been introduced against
either defendant, if each had been tried separately. Although Espinosa
was unable to cross-examine his co-defendant during the guilt-inno-
cence phase of his trial, because his co-defendant did not testify, Espi-
nosa was able to cross-examine him during the penalty phase. 69
Two justices in dissent relied on Florida's due process clause to
argue that severance should generally be allowed in the guilt phase of a
capital trial. Moreover, the requirement for an individualized punish-
ment in death cases dictates that severance always be allowed in the
penalty phase. This is particularly so when the co-defendants exhibit
extreme animosity, and an elevated antagonism. 17 0 The inherent unfair-
165. 572 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, Ehrlich, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring; Barkett, J., specially concurring
with opinion).
166. Id. at 1392.
167. Id. at 1390.
168. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S753 (Nov. 27, 1991) (per curiam).
169. Id. at S754; see also Beltran-Lopez v. State, 583 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1991)
(per curiam).
170. Espinosa, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S756 (Barkett, J., dissenting, Kogan, J.,
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ness of jointly trying co-defendants under those circumstances is that
"'a substantial possibility exists []that the jury will unjustifiably infer
that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.' "171
2. Double Jeopardy
No person shall. . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
... .FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Federal case law provides a frequent source of precedent for
resolving state double jeopardy claims. Robinson v. State17 2 relied on
Oregon v. Kennedy17 3 and rejected a claim that double jeopardy barred
retrial due to asserted prosecutorial overreaching where the record did
not establish that the prosecutor deliberately intended to provoke
Robinson into moving for a mistrial. 117 Robinson, a black man, was
charged with first-degree murder of a white woman whom he kid-
napped, robbed, and sexually battered. Robinson maintained that the
prosecutor, during cross examination of a defense witness, insinuated
that he habitually preyed on white women.
Unable to agree on which federal precedent suggested the better
reasoned outcome, the justices in Goene v. State175 predictably split
their decision. Goene misrepresented his identity at sentencing and re-
ceived a guideline sentence of four and one-half years' imprisonment
following his conviction of various crimes. Afterward the state learned
of Goene's true identity and that he had an extensive criminal history,
which would have resulted in a guideline sentence of twelve-to-seven-
teen years' imprisonment had that fact been taken into account. The
state moved to vacate Goene's sentence. After Goene began serving his
sentence, the trial court granted the state's motion and resentenced
Goene to seventeen years' imprisonment. He argued that a resentence
concurring).
171. Id. (quoting United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1981)).
172. 574 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1991) (Barkett, J., author. Shaw, C.J., and Overton,
Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., and Ehrlich, Senior Justice, concurred. McDonald, J., con-
curred in result only), cert. denied No. 40-8277 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1991).
173. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
174. Robinson, 574 So. 2d at 112-13 (relying on Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S.
667 (1982)).
175. 577 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, and Grimes, J3., concurred; Barkett, J., dissented with an opinion, in which
Kogan, J., concurred).
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to a greater term after he began serving the original sentence violated
the state and federal double jeopardy clauses.1"6
Four of the six justices participating in the decision rejected
Goene's claim of error. The majority acknowledged that the double
jeopardy clause was intended, in part, to avoid subjecting a criminal
defendant to repeated insecurity, which would occur were he or she not
entitled to rely on the finality of the court's action.'" The general rule,
followed in Florida, prohibits a court from resentencing a defendant to
an increased term of imprisonment once he or she has begun serving a
sentence.' 78 However, a defendant's fraudulent behavior in securing a
sentence produces no "'legitimate expectations' " of constitutional fi-
nality." 9 Unlike a jury verdict of acquittal, a sentence imposed through
the defendant's fraud may be assailed on appeal. This conclusion de-
rives equally from the trial court's inherent power to assure the orderly
function of the judicial process by rectifying "'at any time'" its orders
and judgments that are the product of fraud. °80
Two justices argued in dissent that the exception carved out by the
majority ran afoul of the very purpose of the double jeopardy clause.
Constitutional finality requires the state "to marshall all the evidence
and present it at one time, not in a piecemeal fashion."' 8' Here, the
state failed to supply evidence of Goene's identity at the original sen-
tencing hearing, or to seek a continuance and await a forthcoming fin-
gerprint identification that would have established Goene's true
identity. 82
Carawan v. State' continues to have precedential importance in
resolving claims that prosecution or sentencing of multiple charges aris-
ing out of a single act violates Florida law, even though the decision
176. Id. at 1306-07.
177. Id. at 1307 (relying on Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)).
178. Id. at 1308 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 1307-08 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980)); see also United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 632
(lth Cir. 1983).
180. Goene, 577 So. 2d at 1309 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Burton,
314 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. 1975)).
181. Id. at 1310 (Barkett, J., dissenting; Kogan, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 1311 (citing Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990) (reasoning that
double jeopardy barred a subsequent prosecution where the state was capable of prose-
cuting all charges in a single proceeding).
183. 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987).
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was overruled by the legislature effective July 1, 1988.8 Carawan con-
trols pipeline cases, that is, cases with direct appeals pending at the
time the decision became final,188 and cases alleging the occurrence of
criminal activity before July 1, 1988.
The Second District Court of Appeal certified a question in a se-
ries of cases that asked whether double jeopardy barred prosecution
and sentence for sale and possession (or possession with intent to sell)
of the same quantum of cocaine. The lead decision, State v.
McCloud,18' dealt with prosecutions for those crimes allegedly occur-
ring on June 9, 1988, and on August 1, 1988. Relying on the dictates
of Carawan, the court said that the trial judge properly dismissed the
June 9th possession charge.1 87 However, section 775.021(4)(b), Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1988), called for the opposite result concerning the Au-
gust 1st offenses. That section authorized multiple convictions and
sentences for offenses based on a single act, unless, for instance, it was
a lesser-included offense. McCloud argued that the offense of posses-
sion was subsumed by the offense of sale, and fell within the exception.
Rejecting that claim, the court ruled that an offense is a lesser-included
offense under that section "only if the greater offense necessarily in-
cludes the lesser offense,"' 88 and sale is not a lesser-included offense of
possession because it can occur independent of possession. The court
also ruled that the legislature prohibited it from examining either the
pleading or proof to determine whether the defendant possessed and
sold the same quantum of cocaine."
The court ruled in State v. Hollinger 90 that Carawan did not pro-
hibit the state from seeking to convict a defendant for the multiple
offenses of first-degree premeditated murder and use of a firearm dur-
184. State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 617 (Fla. 1989) (construing FLA. STAT. §
775.021(4) (1987)).
185. Rehearing was denied in Carawan on December 10, 1987.
186. 577 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, and Grimes, JJ., concurred; Barkett, J., dissented with an opinion in which
Kogan, J., concurred); see also State v. James, 581 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1991); State v.
Oliver, 581 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1991); Davis v. State, 581 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1991); State
v. Robinson, 581 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); State v. Robinson, 581 So. 2d
157 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); State v. Gillette, 580 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1991) (per
curiam); State v. Dukes, 579 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); State v. V.A.A., 577
So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); State v. White, 577 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1991).
187. McCloud, 577 So. 2d at 940.
188. Id. at 941 (emphasis in original).
189. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(a) (Supp. 1988)).
190. 581 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Grimes, J., author).
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ing the commission of a felony, allegedly occurring on October 1, 1987.
Carawan specifically stated that those crimes did not violate double
jeopardy, a conclusion which it attributed to "'the legislature's mani-
fest concern over the proliferation of violent crimes involving the use of
firearms.' "191 The court added that the intervening changes to section
775.021(4) since Carawan did not mandate a different result.192
Finally, Justice Grimes in State v. Zanger'93 reiterated that
Carawan was limited to single act analysis, and rejected the defend-
ant's claim that the decision prohibited multiple convictions of robbery
and dealing in stolen property. He explained that Zanger robbed his
victims and then sold their jewelry the following day, thus committing
crimes based on separate acts. 9"
E. Prohibited Laws
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts shall be passed. FLA. CONST. I, § 10.
Florida courts adhere to the standard announced in Weaver v.
Graham'95 when deciding whether the application of a statute violates
the prohibition against ex post facto laws under the state constitution.
Weaver established that a statute impermissibly violates the federal ex
post facto prohibition if it applies to events that occurred before its
enactment, and operates to disadvantage the offender against whom it
is applied. 96 For that reason, the court in Hernandez v. State 9' con-
cluded that a law that requires the affirmance of a departure sentence
comprised of a single valid reason for departure, even though other in-
191. Id. at 154 (quoting Carawan, 515 So. 2d at 169). More likely, it meant to
say that those crimes proscribed different conduct, which would permit the state to
prosecute them both without violating double jeopardy.
192. Id.
193. 572 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 1991) (Shaw, C.J., author; Overton, McDonald, Ehr-
lich, and Grimes, JJ., concurred; Barkett and Kogan, JJ., dissented).
194. Id. at 1380; see also Henderson v. State, 583 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1991)
(unanimous, Barkett, J., author) (adopting rationale of Henderson v. State, 572 So. 2d
972 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), and holding that state could separately convict and
sentence under Carawan for theft and uttering a forged instrument when both offenses
arose from a single transaction and the defendant actually receives another's property).
195. 450 U.S. 24 (1981). See State v. McGriff, 537 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 1989).
196. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
197. 575 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author).
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valid reasons are also relied on, could not be applied against a defend-
ant whose crimes occurred before the enactment of the law. 198 The
court vacated the sentence after finding one of two reasons given in
support of a departure sentence was invalid. It left open the question
whether a law that makes the burden of proof for departure reasons
less burdensome similarly violates the ex post facto clause.' 99
F. Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
against the unreasonable interception of private communications
by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued
except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched, the person or per-
sons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be inter-
cepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall
be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right
shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information
would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Only a single decision, Department of Law Enforcement v. Real
Property, °0 relied on article I, section 12 this year. Together with sev-
eral other state constitutional rights, this section prohibits the state
from intruding into the sanctity of the home and the maintenance of
one's personal life when it seeks to execute its seizure and forfeiture
powers, unless it first complies with minimal due process require-
ments."0' The court's authoritative reliance on the state search and
seizure provision illustrates that the provision enjoys a vitality that has
not been completely eviscerated by the conformity requirement.
The clearest opportunity to consider article I, section 12 as a
source of protection, independent of the Fourth Amendment, presents
198. Id. at 641 n.1 (relying on McGriff, 537 So. 2d at 109).
199. Id.
200. 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497.
201. Id. at S499 (also citing FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 (inalienable rights), and 23
(privacy)).
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itself when the facts are outside Fourth Amendment precedent of the
United States Supreme Court. Yet, even then, the section may prove to
be unreliable. Until Florida v. Bostick,2 °0 the United States Supreme
Court had not considered the specific Fourth Amendment implications
when the government searches boarded passengers on commercial car-
riers. There, the Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of
Florida that struck down a law enforcement drug interdiction practice,
which consisted of plain-clothed narcotics officers, without a whisper of
suspicion of wrongdoing, boarding scheduled busses, confronting pas-
sengers, and requesting consent to search their carry-on luggage for
contraband. 0 3 In light of circumstances that the trial judge character-
ized as "very intimidating,"" 4 a majority of the state court determined
that Bostick was seized under article I, section 12 and the Fourth
Amendment. Applying the standard announced in United States v.
Mendenhall,0 5 the majority concluded that Bostick was neither free to
leave, nor to " 'disregard the [officers'] questions and walk away.' "20
A six-member majority of the United States Supreme Court
charged that the Florida court had misread Mendenhall by "focusing
on whether Bostick was 'free to leave' rather than on the principle that
those words were intended to capture."20 The correct formulation
under the Fourth Amendment, Justice O'Connor wrote for the major-
ity, "is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the of-
ficers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." ' 0 Relying on
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado,09 where INS
agents conducted a factory sweep in search of illegal aliens who might
be found inside, she wrote that there is no seizure where persons have
"'no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful
answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to an-
swer.' "110 The opinion chastises the state court for focusing on a "sin-
202. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
203. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989), rev'd, I11 S. Ct. 2382
(1991).
204. Id. at 1157.
205. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
206. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
207. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
208. Id. The dissent agreed that this formulation correctly expressed the Men-
denhall standard, although it would have answered the question differently. Id. at 2389
(Marshall, J., dissenting; Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
209. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
210. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218).
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gle fact-that the encounter took place on a bus," to adopt a per se
rule.2 11 Declining to answer for the moment whether a seizure occurred
when narcotics deputies confronted Bostick in the rearmost seat of his
bus, the Court remanded for a decision on this issue by the Florida
courts.
G. Pretrial Release and Detention
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presump-
tion is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of
municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release
on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasona-
bly protect the community from risk of harm to persons, assure
the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the
judicial process, the accused may be detained. FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 14.
No decision construed this section during the survey period, al-
though a rules amendment has potential constitutional importance.
Without ruling on the constitutional aspects of its decision, a divided
court amended the rule establishing time standards for the state to
charge pretrial detainees. Five justices in In re Amendment to Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure-Rule 3.133(b)(6) (Pretrial Release)2 12
agreed to amend the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure to require
the state to file formal charges against defendants in custody within
thirty days from the date of their arrest or service of capias. If the
defendants remain uncharged on the thirtieth day, the rule requires the
court to order the defendants automatically released on their own re-
cognizance on the thirty-third day, unless the state files formal charges
by that day; or if the state shows good cause, to order the defendants
automatically released on their own recognizance on the fortieth day,
unless the state files formal charges by that day.213 The rule provides a
benchmark for establishing a constitutional minimum when the stan-
211. Id. at 2388. But see id. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Black-
mun and Stevens, JJ.). Justice Marshall wrote that the state supreme court considered
"all of the details of the encounter," suggesting that the majority was unfaithful to the
record. Id. (emphasis in original).
212. 573 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
213. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.134 (renumbering FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.133(b)(6)).
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dards are tested under the light of the adversarial process.
Of note, the majority rejected a rules committee proposal that
would have authorized the state, with good cause, to detain a defendant
beyond forty days without filing formal charges. 14 Proving that some
court conferences must be uproarious, Justice Overton objected to the
majority's forty day rule, charging that it was borne in the court's "bo-
som," rather than in the rules committee. He characterized the rule as
"mandatory [and] inflexible, 2 15 and added that the rule will now re-
sult in "games being played with the process" that thwart the desired
effect of the mandatory cut-off period. For instance, he predicted that
"most state attorneys will be filing informations based on hearsay evi-
dence from investigating officers," rather than on sworn testimony of
material witnesses, to avert the release of uncharged defendants.2 1
H. Rights of Accused and of Victims
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand,
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and shall be furnished a copy of the charges, and shall have
the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to confront at
trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both,
and to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the
county where the crime was committed. If the county is not
known, the indictment or information may charge venue in two or
more counties conjunctively and proof that the crime was commit-
ted in that area shall be sufficient; but before pleading the accused
may elect in which of those counties he will be tried. Venue for
prosecution of crimes committed beyond the boundaries of the
state shall be fixed by law.
(b) Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the
next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be
214. The proposed rule provided, in part:
Unless the state can show good cause why the charging instrument has not
been filed, the defendant shall be released from custody on his or her own
recognizance. Any defendant who remains in custody after the 30th day
[without formal charges] shall be brought before a magistrate at least
every ten days thereafter, until the charging document is filed or defendant
is released from custody.
In re Amendment, 573 So. 2d at 826 n.*.
215. Id. at 828 (Overton, J., dissenting; McDonald, J., concurring.).
216. Id. at 829.
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informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all cru-
cial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights
do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 16.
Article I, section 16(a) creates a cluster of rights designed to serve
persons who are subject to criminal prosecution. Second to article I,
section 9 (due process), rights in this cluster are the most actively liti-
gated article I rights. Half of those cases addressed the right to trial by
an impartial jury.
1. Notice of Charges
The requirement that the state inform a defendant of "the nature
and cause of the accusation against him" embodies the due process
concept of fair notice. In State v. Rodriguez,21 7 a unanimous court re-
lied on the two companion provisions to overturn Rodriguez's convic-
tion for felony driving under the influence (DUI) because the state ne-
glected to give him any notice of the particular prior DUI convictions it
intended to rely in proving the enhanced felony DUI offense. Because
the state ultimately was required to prove that Rodriguez had three or
more DUI convictions, as an essential element of felony DUI, it was
required to specifically allege the prior convictions in the charging
instrument.2 18
2. Fair Trial
A juror's use of unauthorized materials may implicate the right of
a fair trial, in particular the rights of confrontation, cross examination,
and assistance of counsel, guaranteed to the accused under article I,
section 16 and the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution. In
State v. Hamilton,"' the state appealed a trial court ruling that or-
dered a new trial as to the penalty phase in the capital trial because
one juror brought two unauthorized magazines into the jury room.
Noting that no Florida case had yet formulated a test for measuring
the error caused by a juror's use of unauthorized documents, and stat-
ing that there could be no bright-line test, the court adopted a federal
217. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991). This case was introduced above. See supra
notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
218. Id. at 1266.
219. 574 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author).
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test that attempts to balance the accused's constitutional right to a fair
trial and the juror's privacy right to be shielded from needless prying
and harassment. 2 °
Under Hamilton, the moving party bears the initial burden of es-
tablishing the breach by stating a legally sufficient reason for con-
ducting an interview of the jury. Defense counsel alleged that the unau-
thorized magazines distracted the jury because one included a single
advertisement that depicted a blonde woman wearing a bathing suit.221
The court said that the trial judge could have summarily denied de-
fense counsel's motion for a new trial based on counsel's allegations, for
the allegations expressed counsel's reaction to the advertisement and
not the juror's reaction. The trial judge conducted a hearing, even
though he harbored "serious doubt" about the existence of miscon-
duct.22 The court commended the trial judge, but hastened to add that
a judge need not conduct an interview if the allegation of misconduct is
"unreasonable. "223
When the movant provides a legally sufficient reason for interview-
ing the juror, the misconduct raises a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice. The burden then shifts to the state to show that the breach
was harmless:22 4 "'[D]efendants are entitled to a new trial unless it
can be said that there is no reasonable possibility that the [unautho-
rized materials] affected the verdict.' "25 The inquiry must be "'lim-
ited to objective demonstration of extrinsic factual matter disclosed in
the jury room,' "226 and may not extend into matters relating to the
juror's subjective thoughts, impressions, or mental processes.2 In
Hamilton, the justices agreed that the error was harmless, particularly
because the unauthorized materials were irrelevant to the factual and
220. Id. at 128, 130; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.607(2)(b) (1987). The test may
also be viewed as preserving the station of the jury itself by impermissibly delving into
matters that inhere in the verdict, Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d
97, 99 (Fla. 1991) (citation omitted), and averting improper second-guessing of ver-
dicts. Id. at 102 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
221. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d at 130.
222. Id. at 130.
223. Id. (emphasis in original).
224. Id. (citing United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1975)).
225. Id. at 129 (quoting Paz v. United States, 462 F.2d 740, 745 (5th Cir.
1972)).
226. Id. (quoting Howard, 506 F.2d at 869); see, e.g., Trotter v. State, 576 So.
2d 691 (Fla. 1991) (upholding trial court's finding that evidence failed to support alle-
gations that law books and a telephone in jury room improperly influenced the jury).
227. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d at 129.
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legal issues of the case. 28
Because Hamilton may be read to authorize an inquiry, even
though the trial judge harbored serious doubt about the merits of any
alleged juror misconduct, a realigned court "clarified" its decision in a
civil case, Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Maler2 29 A four-justice
majority held that "an inquiry is never permissible unless the moving
party has made sworn factual allegations that, if true, would require a
trial court to order a new trial using the standard adopted in Hamil-
ton." 2 3  Thus, an inquiry is permissible if it will elicit information
about overt prejudicial acts, and is impermissible if it will elicit infor-
mation about a juror's subjective thoughts. 31 In Baptist Hospital, at-
torneys for the defendant hospital sought to interview jurors following
the verdict for the brain-damaged infant plaintiff and against the hos-
pital. They presented affidavits, alleging essentially that the verdict was
an agreement borne out of sympathy for the plaintiff, and that the jury
relied on nonrecord evidence of the hospital's insurability. The court
ruled that the affidavits were legally insufficient, because they alleged
facts that merely purported to be opinions of two jurors about the rea-
son for the verdict, sought to delve into the jurors' subjective impres-
sions, or were otherwise refuted by the record. 2
Justice Kogan, who authored Hamilton, concurred in the court's
continued adherence to the decision, but dissented for what he saw as
an effective overruling of Hamilton's threshold inquiry. He would au-
thorize a "very limited" interview of jurors, to permit inquiry into ob-
jective acts that would establish whether jurors agreed to disregard
their oaths and instructions, and whether nonrecord evidence was
received.23 3
3. Right to Counsel
A majority of the court in McKinney v. State 8 affirmed the de-
228. Id. at 131.
229. 579 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, McDon-
ald, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring. Kogan, J., concurred in part and dissented in
part with an opinion in which Harding, J., concurred).
230. Id. at 100 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 99.
232. Id. at 99-100.
233. Id. at 101 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part; Harding,
J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
234. 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991) (Barkett, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Grimes and
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fendant's convictions, but declined to hear a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel. McKinney reaffirms the court's practice of re-
quiring defendants who claim that they received ineffective assistance,
including those that assertedly impinge article I, section 16, to prose-
cute their claims in a motion for post conviction relief. Generally, di-
rect appeal is an inappropriate time to initiate a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel because the trial judge has had no opportu-
nity to consider and rule on the evidentiary basis of the claim . 3 5
Unable to garner additional votes, Justice Overton dissented alone
on this point, arguing that the holding sets bad precedent by encourag-
ing multiple litigation. He would have declined for the moment to
reach the merits of McKinney's other claims, preferring instead to re-
mand for an evidentiary hearing and await the outcome on the ineffec-
tive assistance claim."'
The right to present mitigating evidence in capital cases is consti-
tutionally guaranteed. The question posed in Anderson v. State"'
asked whether a defendant's waiver of that right amounts to a waiver
of effective assistance of counsel, thereby implicating enhanced proce-
dural protections. For reasons not clear from the record or opinion, An-
derson instructed his attorney not to present evidence at the penalty
phase of his capital trial. He argued on direct appeal that his decision
effectively amounted to a waiver of effective assistance of counsel for
which the trial court was required to ascertain that the waiver was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial colloquy reflected that de-
fense counsel advised the court that his investigation identified numer-
ous persons who could provide mitigating evidence, but that Anderson
commanded him not to call any. Anderson declared on the record that
he preferred not to have any witnesses testify on his behalf. The trial
court's inquiry was limited to a solitary question-whether Anderson
was on drugs or medication that would affect his understanding of the
proceedings. Anderson replied that he was not.238 Ultimately, the trial
court accepted the jury's recommendation and imposed the death
penalty.
Kogan, JJ., concurring; McDonald, J., concurred in part, and dissented in part, without
an opinion; Overton, J., dissented with an opinion).
235. Id. at 82.
236. Id. at 85 (Overton, J., dissenting) (citing unreported order in Francis v.
State, No. 50,127 (Fla. June 20, 1978)).
237. 574 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3259
(U.S. Oct. 10, 1991).
238. Id. at 89-90, 94-95.
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A majority affirmed the conviction and death sentence, holding
that the trial court was not obliged to conduct further inquiry. 39 It
specifically rejected Anderson's claim that the trial court was required
to ascertain whether the waiver of his right to present mitigating evi-
dence, which amounted to a waiver of his right to effective assistance of
counsel, satisfied Faretta v. California.4 0 The majority reasoned that
Faretta's standard for protecting a defendant who seeks to exercise the
right of self-representation did not apply because Anderson was repre-
sented by counsel.241
The decision to forego presenting mitigating evidence, Justice Bar-
kett argued in dissent, raises the specter of "the most dire consequences
possible under the law. '24 2 The right to present mitigating evidence is
constitutionally guaranteed, and is no less important than the right to
plead guilty to a capital crime. The latter requires an affirmative show-
ing on the record that the defendant tendered his or her plea intelli-
gently and voluntarily. 43 She wrote that Anderson was entitled to an
equivalent degree of procedural protection, which should not be sus-
pended "'simply because the accused invites the possibility of a death
sentence.' "2,4 Moreover, a full inquiry into the effectiveness of a de-
fendant's waiver, on the record, promotes finality of the judicial pro-
cess, which is otherwise lost on collateral proceedings "'that seek to
probe murky memories.' "9245
4. Right to Appeal
Article I of the state constitution does not expressly create a right
of appeal. And State v. Gurican2"6 casts doubt on whether other consti-
239. Id. at 95 (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, McDonald, and Grimes, JJ.,
concurred).
240. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
241. Anderson, 574 So. 2d at 95. Justice Ehrlich concurred separately, stating
that he would dissent on this point had the colloquy between the trial judge, defense
counsel, and Anderson not occurred. He added that the colloquy was "sufficient to
meet any constitutional requirement." Id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring; Shaw, C.J., and Ko-
gan, J., concurred.).
242. Id. at 96 (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
243. Id. (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)).
244. Id. at 97 (quoting Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 804 (Fla. 1988)).
245. Id. (citation omitted).
246. 576 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1991) (McDonald, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Over-
ton, Ehrlich, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Kogan, J., dissented without
opinion.).
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tutional sources may provide such a right.2"" There the court addressed
for the first time whether a defendant who fled the jurisdiction of the
trial court before sentencing and filing her notice of appeal is entitled
to appeal her conviction if she returns to the jurisdiction before the
state files a motion to dismiss the appeal. Justice McDonald, writing
for a majority of six members, noted that but for Gurican's voluntary
absence from the jurisdiction, the trial judge would have rendered a
judgment sentencing her. Justice McDonald explained that Gurican
forfeited whatever right to an appeal she possessed by fleeing the juris-
diction of the trial court, and showing overt disrespect for the judicial
system, which she could no longer rely on for protection. 248
Although Gurican does not foreclose the matter, it seems unlikely
that future claimants will successfully argue that the state constitution
provides a right of appeal to persons who comply with procedural rules.
The majority distinguished its earlier decisions that found that a de-
fendant had a constitutional right of appeal, explaining that those deci-
sions construed jurisdictional provisions of former constitutions. ' 9
Moreover, the majority disagreed with a district court decision, which
found a state constitutional right to appeal, and characterized its rea-
soning as "debatable. '2 50
5. Impartial Jury
Florida adheres to a determined policy to rid its trial courts of
race-based jury selection, and the appearance of impropriety that such
a practice fosters. The focus of this effort has been on the entitlement
of defendants in criminal cases to trial by an impartial jury guaranteed
247. See id. at 711-12 n.2 (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1) ("[d]istrict
courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter
of right . .. ")). The matter would seem to be foreclosed by State v. Creighton, 469 So.
2d 735, 740 (Fla. 1985), which construed the section as merely allocating jurisdiction,
rather than conferring a right to appeal. See In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal
Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990); see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,
656 (1977) (noting that there is no federal constitutional right to an appeal, and that
the right of appeal in criminal cases is purely a creature of statute); Estelle v. Dor-
rough, 420 U.S. 534, 536 (1975) (noting that there is no federal constitutional right to
state appellate review of state criminal convictions).
248. Gurican, 576 So. 2d at 711.
249. Id. at 712 (citations omitted).
250. Id. (citing Marshall v. State, 344 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.)
(Grimes, J., author) ("Our Florida Constitution guarantees convicted persons of the
right of appeal . . . ."), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1977)).
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in article I section 16. It is noteworthy that other article I sections
provide coordinate protection against racially discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges,2 51 and that the protection extends to litigants and
jurors in civil proceedings.252 Also, the court has declared in dicta that
the state itself is entitled to a fair trial, free of discriminatory
impediments."'
Florida's current standard for reviewing claims of racial bias in
the jury selection process was announced in the 1984 decision State v.
Neil.254 The standard essentially provides that the moving party must
first make a timely objection that the other party improperly exercised
a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror on account of race.
Then the movant must demonstrate a prima facie case on the record
that the juror belongs to a distinct racial group, and that there is a
"strong likelihood" that the peremptory was entirely racially motivated.
Once the movant demonstrates the existence of a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the other party to show that it struck the prospective
juror for a valid, non-racial reason.2 55 The court considered six cases in
the Neil case line this period, proving that its standard continues to
demand the court's attention as the single-most litigated right in the
cluster of article I, section 16 rights.
Defense counsel in Williams v. State"6 established a prima facie
case of discrimination by objecting to the state's removal of two blacks
251. See Reynolds v. State, 576 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1991) (noting in dictum that
article I, section 5's right to petition officials for redress of grievances assures accounta-
bility of public officials of the sort advanced by requiring the prosecutor to explain a
race-based exercise of a peremptory challenge); Tillman v. State, 522 So. 2d 14 (Fla.
1988) (relying on state and federal equal protection clauses).
252. Mazaheritehrani v. Brooks, 573 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990),
rev. granted, No. 77,692 (Fla. July 11, 1991); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause prohibits discrimination on account of race in selecting a jury in a
civil proceeding).
253. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1984). The Neil case line to date
focused entirely on the rights of defendants and jurors in criminal trials to be free of
race-based discriminatory practices in the selection of jurors. No case has yet reached
the court asking it to apply Neil to remedy impermissible defense selection practices,
although at least one district court considered the point. See Cure v. State, 564 So. 2d
1251, 1252 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
254. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 481 (Fla. 1984), clarified, State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d
18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); State v. Castillo, 486 So. 2d 565 (Fla.
1986).
255. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486-87.
256. 574 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (unanimous).
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from the jury. However, after the prosecutor explained the decision to
remove the first black juror, the trial judge prevented the prosecutor
from explaining the decision to excuse the second black juror. This was
error, the court ruled, because the trial judge should have resolved all
doubts in favor of the defense and conducted an inquiry. Relying on
State v. Slappy 57 the court declared that "'[i]f we are to err at all, it
must be in the way least likely to allow discrimination.' "258 Therefore,
"[w]henever a sufficient doubt has been raised as to the exclusion of
any person on the venire because of race, the trial court must require
the state to explain each one of the allegedly discriminatory chal-
lenges."'2 "'9 That error here required remand for a new trial.
Williams is instructive for several reasons. The opinion illustrates
circumstances when the defense may satisfy the "strong likelihood" re-
quirement of establishing a prima facie case under Neil simply by cre-
ating "sufficient doubt" on the record that the state improperly struck
even a single juror. It also shows the court's intolerance of and the
severe consequences to the state for its unjustified, race-based juror
selection.260
Defense counsel failed to show a "strong likelihood" of improper
discrimination in Taylor v. State," 1 where the prosecutor removed one
of four black members of the venire. The trial judge rejected counsel's
assertion that the prosecutor was "systematically excluding" blacks,
and refused to require the prosecutor to explain his peremptory." ' The
record failed to show a Neil violation, and the court held that the mere
fact that the prosecutor challenged one of four black members does not
show "substantial likelihood" of an improper peremptory, particularly
when the prosecutor knew, under the procedure followed for jury selec-
tion, that another black juror would succeed the excused juror to the
257. :522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
258. Williams, 574 So. 2d at 137 (quoting Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22).
259. Id. at 137 (emphasis in original); see Reynolds v. State, 576 So. 2d 1300,
1301 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author) ("strong likelihood" of discrimina-
tion exists when the prosecutor removes the only black member of the venire); see also
Taylor v. State, 583 So. 2d 323, 327-28 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (trial court need not
look back to the prosecutor's reasons for strike of second black venire member when
defense accepts prosecutor's withdrawal of the peremptory challenge).
260. The court expressly stated in another case that it has the highest regard for
the integrity and skill of the state's prosecutors, and does not ascribe to them a racist
sentiment. Reynolds, 576 So. 2d at 1302 (Fla. 1991).
261. 583 So. 2d 323, 327 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
262. Id.
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panel.268
Not infrequently the court addresses the standard of reviewing the
trial judge's Neil rulings. Neil established a deferential standard of re-
view, where it emphasized that "the trial court's decision as to whether
or not an inquiry is needed is largely a matter of discretion. 264 Later
the court said that the trial judge "necessarily is vested with broad
discretion in determining whether peremptory challenges are racially
intended . . . . [and] we must necessarily rely on the inherent fairness
and color blindness of our trial judges who are on the scene and who
themselves get a 'feel' for what is going on in the jury selection
process. 265
With those principles in mind, four of six members of the court
participating in Green v. State266 sustained the decision of the trial
judge to deny defense counsel's Neil claim, which was prompted when
the prosecutor excused two black jurors. The majority wrote that the
trial judge "sees and hears the prospective jurors, . . . has the ability
to assess the candor and the credibility of the answers given to the
questions presented. Clearly, the trial judge is in the best position to
determine if peremptory challenges have been properly exercised. 267
Having reviewed the record, the justices declared: "we cannot say that
the trial judge abused his discretion ....
The factual basis of the majority's decision in Green was seriously
called into doubt in Justice Barkett's dissenting opinion.269 Engaging in
a careful review of the voir dire proceedings, she identified several in-
stances where the majority had passed over voir dire testimony of cau-
casian jurors, who went unchallenged by the prosecutor, and yet pos-
sessed qualities that resulted in the dismissal of blacks.
The majority made no attempt to reconcile the dispute raised by
Justice Barkett. The unexplained impasse allows room for speculation
263. Id. at 326 n.3, 327.
264. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487 n.10; see also Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 24.
265. Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203, 206 (Fla. 1990).
266. 583 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Barkett, J., dissented with an opinion, with which
Kogan, J., concurred.).
267. Id. at 652 (citation omitted).
268. Id. But see Files v. State, 586 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (on
motion for rehearing) (panel split on whether Neil rulings by trial judge should be
resolved by abuse of discretion standard, or whether state's reasons must be supported
by competent, substantial evidence).
269. Green, 583 So. 2d at 653 (Barkett, J., dissenting; Kogan, J., concurring.).
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that the majority is unlikely to hold the state to exacting certainty. 270
Green also suggests that the majority tends to defer to the trial judge's
factual findings in Neil rulings, even though a perusal of the record
contains facts that suggest the findings were erroneous. 7' Moreover,
the existence of record inconsistency will not necessarily convince the
justices to find error after a Neil inquiry.
Deference to the station of the trial judge on the issue of discrimi-
natory intent is clearly not warranted in all circumstances. For in-
stance, the court refused to defer to the trial judge in Reynolds v.
State2 72 because she failed to conduct any sort of Neil inquiry. There,
the state peremptorily struck the sole black juror on the venire. The
trial judge agreed with the prosecutor that there was no "systematic
exclusion," and summarily denied defense counsel's Neil objection.2 73
Because the excusal of the entire black membership on a venire raises a
"strong likelihood" of impropriety, the trial judge should have con-
ducted a Neil inquiry to ascertain the prosecutor's motives, but errone-
ously never did.
Generally, the court will not reach the merits of a Neil claim that
is procedurally barred. This period, the court declined to consider
claims in two cases because trial counsel failed to preserve the issue for
appeal. The first case, Valle v. State,2 74 illustrates the importance to
the movant of understanding the mechanics for asserting a Neil claim.
At trial, defense counsel charged that the prosecutor's exercise of pe-
remptory challenges to remove six blacks and two Hispanics from the
jury created "an impropriety in the record. 176 The trial judge stated
that he would allow the prosecutor to respond, but noted that "'I've
270. See Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22 (misuse of a preemptory is indicated by "a
challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who were not challenged");
see, e.g., Gadson v. State, 561 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
271. See Bryant v. State, 565 So. 2d 1298,1303 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part) (dissenting on decision to grant new trial for Neil
violation, and arguing that "it is manifest from the record that the peremptory chal-
lenges were not racially motivated"); Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710, 716 (Fla. 1989)
(McDonald, J., dissenting, Ehrlich, C.J., concurring) (independently reviewing the rec-
ord and concluding that there was no possibility of racial overtones that would warrant
overturning the trial court ruling rejecting Neil claim); Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 24 (Fla.
1988) (McDonald, C.J., dissenting) (no showing that the trial judge abused his
discretion),
272. 576 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author).
273. Id. at 1300-01.
274. 581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (unanimous).
275. Id. at 43.
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been asked to make no findings and I am making no findings'" that the
state acted improperly.27 6 After the prosecutor volunteered reasons for
striking the eight jurors, the defense objected only that the challenges
were used to create a death-prone jury.
The record suffered from three defects, each of which could have
been independently fatal. First, the record makes clear that defense
counsel unartfully pled a Neil claim. Second, counsel should have
asked the trial judge to expressly find that the defense had carried its
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial bias. Fi-
nally, counsel failed to show that the reasons advanced by the prosecu-
tor were racially motivated. 7 8
The court also declined to consider a Neil claim raised collaterally
in Francis v. Barton .1 9 Although Neil was issued in 1984, after Fran-
cis appealed his conviction and sentence, Francis's failure to assert a
Neil violation in his first collateral attack procedurally barred him from
seeking to litigate the claim in his second collateral attack. 80 The ma-
jority denied all relief. Two justices specially concurred, but wrote to
argue that the case should have been remanded for a review of the
claim on its merits. They advanced a minority position that every con-
stitutional claim in a death case should be reviewed on its merits.
Moreover, they would have excused the procedural bar because Fran-
cis's direct appeal was in the Neil pipeline and the court issued its opin-
ion on the direct appeal after it released Neil. 81
I. Excessive Punishments
Excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture
of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of
witnesses are forbidden. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
Article I, section 17 prohibits, in part, "[e]xcessive fines, cruel or
unusual punishment, ... [and] forfeiture of estate." Seldom have
276. Id.
277. Id. at 44.
278. Id.
279. 581 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, Grimes, and Harding, JJ., concurring. Barkett, J., concurred specially with an
opinion with which Kogan, J., concurred.).
280. Id. at 584-85.
281. Id. at 585 (Barkett, J., specially concurring, Kogan, J., concurring).
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courts construed this section. The two references to article I, section 17
in Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property282 are therefore
exceptional, and for their brevity might go unnoticed. The court de-
clared that Floridians have, under this section, a substantive right to be
free from "excessive punishments. ' 1"83 The phrase seems to borrow di-
rectly from the caption above the section, for it has no literal, textual
derivation. This suggests that the phrase is only of general importance
because the text of a constitutional section, and not its title, determines
its construction.2 84 In light of the facts and following discussion, how-
ever, the phrase "excessive punishments" effectively captures the spirit
of the section, and establishes a principle akin to Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis.2 8
The court also declared that article I, section 17 limits the state to
forfeiting property of a defendant that was used in the predicate crime,
or alternatively, prohibits the state from forfeiting property that was
not an instrument of criminal activity.2 86 The state had alleged at trial
that the defendant used portions of the properties, or improvements, to
facilitate drug trafficking activity. It did not allege that the defendant
used the entirety of the seized properties in that activity.2 87 Under the
ruling, the state may not forfeit property that was not related to further
the predicate drug offense without violating the defendant's right to be
free from "excessive punishments." This is a marked departure from
federal Eighth Amendment case law, which permits forfeiture of the
whole, even though the criminal activity pertained to a part.188 The
282. 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497. For an extended discussion of this case, see
supra notes 71-122 and accompanying text, and infra notes 282-88, 316-20 and accom-
panying text.
283. Id. at 5499. This right is protected by the notice and hearing requirements
of article I, section 9. Id.
284. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(h).
285. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (Eighth Amendment pros-
cribes punishment that is disproportionate to the crime committed).
286. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S501 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ .9
and 17).
287. In re Real Property Forfeiture Proceedings, No. 90-250 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct.
Dec. 21, 1990) (order and opinion granting claimant's amended motion to dismiss peti-
tions for forfeiture).
288. See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1990)
(as applied, statute subjecting the whole of any tract of land used to facilitate narcotics
distribution permits forfeiture of apartment building as a whole, rather than specific
apartments, and does not violate eighth amendment proscription against disproportion-
ate punishment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. One 107.9
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decision illustrates an important principle of federalism-that the state
may extend greater protection to persons from governmental excess
than they are entitled to under the federal counterpart.
J. Access to Courts
The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury,
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
In its 1973 decision, Kluger v. White,"8 the court declared that
article I, section 21 prohibits the legislature from abolishing a statutory
right of access to the courts that predated the adoption of the Florida
Constitution, or that became part of the state's common law. Despite
its commitment to preserving an avenue of redress through Florida's
courts, Kluger recognized that the demands of society and the "ever-
changing character of the law" may on occasion justify the abolition of
an enduring right of action. The court announced that the legislature is
free to abolish a personal right of access if it provides a "reasonable
alternative" to protect the right, or otherwise shows an "overpowering
public necessity" for abolishing the right and that no alternative
method exists to satisfy that necessity. " ' As the following two cases
illustrate, Kluger's "exacting standard" continues to serve as the cor-
nerstone of the court's article I, section 21 case law.
Various taxpayers, employers, employees, and others opposed re-
cent comprehensive changes to Florida's workers' compensation law.
They claimed in Martinez v. Scanlan,291 in part, that the 1990292
Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1990) (statute making all real prop-
erty, or part, subject to forfeiture does not violate Eighth Amendment's protections
against cruel, unusual, and disproportionate punishments). The identical conclusion
would not necessarily withstand scrutiny under the double jeopardy clause. See, e.g.,
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989) (holding that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause may not subject a defendant who has already been punished in a criminal
prosecution to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction does
more than make the government whole); State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223, 229 (Fla.
1989) (Kogan, J., dissenting; Shaw and Barkett, JJ., concurring) (arguing that the
state's failure to establish a nexus between the forfeited property and the criminal con-
duct renders the forfeiture an impermissible second punishment).
289. 281 So. 2d 1 (1973).
290. Id. at 4.
291. 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991) (McDonald, J., author; Overton, Grimes, and
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amendments substantially reduced preexisting benefits to eligible work-
ers, without providing countervailing advantages, and assertedly vio-
lated article I, section 21. A four-member majority found that the
workers' compensation law remains a reasonable alternative to tort liti-
gation. The majority explained that the law continued to provide in-
jured workers with full medical care and wage-loss payments, regard-
less of fault and without the delay and uncertainty associated with
common law tort remedies.298 Three justices would not have addressed
this claim, believing instead that the statute violated the single subject
requirement 294 and made inappropriate the court's consideration of this
and other constitutional claims. 295
Petitioners in Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc.296 argued un-
successfully that the legislature failed to provide a reasonable alterna-
tive or demonstrate overpowering necessity when it limited the liability
of long-term lessors of automobiles from negligence of their lessees.
The right to sue the lessors of motor vehicles was the product of recent
common law, 297 not a long-established statute. Thus, the legislature
was free to limit the vicarious liability of long-term lessors, without
complying with the rigors of Kluger 99 Justice McDonald wrote that
such a limitation does not equate to denial of access to courts, and he
added in passing, "particularly when the law is unsettled at the time of
the enactment. 299
Litigants frequently, yet unsuccessfully challenge statutes of limi-
tations and repose on grounds that they deny access to courts. The
Harding, JJ., concurring; Kogan, J., concurred specially with an opinion, with which
Barkett, J., concurred; Barkett, J., concurred in part and dissented in part with an
opinion, with which Shaw, C.J., and Kogan, J., concurred).
292. Ch. 90-201, 1990 Fla. Laws 894.
293. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d at 1171-72.
294. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
295. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d at 1176 (Kogan, J., specially concurring, joined by
Barkett, J.); id. (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by Shaw,
C.J., and Kogan, J.).
296. 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991). The case was introduced above. See supra
notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
297. Id. at 333 (citing Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla.
1959)).
298. Id.; see also Wright v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 So. 2d 1033
(Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (unanimous); Raynor v. De La Nuez, 574 So. 2d 1091 (Fla.
1991) (Ehrlich, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ.,
concurred: McDonald, J., concurred in part and dissented in part in an opinion.).
299. Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 333.
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court in Blizzard v. W. H. Roof Co., Inc.3 00 upheld the constitutionality
of two statutes that shortened the period from four years to one year
for bringing a negligence claim against insured tortfeasors whose insur-
ance carrier became insolvent after the cause of action accrued. The
justices adopted the opinion of the district court under review, which
expressed the familiar principle that a statute of limitation does not
deny constitutionally protected access to courts by merely shortening
the period for bringing an action.30' Without elaborating, the court de-
clared that the legislative action was a "reasonable" restriction on the
right of access assured under article I, section 21,302 which was "neces-
sary" to protect the rights of claimant and insured tortfeasor alike. 303
Finally, the most divisive debate over article I, section 21 protec-
tions occurred in Smith v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,304 where three justices concurred in a plurality decision that
article I, section 21 was "inapplicable" to cases brought by indigents
who sought to receive free transcripts of administrative hearings. 05
They reasoned that the right of appeal to a judicial tribunal provided in
the Administrative Procedure Act" 6 afforded sufficient protection of
300. 573 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1991). This case was introduced in article I, section 2
(equal protection). See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
301. Blizzard v. W.H. Roof Co., 556 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990); see also University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (Fla. 1991)
(statute of repose limiting period for medical malpractice claims does not violate article
I, section 21, even when applied to claims accruing after the period had expired) (cita-
tion omitted) (McDonald, J., author; Overton and Grimes, JJ., and Ehrlich, Senior
Justice, concurring; Shaw, C.J., and Barkett and Kogan, JJ., dissented without
opinion.).
302. Blizzard, 556 So. 2d at 1238. The district court panel explained the reason-
ableness of the linkage between the statute of limitation and the purpose to be served in
light of Blizzard's equal protection argument, which we may assume applies equally to
the access to courts argument.
303. Blizzard, 573 So. 2d at 334. This statement is potentially misleading. A
showing of necessity itself is insufficient to sustain a legislative infringement of a right
of access protected under article I, section 21. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. Moreover,
statutory time bars on initiating claims need only be reasonable. See, e.g., Pullum v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114
(1986).
304. 573 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam). This case was introduced in arti-
cle I, section 9 (due process). See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
305. Id. at 323 (Overton and Grimes, JJ., concurring); id. at 325 (McDonald, J.,
concurring on point).
306. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1985).
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their right of redress."0 7 Chief Justice Shaw concurred in result only,
which leaves in doubt his position regarding the outcome of the consti-
tutional issues, for he may not have disputed the decision of Justices
Overton, McDonald, and Grimes, to grant petitioners relief on the stat-
utory claim.308 Justice Ehrlich, with whom Justices Barkett and Kogan
agreed, dissented on the constitutional issue, charging that the major-
ity's "parsimonious" reading of the Act "facilely avoids the question of
whether the right has any substance in the absence of a transcript."30 9
Justice Ehrlich concluded that "[tlhe plain language of article I, sec-
tion 21 guarantees access to courts . . . .[and that] meaningful judi-
cial review by an article V court" of an administrative proceeding is
essential to the fulfillment of that guarantee. 10
K. Trial by Jury
The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain invio-
late. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than
six, shall be fixed by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
This section preserves the right to a jury trial in cases that were
triable before a jury when Florida adopted its first constitution in
1838.311 Without elaboration, the court relied on this section as author-
ity in State v. Rodriguez312 for its conclusion that a defendant who the
state has charged with the crime of felony driving under the influence
has a right to be tried by a jury. 13 In addition, Department of Law
Enforcement v. Real Property"1 4 reaffirmed the well-known principle
that forfeiture proceedings are triable by a jury unless waived, and
307. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 323.
308. Id. at 325 (Shaw, C.J., concurring in result only).
309. Id. at 326 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Barkett
and Kogan, JJ., concurring).
310. Id. (emphasis in original). The notion that access to courts must be mean-
ingful was echoed in the more recent and unanimous opinion of Real Property, 16 Fla.
L. Weekly at S497, which declared that the right is entitled to all the safeguards of
procedural due process. Id. at S499
311. State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 1976).
312. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991). This case is discussed more fully under the
due process section above. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
313. Id. at 1266 n.6.
314. 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497.
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noted that state due process provides coordinate protection.3 15
L. Right of Privacy
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the
public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided
by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
This survey period, only Department of Law Enforcement v. Real
Propertys16 relied on Florida's express right of privacy. Residential
property rights derive special protection from article I that is directly
attributed to several coordinate provisions, including the express right
of privacy. 17 Because property rights subject to divestment under the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Acts8" are "particularly sensitive"319
when residential property is at stake, the state is compelled to meet at
a minimum a clear and convincing burden of proof, rather than the
lesser preponderance standard, before it is entitled to forfeit property
under the act.320
Last year, In re Guardianship of Estelle M. Browning321 held that
Florida's privacy amendment protects the right of a person to self-de-
termine purely personal matters of medical health care, and rejected
the interests traditionally relied on by the state to justify its regulation
of a patient's choice to forego or withdraw life-saving procedures. Sev-
eral laws enacted by the regular session of the 1991 Florida Legislature
rode the crest of Browning and are worth noting. Those laws create
statutory rights of privacy on behalf of patients who are subject to the
state's health care system.
Chapter 91-98 creates rights for residents of continuing care facili-
ties by providing, in part, that: "No resident of any facility shall be
deprived of any civil or legal rights, benefits, or privileges guaranteed
315. Id. at S501.
316. Id. at S497
317. Id. at S499 (also relying on FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 (inalienable rights),
and 12 (search and seizure)).
318. FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-.704 (1989).
319. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S499.
320. Id. at S500.
321. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
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by law, by the State Constitution, or by the United States Constitution
solely by reason of status as a resident of a facility ... ."" Among
the enumerated rights is the "[f]reedom from governmental intrusion
into the private life of the resident, as provided in s. 23, Art. I of the
State Constitution. 828
Another law, Chapter 91-127, creates the "Florida Patient's Bill of
Rights and Responsibilities,' 324 which directs each health care facility
or provider to observe specific standards. One standard requires respect
for the patient's individual dignity, and acknowledges that patients re-
tain certain "rights to privacy," which it declares to exist without re-
gard to the patient's economic status.3 25
As patients and health care providers test the limits of these statu-
torily created rights in the future, they are certain to present the oppor-
tunity for courts to consider the constitutional dimension of their claims
under article I, section 23.
III. CONCLUSION
No case fosters the principles of article I of the state constitution
more than Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property. A unani-
mous Supreme Court of Florida let stand the Florida Contraband For-
feiture Act, despite the act's widespread disregard of substantive rights,
and interpolated into the text "minimal" due process requirements on
the state when it wields its powers to seize and forfeit private property.
The opinion by Justice Barkett is a fountainhead of state constitu-
tional jurisprudence, and establishes an analytical paradigm of state
due process. Real Property relies explicitly, and exclusively on article I,
in which Floridians have declared for themselves a cluster of basic, fun-
damental property rights, deserving heightened protection from state
encroachment. The opinion describes state due process as a broad con-
cept that is central to the protection of all substantive rights. The deci-
sion provides a valuable precedent to guide courts in rehabilitating,
rather than overturning constitutionally defective laws. The result re-
spects the province of a coordinate branch of state government by leav-
ing the law intact and promoting the implementation of legislative
322. Ch. 91-98, 1991 FLA. LAWS 705.
323. Ch. 91-98, § 9, 1991 FLA. LAWS at 705, 708 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
651.083 (1991)).
324. Ch. 91-127, 1991 FLA. LAWS at 1298.
325. Ch. 91-127, § 1, 1991 Fla, Laws 1298, 1299.
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policy.
Real Property is also noteworthy because it ventured beyond the
perimeter of federal law, which historically established forfeiture policy
involving property, due process, and punishment. This point demon-
strates an important principle of federalism that should not be lost to a
footnote . 2 Florida forfeiture law is now less vulnerable to shifts in fed-
eral forfeiture policy. The decision numbers among others of this court
announcing a level of protection for article I rights that eclipse federal
constitutional analogues27
The court fulfills its most essential mission by deciding constitu-
tional questions.3  State constitutional scholarship is most apparent
when the court grounds a decision explicitly, exclusively, and soundly
on principles of state law. The court legitimizes its divergence from the
federal constitutional base by articulating a well-reasoned decision, and
by relying on policy choices of Floridians reflected, for instance, in tex-
tual distinctions between state and federal constitutions. The court also
fulfills its unique interpretive role in those rare instances when it relies
on its authority to craft rules of constitutional dimension to protect
substantive rights newly-acknowledged in the opinion itself.329 The un-
common occurrence of rule making in this context implies a decision of
profound importance.
Occasionally, the court contributes to state constitutional policy
under circumstances when it is not compelled to decide constitutional
questions. This practice is commendable when the court disregards a
procedural bar and reaches the merits of a constitutional claim due to
"fundamental fairness," 330 although traditionally, the court will not ad-
dress the merits of a claim that is procedurally barred.33 1 Express reli-
ance on state procedural rules is today, more than before, likely to be
accorded finality by federal courts.33 2 Other practices equally should be
encouraged, such as the reliance on dicta to offer insight into seldom-
326. See Reynolds v. State, 576 So. 2d 1300, 1303 (Fla. 1991) (taking the op-
portunity to correct an erroneous, "tacit assumption" that Florida's Neil decision pro-
vides less protection than Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
327. See Decade Survey supra note 2 at 857-58 (identifying five cases); 1990
Survey supra note 2 at 1129-30 (identifying two cases).
328. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3(b)(l), (3).
329. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 165, 274, 279 and accompanying text.
332. See Coleman v. Thompson, 59 U.S.L.W. 4789, 4796 (U.S. June 25, 1991).
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litigated article I guarantees, s and the issuance of a special concur-
ring opinion to express, clarify, or qualify a position on a fundamental
matter.3 4 This year, the court disregarded a providential rule of self-
restraint and considered a constitutional question said to be particu-
larly important, or extensively argued.388 These cases add a welcome
measure of understanding to the field, even though the rationale for
disregarding the rule is inappropriate, or the holding affords only dubi-
ous precedential value.
As a group, race-based discrimination cases continue to demand
attention. This year, as in the past, strong majority votes characterize
the Neil line of cases, which is designed to rid Florida's courtrooms of
racially discriminatory jury selection practices. s e In these cases, the
court fulfills its traditional role of protecting minorities.
A postscript: the 1991 Florida Legislature created a right of action
to redress interferences by threats, intimidation, or coercion with rights
secured by the state constitution or laws. 3 7 The enactment authorizes
the Attorney General to sue for appropriate relief on behalf of injured
persons., provides that damages shall accrue to those persons, and
prescribes a civil penalty, which enures to the state. Because article I
itself creates no affirmative remedy, the potential that this statutory
sword will vindicate certain violations of article I can only enhance the
importance of the state bill of rights.
333. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., supra note 58 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 156.
336. See supra notes 251-81 and accompanying text. For other racial discrimina-
tion cases cast in an equal protection context, see supra notes 38-55 and accompanying
text.
337. Ch. 91-74, § 4, 1991 FLA. LAWS 567, 569 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
760.51 (1991)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is a survey of substantive criminal law cases decided
between December 1, 1990, and December 1, 1991, excluding opinions
relating to the death penalty. Although the survey focuses on the deci-
sions of the Florida Supreme Court, selected cases from Florida's dis-
trict courts of appeal have been included, as well.
A large percentage of the Florida Supreme Court's criminal law
decisions continue to concern sentencing. Although Florida's sentencing
guidelines have been employed since October 1, 1983, it is apparent
that numerous sentencing issues remain unresolved. However, during
the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court made substantial pro-
gress towards clarifying some of these issues. In other instances,
though, the solutions offered by the Court only raise new questions.
II. SENTENCING
A. Legislative Enactments
Effective May 30, 1991, the Legislature adopted the revisions rec-
ommended by the Florida Supreme Court' in Florida Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure re: Sentencing Guidelines (Rules 3.701 and 3.988),2 con-
cerning the issues of legal status8 and victim injury points." Although
the Florida Supreme Court determined that the revisions were substan-
tive5 in nature and required legislative approval, the supreme court
1. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 270 (West), amending FLA. R. CRlM. P.
3.701(d)(6), 3.701(d)(7).
2. 576 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1991).
3. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(6).
4. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(7).
5. Florida Rules, 576 So. 2d at 1308-09 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.001(1)
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characterized the changes as clarifications of original legislative intent.6
1. Legal Constraint
The use of a so-called "multiplier" for purposes of assessing legal
status points frequently resulted in potentially draconian sanctions for
persons accused of committing multiple offenses while subject to a legal
constraint.7 By amending Rule 3.701(d)(6), of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the legislature directed that "points are to be as-
sessed only once whether there are one or more [primary or additional]
offenses at conviction." 8
The Florida Supreme Court followed its opinion in Florida Rules
with its decision in Flowers v. State.' In Flowers, the supreme court
was required to decide whether the legal constraint "multiplier" should
be applied to offenses occurring before May 30, 1991, the effective date
of the substantive amendments to Rule 3.701(d)(6). The supreme court
first determined that "Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(6)
and 3.988 do not address the use of a multiplier when calculating legal
constraint points."1 However, by applying the principle of lenity found
in section 775.021(1) of the Florida Statutes,"1 the supreme court con-
cluded that the use of a "multiplier" is inappropriate.
2. Victim Injury
The recent legislative amendments recommended by the supreme
court in Florida Rules also clarified the assessment of victim injury
points, pursuant to Rule 3.701(d)(7) of the Florida Rules of Criminal
(1989)).
6. Id. at 1309.
7. See Scott v. State, 574 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the
trial court's assessment of legal constraint points for each of 24 offenses committed
while on probation, thereby resulting in a recommended sentence of life imprisonment).
8. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.701(d)(6), as amended, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 270
(West), pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re: Sentencing Guidelines
(Rules 3.701 and 3.988), 576 So. 2d 1307, 1309-10 (Fla. 1991).
9. 586 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1991).
10. Id. at 1059.
11. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (Supp. 1988) provides: "The provisions of this code
and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is
susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the ac-
cused." See Lambert v. State, 545 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1989) (applying the principle of
lenity found in Florida Statutes section 775.021(1) to the sentencing guidelines).
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Procedure. That amendment provides that for offenses occurring after
May 30, 1991, victim injury points are properly assessed not only for
each victim physically injured during a criminal offense, but for each
count resulting in injury, regardless of the number of counts or
victims.12
Based upon the fact that the supreme court in Flowers concluded
that the principle of lenity in section 775.021(1) applies to the sentenc-
ing guidelines, it seems appropriate that victim injury points should be
scored differently depending upon whether an offense occurs before
May 30, 1991, the effective date of Chapter 91-270.13 On the other
hand, this result is made less clear by the Florida Supreme Court's
observation in Florida Rules that the Florida Sentencing Guidelines
Commission "never intended"1 4 for victim injury to be scored only
once, in instances of multiple offenses against the same victim.15
B. Scoresheet Errors
In Goene v. State,1 6 the Florida Supreme Court determined that
principles of double jeopardy are not violated when a defendant is re-
sentenced to an increased term where the defendant affirmatively mis-
represented his identity during sentencing. The defendant in Goene re-
ceived a guideline sentence of four and one-half years imprisonment for
the offenses of armed robbery, false imprisonment, and carrying a con-
12. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(7), as amended, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 270
(West) (amendment pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re: Sentencing
Guidelines (Rules 3.701 & 3.988), 576 So. 2d 1307, 1310 (Fla. 1991) [hereinafter
Florida Rules].
13. For offenses occurring prior to May 30, 1991, recent cases have consistently
concluded that it is error to score victim injury twice for the same victim, regardless of
the number of offenses committed against that victim. Weekly v. State, 553 So. 2d 239
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. State, 565 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Stermer v. State, 567 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Gordon v.
State, 575 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
14. Florida Rules, 576 So. 2d at 1308.
15. In an asterisk near the conclusion of their opinion, the supreme court added:
Of course, if the Legislature approves the amendments, they then must be
accorded the same legal status as any other express clarification of original
legislative intent. Our opinion today is not meant to deny that the propos-
als in Appendix B are in fact a clarification, only to say that they will
become a clarification only if and when the Legislature approves them.
Id. at 1309.
16. 577 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1991).
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cealed weapon. At his sentencing hearing, the defendant represented to
the trial court that. Edwin Goene was his real name.
After Goene had commenced the service of his sentence, the state
received information that the defendant had an extensive criminal his-
tory under his true name, Russell Dean Gorham, and properly scored
twelve to seventeen years imprisonment under the sentencing guide-
lines. Accordingly, the trial court resentenced the defendant to a term
of seventeen years imprisonment.
The Florida Supreme Court rejected Goene's contention that his
resentencing violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Instead,
the supreme court concluded that the defendant's affirmative misrepre-
sentation of his identity constituted a fraud upon the trial court, and
that "orders, judgments or decrees which are the product of fraud, de-
ceit, or collusion 'may be vacated, modified, opened or otherwise acted
upon at any time.' "17
In Manuel v. State,18 the Second District Court of Appeal read
the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Goene narrowly. The defend-
ant in Manuel appeared before the trial court for a violation of com-
munity control. After the imposition of the defendant's original com-
munity control sentence, the state discovered several additional prior
convictions obtained by the defendant under aliases. Utilizing a cor-
rected scoresheet prepared by the state, the trial court sentenced the
defendant to five years' incarceration for the community control
violation.
On appeal, the court reversed the defendant's sentence, and re-
manded for resentencing in accordance with the defendant's original
scoresheet. Citing the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Goene, the
Manuel court concluded that the defendant was entitled to sentencing
under the original, and incorrect, scoresheet, in the absence of evidence
that the defendant "took any affirmative action to mislead the trial
court as to his prior record." 19
C. Consolidated Sentencing Hearings
Rule 3.701(d)(1), of Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, re-
quires that "[o]ne guideline scoresheet shall be utilized for each de-
17. Id. at 1309 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Burton, 314 So. 2d 136,
138 (Fla. 1975).
18. 582 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
19. Id. at 824.
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fendant covering all offenses pending before the court for sentencing.12 0
No definition of the term "pending" is provided by the Rule 3.701. On
the other hand, Rule 3.720 requires the court to order a sentencing
hearing "[a]s soon as practicable after the determination of guilt and
after the examination of any presentence reports."'"
In Clark v. State,2 the defendant was found guilty of sale and
possession of cocaine on November 19, 1986, after a trial by jury. On
November 21, 1986, the defendant was brought to trial in a separate
case before a different judge in the same circuit. During the jury's de-
liberations in the second trial, the judge in the first case sentenced the
defendant to a guideline sentence of four years' incarceration, without
objection by the defendant.
After the jury in the defendant's second trial also returned verdicts
of guilty, the defendant was again sentenced to four years' incarcera-
tion. However, the trial court directed that the defendant serve the sec-
ond four-year sentence consecutively to the sentence imposed two days
earlier. Again, the defendant failed to object.
In Clark, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that unless a de-
fendant can show that a postponement of sentencing would not result in
"unreasonable delay," 23 an offense should generally be considered
pending for purposes of Rule 3.701(d)(1) only if "a verdict of guilt or
plea of guilty or nolo contendere has been obtained. ' 4 The supreme
court specifically placed the burden on the defendant to request a "con-
solidated sentencing ' 25 hearing, and cautioned that the defendant's
failure to raise a timely objection would constitute "a procedural bar
for appellate review." 2
As guidelines, the supreme court suggested that unreasonable de-
lay would result in instances where sentencing "might be postponed for
an extended period of time-for example, for many months, 27 as jux-
taposed by situations where a defendant's second case is "likely" to be
pending for sentencing "within the same day or week." '28
Applying this approach, the supreme court in Clark concluded
20. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(1).
21. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.720.
22. 572 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1991).
23. Id. at 1391.
24. Id. at 1390-91.
25. Id. at 1391.
26. Id.
27. Clark, 572 So. 2d at 1391.
28. Id.
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that the defendant was entitled to a consolidated sentencing hearing.
However, the supreme court determined that the defendant was proce-
durally barred from raising the issue on appeal.29 Although the su-
preme court had little difficulty reaching this result, their opinion was
less equivocal concerning other matters. For example, the supreme
court failed to suggest what result is appropriate when a defendant's
second case is not "likely" to be completed within "the same day or
week," but "might" be concluded in less than "many months."30
D. Departure Sentences
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court issued sev-
eral decisions concerning the propriety of various departure sentences.
In a related issue, the supreme court modified its holding in Ree v.
State,"' by slightly relaxing the requirement that written reasons be
filed contemporaneous with a guidelines departure sentence.32
29. The supreme court stated:
The burden falls on the defendant to assert a desire for simultaneous sen-
tencing and to demonstrate to the sentencing court's satisfaction that such
a sentencing will not result in an unreasonable delay. This, Clark failed to
do. Accordingly, the issue now is procedurally barred.
Id.
30. Aside from the supreme court's unfortunate reliance on terms such as
"likely" or "might," other problems are apparent, as well. For example, does a defend-
ant's demand for speedy trial in a second prosecution constitute sufficient grounds to
postpone sentencing in the defendant's first case. If so, are constitutional concerns ade-
quately safeguarded by presenting a defendant with the "Hobson's choice" of either
foregoing adequate discovery in a second prosecution, or waiving the right to a consoli-
dated sentencing hearing, and concurrent sentences, in each of the defendant's "pend-
ing" cases. See State v. Frank, 573 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (a
defendant cannot be forced to choose between the independently guaranteed right to
discovery and the right to a speedy trial); Harris v. Moe, 538 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (same); State ex rel. Wright v. Yawn, 320 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (same).
On the other hand, what result is appropriate where an "unreasonable delay" in a
defendant's second prosecution is attributable to supplemental discovery provided by
the state, or by the filing of additional charges, or delay caused by the unavailability of
a state witness, or defense witness?
31. 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990).
32. See Pamela Cole Bell, Substantive Criminal Law, 15 NOVA L. REv. 1037,
1039 (1991).
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1. Contemporaneous Writing Requirement
In State v. Lyles,"3 the supreme court determined that the contem-
poraneous writing requirement of Ree was satisfied where, at sentenc-
ing, the court made oral findings in support of its departure sentence,
which were "reduced to writing without substantive change on the
same date." ' It cautioned, however, that even "a few days"35 delay in
entering written reasons would not be considered contemporaneous. 6
2. Nonscoreable Juvenile Convictions
Juvenile convictions may be scored as prior record only if the dis-
position date of the juvenile offense occurred within three years from
the date of a defendant's primary offense at conviction. 7 However, in
instances where juvenile convictions are too remote in time to be in-
cluded as prior record, they may be considered as a basis for departure
from the sentencing guidelines.38
In Puffinberger v. State,39 the Florida Supreme Court clarified
when, and to what extent, a defendant's nonscoreable juvenile convic-
tions may be used as a basis for departure from the sentencing guide-
lines. Initially, the supreme court in Puffinberger concluded that "mini-
mal or insignificant juvenile dispositions"4 are insufficient grounds to
serve as a basis for departure from the guidelines. On the other hand,
the Puffinberger court reasoned that a "significant" '41 juvenile record
would support a departure sentence.
In determining what is "significant," the supreme court directed
33. 576 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1991).
34. Id. at 708.
35. Id. at 709.
36. The supreme court also concluded that the "ministerial act" of filing the
written departure order with the clerk of the court on the first business day after the
defendant's sentencing hearing resulted in no prejudice and complied with Ree. Id. The
Fifth District Court of Appeal subsequently extended this aspect of the Florida Su-
preme Court's decision in Lyles to a case where the written reasons for departure were
not filed with the clerk of the court until three business days after sentencing. Rodwell
v. State, 588 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
37. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(5)(c).
38. See Weems v. State, 469 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1985).
39. 581 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1991).
40. Id. at 899; see Crocker v. State, 581 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1991).
41. Id.
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that not only the "number," but the "nature and seriousness" 42 of the
juvenile: offenses must be examined.' s However, the Puffinberger court
concluded that any departure is "per se invalid" to the extent that it
exceeds the maximum sentence a defendant could have received had
the juvenile dispositions been scored as prior record. 44
3. Escalating Patterns of Criminal Activity
Shortly after the establishment of the sentencing guidelines, the
Florida Supreme Court determined in Keys v. State45 that an "escala-
tion from crimes against property to violent crimes against persons"
constitutes a sufficient basis for departure from the sentencing guide-
lines."" [n Williams v. State,4" the Florida Supreme Court determined
42. Id.
43. The supreme court offered some guidance in defining the term "significant,"
stating: "lA]n unscored juvenile record is significant for departure purposes if the rec-
ord is extensive or serious, or if the number and nature of the dispositions, when consid-
ered in combination, amount to a significant record under the circumstances." Id. at
899.
The supreme court also determined that Puffinberger's three nonscoreable bur-
glary convictions were not "significant," and therefore, could not be used by the trial
court as a basis for enhancing Puffinberger's presumptive guidelines sentence for the
offense of aggravated child abuse.
In concluding that Puffinberger's juvenile record was not "significant," the su-
preme court examined seemingly every facet of Puffinberger's juvenile record, noting
that Puffinberger: 1) burglarized his parents home on each occasion; 2) all three bur-
glaries occurred within a ten-day period; 3) Puffinberger was again living at home
when he plead guilty to each of the three burglaries; 4) the victim, Puflinberger's fa-
ther, cosigned the defendant's plea forms; 5) Puffinberger was required to make restitu-
tion for unrecovered items as a condition of his sentence. Id. at 900.
44. Id. at 899. But see FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (Supp. 1990) which provides in
pertinent part: "The extent of departure from a guideline sentence shall not be subject
to appellate review."
45. 500 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1986).
46. Id. at 136. The holding in Keys was codified by the legislature in FLA. STAT.
§ 921.001(8) (1987):
A trial court may impose a sentence outside the guidelines when credible
facts proven by a preponderance of the evidence demonstrate that the de-
fendant's prior record, including offenses for which adjudication was with-
held, and the current criminal offense for which the defendant is being
sentenced indicate an escalating pattern of criminal conduct. The escalat-
ing pattern of criminal conduct may be evidenced by a progression from
nonviolent crimes to violent crimes or a progression of increasingly violent
crimes.
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that a pattern of "increasingly serious" nonviolent criminal activity
may also constitute a valid basis for departure from the sentencing
guidelines.4 8
4. Continuing and Persistent Patterns of Criminal Conduct
The Florida Supreme Court has consistently concluded that the
"timing ' 49 or "temporal proximity"60 of a defendant's prior offenses
may, under certain circumstances, constitute a valid basis for departure
from the sentencing guidelines, where the offenses demonstrate a "con-
tinuing and persistent pattern of criminal activity." 5' 1 Unfortunately,
the circumstances required to sustain such a departure have continued
to avoid easy definition.
In the 1988 decision of Jones v. State,52 the supreme court deter-
mined that before the temporal proximity of a defendant's offenses
could serve as a valid basis for departure from the sentencing
guidelines:
it must be shown that the crimes committed demonstrate a defend-
ant's involvement in a continuing and persistent pattern of criminal
activity as evidenced by the timing of each offense in relation to
prior offenses and the release from incarceration or other
supervision.s
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court referred to its earlier
decision in Williams v. State (Williams J),54 and emphasized that the
47. 581 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1991).
48. Id. at 146. In Williams, the defendant's prior record consisted of fifteen mis-
demeanor convictions, followed by a conviction for the offense of grand theft, a third
degree felony. The defendant was then placed on probation by the trial court for the
offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a second degree felony.
When Williams violated his probationary sentence, the trial court departed from
the sentencing guidelines, relying upon the defendant's escalating pattern of criminal
conduct. See infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text. The Florida Supreme Court
approved the trial court's departure sentence based upon Williams' pattern of increas-
ingly serious nonviolent criminal activity. Williams, 581 So. 2d at 146.
49. State v. Simpson, 554 So. 2d 506, 510 (Fla. 1989).
50. State v. Jones, 530 So. 2d 53, 56 (Fla. 1988).
51. Id.
52. 530 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1988).
53. Id. at 56.
54. 504 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1987).
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defendant's conduct must demonstrate a "definite pattern." 5 The su-
preme court's opinion failed, however, to suggest that any escalation in
the severity of the defendant's offenses was necessary to support a de-
parture sentence.
Subsequent to Jones, the supreme court concluded in State v.
Simpson" that the "timing" 57 of a defendant's offenses may serve as
grounds for departure from the sentencing guidelines "if based on facts
that demonstrate the type of escalating or persistent pattern described
with approval in Keys, Williams I, Rousseau and Jones."58
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court again revis-
ited this issue in State v. Smith,5 and in their opinion, cited to their
earlier decision in State v. Simpson, and quoted from Jones v. State.
Discussing Simpson, the supreme court stated that "we suggested that
the temporal proximity of crimes could, under some circumstances, be
grounds for departure." 60 Without articulating precisely what "circum-
stances" are necessary to support such a departure sentence, the Smith
court determined that the defendant's commission of the offenses of
grand theft, petit theft, and resisting arrest without violence-only
thirty days after release from incarceration-was not a sufficient basis
to support a departure from the sentencing guidelines. The Smith court
specifically noted that all of defendant's crimes were "nonviolent prop-
erty crimes with no substantial escalation in severity."' Although their
decision quoted the "temporal proximity" language of Simpson and
Jones, the supreme court nevertheless concluded that "one successive
criminal episode of no greater significance than the first, even though
committed only thirty days after release from incarceration, is not a
sufficient reason to depart from the guidelines." '
55. Jones, 530 So. 2d at 56.
56. 554 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1989).
57. Id. at 510.
58. Id. (citations omitted in original). The citations to Jones, Williams I, Rous-
seau, and Keys are as follows: State v. Jones, 530 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1988); Williams v.
State, 504 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1987); State v. Rousseau, 509 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1987); Keys
v. State, 500 So. 134 (Fla. 1986).
It is unclear why the supreme court in Simpson mixed the terms "escalating" and
"persistent." Each term had historically referred to a separate and distinct basis for
departure.
59. 579 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1991).
60. Id. at 76.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 77.
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In the final analysis, then, it is unclear based upon the supreme
court's decisions in Jones, Simpson, and now Smith, exactly what fac-
tors are necessary, and should be considered, when examining whether
the timing of an individual's offenses support a departure sentence. The
supreme court's decision in Jones suggests that where a definite pattern
exists, a defendant's continuing and persistent criminal activity need
not necessarily escalate in severity to give rise to a departure sentence.
On the other hand, Smith suggests that an escalation in severity, com-
bined with the temporal proximity of the defendant's offenses, may give
rise to a departure, regardless of whether the defendant has exhibited a
persistent pattern of criminal conduct.63
5. Professional Manner
In Hernandez v. State," the Florida Supreme Court determined
that a departure sentence may never be based upon the "professional"
manner of a criminal act. The Hernandez court found the term "pro-
fessionalism" incapable of easy definition, and simply "too vague" a
basis upon which to substantiate a departure sentence." Alternatively,
the supreme court reasoned that to the extent "professionalism" relates
to a defendant's background or experience, this factor is already
weighed into the sentencing guidelines, based upon a defendant's prior
record.66
6. Probation and Community Control Sentences
In recent years, the Florida Supreme Court has consistently con-
63. Simpson appears to suggest that either possibility is correct. See supra notes
57-59 and accompanying text.
Because of the lack of clarity in the Jones-Simpson-Smith line of cases, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's decision in Smith will undoubtedly cause confusion for the district
courts of appeal. See Wilson v. State, 573 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(concluding that a departure sentence may be based upon the temporal proximity of a
defendant's offenses, without any showing of an escalation in the seriousness of the
offenses, "notwithstanding language in Smith which might arguably be taken
otherwise").
64. 575 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1991).
65. Id. at 642.
66. Id. Citing its earlier decision in Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla.
1985), the supreme court concluded that "Florida law now is settled that a departure
may not be based on any matter already factored into the guidelines' computations."
Id. at 641.
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cluded that it is improper to impose a departure sentence following a
violation of probation. 67 However, in Williams v. State,68 the supreme
court concluded that a departure sentence may be imposed following a
violation of probation if the legal basis for the departure existed at the
time the offender was originally placed on probation."
The supreme court reasoned that their earlier decisions in Lambert
v. State,7 ' and Ree v. State," prohibited only those departure sentences
which relied upon conduct occurring during the defendant's probation-
ary sentence, as opposed to reasons for departure which existed at the
time the defendant was originally sentenced.7 2 As a matter of policy,
the sup:reme court expressed concern that efforts to curtail the discre-
tionary authority of the courts following a probation violation might
discourage courts from imposing probationary sentences. 73
Following the Williams opinion, the supreme court rejected a post-
probation violation departure sentence in State v. Johnson.7 , The de-
fendant in Johnson received a split sentence, 7  and subsequently vio-
lated the probationary portion of that sentence. Upon revoking the de-
fendant's probation, the trial court imposed a departure sentence. As a
basis for the departure, the trial court relied upon conduct which oc-
curred (luring the defendant's probationary sentence-the same prac-
tice prohibited in Williams.
Without citing Williams, the supreme court instead discussed and
rejected the theory that departure sentences could be based upon "non-
67. Ree v. State, 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990); Lambert v. State, 545 So. 2d 838
(Fla. 1989).
68. 581 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1991); see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 146. Although the supreme court's decision failed to specifically ad-
dress the issue, it logically follows that the holding in Williams pertains to offenders
placed on community control.
70. 545 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1989).
71. 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990).
72. Williams, 581 So. 2d at 145-46.
73. Id. at 146. The supreme court found additional support for their holding in
FLA. STAT. § 948.06(1) (1987) which provides in part:
If probation or community control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the
probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admit-
ted, unless he has previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sen-
tence which it might have originally imposed before placing the proba-
tioner on probation or the offender into community control.
74. :585 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1991).
75. See generally Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988) (describing the
various types of split sentences recognized in Florida).
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criminal" violations occurring during a defendant's probationary sen-
tence.7 6 It reasoned that "[t]his construction would require us to over-
rule both Franklin and Poore,"' '  and added that "[i]t would be
incongruous to permit guideline departures for noncriminal probation
violations but prohibit departures for new criminal conduct. '7 8
Curiously, the supreme court's opinion in Johnson failed to make
any reference whatsoever to its decision in Williams.7 9 Equally odd was
its failure in Johnson to cite Ree v. State,8 the other cased relied upon
in Williams.
One explanation is an implicit recognition by the supreme court in
Johnson that the rationale in Williams is inapplicable to cases involv-
ing split sentences. Williams stands for the proposition that a departure
sentence may be imposed following a violation of probation if the legal
basis for the departure existed at the time the offender was originally
placed on probation. Johnson, on the other hand, implies that a trial
court may never depart from the sentencing guidelines when a defend-
ant violates the probationary portion of a split sentence, regardless of
whether valid reasons existed for a departure sentence at the time the
offender was originally placed on probation.81
This reading of Johnson is directly supported by the supreme
court's earlier decision in Franklin v. State,8" which discussed sentenc-
ing options following violations of a true split sentence and a probation-
ary split sentence. In both instances, the Franklin court concluded on
the authority of Lambert v. State8" and Rule 3.701(d)(14) of the Flor-
ida Rules of Criminal Procedure,84 that departure sentence were
76. Johnson, 585 So. 2d at 273.
77. Id. (citing Franklin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1989); Poore v. State, 531
So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)).
78. Id.
79. Williams was decided on May 30, 1991 and Johnson on August 22, 1991.
80. 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990).
81. If this reading of Johnson is correct, split sentences remain a safe harbor for
defendants seeking to avoid the types of post-probation violation departure sentences
approved in Williams.
82. 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1989).
83. Id. at 838.
84. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(14) provides:
Sentences imposed after revocation of probation or community control
must be in accordance with the guidelines. The sentence imposed after
revocation of probation or community control may be included within the
original cell (guidelines range) or may be increased to the next higher cell
(guidelines range) without requiring a reason for departure.
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prohibited. 85
E. Modifications of Probation or Community Control
In Clark v. State,86 the Florida Supreme Court determined that
before a probation or community control sentence may-be enhanced,
"either by extension of the period or by addition of terms, ' 87 an of-
fender must be 1) formally charged; 2) brought before the court; and
3) advised of the charge, in accordance with the procedures in section
948.06 of the Florida Statutes. 8 The supreme court concluded that
"[absent proof of a violation,"89 a court may not enhance an offenders
probationary or community control sentence, even where the defendant
and the probation or community control officer agree to the modifica-
tion in writing, and waive notice and hearing. 90
But see Williams v. State, 581 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1991).
85. Concerning true split sentences, the supreme court in Franklin stated:
Upon the violation of probation after incarceration, the judge may resen-
tence the defendant to any period of time not exceeding the remaining
balance of the withheld or suspended portion of the original sentence, pro-
vided that the total period of incarceration, including time already served,
may not exceed the one-cell upward increase permitted by Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(14). Any further departure for violation of
probation is not allowed. Lambert v. State.
Franklin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851, 852-53 (Fla. 1989) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
The Court reached the same result regarding probationary split sentences:
Upon a violation of probation during a probationary split sentence, a trial
court may resentence the defendant to any term falling within the original
guidelines range, including the one-cell upward increase. However, no fur-
ther increase or departure is permitted for any reason. Lambert.
Id. at 853 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
86. 579 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1991).
87. Id. at 110.
88. Id. at 110-111.
89. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
90. Id. In a footnote, the supreme court stated:
We recognize that section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes (1987), permits the
court to "rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions thereto-
fore imposed by it upon the probationer or offender in community control."
However, that statute is not applicable here because the court did not
modify a term or condition previously imposed. Rather, it added an en-
tirely new condition to the order of community control.
Id. at 110 n.3.
The court's reasoning seems less convincing when considered in conjunction with
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F. Youthful Offender Sentences
In Kepner v. State,91 the Florida Supreme Court examined the
language and amendments to section 958.04(3) of the Florida Statutes,
concerning the sentencing of youthful offenders. 2 The supreme court
determined that section 958.04(3) allows for three possible results, de-
pending upon an offender's guidelines scoresheet, and the sentence im-
posed by the court. While emphasizing in their opinion that the maxi-
mum youthful offender sentence is six years, the supreme court
concluded in a multi-part holding:
First, if the recommended guidelines sentence exceeds six years
• ..and the court sentences the youthful offender to six years of
sanctions, written reasons for a sentence less than the recom-
mended guidelines sentence are not required. Second, if the recom-
mended guidelines sentence is less than .. .six years, the court
must sentence within the guidelines or give written reasons for the
departure whether upward or downward. Third, if the recom-
mended sentence is six years or greater and the court imposes a
[sentence of] ... less than six years, the court must provide written
the first sentence of FLA. STAT. § 948.03(7) (1987). The language quoted by the su-
preme court comes exclusively from the second sentence of that section. Read together,
the first two sentences of section 948.03(7) provide:
The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not pre-
vent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers
proper. The court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and condi-
tions theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer or offender in commu-
nity control.
FLA. STAT. § 948.03(7) (1987) (emphasis added).
Other portions of this section have subsequently been amended and renumbered as
FLA. STAT. § 948.03(8) (Supp. 1990).
91. 577 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1991).
92. FLA. STAT. § 958.04(3) (1985) provided:
The provisions of this section shall not be used to impose a greater sen-
tence than the maximum recommended range as established by statewide
sentencing guidelines pursuant to s. 921.001 unless clear and convincing
reasons are explained in writing by the trial court judge. A sentence im-
posed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal by the defend-
ant pursuant to s. 924.06.
Portions of both sentences in this section were subsequently amended. The supreme
court's decision in Kepner concerned the changes to the final sentence of FLA. STAT. §
958.04(3) (1987) which was amended to provide: "A sentence imposed outside of such
guidelines shall be subject to appeal pursuant to s. 924.06 or s. 924.07."
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reasons for departure. 3
The supreme court in Kepner specifically recognized that a youthful
offender sentence is an "alternative sentence." 94 However, the holding
in Kepner makes the sentencing guidelines applicable to the extent pro-
vided above, with one caveat-unlike other sentencing schemes within
the guidelines, the supreme court's rationale necessarily considers
"sanctions" to include probation and community control. In all other
instances under the sentencing guidelines, probation and community
control cannot be used interchangeably, or in lieu of incarceration, in-
sofar as each is a different type of "sanction" for purposes of the sen-
tencing guidelines.
G. Alternative Sentencing Provisions
Several recent decisions of the district courts of appeal have ad-
dressed the conflict between the mandatory minimum sentencing provi-
sion contained in section 893.13(l)(e)(1), Florida Statutes,95 relating to
the manufacture, sale, or purchase of controlled substances within one
thousand feet of a school, and section 397.12, Florida Statutes, which is
an alternative sentencing provision for drug offenders."0 Section 397.12
93. 5,77 So. 2d at 578.
94. Id.; see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. See generally FLA. STAT.
§ 958.04 (Supp. 1990).
95. This section provides that individuals convicted of various offenses, including
the manufacture, sale, or purchase of controlled substances such as cocaine within 1000
feet of a school are:
guilty of a felony of the first degree . . . and shall be sentenced to a mini-
mum term of imprisonment of 3 calendar years and shall not be eligible
for parole or release under the Control Release Authority . . .or statutory
gain-time . . . prior to serving such minimum sentence.
FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(e)(1) (Supp. 1990).
96. FLA. STAT. § 397.12 (1989) provides:
When any person, including any juvenile, has been charged with or con-
victed of a violation of any provision of chapter 893 or of a violation of any
law committed under the influence of a controlled substance, the court,
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Department of Correc-
tions, or Parole Commission, whichever has jurisdiction over that person,
may in its discretion require the person charged or convicted to participate
in a drug treatment program licensed by the department under the provi-
sions of this chapter. If referred by the court, the referral may be in lieu of
or in addition to final adjudication, imposition of any penalty or sentence,
or any other similar action. If the accused desires final adjudication, his
1991]
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permits courts to require persons charged or convicted of a violation
relating to controlled substances to participate in a licensed drug treat-
ment program, "in lieu of or in addition to final adjudication, imposi-
tion of any penalty or sentence. '97
With some reservations," the Fourth District Court of Appeal has
consistently held that the alternative sentencing scheme provided by
section 397.12 may not be used to avoid the mandatory minimum sen-
tencing language contained in section 893.13(l)(e)(1)." Several rea-
sons were offered. First, section 397.12 provides an alternative sentenc-
ing option only for persons charged with the possession of controlled
substances, as opposed to purchasing offenses."' 0 Additionally, it is un-
likely that the legislature intended that simple drug addiction should
overcome the mandatory provisions of section 893.13(1)(e)(). °1 Fi-
constitutional right to trial shall not be denied. The court may consult with
or seek the assistance of any agency, public or private, or any person con-
cerning such a referral. Assignment to a drug program may be contingent
upon budgetary considerations and availability of space.
97. Id.
98. State v. Liataud, 587 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (An-
stead, J., specially concurring) ("[T]his is another case of the left hand of the legisla-
ture not knowing what the right hand is doing."); State v. Scates, 585 So. 2d 385 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (question certified); State v. Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly
D2628 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (same); State v. Vola, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2246,
2249 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Anstead, J., specially concurring) ("[T]he legislature's
intent to see persons such as the appellee receive treatment is obviously being thwarted
by our reversal of the trial judge's order.").
99. State v. Baxter, 581 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Lane, 582 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Baumgardner, 587 So. 2d
1147 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Liataud, 587 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2038 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
State v. Scates, 585 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Greisdorf, 587
So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Vola, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2246
(4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Kalogeras, 587 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991); State v. Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2628 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
100. Baxter, 581 So. 2d at 938; Lane, 582 So. 2d at 78; Vola, 16 Fla. L. Weekly
at D2247; Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at D2628. This argument is derived from the
language of FLA. STAT. § 397.011(2) (1989) which provides in pertinent part:
For a violation of any provision of chapter 893 . . . relating to possession
of any substance regulated thereby, the trial judge may, in his discretion,
require the defendant to participate in a drug treatment program . . . pur-
suant to the provisions of this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. Vola, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at D2247. This line of analysis further reasons that
the minimum mandatory sentencing provision in section 893.13(1)(e)(l) was promul-
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nally, pursuant to Rule 3.701(d)(9), of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, mandatory sentences take precedence over guideline
sentences. 102
H. Habitual Offender Sentences
During the survey period, two closely related issues concerning the
habitual felony offender statute divided the district courts of appeal.
Both issues concern the meaning of section 775.084(4)(a)(1), Florida
Statutes, which provides: "The court . ..shall sentence the habitual
felony offender as follows: 1. In the case of a felony of the first degree,
for life."
On the one hand, the district courts of appeal have reached con-
trary conclusions concerning whether section 775.084(4)(a)(1) permits
trial courts to impose habitual felony offender sanctions for individuals
convicted of first degree felonies punishable by life. Some courts have
determined such offenders are not subject to habitual felony offender
sanctions. Other courts have reached a contrary result.103
On the other hand, the district courts of appeal have issued con-
flicting decisions concerning whether section 775.084(4)(a)(1) is
mandatory or permissive in nature. Some courts have decided that sec-
tion 775.084(4)(a)(1) permits the imposition of sentences of less than
life in prison, as an habitual offender, where the offender is convicted of
gated more recently, and therefore, evinces the intent of the legislature. Id.; accord
Lane, 582 So. 2d at 78.
102. Baxter, 581 So. 2d at 938; Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at D2628. FLA. R.
CRIM P. 3.701(d)(9) provides:
Mandatory sentences: For those offenses having a mandatory penalty, a
scoresheet should be completed and the guideline sentence calculated. If
the recommended sentence is less than the mandatory penalty, the
mandatory sentence takes precedence. If the guideline sentence exceeds
the mandatory sentence, the guideline sentence should be imposed.
103. Compare Gholston v. State, 589 So. 2d 307, 307 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990) ("[sjection 775.084, Florida Statutes, makes no provision for enhancing penal-
ties for first-degree felonies punishable by life, life felonies, or capital felonies"); John-
son v. State, 568 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (same) and Power v. State,
568 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (same) with Paige v. State, 570 So. 2d
1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (first degree felonies punishable by life are subject
to enhancement under habitual felony offender statute); Swain v. State, 579 So. 2d 842
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Westbrook v. State, 574 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (question certified) and Ford v. State, 586 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (question certified).
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a first degree felony. These courts reason that the language contained
in section 775.084(4)(a)(1) is permissive, rather than mandatory.
Other courts have disagreed, finding the statute's language
mandatory.10'
I. Restitution
In State v. Hawthorne,105 the Florida Supreme Court refined the
analysis for determining the value of property in restitution hearings.10 6
In those instances when "the value of property is an essential element
of a crime, ' 10 7 value is determined as the market value of the property
on the date of the offense.108 In this regard, fair market value of an
item should be derived from "direct testimony or through evidence of
the four factors announced by the supreme court in Negron."'0 9
In other instances, though, the standard method of determining
value is inadequate. In these situations, "a court is not tied to fair mar-
ket value as the sole standard for determining restitution amounts, but
rather may exercise such discretion as required to further the purposes
of restitution." 1 0 Examples might include the theft of a family heir-
loom, new automobiles-which immediately depreciate in value after
purchase-or property which has undergone restoration, and thus, has
104. Compare State v. Fannin, 578 So. 2d 471, 471 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991) ("section 775.084(4)(a) mandates a life sentence in the case of felonies of the
first degree," but question certified); Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (same) and Walsingham v. State, 576 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (same) (question certified) with Henry v. State, 581 So. 2d 928, 929 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("the 'shall sentence' provision of the habitual offender statute
• ..is permissive, not mandatory"); Cotton v. State, 588 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) and Smith v. State, 16 Fla. L. Weekly DI51 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
105. 573 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991).
106. See generally FLA. STAT. § 775.089 (1989).
107. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 332 (citing Negron, 306 So. 2d at 108).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 333 (footnote omitted). The four factors used to determine the appro-
priate market value in Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1974), receded from on
other grounds, Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980), were summarized
by the supreme court as follows: "(1) original market cost; (2) manner in which the
item was used; (3) the general condition and quality of the item; and (4) the percent-
age of depreciation." Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 332.
110. Id. at 333. As authority for this proposition, the supreme court looked to
FLA. STAT. § 775.089(6) (1987) which includes reference to the fact that the court
"shall consider ...such other factors which it deems appropriate." Id.
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not depreciated in value since the time of purchase.'
III. DEFENSES
A. Entrapment
1. Entrapment as a Matter of Law
In State v. Hunter,"2 the Florida Supreme Court determined that
the objective entrapment standard established in Cruz v. State" s was
not superseded by section 777.201."1 The supreme court's conclusion
was predicated upon an implicit recognition that constitutional consid-
erations of due process cannot be superseded by statutory enactment,1 1 5
combined with an explicit recognition that, "[b]y focusing on police
conduct," the objective entrapment aspects of their decision in Cruz
"includes due process considerations.""' 6
The: facts in Hunter were typical of many drug transactions. First,
111. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 333 nn.4-5. The facts in Hawthorne concerned
the theft of an older car that had been repaired shortly before it was stolen, but was
otherwise in good working condition. As a result of the theft, the car was destroyed.
Although the vehicle had been purchased by the victim for $1,530 14 months prior to
the theft, the supreme court, cognizant of the repairs made to the vehicle and the fact
that the car was in good working condition, approved the trial court's award of $1,500
restitution.
112. 586 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1991).
113. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985).
114. Following the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Cruz, the legislature en-
acted FLA. STAT. § 777.201 (1987) which states in pertinent part:
(1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation with a law
enforcement officer, or a person acting as an agent of a law enforcement
officer perpetrates an entrapment if, for the purpose of obtaining evidence
of the commission of a crime, he induces or encourages and, as a direct
result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such crime
by employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a sub-
stantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than one
who is ready to commit it.
(2) A person prosecuted for a crime shall be acquitted if he proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that his criminal conduct occurred as a re-
sult of an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier
of fact.
115. See Strickland v. State, 588 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(concluding in light of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Hunter that "Cruz is
still alive and well").
116. Hunter, 586 So. 2d at 322.
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an individual named Ron Diamond agreed to perform substantial assis-
tance' 17 for the police in exchange for a reduction of sentence in his
drug trafficking conviction. Diamond approached Kelly Conklin, who
was not involved in any ongoing criminal activity, seeking to purchase
drugs. Conklin, after much persistence from Diamond, turned to the
defendant, David Hunter for assistance. Through a friend, Hunter was
able to produce drugs to sell to Diamond. On the day of the sale, both
Conklin and Hunter were arrested. Because Conklin had not been en-
gaged any specific, ongoing criminal activity, the Court concluded that
he had been entrapped by the State's agent, Diamond, as a matter of
law.118
The supreme court, however, affirmed Hunter's conviction:
Although Diamond's acts amounted to entrapment of Conklin, the
middleman, he had minimal telephone contacts with Hunter. When
a middleman, not a state agent, induces another person to engage
in a crime, entrapment is not an available defense. " 9
2. Entitlement to Jury Instruction
In a separate case, Wilson v. State,120 the supreme court held that
where evidence exists to support a defendant's claim of entrapment, a
request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment "should be
refused only if the defendant has denied under oath the acts constitut-
ing the crime that is charged." '21 In Wilson, the defendant was
charged with sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to
sell, after allegedly selling a twenty dollar piece of crack cocaine to an
undercover police officer. Wilson testified under oath all of the factual
allegations concerning his arrest were untrue, and that another man
was actually responsible for the offenses. Under these circumstances,
the supreme court determined that Wilson was not entitled to an in-
117. See generally FLA. STAT. § 893.135(3) (1985).
118. Hunter, 586 So. 2d at 322.
119. Id. In dicta, the supreme court stated that defendants may not vicariously
assert due process violations suffered by third persons. Therefore, to the extent that a
third party is the victim of outrageous police conduct, rising to the level of a due pro-
cess violation, others who are induced to commit crimes based upon the third party's
actions have no standing to raise constitutional challenges. See State v. Glosson, 462
So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985).
120. 577 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1991).
121. Id. at 1302.
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struction on the defense of entrapment. However, the supreme court
recognized that "there are some circumstances under which a defend-
ant who claims entrapment may deny commission of the crime without
necessarily committing perjury." ' In these instances, an entrapment
instruction is appropriate. 123
B. Self-Defense
Under section 776.041(1), Florida Statutes, 24 the defense of self-
defense is not available to defendants charged with a "forcible felony,"
as enumerated in section 776.08, Florida Statutes. That section con-
tains a laundry list of "forcible felony" offenses, along with the proviso
that a "forcible felony" includes "any other felony which involves the
use of threat or physical force or violence against any individual. 1 25
In Perkins v. State,' the defendant, Marcus Perkins, was
charged. with attempted trafficking in cocaine, and first degree murder,
for the death of Anthony Kimble. On the date of Kimble's death, Per-
kins arranged to purchase cocaine from Kimble in exchange for
$11,000. At the transaction Kimble failed to bring any cocaine, and
instead, demanded Perkins' money at gun-point. A struggle ensued,
and Kimble shot Perkins. Although injured, Perkins somehow took the
firearm from Kimble, and fatally wounded him.'2"
In pre-trial proceedings, the State agreed that Perkins acted in
self-defense, but argued that Perkins was prohibited from raising self-
defense as a defense, based upon the State's contention that trafficking
in cocaine is a "forcible felony" for purposes of section 776.08.128 The
122. Id. at 1301.
123. Id. The supreme court cited several cases as examples of instances where a
defendant could properly claim entrapment and at the same time still deny the com-
mission of any criminal act, without committing perjury. Mathews v. United States,
485 U.S. 58 (1988); United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984); Stripling v.
State, 349 So. 2d ,187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert denied, 359 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.
1978).
124. FLA. STAT. § 776.041(1) (1989) provides, in part, that the defense of self
defense is not available to a person who: "(1) Is attempting to commit, committing, or
escaping after the commission of a forcible felony . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
125. FLA. STAT. § 776.04(1) (1987).
126. 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991).
127. Id. at 1311.
128. Id. FLA. STAT. § 776.08 (1987) provides:
"Forcible felony" means treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery;
robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated bat-
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Florida Supreme Court disagreed based upon their conclusion that "a
'forcible felony' under the final clause of section 776.08 is a felony
whose statutory elements include the use or threat of physical force or
violence against any individual." Drug trafficking fails to meet this
definition.129
C. Double Jeopardy
In Grady v. Corbin,'"0 the United States Supreme Court clarified
the coverage provided by the double jeopardy clause of the United
States Constitution"' by holding that double jeopardy prohibits a sec-
ond prosecution if, "to establish an essential element of an offense
charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prose-
cuted." 3 The United States Supreme Court indicated that double
jeopardy clause analysis necessitates a two-part test. First, the trial
court must apply the analysis articulated in Blockburger v. United
States." ' This stage is commonly referred to as the "traditional Block-
burger test.' 3 4
If application of that test reveals that the offenses have identical
statutory elements or that one is a lesser included offense of the
tery; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a de-
structive device or bomb; any other felony which involves the use or threat
of physical force or violence against any individual.
129. Perkins, 576 So. 2d at 1313. The supreme court conceded that neither trea-
son or burglary meet this definition either, although each is designated as a "forcible
felony" in section 776.08. Nevertheless, it reiterated that due process concerns require
"that penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter." Id. (citing
State v. Jackson, 526 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1988); State ex rel. Cherry v. Davidson, 139 So.
177 (1931); Ex parte Bailey, 23 So. 552 (1897)). The Court concluded that the offense
of drug trafficking does not inherently "involve" the use or threat of physical force or
violence on every occasion, as required by section 776.08, although, obviously, drug
trafficking offenses are sometimes violent. Id. at 1313.
130. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
131. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, §
9. The Double Jeopardy Clause is enforceable against the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
132. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2087.
133. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
134. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2090.
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other, then the inquiry must cease, and the subsequent prosecution
is barred. 135
However, the Court indicated, "a subsequent prosecution must do
more than merely survive the Blockburger test."'13 6
[Tihe Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in
which the government, to establish an essential element of an of-
fense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that consti-
tutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prose-
cuted. This is not an "actual evidence" or "same evidence" test.
The critical inquiry is what conduct the State will prove, not the
evidence the State will use to prove that conduct.3 17
135. Id. (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 2093.
137. Id. The Court indicated that this secondary inquiry had its genesis in the
Court's opinion in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
Factually, Grady v. Corbin concerned a traffic fatality. The State of New York
first successfully prosecuted the defendant, Thomas Corbin, for various traffic offenses.
In separate a prosecution, the defendant was subsequently charged with a more serious
manslaughter offense, stemming from the same conduct.
In its Double Jeopardy Clause analysis, the United States Supreme Court relied
heavily upon a bill of particulars filed by the State of New York prior to Corbin's trial
on the charge of reckless manslaughter. The bill of particulars revealed that the same
traffic violations for which the defendant had already plead guilty would again be re-
lied upon by the State as predicate offenses for proving the defendant's recklessness in
the manslaughter charge.
Although the elements of the offenses survived the traditional Blockburger analy-
sis, the Court concluded that the same conduct was being relied upon by the prosecu-
tion in the defendant's subsequent case, thereby violating the second prong of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Relying on the bill of particulars filed by the State of New
York, the Court concluded:
By its own pleadings, the State has admitted that it will prove the entirety
of the conduct for which Corbin was convicted-driving while intoxicated
and failing to keep right of the median-to establish essential elements of
the homicide and assault charges. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars this successive prosecution.
Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
The Court was aware of the additional burdens their holding would place on pros-
ecuting agencies. The Court noted that "[p]rosecutors' offices are often overworked and
may not always have the time to monitor seemingly minor cases as they wind through
the judicial system." Id. at 2095. However, the Court concluded that "these facts can-
not excuse the need for scrupulous adherence to our constitutional principles." Id. (cit-
ing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)).
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The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Grady v. Corbin
has had an immediate impact on Florida Courts. Most importantly, in
Scalf v. State,3 8 the First District Court of Appeal properly recognized
that Grady may be at variance with section 775.021(4)(b), Florida
Statutes," 9 as well as the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Smith." 0 Relying upon Grady v. Corbin, several district courts of ap-
peal decisions have barred subsequent prosecutions on double jeopardy
clause grounds."" However, at least one district court opinion success-
fully distinguished Grady v. Corbin, and sustained a second prosecution
for an offense arising from previously prosecuted conduct." 2
IV. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL OFFENSES
A. Aggravated Battery
In Lareau v. State,"3 the Florida Supreme Court concluded that
the offense of aggravated battery, resulting in great bodily harm, per-
manent disability, or permanent disfigurement, contrary to section
784.045(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes,"4 when committed with a
138. 573 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
139. The appeals court in Scalf stated:
In reaching our conclusion we acknowledge that our disposition of this case
may be at variance with certain language set forth in Section
775.021(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), as approved in State v.
Smith, 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1989), in that the statute provides that it is
the legislature's intent to "convict and sentence for each criminal offense."
If the legislature intended to permit a successive prosecution based on con-
duct that constituted an offense for which the defendant had previously
been prosecuted, any such intent would no doubt be forced to give way to
the interpretation placed on the Double Jeopardy clause by the United
States Supreme Court.
Scalf, 573 So. 2d at 204 n.5 (emphasis in original).
140. 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1989).
141. Scalf v. State, 573 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Dixon v.
State, 584 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Anderson v. State, 570 So. 2d
1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
142. Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In Walls, the
court factually distinguished the holding in Grady v. Corbin, and approved a second
prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, even though the defendant
had previously been convicted of grand theft of the same firearm and armed burglary.
143. 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1991).
144. FLA. STAT. § 784.045 (1989) provides:
(1) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:
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weapon or firearm, may properly be reclassified as a felony of the first
degree, pursuant to the enhancement provision contained in section
775.087(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes. 45 The supreme court found this
result gives full effect to both section 784.045(l)(a) and the enhance-
ment provision of 775.087(1)(b), and additionally, conforms with the
legislative intent of providing increased punishments for violent crimi-
nal acts perpetrated with a firearm, or other weapon.146
In an unrelated case, State v. Nelson, 47 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of an information charging the offense
of aggravated battery upon a person 65 years of age or older, on the
grounds that the information failed to allege that the offense was car-
ried out "knowingly."' 48 The Nelson court concluded that the language
of section 784.08(2), Florida Statutes, 4" requires that the state prove
the defendant knew the victim was at least 65 years of age. 5
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disa-
bility, or permanent disfigurement; or
(b) Uses a deadly weapon.
(2) Whoever commits aggravated battery shall be guilty of a felony of the
second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084.
145. FLA. STAT. § 775.087 (1985) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, whenever a person is charged with a
felony, except a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essen-
tial element, and during the commission of such felony the defendant car-
ries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm, or
during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggra-
vated battery, the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassi-
fied as follows: ...
(b) In the case of a felony of the second degree, to a felony of the first
degree.
146. Lareau, 573 So. 2d at 815.
147. 577 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
148. Id. at 972.
149. FLA. STAT. § 784.08 (1989) provides in part:
(2) Whenever a person is charged with knowingly committing an assault
or aggravated assault or a battery or aggravated battery upon a person 65
years of age or older, the offense for which the person is charged shall be
reclassified as follows:
(a) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree
to a felony of the first degree.
150. Nelson, 577 So. 2d at 972.
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B. Aggravated Child Abuse
In State v. Gethers,151 the Fourth District Court of Appeal re-
jected the contention that the use of cocaine during pregnancy may
constitute aggravated child abuse, contrary to section 827.04(1), Flor-
ida Statutes. ' On the other hand, persons who ingest cocaine during
pregnancy might violate other statutory provisions.1 53
C. Controlled Substances
In Campbell v. State,""' the defendant was convicted of the offense
of trafficking in cocaine. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction after concluding that the defendant was entitled to
a special jury instruction concerning the issue of dominion or control,
based upon language in Graces v. State.'55
The defendant in Campbell was arrested in a reverse-sting opera-
tion -after negotiating the purchase of four kilos of cocaine from an
undercover police officer. Just prior to the completion of the transac-
tion, the defendant was permitted to inspect one of the four kilos of
cocaine while seated in the back seat of a car. The defendant placed
the kilo on his lap and examined its contents. After expressing satisfac-
tion with the cocaine, the defendant placed the kilo on the rear seat,
exited the vehicle, and was arrested.156
Based upon this factual scenario, the supreme court concluded
that the defendant was entitled to a special jury instruction on the issue
of dominion or control:
Temporary control of the contraband in the presence of its actual
owner, for the purpose of verifying that it is what it purports to be
151. 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
152. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(1) (1987) provides:
Whoever, willfully, or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows
a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical
treatment, or who, knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits physical
or mental injury to the child, and in so doing causes great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to such child, shall be
guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082,
s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
153. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
154. 577 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1991).
155. 485 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
156. Campbell, 577 So. 2d at 932-33.
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or to conduct a sensory test for quality, prior to the consummation
of the contemplated transaction, without more, does not constitute
legal possession."5 7
The supreme court also reiterated that "a judgment of acquittal is
proper where there is no evidence from which dominion or control can
be infe:rred.' 6
In an unrelated matter, the definition of a "school," for purposes
of section 893.13(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes, 15 9 relating to narcotics
offenses at or near schools, was decided in State v. Roland. 60 In that
case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that offenses occurring
near "kindergartens and preschools"''l are not subject to the enhance-
ment penalties provided in section 893.13(1)(e)(1) of the Florida Stat-
utes. " 2 The court determined that an elementary school, for purposes
of the statute, means the "first through sixth grades."' 3 However,
grade level is determined by performance level, not chronological
age.1
6 4
Finally, in Johnson v. State, 6 " the Fifth District Court of Appeal
157. Id. at 934 (emphasis in original) (quoting Garces v. State, 485 So. 2d 847,
848 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
158. Id. at 935.
159. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(l)(e) (Supp. 1990) provides in part:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to sell,
manufacture, or deliver, or to possess with intent to sell, purchase, manu-
facture, or deliver, a controlled substance in, on, or within 1,000 feet of the
real property comprising a public or private elementary, middle, or second-
ary school.
160. 577 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
161. Id. at 681.
162. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(l)(e)(1) (Supp. 1990) provides, in part, that persons
convicted of offenses occurring within 1000 feet of a school:
[S]hall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 calendar
years and shall not be eligible for parole or release under the Control Re-
lease Authority . . .or statutory gain-time . . . prior to serving such mini-
mum sentence.
163. Roland, 577 So. 2d at 681.
164. Compare State v. Edwards, 581 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(definition of school satisfied where one child was performing at the first grade level)
with State v. Lee, 583 So. 2d 1055, 1055 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (school for
severely mentally handicapped and retarded persons, ages five to twenty-two years old;
not a school for purposes of enhancement statute where "the students have a minimal
I.Q. and function below the level of a two year old").
165. 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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determined that a pregnant person who ingests cocaine may violate sec-
tion 893.13(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes,1" concerning the delivery of
controlled substances to minors. Under the theory advanced in John-
son, the criminal act occurs at the moment of birth:
Appellant voluntarily took cocaine into her body, knowing it would
pass to her fetus and knowing (or should have known) that birth
was imminent. She is deemed to know that an infant at birth is a
person, and a minor, and that delivery of cocaine to the infant is
illegal. We can reach no other conclusion logically. 1 7
The court concluded that it was "singularly unimpressed" with "what
pregnant mothers might resort to if they know they may be charged
with this crime."'"
D. Driving Under the Influence
Section 316.193(1)(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that any per-
son convicted of a fourth or subsequent offense of driving under the
influence is guilty of a third degree felony. 169 In State v. Rodriguez,17 0
the Florida Supreme Court determined that in order to invoke the ju-
risdiction of the circuit court, an information alleging the offense of
felony driving under the influence must "unambiguously" charge a fel-
ony. 7 ' The supreme court concluded that reference in the information
to section 316.193(l)(2)(b) was sufficient for this purpose. 72
However, to comply with due process requirements, the supreme
court held that the charging document must specifically allege each
predicate DUI offense. 73 Therefore, to the extent that a jury is pro-
vided with a copy of the information during its deliberations, any refer-
166. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(c) (1987) provides in part: "Except as authorized
by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to deliver any
controlled substance to a person under the age of 18 years."
167. Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 420.
168. Id.
169. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1)(2)(b) (Supp. 1988) provides: "Any person who is
convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of subsection (1) is guilty of a felony of
the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084."
170. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991).
171. Id. at 1264.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1266.
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ence to the predicate offenses must be redacted.' 7 4
Additionally, in the event that a verdict of guilty is obtained, the
supreme court's decision in Rodriguez directs that the trial court, sit-
ting as fact-finder, "shall" conduct a separate evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the defendant has, in fact, been previously convicted
of DUI on three or more occasions. The State bears the burden of prov-
ing the existence of the predicate offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt. 171
In a related issue, the supreme court held in Had v. State,1 76 that
an uncounseled DUI conviction may serve as a predicate offense in a
prosecution for felony driving under the influence, but only if the maxi-
mum penalty for the prior offense was no greater than six months in-
carceration, and the defendant was not actually incarcerated as a result
of the conviction. 17 This bright-line test expressly approves the analysis
urged by United States Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun in
Baldasar v. Illinois.178
Finally, in State v. Reisner,17 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
found Rules 1OD-42.023 80 and 1OD-42.024' 8' of the Florida Adminis-
trative Code, relating to chemical breath testing, unconstitutionally
void for vagueness. Section 316.1932(1)(f)(1) of the Florida Statutes
requires the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to im-
plement rules governing the administration of all chemical breath test-
ing in the State of Florida." 2 The results of a chemical breath test are
174. Id.
175. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1266.
176. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S586 (Fla. 1991).
177. Id. at S586.
178. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (Blackmun, J. concurring).
179. 584 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
180. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.1OD-42.023 (1990) governing the registration
and yearly testing of chemical breath test instruments provides in part: "All such
chemical tests, instruments or devices registered hereunder shall be checked at least
once each calendar year (January 1 through December 31) for accuracy and reproduc-
ibility." (emphasis added).
181. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1OD-42.024(1)(c) (1990), governing the
monthly maintenance of chemical breath test instruments, provides:
Chemical tests, instruments and devices used in the breath test method
shall be inspected at least once each calendar month by a technician to
ensure general cleanliness, appearance, and accuracy.
Id. (emphasis added).
182. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(l)(f)1 (Supp. 1988) provides in part: "The tests de-
termining the weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be administered at the
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inadmissible in a criminal proceeding " if the testing procedures fail to
substantially comply with section 316.1932,84 and the applicable ad-
ministrative rules.1 85 Pursuant to section 316.1932((1)(f)(1):
Such rules and regulations shall be adopted after public hearing,
shall specify precisely the test or tests which are approved by the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for reliability of
result and facility of administration which shall be followed in all
such tests given under this section. "
In Reisner, the court determined that the rules and incorporated
forms promulgated to maintain the "accuracy" and "reproducibility"
of chemical breath test machines failed to define those terms ade-
quately, and were unconstitutionally void for vagueness. 8 , Therefore,
the court excluded the results of the defendant's chemical breath test.
request of a law enforcement officer substantially in accordance with rules and regula-
tions which shall have been adopted by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services." (emphasis added).
183. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(l)(f)(1) (Supp. 1988) provides in part: "The tests
determining the weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be administered at the
request of a law enforcement officer substantially in accordance with rules and regula-
tions which shall have been adopted by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services." (emphasis added). But see State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. 1980)
("[T]he results of blood alcohol tests are admissible into evidence without compliance
with the administrative rules if the traditional predicate is laid which establishes the
reliability of the test, the qualifications of the operator, and the meaning of the test
results by expert testimony.").
184. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(l)(b) (Supp. 1988) provides:
An analysis of a person's breath, in order to be considered valid under this
section, must have been performed substantially according to methods ap-
proved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. For this
purpose, the department is authorized to approve satisfactory techniques or
methods. Any insubstantial differences between approved techniques and
actual testing procedures in any individual case shall not render the test or
test results invalid.
(emphasis added). FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(f)(1) (Supp. 1988) provides in part: "The
tests determining the weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be administered
at the request of a law enforcement officer substantially in accordance with rules and
regulations which shall have been adopted by the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services." (emphasis added).
185. See supra notes 180-81.
186. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932((1)(f)(1) (Supp. 1988).
187. State v. Reisner, 584 So. 2d 141, 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing
State v. Cumming, 365 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1978)).
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E. Grand Theft
In State v. G.C.,'88 the Florida Supreme Court held that "mere
presence as an after-acquired passenger in a vehicle, with knowledge
that it has been stolen,"' 189 was insufficient to sustain a conviction for
the offense of grand theft. 9 ' The facts revealed that G.C., a fourteen-
year-old juvenile, accepted a ride in a stolen vehicle. The defendant
admitted that he suspected the car was stolen due to the fact that the
vehicle's steering column was broken.'
However, unlike the driver of a stolen car, the supreme court de-
termined that the defendant's mere presence as a passenger was insuffi-
cient evidence to prove "possession, dominion, or control" over the vehi-
cle.' 92 The supreme court distinguished the defendant's "use" from the
specific: intent to either temporarily or permanently "deprive" or "ap-
propriate" the property of another.19 3 To prove the "taking," the G.C.
188. 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1991).
189. Id. at 1382.
190. FLA. STAT. § 812.014 (1987) provides in part:
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors
to obtain or use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily
or permanently:
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit
therefrom.
(b) Appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person not
entitled thereto.
FLA. STAT. § 812.012 (1987) provides in part:
(2) "Obtains or uses" means any manner of:
(a) Taking or exercising control over property.
(b) Making any unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of property.
(c) Obtaining property by fraud, willful misrepresentation of a future act,
or false promise.
(d) l. Conduct previously known as stealing; larceny; purloining; abstract-
ing; embezzlement; misapplication; misappropriation; conversion; or ob-
taining money or property by false pretenses, fraud, or deception; or
2. Other conduct similar in nature.
191. G.C., 572 So. 2d at 1380-81.
192. Id. at 1382.
193. Id. at 1381. The supreme court concluded, however, that the defendant's
unauthorized entry into the stolen motor vehicle constituted the offense of trespass to a
conveyance, contrary to FLA. STAT. § 810.08(1) (1987) which provides:
Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters or
remains in any structure or conveyance, or, having been authorized, li-
censed, or invited, is warned by the owner or lessee of the premises, or by a
person authorized by the owner or lessee, to depart and refuses to do so,
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court concluded that proof of a specific intent to commit the offense of
theft is necessary. This, the supreme court suggested, requires "some
active step" on the part of the defendant beyond merely riding in the
vehicle as a passenger.
19 4
F. Keeping a House of Ill Fame
In Warren v. State,195 the Florida Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of section 796.01, Florida Statutes.'96 Finding the
term "ill fame" unconstitutionality vague, the court declared the stat-
ute unconstitutional. Although the supreme court concluded that the
term "ill fame" may have provided sufficient notice of prohibited con-
duct in the past, it was nevertheless persuaded that in today's society,
the term fails to provide sufficient notice between permitted and pro-
hibited conduct.197
commits the offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance.
194. G.C., 572 So. 2d at 1381-82; see State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla.
1978).
195. 572 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1991).
196. FLA. STAT. § 796.01 (1987) provides: "Whoever keeps a house of ill fame,
resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, is guilty of a felony of the third
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084." On the other
hand, FLA. STAT. § 796.07 (1987) provides in part:
(2) It is unlawful in the state:
(a) To keep, set up, maintain, or operate any place, structure, building, or
conveyance for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution.
(5) Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
775.083, or s. 775.084.
According to the Warren court, "'[i]ll fame' is the element that distinguishes the fel-
ony prohibited by § 796.01, Fla. Stat. (1987), from the misdemeanor prohibited by §
796.07(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987)." Warren, 572 So. 2d at 1377 n.3.
197. Warren, 572 So. 2d at 1377. The supreme court in Warren conceded that
"[w]hile the general population might have understood the meaning of 'ill fame' a cen-
tury ago, the lack of definition in the statutes, jury instructions, and cases is fatal to its
continued validity." Id.
The term "Ill fame" is defined by one source as follows: "Evil repute; notorious
bad character. Houses of prostitution, gaming houses, and other such disorderly places
are called 'houses of ill fame,' and a person who frequents them a person of ill fame."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (5th ed. 1979).
The Warren court made special reference to the frustrations of one prosecutor,
who, referring to the term "ill fame," unabashedly stated: "'How are we going to
prove that element, what witnesses are we going to use?" Warren, 572 So. 2d at 1377
(citing to State v. Warren, 558 So. 2d 55, 58 n.4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (quot-
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G. Robbery
Section 812.13, of the Florida Statutes, defines the offense of rob-
bery.' 98 The element of "taking," for purposes of section 812.13, is de-
fined in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions as one of the four ele-
ments necessary to prove the offense of robbery. This element requires
proof that:
The taking was with the intent to permanently [deprive (victim) of
his right to the property or any benefit from it.] [appropriate the
property of (victim) to his own use or to the use of any person not
entitled to it.] 1
In Daniels v. State,200 the Florida Supreme Court held that "the spe-
cific intent to commit robbery is the intent to steal, i.e., to deprive an
owner of property either permanently or temporarily."'0 By holding
that the specific intent to commit robbery is either the permanent or
temporary deprivation of the property of another, the supreme court's
opinion in Daniels expands the definition of "taking,"20 2 and necessa-
ing an unpublished portion of the trial court record in State v. Palmieri, 558 So. 2d 53
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, Palmieri v. State, 572 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1991)).
198. FLA. STAT. § 812.13 (1989) provides in part: "(1) 'Robbery' means the tak-
ing of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or
custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence,
assault, or putting in fear."
199. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 155 (The
Florida Bar 1989).
200. 587 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1991).
201. Id. at 462.
202. The supreme court's determination in Daniels that the "taking" may be
temporary or permanent was based on a 1977 legislative amendment to chapter 812.
Id.; see Chapter 77-342, Laws of Florida, codified at FLA. STAT. § 812.014 (concerning
the offense of theft). That revision changed the language of the theft statute, in part,
by adding the words "temporarily or permanently" to subsection 812.014(1).
In State v. Denumann, 427 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1983), the Florida Supreme Court
suggested in dicta that the 1977 legislative amendment had no impact on section
812.13, relating to the offense of robbery. Id. at 169. Daniels specifically recedes from
that portion of Denumann. Daniels, 587 So. 2d at 462.
Additionally, in State v. Bell, 394 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1991), the following question
was certified: "Whether specific intent (i.e., the intent to permanently deprive the
owner of property) is still a requisite element of the crime of robbery as now defined by
Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975)." Id. at 979 (emphasis added). The supreme
court answered the question in the affirmative, stating: "We hold that specific intent is
still a requisite element of the crime of robbery." Id. at 980.
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rily amends the appropriate jury instruction when the offense of rob-
bery is alleged.
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court's numerous decisions in the area of
sentencing, and the guidelines, continues to provide much needed re-
finement. Most, but not all, of the supreme court's sentencing decisions
conceived reasonably appropriate solutions to difficult problems. In
other instances, however, the supreme court's efforts failed to provide
adequate guidance
In particular, the supreme court has again failed to clearly define
what constitutes a continuing and persistent patterns of criminal con-
duct. Similarly, the test announced by the supreme court in Clark v.
State,0 concerning consolidated sentencing hearings, seems certain to
foster numerous appeals.
Other important sentencing issues appear on the horizon, as well.
One area which seems especially ripe for review concerns matters relat-
ing to the sentencing of habitual felony offenders. In the final analysis,
then, it appears that as long as the sentencing guidelines remain in
existence, there will be a fresh supply of criminal law cases to decipher
and digest, and most importantly, to survey.
Based upon the manner in which the certified question in Bell was phrased, the
supreme court's answer to the certified question reasonably suggested that the specific
intent necessary to commit the offense of robbery included "permanent" deprivation.
To this extent, the supreme court's decision in Daniels recedes from the language con-
tained within the parenthetical portion of the certified question in Bell. Daniels, 587
So. 2d at 462.
203. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey will treat recent decisions by Florida courts which im-
pact the elderly. The cases chart statutory measures which punish
crimes against the elderly, issues bearing on vital medical decisions
over the elderly's right to proper care and treatment, and in some
cases, to die. It covers as well matters dealing with the right of support
and pension benefits sounding in the elderly setting and those issues
unfolding in adult communities. It wraps up with a look at the state of
legal representation for the elderly.
II. MEDICAL ISSUES
In In re Guardianship of Browning,' a landmark ruling, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court delivered a sweeping declaration on a competent or
incompetent person's right to say no to all forms of medical treatment.
It was a ringing endorsement of privacy, personal autonomy, and self-
determination.
In 1.985, Estelle Browning drew up a living will, a document con-
taining instructions on whether aggressive medical care is to be applied
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center; LL.M., Ge-
orgetown Law Center, 1984; J.D., University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall),
1977; B.A. Pomona College, 1974.
1. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
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at life's twilight. Beyond refusing the customary life supports, like res-
pirators, Mrs. Browning also recorded her steadfast opposition to
forced feeding.
The following year, Mrs. Browning suffered a stroke which left her
unable to swallow. Overriding her written directive, the hospital in-
serted a feeding tube directly into her stomach, where it remained for
eighteen uncomfortable months before giving way to a nasogastric
tube. In the meantime, Doris Herbert, Mrs. Browning's court-ap-
pointed guardian, citing the living will, asked the trial court for permis-
sion to cut off the unwanted life line.
In the course of an evidentiary hearing, an earlier living will bear-
ing identical language offered striking proof that Mrs. Browning's in-
tentions were more than casual chatter. Neighbors also testified that,
time and again, Mrs. Browning voiced horror at the prospect of a pro-
tracted death. Grim medical evidence indicated that while not coma-
tose, Mrs. Browning had lapsed into a persistent vegetative state. With-
out the feeding tubes, she would die within ten days. With them, she
could linger in limbo for a year or longer.
The trial court refused to order the tube removed because Mrs.
Browning's death was not imminent. In support of its conclusion, the
court relied on Florida law which at the time flatly ruled out suste-
nance from its definition of "life-prolonging procedure." 2 Reaching out
beyond statutory law, however, the appellate court backed Mrs. Brown-
ing's decision to turn down aggressive intervention,3 citing the right to
privacy embedded in the Florida Constitution as authority.4 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court agreed.'
In sizing up the sweep of Florida's constitutional privacy guaran-
tee, the supreme court opened its analysis with the premise that each
individual holds, as an article of faith, "sole control of his or her per-
son."6 One measure of self-determination, the supreme court noted, "is
the right to make choices pertaining to one's health, including the right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment."7 Citing dicta contained in the
United States Supreme Court ruling in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
2. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-223. Since October 1, 1990, a patient may authorize
the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition or hydration under certain circumstances.
3. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
4. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
5. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 4.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id.
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Department of Health,8 the Florida Supreme Court emphasized that a
competent person has a constitutional right to refuse extraordinary
medical intervention without regard to medical condition.9 In support
of this principle, the Florida Supreme Court applauded the result
reached in Bouvia v. Superior Court, a California case sustaining a
competent patient's prerogative to refuse any medical treatment.1"
The supreme court also relied on its earlier decision in Public
Health Trust v. Wons, which recognized the right of a competent and
middle-aged Jehovah's Witness to turn down an emergency blood
transfusion, even though it meant certain death.11 In Wons, the su-
preme court expanded their previous holding by ruling an incompetent
person12 is equally entitled to refuse medical treatment, if such intent
was communicated while the individual was competent.'3
Throughout the balance of the opinion, the supreme court mea-
sured the countervailing interests advanced by the state, against an in-
dividual's bid to refuse medical treatment. 4 It rejected outright the
suggestion that Mrs. Browning may have had a change of heart since
drawing up her living will.' 5 As for the state's interest in preserving
life, a potent argument in the proper setting, the supreme court con-
cluded that this interest is weakened when the question is "not
whether, but when, for how long and at what cost to the individual...
life may be briefly extended."'"
Moreover, the supreme court reasoned that the state's interest in
preventing suicide bears little heft when removing life support merely
lets nature take its course.'7 Finally, it roundly dismissed the idea that
honoring a person's right to halt all life-saving measures somehow com-
promises the integrity of the medical profession.' 8
8. 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990).
9. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
10. Id. at 10-11 (citing Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1142-
43 (1986)).
11. 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
12. Reform legislation has since replaced the "incompetency" concept with
"incapacity."
13. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12 (citing John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984)).
14. Id. at 13-14.
15. Id. at 13.
16. li. at 14.
17. I.
18. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
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In what is likely to be its signature feature, the supreme court
firmly cast aside all argument that the judiciary should serve as a
watchdog upon the decision to pull life supports. 9 In a bold stroke, it
held that a court order was not necessary to halt medical treatment, if
"do not resuscitate" instructions are contained either in a living will, or
in oral declarations; or if the decision is arrived at by a proxy author-
ized in writing to make all health care decisions for the patient." Fur-
thermore, life supports may be removed upon evidence of the patient's
intent, without a court order, without regard to whether a surrogate
has been named to carry out the instructions.21
When a patient leaves oral or written "end of life" directions and
designates a proxy to carry out these instructions, common sense safe-
guards are in order. For example, the proxy, with written authority,
must support the patient's decision to remove life supports by clear and
convincing evidence. 22 The surrogate also must be satisfied that the pa-
tient drew up the plans knowingly, willingly, and without undue influ-
ence; and, that the evidence of the patient's oral declarations is relia-
ble.2 3 Beyond this, there must be a medical finding that the patient's
prognosis is hopeless .2 Finally, the surrogate must ensure that the pa-
tient's instructions have been carefully weighed and satisfied.25
When a patient leaves no instructions, except to name someone to
act on her behalf, a couple of conditions must first be met before life
support may be removed. For example, the surrogate must certify that
the proxy authorization was made knowingly, willingly, and without
undue influence. 26 Furthermore, the proxy must obtain the statements
of three physicians that the patient is unlikely to recover. 27
When ambiguity clouds the patient's instructions, or challenges to
the proxy's decision emerge, courts will unavoidably end up breaking
the deadlock. 8 Any proceeding, however, will be streamlined and the
court will only look at conflicting testimony bearing on the patient's
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id. at 15-16.
27. Id. at 16.
28. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16.
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intent." To move matters along, written proxy authorizations carry a
rebuttable presumption as clear and convincing evidence of the pa-
tient's wishes.30 Likewise, physicians' medical findings draw a rebutta-
ble presumption that the conditions for removal of life support have
been met."1
Not surprisingly, courts note that penned instructions of the pa-
tient's wishes are more reliable evidence, and thus, the written word
draws broader judicial deference.32 Accordingly, while a patient's writ-
ten statements can stand on their own, the surrogate must bear the
burden of proof when her decision to discontinue life support rests on
oral evidence alone, and is challenged.33
In Mrs. Browning's case, the only question which called for judi-
cial resolution was whether her condition was terminal. Reviewing the
medical evidence, the supreme court was satisfied her prognosis was
dim.3 ' Accordingly, it found that the guardian's request to remove the
feeding tube should have been honored. 5
Justice Overton, in dissent, would require court approval whenever
oral declarations by the patient represent the only evidence cited by a
surrogate in the bid to terminate the patient's life supports.3 " Justice
Overton voiced concern over the possibility that proxies may profit fi-
nancially from an early death of the incompetent.37
III. COMMUNITY AGE RESTRICTIONS
Brookridge Community Property Owners v. Brookridge, Inc.38
concerned a dispute over whether age restrictions burdening a retire-
ment community in Hernando County were binding on the owners of
undeveloped lots in the development. The defendant homeowners asso-
ciation recorded age restrictions six years after the plaintiff, the com-
munity's developer, assigned management powers to the defendant.
Before the age restrictions were recorded, however, lots were sold with-
29. id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 18 (Overton, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. 573 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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out regard to the buyer's age.
Under the disputed restrictions, at least one permanent occupant
had to be at least fifty-five years of age and all permanent occupants
were required to be at least eighteen years of age. While the restriction
only covered about 140 of the 2,856 platted lots that remained undevel-
oped when the covenant was recorded, nearly eighty percent of the oc-
cupied homes already contained at least one person fifty-five years or
older.
The plaintiff developer, who owned the bulk of the undeveloped
lots, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the homeowners
association, claiming that the age rule was unreasonable. Plaintiff's
successful motion for summary judgment persuaded the trial court that
the line drawn by the age rule between improved and unimproved lots,
and the series of exemptions for improved homes, were arbitrary.
In siding with the developer, the trial court reasoned that a rule
which exempts from sixty to ninety-five percent of the lots in question
was not crafted to serve the goal of building an older adult commu-
nity. 39 The court pointed out that it was flatly arbitrary to prohibit
current owners of unimproved lots from building a residence in which
grandchildren might reside.' Accordingly, the homeowners association
was permanently enjoined from enforcing the age rule.'1
While the Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed with the result, it
took issue with the trial court's reasoning.42 Even if the rule was rea-
sonable, the appellate court found that the homeowners association
lacked the authority to enact such a rule in the first place.' 3 The power
to enact age restrictions could not have been assigned by the developer,
the court concluded, because it lacked the authority "to assign as
against owners who purchased lots without notice of age restrictions
"44
IV. ADULT CONGREGATE LIVING FACILITIES
Mang v. Country Comfort Inn,'45 addressed whether an adminis-
trator of a retirement community could be sued for violating a resi-
39. Id. at 975.
40. Id.
41. id.
42. Id.
43. Brookridge, 573 So. 2d at 975.
44. id.
45. 559 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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dent's right, under the Florida Adult Congregate Living Facilities
Act,46 to receive proper medical attention.
Mang suffered injuries after falling in a pool of urine on the floor
of a bathroom at the Country Comfort Inn, an adult congregate living
facility. Not only had Mang lain in the urine unattended overnight, a
full day passed before he was seen by a doctor. The trial court dis-
missed Mang's charge that Perez, the facility's administrator, violated
Mang's statutory rights.
After reviewing Florida's Adult Congregate Living Facilities Act,
the appellate court reinstated Mang's claim against Perez."' The Act
accords residents of adult congregate living facilities the right to live in
a safe and decent living environment, free from abuse and neglect. The
Act also gives residents the right to receive proper health care.4 8 Fi-
nally, it assigns to the administrators of such facilities a continuing
duty to assess whether a resident is "incontinent of bladder and bowel
"149
Under the Act, residents are expressly entitled to press claims
against administrators who fail in their duties as caretakers.50 The ap-
pellate court concluded Mang's second drafting effort stated an ade-
quate case to survive pre-trial challenge." The claim against Perez was
accordingly remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 2
The negligent administration of an adult congregate living facility
drew judicial notice in B.B.A. v. Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services." The defendant, B.B.A., and his wife were the owners,
and the wife was the administrator, of an adult congregate living facil-
ity in which the plaintiff, C.C., a mentally disabled person with a his-
tory of seizures, had resided for several years." While the plaintiff was
hospitalized, a defendant physician prescribed dilantin to control the
seizures." The defendant failed to check plaintiff's dilantin blood level
for seventeen months after the plaintiff left the hospital to return once
46. FLA. STAT. § 400.401 (1987).
47. Mang, 559 So. 2d at 673-75.
48. FLA. STAT. § 400.28 (1987).
49. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.1OA-5.0181(3)(e) (1986) (Adult Congregate Liv-
ing Facilities).
50. FLA. STAT. § 400.29 (1987).
51. Mang, 559 So. 2d at 675.
52. Id.
53. 581 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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again to the defendant's care.56 Subsequently, the plaintiff was re-hos-
pitalized and lapsed into seizures.5
An HRS investigator, suspecting neglect, poured over the plain-
tiff's medical files and interviewed medical personnel. The HRS investi-
gator concluded that the plaintiff was, indeed, a victim of neglect.58
HRS approved the investigator's findings and entered the defendant's
name on its central abuse registry.59 The defendant challenged this
move and requested that HRS expunge the record of neglect.00
In the course of an administrative hearing conducted by HRS, a
neurology specialist testified that a seizure patient's dilantin level
should be checked annually.6 1 Furthermore, the specialist noted that a
caregiver must be acutely alert when handling a mentally disabled indi-
vidual who may not wholly appreciate the importance of taking his
medication regularly. 2
After finding, under Florida law, that the plaintiff was a "disabled
adult"68 and that the defendant was a "caregiver," 6 the hearing officer
ratified the finding of neglect and recommended that HRS deny the
defendant's request to wipe out the registry entry of his neglect.6 " HRS
adopted the hearing officer's recommendations and an appeal
followed.66
The court of appeal addressed the question of whether competent,
substantial evidence supported HRS' finding of neglect.67 Citing the
neurologist's unrebutted testimony and the defendant's admission that
he had not measured the plaintiff's dilantin blood level for seventeen
months, the court affirmed the finding of neglect."
In his defense, the defendant also claimed that HRS failed to con-
nect the defendant's level of care with the plaintiff's subsequent
56. Id.
57. Id. at 957 (Zehmer, J., dissenting).
58. B.B.A., 581 So. 2d at 956.
59. FLA. STAT. § 415.103(3)(c) (1989) (the statute requires that HRS maintain
a central registry and tracking system where all reports of abuse are logged, including
the HRS final disposition indicating the results of its investigation).
60. B.B.A., 581 So. 2d at 956.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. § 514.102(8) (1989).
64. FLA. STAT. § 415.102(4) (1989).
65. B.B.A., 581 So. 2d at 956.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 957.
[Vol. 16
273
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Sanchez
seizures." Unlike tort claims, where doctrines like proximate cause and
contributory negligence must be weighed, the court concluded that
once it was established that the defendant did not take the steps a pru-
dent caregiver would follow, the statutory definition of neglect had
been met.7
The: court's opinion was not unanimous, however. Judge Zehmer,
in dissent, disputed whether competent, substantial evidence proved
that the plaintiffs injury was the outcome of the defendant's failure to
act; in other words, the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defend-
ant's acts were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.71 Judge
Zehmer pointed out that each time the plaintiff entered the hospital,
his dilantin level was satisfactory.72 Given that, the judge noted it was
altogether possible that the plaintiffs dilantin level was normal over the
course of those seventeen months between hospital stays." Moreover,
the judge pointed out that the plaintiffs seizures may not even be
traced to a low dilantin level; the seizures could be credited to a cere-
bral vascular accident.7 '
Finally, no statute or HRS guideline called for an annual check of
dilantin blood level in this type of setting. 5 Indeed, the expert did not
testify to a minimum standard of care, but said, "I think an optimum
standard of care is to do it at least once a year."716 Accordingly, the
judge concluded that since the statute does not define "neglect" as fail-
ure to extend optimum care, no competent or substantial evidence laid
out a minimum statutory standard." Therefore, without notice of the
prevailing benchmarks of professional care, the defendant's right to due
process had been violated. 8
V. PENSION AND SUPPORT ISSUES
The question of whether a husband's disability pension may be
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. B.B.A., 581 So. 2d at 957 (Zehmer, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. d. at 958.
76. B.B.A., 581 So. 2d at 958.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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cast as a marital asset was at the heart of Hoffner v. Hoffner.7 9 The
lower court had awarded the wife part of her ex-husband's disability
pension as permanent periodic alimony, treating these regular pay-
ments as a marital asset which survived the wife's remarriage. 80
While the court of appeal acknowledged that there would be times
when a future-vesting pension would hold all the earmarks of marital
property, it is not so when the spouse is presently drawing benefits. 81
Under these circumstances, the pension acts as a proxy for future lost
income, and that lies beyond the reach of a former spouse.82 Although
the pension was not marital property, subject to equitable distribution,
it could continue to be a source of alimony.8 3 Accordingly, the lower
court was free to count pension distributions as income in arriving at
the proper amount of alimony.8 ' However, unlike marital property, the
wife's claim to a share of the pension is terminated by her re-marriage
or the death of either spouse.8 5
In contrast, the court of appeal in Lovelady v. Lovelady, con-
cluded that a husband's pension plan should be treated as a marital
asset in calculating the proper amount of alimony. 6
In Town of Davie Police Pension Fund v. Cummings, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that a public pension fund was immune
to a garnishment claim by a creditor of a police officer over an out-
standing debt. 7
Nowadays, and with regard to support, grandparents are thrust
more and more into the role of surrogate parents to their grandchil-
dren. In Wilson v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,
a court had placed two children in their wayward mother's custody as
long as she lived under the watchful eye of the children's grand-
mother.8 8 Although the children's mother was drawing food stamps, the
grandmother suspected the children were being shortchanged.8 9 For
this reason, the grandmother applied separately for food stamps for the
79. 577 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
80. Id. at 704.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Hoffner, 577 So. 2d at 704.
85. Id.
86. 576 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
87. 576 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
88. 561 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
89. Id.
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children, averring their status as one of an independent food stamp
household, apart from their mother and grandparents."
In the course of administrative hearings, HRS ruled that the
grandmother was acting as a "custodial parent," that she and her hus-
band were a part of the children's food stamp household, and because
the household income exceeded the cap on eligibility, the application
was denied. 91
In a reversal of fortunes, the First District Court of Appeal judged
the agency's definition of a "food stamp household" tightfisted and,
moreover, at odds with federal eligibility standards.9" Indeed, federal
law carves out an exception to the definition of a parent-child house-
hold when "one of the parents . . . is an elderly or disabled member.""
As it turned out, appellant Wilson's 82-year-old husband handily met
the federal definition of elderly.94
The only other roadblock bearing on food stamp eligibil-
ity-whether the putative food stamp household routinely buys food
and prepares meals together-was not addressed by the administrative
hearing officer and the court remanded for further attention on this
matter.9 11
VI. CRIMES AGAINST THE ELDERLY
Florida lawmakers recently stiffened penalties for assault and bat-
tery when the victim is sixty-five years of age or older.96 The measure's
language, however, is unclear about whether the "knowingly" element
of the offense refers to the assault and battery or whether it means that
the aggressor must know that his victim is elderly.
In State v. Nelson, the trial court ruled that "knowingly" cannot
bear on the assault and battery offense because intent is already part of
its definition.9" The Fourth District Court of Appeal reluctantly agreed,
but at the same time cast doubt on whether the lawmakers seriously
intended that the state would have to prove the criminal knew the vic-
tim was sixty-five years or older before the stepped-up sanction could
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1988)).
93. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1988).
94. Wilson, 561 So. 2d at 663 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2012(r)(1) (1988)).
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 784.08(2) (1989).
97. 577 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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be applied.98 After all, the court wryly noted, the law was adopted to
protect the elderly, not the criminal.99
In support of its reading of the law, the court assayed identical
wording in another penal code provision that sharpens penalties when
the victim of assault and battery is a law enforcement officer or
firefighter. The Florida Supreme Court interpreted the word "know-
ingly" to mean "that the accused know that his victim is a law enforce-
ment officer or firefighter."'' 0 But, the "knowingly" element makes
more sense in the situation where off-duty police officers or fire fighters
are not identifiable as such. By contrast, calling on the state to prove
that the defendant knew his victim was elderly is an intolerable burden.
While the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion re-
cently on a similar matter, 10 the Fourth District Court of Appeal pru-
dently aligned itself with Florida Supreme Court precedent for the time
being.
VII. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND ISSUES OF REPRESENTATION
Availability of attorney's fees earned from efforts to force HRS to
hand over its report on nursing home abuse was taken up by the Third
District Court of Appeal in Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services. v. Martin.102 After Idora Smith died in a nursing home at the
end of 1988, HRS conducted an investigation under chapter 415 of
Florida law'08 in response to grapevine reports of elder abuse. Smith's
personal representative, appellee Harriet J. Roberts Martin, enlisted
Herman M. Klemick as counsel to assess the odds of pressing a suc-
cessful wrongful death action against the nursing home.104 HRS stead-
fastly refused to hand over to Klemick the fruits of its chapter 415
investigation under the mistaken belief that access was blocked by
chapter 415.105 Striking a balance between accommodating Klemick
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Street v. State, 383 So. 2d 900, 901 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis added).
101. See United States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 737 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the government need only prove that a person was under age eighteen when employed
in the commission of a drug offense, not that defendant knew the person was under
eighteen).
102. 574 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
103. See Adult Protective Service Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 415.101-.608 (1987).
104. Martin, 574 So. 2d at 1223.
105. Id. at 1224 (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.107(2)(d) (1987)).
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and covering its own hide, HRS suggested Klemick invite the probate
court to order the agency to turn over its findings, but the probate
court would not go along.106 Finally, Klemick got his hands on the
chapter .415 file by suing for access under chapters 119 and 415.107
After an in camera inspection, the trial court released the report to
appellee Martin. 108
Seeking his just desserts, Klemick moved for an award of attor-
ney's fees under chapter 119.109 The trial court awarded not only attor-
ney's fees, but costs as well and HRS appealed. 110 The Third District
Court of Appeal upended the award of attorney's fees upon a close
reading of chapter 119. Under this chapter, fees are recoverable "[i]f a
civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the provisions of this
chapter .. ."I" Disclosure of HRS' report was ordered under chapter
415, not chapter 119 which squarely shields from public scrutiny
records of abuse investigations."' Unhappily for Klemick, attorney's
fees are not authorized under chapter 415.113
In the case of In re Skinner, " " Indian River County and HRS
squared off over which one should shoulder attorney's fees incurred on
behalf of Lloyd H. Skinner, a disabled 82-year-old caught in the cross-
fire. HRS had gone to court seeking protective services under Chapter
41511 5 for the elderly man who had been victimized by his caretaker,
Julia Bri:nson." 6 At the same time the court authorized the protective
services, it appointed attorney Martin E. Wall to serve as Skinner's
counsel and later charged the county for Wall's fees. 17
Finding no guidance on this matter under Chapter 415, the trial
court cast about in state law until it hit upon section 43.28 which
prescribes "[t]he counties shall provide appropriate courtrooms, facili-
ties, equipment, and, unless provided by the state, personnel necessary
106. Id.
107. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-.14 (1987).
108. Martin, 574 So. 2d at 1224.
109. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 119.12 (1987).
110. Martin, 574 So. 2d at 1224.
111. FLA. STAT. § 119.12(1) (1987) (emphasis added).
112. Martin, 574 So. 2d at 1224.
113. Id.
114. 541 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
115. See FLA. STAT. § 415.105(3) (Supp. 1986).
116. Skinner, 541 So. 2d at 781.
117. d.
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to operate the circuit and country courts."118
The district court of appeal agreed that neither Chapter 415 nor
its legislative history shed light on which public body should pay the
tab for appointed counsel." 9 Turning to case law, the court reviewed In
the Interest of D.B. & D.S. ° where the Florida Supreme Court had
pinned appointed counsel fees on the county citing section 43.28 in a
case involving juvenile dependency proceedings. Drawing upon the kin-
ship between juvenile dependency proceedings and protective services
proceedings, the District Court concluded the county must pay Mr.
Wall's fees, glossing over the fact that appointed counsel in juvenile
proceedings is constitutionally founded while appointed counsel in pro-
ceedings for the elderly rests on statute.' 2'
In a footnote, the court distinguished decisions burdening HRS
with appointed counsel fees because in those cases counsel was not le-
gally required. 22 Finally, the court of appeal supported its assessment
of fees against the county on policy grounds as well. Conflicting loyal-
ties are likely to emerge whenever HRS seeks protective services at the
same time that it must pay for counsel to resist the agency's efforts in
such proceedings. To be sure, HRS may well think twice before trig-
gering protective services if it knows it must pay counsel fees.
In an unusual advisory opinion, Florida Bar re Advisory Opin-
ion-Nonlawyer Preparation of Pension Plans,'23 the Florida Supreme
Court tackled the sensitive subject of nonlawyer preparation of em-
ployee pension plans. Federal law, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)124 regulates the preparation of pension
plans and authorizes such nonlawyers as certified public account-
ants-to prepare pension plans for Internal Revenue Service approval.
Crafting pension plans also calls for tax, actuarial, accounting, econom-
ics, insurance and investment advice.
The opinion, with Solomonic wisdom, sorted out those things only
lawyers can do and those things nonlawyers can do. Nonlawyers can
gather information and digest it to arrive at plan options for clients.'2
What is more, nonlawyers can explain alternatives to employers, pre-
118. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 43.28 (1987) (emphasis added)).
119. Skinner, 541 So. 2d at 782.
120. 385 So. 2d 83, 86 (Fla. 1980).
121. Skinner, 541 So. 2d at 782.
122. Id. at 782 n.1.
123. 571 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1990).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
125. Advisory Opinion, 571 So. 2d at 437-38.
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pare annual returns and reports incident to pension plan administra-
tion, administer the plan day-to-day, and market and sell pension
plans. 2 6
On the other hand, only lawyers may analyze client information
and counsel clients on the best plan, draft plan documents, qualify
plans before the IRC, and terminate a pension plan. 1' 7 Moreover, the
nonlawyer professionals may not select the attorney for the em-
ployer. 28 Even a lawyer working in a nonlawyer company cannot draft
pension plans or select plan options for a customer of the company. 29
The Court acknowledged that pension planning draws on several
overlapping professional disciplines. A similar issue was addressed by
the Florida Supreme Court in Florida Bar v. Turner.80 Like the deci-
sion at bar, Turner ruled that some work connected with structuring
pension plans could legitimately be performed by nonlawyers, but that
other components could only be rendered by attorneys.' 3' Unfortu-
nately, the lines drawn by Turner were fuzzy, spawning confusion, with
lawyers reading the decision narrowly and nonlawyer professionals
resolving doubts in their favor. This confusion prompted the Standing
Committee to issue an opinion. The State Bar introduced evidence that
the public was being harmed because nonlawyer practitioners were
more concerned with the sale of a product or service other than the
plan itself'. At the same time, nonlawyers are unable to gauge the im-
pact of the plan on other legal areas such as estate tax or probate plan-
ning. Ideally, the client is best served when all the experts, legal and
nonlegal, have a say in the shape of the plan.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 438.
128. Id. at 440.
129. Id. at 441.
130. 355 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1978).
131. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1990 amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar
("the Rules") constitute significant changes in The Florida Bar's ("the
Bar") disciplinary process.' This article addresses those changes which
have effected the Bar's grievance procedures and confidentiality rules
due to the substantial revision of these areas. The article goes on to
discuss changes made to the rules concerning perjured testimony.
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA BAR'S GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURES AND CONFIDENTIALITY RULES
A. Grievance Procedure Changes
The first procedural change is that a formal complaint can now be
filed by the Bar against a respondent attorney if: 1) a grievance corn-
* Miami Branch Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar; J.D., Nova University Shepard
Broad Law Center, 1978; M.S., Florida International University, 1975; B.A., Florida
International University, 1974.
1. The Fla. Bar re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar (Grievance
Procedures & Confidentiality), 558 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 1990) (citing The Fla. Bar re
Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar (Grievance Procedures & Confiden-
tiality), (Fla. No. 74,570 filed February 15, 1990)) [hereinafter Amendments].
The Rules took effect on January 1, 1987. The Fla. Bar re Rules Regulating the
Fla. Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1986).
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mittee or the board of governors of the Bar finds probable cause to
believe that the respondent is guilty of misconduct justifying discipli-
nary action; 2) the member has been temporarily suspended for the
same misconduct that is the subject matter of the formal complaint; 3)
the respondent has been determined or adjudged to be guilty of com-
mitting a felony; or 4) the respondent has been disciplined by another
entity having jurisdiction over the practice of law or, with the concur-
rence of the chairperson of the grievance committee, if the member has
been charged with the commission of a felony under applicable law
which warrants the imposition of discipline.'
The ability to file formal complaints based upon a temporary sus-
pension or being charged with a felony are new in the 1990 amend-
ments. Previously, a formal complaint could only be filed upon a find-
ing of probable cause, a conviction or determination of a crime by a
criminal court, or where the respondent had been disciplined by an-
other entity having jurisdiction over the practice of law.'
Under the previous rule, even if the Bar had obtained a temporary
suspension" from the Supreme Court of Florida based upon misappro-
priation of funds or other great public harm, the Bar continued to need
a finding of probable cause prior to the filing of a formal complaint.5
Private reprimands6 for minor misconduct have been renamed as
"admonishments" in the 1990 amendments.' Additionally, within fif-
teen days after a finding of probable cause by a grievance committee, a
respondent may tender a written admission of minor misconduct to bar
2. Amendments, 558 So. 2d at 1008; RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR
Rule 3-3.2(a).
3. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-3.2(a). Former Rule 3-3.2(a)
provided:
Authority to file complaint. No formal complaint shall be filed by the Bar
in disciplinary proceedings against a member of the bar unless either a
grievance committee or the board shall first find probable cause exists to
believe that the respondent is guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary
action or unless the respondent has been determined or adjudged to be
guilty of the commission of a felony or unless the respondent has been
disciplined by another entity having jurisdiction over the practice of law.
The finding of probable cause shall be made by a grievance committee or
by the board in accordance with these rules.
RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-3.2(a) (1989).
4. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-5.1(g) (1989).
5. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-3.2(a) (1989).
6. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-5.1(a) (1989).
7. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-5.1(a).
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counsel or the grievance committee.' Under the prior rule, a respondent
was able to tender an admission of minor misconduct after a finding of
probable cause and before the filing of the formal complaint. Under
the current or prior rule, the grievance committee can accept or reject
such a tender of minor misconduct.
Rule 3-5.1(d) now requires that the public reprimands be reported
in the Southern Reporter. Also, the rule mandates that a respondent
shall appear personally before the Supreme Court of Florida, the board
of governors and a judge designated to administer the reprimand, or
the referee if required. 10 The former rule did not require the public
reprimand to be published in the Southern Reporter, and did not allow
any judge to be designated. The previous rule allowed the Supreme
court, the referee or the board of governors to administer the
reprimand.
Another significant change in the 1990 amendments concerns Rule
3-6.1(c) of the Rules of Discipline regarding employment of certain
disciplined attorneys. The former rule provided: "(c) client contact. No
suspended or disbarred attorney shall have direct contact with any cli-
ent or receive, disburse, or otherwise handle funds or property of a cli-
ent."" Occasionally, when an attorney has disciplinary action pending,
the attorney will decide to tender a petition for resignation.' 2 The resig-
nation must list all pending disciplinary actions and if granted, termi-
nates the respondent's status as an attorney.
Prior to the 1990 amendments, a loophole existed regarding Rule
3-6.1(c) in that an attorney who resigned pending disciplinary action
was not precluded from direct contact with any client and was not pro-
hibited from handling trust funds. The 1990 amendments included at-
torneys who resign with suspended and disbarred attorneys, and pro-
hibited all such disciplined or resigned attorneys from direct contact
with clients and trust funds.' 3
Rule 3-7.31" is a new rule which separates complaints into inquir-
8. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-5.1(b)(5).
9. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-5.1(b)(5) (1989).
10. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-5.1(d).
11. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-6.1(c) (1989).
12. The petition to resign is considered pending disciplinary action and is filed
pursuant to RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.11.
13. Rule 3-6.1(c) provides: "Client contact. No suspended, resigned or disbarred
attorney shall have direct contact with any client or receive, disburse or otherwise han-
dle trust funds or property." RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-6.1(c).
14. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.3 provides:
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ies and disciplinary files (complaints) and requires the complainant to
be notified and given reasons for dismissal of the inquiry/complaint. If
the bar counsel decides to pursue an inquiry, a disciplinary file shall be
opened and the inquiry shall be considered as a complaint if the com-
plaint is provided under oath.15
For the first time, pursuant to Rule 3-7.3(c), complaints, except
those initiated by the Bar, must be in writing and under oath. 6 Most
a) Screening of inquiries. Prior to opening a disciplinary file, bar counsel
shall review the inquiry made and determine whether the alleged conduct,
if proven, would constitute a violation of the Rules warranting the imposi-
tion of discipline. If bar counsel determines that the facts, if proven, would
not constitute a violation of the Rules warranting the imposition of disci-
pline bar counsel may decline to pursue the inquiry. A decision by bar
counsel not to pursue an inquiry shall not preclude further action or review
under the Rules. The complainant shall be notified of a decision not to
pursue an inquiry and shall be given the reasons therefor.
b) Complaint processing and bar counsel investigation. If bar counsel de-
cides to pursue an inquiry, a disciplinary file shall be opened and the in-
quiry shall be considered as a complaint, if the form requirement of (c) is
met. Bar counsel shall investigate the allegations contained in the
complaint.
c) Form for complaints. All complaints, except those initiated by The Flor-
ida Bar, shall be in writing and under oath. The complaint shall contain a
statement providing that: "Under penalty of perjury, I declare the forego-
ing facts are true, correct and complete."
d) Dismissal of disciplinary cases. Bar counsel may dismiss disciplinary
cases if, after complete investigation, bar counsel determines that the facts
show that the attorney did not violate the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar. Dismissal by bar counsel shall not preclude further action or review
under the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Nothing in these rules shall
preclude bar counsel from obtaining the concurrence of the grievance com-
mittee chairperson on the dismissal of a case. If a disciplinary case is dis-
missed, the complainant shall be notified of the dismissal and shall be
given the reasons therefor.
e) Referral to grievance committees. Bar counsel may refer disciplinary
cases to a grievance committee for its further investigation or action as
authorized elsewhere in these rules. Bar counsel may recommend specific
action on a case referred to a grievance committee.
f) Information concerning closed inquiries and complaints dismissed by
staff. When bar counsel does not pursue an inquiry or dismisses a discipli-
nary case, such action shall be deemed a finding of no probable cause for
further disciplinary proceedings and the matter shall become public
information.
15. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.3(b).
16. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.3(c).
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significantly, under the 1990 amendments, a complainant no longer has
absolute immunity, 17 but now is subject to applicable Florida law
which provides for a qualified privilege. When the law required an ab-
solute immunity for a complainant arising out of making a grievance
complaint, confidentiality rules existed which required summarily dis-
missed files, files closed with no probable cause findings and files result-
ing in private reprimands to remain confidential.1 8 Further, during the
pendency of a grievance case, most files were confidential prior to the
filing of a formal complaint.1 9 The changes made regarding confidenti-
ality will be addressed later in this article.
The 1990 amendments changed portions of the grievance commit-
tee procedures.2 0 Admonishments made after no probable cause find-
ings are now called "letters of advice."2 Previously, in order to have a
quorum of the grievance committee, the chairperson, or vice-chairper-
son, another lawyer member and any other member were required to
be present. Currently, three members of a grievance committee are re-
quired, two of whom must be lawyers." Three-member panels can now
determine matters .2 The chairperson or vice-chairperson need not be a
member of the panel. 24 Dividing a grievance committee into panels al-
lows the committee to determine matters more expeditiously.
Another new requirement to the grievance committee procedures
is that a lawyer grievance committee member may not vote on the dis-
position of any matter in which that member served as the investigat-
ing member of the committee.2 5 However, nonlawyer grievance com-
mittee members can vote on matters they investigated. At least one-
third of grievance committees are comprised of non-lawyer members. 6
There have been significant changes regarding the rights and re-
sponsibilities of the respondent. Under the prior rule, a grievance com-
mittee could not find probable cause unless the respondent had been
17. Previously, a complaining party had absolute immunity when filing a com-
plaint against an attorney with the Bar. Stone v. Rosen, 348 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1977).
18. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1 (1989).
19. Id.
20. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.4.
21. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.4(e).
22. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.4(f).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-3.4(c).
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granted the right to be present at any grievance committee hearing at
which evidence was presented, to face the accuser, to call witnesses or
present evidence and to cross-examine, subject to reasonable
limitation.27
Under the 1990 amendments, a respondent no longer has the right
to be present when evidence is presented to the grievance committee. 28
The grievance committee now has the option of holding an evidentiary
hearing with the respondent and complainant present or determining
the matter based upon a paper hearing consisting of documents.2 9 If
the grievance committee determines the matters based on documents
without the respondent present, the respondent shall be provided with
all materials considered by the committee and shall be given an oppor-
tunity to provide a written response for consideration by the grievance
committee. In any event, the respondent has a right to be advised of the
conduct which is being investigated and the rules which may have been
violated before a hearing at which any finding of probable cause or
minor misconduct is made. 0
Providing the grievance committees with the option of holding
open hearings should help to expedite probable cause determinations.31
However, it is important to be reminded that the grievance committee
determination is a decision regarding whether probable cause exists for
further proceedings after a finding of probable cause is found. A de
novo adversary hearing is held before a referee appointed by the Su-
27. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.4(g) (1989).
28. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.4(g).
29. Id. Rule 3-7.4(g) provides:
Rights and responsibilities of the respondent. The respondent may be re-
quired to testify and to produce evidence as any other witness unless the
respondent claims a privilege or right properly available to the respondent
under applicable federal or state law. The respondent may be accompanied
by counsel. At a reasonable time before any finding of probable cause or
minor misconduct is made the respondent shall be advised of the conduct
which is being investigated and the rules which may have been violated.
The respondent shall be provided with all materials considered by the com-
mittee and shall be given an opportunity to make a written statement
sworn or unsworn, explaining, refuting, or admitting the alleged
misconduct.
30. Id.
31. In a previous article written on the changes in the bar rules, the author ex-
pressed concern regarding the respondent's rights being changed at the grievance com-
mittee level. See Diane Marger Moore, "New" Grievance Procedures: A Summary and
Analysis, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1991, at 35, 40.
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preme Court of Florida. 2 A trial is held before the referee and the
referee's findings and recommendations are forwarded to the Supreme
court which issues its opinion or order in the matter."
Similarly, the complainant is granted the right to be present at
any grievance committee hearing when the respondent is present before
the committee unless found to be impractical by the chairperson of the
grievance committee due to unreasonable delay or other good cause. 4
Accordingly, both the complainant and the respondent have the same
right to be present when the grievance committee determines their
presence is appropriate.35
The new Rule 3-7.40) defines the record before the grievance
committee as consisting of all reports, correspondence, papers and/or
recordings furnished to or received from the respondent, and the tran-
script of grievance committee meetings or hearings if the proceedings
were attended by a court reporter. 6
Notice of the grievance committee's action is provided to the re-
viewer (the local member of the board of governors that oversees the
actions of a particular grievance committee).37 If the reviewer disagrees
with the grievance committee's action, the designated reviewer shall
make a report and recommendation to the disciplinary review commit-
tee.3 8 If the designated reviewer does not make a report and recommen-
dation within twenty-one days following the mailing date of the notice
of grievance committee action, then the grievance committee action
shall become final. 39
32. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.6(b).
33. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.7.
34. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.4(h). Rule 3-7.4(h)
provides:
Rights of the complaining witness. The complaining witness is not a party
to the disciplinary proceeding. Unless found to be impractical by the chair-
man of the grievance committee due to unreasonable delay or other good
cause, the complainant shall be granted the right to be present at any
grievance committee hearing when the respondent is present before the
committee. Neither unwillingness nor neglect of the complaining witness to
cooperate, nor settlement, compromise, or restitution will excuse the com-
pletion of an investigation. The complaining witness shall have no right to
appeal.
35. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.4(g), (h).
36. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.4().
37. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.5(b).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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B. Confidentiality Rule Changes
The 1990 amendments to the Rules extensively changed the confi-
dentiality rule and definition of public records regarding disciplinary
proceedings.' 0 Rule 3-7.1, as amended, opened the grievance process to
40. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1. Rule 3-7.1 provides:
Confidentiality. All matters including files, preliminary investigation re-
ports, inter-office memoranda, records of investigations, and the records in
trials and other proceedings under these rules, except those disciplinary
matters conducted in circuit courts, are property of The florida Bar. All of
those matters shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as
provided in these rules. When disclosure is permitted under these rules, it
shall be limited to information concerning the status of the proceedings
and any information which is part of the public record as defined in these
rules.
(a) Public record. The public record shall consist of the record before a
grievance committee, the record before a referee, the record before the
Supreme Court of Florida and any reports, correspondence, papers, record-
ings and/or transcripts of hearings furnished to, served on or received from
the respondent or the complainant.
(b) Circuit court proceeding. Proceedings under rule 3-3.5 shall be public
information. Contempt proceedings authorized elsewhere in these rules
shall be public information even though the underlying disciplinary matter
is confidential as defined in these rules.
(c) Limitations on disclosure. Any material provided to the Florida Bar
which is confidential under applicable law shall remain confidential and
shall not be disclosed except as authorized by the applicable law. If this
type of material is made a part of the public record, that portion of the
public record may be sealed by the grievance committee chairman, the
referee or the Supreme Court of Florida.
(d) Disclosure of information. Unless otherwise ordered by this Court or
the referee in proceedings under this rule, nothing in these rules shall pro-
hibit the complainant, respondent or any witness from disclosing the exis-
tence of proceedings under these rules or from disclosing any documents or
correspondence served on or provided to those persons.
(e) Response to inquiry. Representatives of the Florida Bar, authorized by
the board of governors, shall respond to specific inquiries, concerning mat-
ters which are in the public domain, but otherwise confidential under the
rules, by acknowledging the status of the proceedings.
(f) Notice to law firms. When a disciplinary file is opened the respondent
shall disclose to his or her current law firm and, if different, respondent's
law firm at the time of the act(s) giving rise to the complaint, the fact that
a disciplinary file has been opened. Disclosure shall be in writing and in
the following form: "A complaint of unethical conduct against me has
been filed with the Florida Bar. The nature of the allegations are [insert
allegations]. This notice is provided pursuant to Rule 3-7.1(f) of the Rules
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Regulating the Florida Bar."
The notice shall be provided within fifteen (15) days of notice that a disci-
plinary file has been opened and a copy of the above notice shall be served
on the Florida Bar.
(g) Pending investigation. Disciplinary matters pending at the initial inves-
tigatory and grievance committee levels shall be treated as confidential by
the Florida Bar, except as provided in rule 3-7.1(e).
(h) Minor misconduct cases. Any case in which a finding of minor miscon-
duct has been entered, by action of the grievance committee or board, shall
become public information.
(i) Probable cause cases. Any disciplinary case in which a finding of prob-
able cause for further disciplinary proceedings has been entered shall be
public information. For purposes of this paragraph a finding of probable
cause shall be deemed to have been made in those cases authorized by rule
3-3.2(a), for the filing of a formal complaint without the prior necessity of
a finding of probable cause.
j) No probable cause cases. Any disciplinary case which has been con-
cluded by a finding of no probable cause for further disciplinary proceed-
ings shall become public information.
(k) Production of disciplinary records pursuant to subpoena. the Florida
Bar, pursuant to a valid subpoena, issued by a regulatory agency, may
provide any documents, which are a portion of the public record, even if
the disciplinary proceeding is confidential under these rules, the Florida
Bar may charge a reasonable fee for identification of and photocopying the
documents.
(1) Notice to judges. Any judge of a court of record may be advised as to
the status of a confidential disciplinary case and may be provided with a
copy of the public record. The judge shall maintain the confidentiality of
the matter.
(m) Evidence of crime. The confidential nature of these proceedings shall
not preclude the giving of any information or testimony to authorities au-
thorized to investigate alleged criminal activity.
(n) Alcohol and drug treatment. That an attorney has voluntarily sought,
received, or accepted treatment for alcoholism or alcohol or drug abuse
shall be confidential and shall not be admitted as evidence in disciplinary
proceedings under these rules unless agreed to by the attorney who sought
the treatment.
It is the purpose of this paragraph to encourage attorneys to voluntarily
seek advice, counsel, and treatment available to attorneys, without fear
that the fact it is sought or rendered, will or might cause embarrassment
in any future disciplinary matter.
(o) Response to false or misleading statements. If public statements which
are false or misleading are made about any otherwise confidential discipli-
nary case, the Florida Bar may disclose all information necessary to cor-
rect such false or misleading statements.
Disclosure by waiver of respondent. Upon written waiver executed by
a respondent, the Florida Bar may disclose the status of otherwise confi-
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public review.4'
The confidentiality rule amendments pertain to any inquiry or
complaint file received by the Bar on or after March 17, 1990, as the
rules became effective March 17, 1990.42 However, the removal of the
gag rule was applied retroactively and applied to disciplinary files re-
ceived prior to or subsequent to March 17, 1990.13
The gag rule concerned the previous requirement that a complain-
ant or witness could not disclose the existence of a Florida Bar matter
unless the matter reached a public level." This rule has been elimi-
nated by the 1990 amendments. Additionally, prior to the Florida Su-
preme Court issuing its opinion amending the confidentiality rules, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida found
the gag rule unconstitutional. 5
The Florida Supreme Court's March 16, 1990 amended opinion
summarized the confidentiality rule changes as follows:
Rule 3-7.1, as amended, opens the grievance process to public re-
view. Disclosure under the rule is limited to information concerning
the status of the proceedings and information which is part of the
public record. Paragraph (a) clarifies what constitutes the "public
record." Paragraph (b), as amended, provides that proceedings
under Rule 3-3.5 are public and contempt proceedings authorized
under the rules are public, even if the underlying disciplinary mat-
ter is otherwise confidential. Consistent with this amendment, para-
graph (f)(2) of former Rule 3-7.10 dealing with the preservation of
confidentiality during contempt proceedings has been deleted. Like-
wise, paragraph (g) of Rule 3-7.11 (former Rule 3-7.10) has been
amended to reflect this change. Paragraph (d) of the Rules 3-7.1
allows the complainant, respondent, or any witness to disclose the
existence of disciplinary proceedings and any documents or corre-
dential disciplinary proceedings and provide copies of the public record to:
(1) The Florida Board of Bar Examiners or the comparable body in other
jurisdictions for the purpose of evaluating the character and fitness of an
applicant for admission to practice law in that jurisdiction; or
(2) Florida judicial nominating commissions or the comparable body in
other jurisdictions for the purpose of evaluating the character and fitness
of a candidate for judicial office.
41. Id.
42. See Amendments, 558 So. 2d at 1011.
43. Id.
44. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1 (1989).
45. See Doe v. Gonzales, 723 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Fla. 1988), afid, 886 F.2d
1323 (1lth Cir. 1989) (construing FLA. STAT. § 112.317(6) (1987)).
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spondence served on or provided them. Consistent with this change,
paragraph (e) of Rule 3-7.11 (former Rule 3-7.10) no longer pro-
hibits witnesses from disclosing the existence of a disciplinary pro-
ceeding or the identity of the respondent. Paragraph (e) of Rule 3-
7.1 allows authorized representatives of the Bar to respond to in-
quiries concerning matters in the public domain, but otherwise con-
fidential, by acknowledging the status of the proceedings. Under
paragraph (g) of that rule, disciplinary matters pending at the ini-
tial investigatory and grievance committee levels shall be treated as
confidential by the Bar, except as provided in paragraph (e). Under
paragraph (h) of Rule 3-7.1, disciplinary cases in which a finding
of minor misconduct has been entered became public information.
Similarly, upon a finding of probable cause or no probable cause
disciplinary cases become public information, under paragraphs (i)
and (j), respectively. Paragraph (i) also provides that for purposes
of that paragraph a finding of probable cause shall be deemed to
have been made in those cases authorized by Rule 3-3.2(a) for fil-
ing of a formal complaint without the prior necessity of a finding of
probable cause. Paragraph (k) authorizes the Bar to provide infor-
mation pursuant to subpoenas of regulatory agencies. Paragraph
(1) provides that any judge may be advised as to the status of a
confidential matter and provided with a copy of the public record.
Paragraph (o), which is new, replaces paragraph 3-7.1(a)(1)(e)
which allowed the Bar to disclose information necessary to correct
a false or misleading statement made by a candidate for public
office concerning a disciplinary action against the candidate. This
paragraph authorizes the Bar to respond to false and misleading
statements made by any person regarding disciplinary cases by dis-
closing all information necessary to correct the false or misleading
statements. Paragraph T, which is also new, allows the Bar, upon
written waiver by the respondent, to disclose the status of the pro-
ceeding and to provide copies of the public record to the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners, the Florida judicial nominating commis-
sions and comparable bodies in other jurisdictions."'
The: "public record" is now defined as the public record before a
grievance committee, referee, and the Supreme Court of Florida, and
any reports, correspondence, papers, recordings and/or transcripts of
hearings furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent or the
complainant.47
46. See Amendments, 558 So. 2d at 1010.
47. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(a).
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Any party other than the Bar can disclose the existence of a griev-
ance at any time because the gag rule no longer exists. However, the
Bar must maintain the confidential nature of its files regarding pending
matters being reviewed by staff or a grievance committee. Once staff or
a grievance committee closes a matter, the public record portion of the
file is public and subject to public review. 8
Any material provided to the Bar which is confidential under ap-
plicable law shall remain confidential and shall not be disclosed except
as authorized by the applicable law and may be sealed in the
proceedings."9
While a matter is pending with the Bar, representatives of the Bar
shall respond to specific inquiries concerning matters which are in the
public domain, but otherwise confidential under the rules by acknowl-
edging the status of the proceedings.50
When a disciplinary file is opened, the respondent is required to
disclose to his or her current law firm, and if different, respondent's law
firm at the time of the acts giving rise to the complaint, the fact that a
disciplinary file has been opened.5 1
Disciplinary matters pending at the initial investigatory and griev-
ance committee levels shall be treated as confidential by the Bar except
where a specific inquiry is made pursuant to Rule 3-7.1(e). 2
A major distinction between the new and old rules concerns the
fact that pursuant to the 1990 amendments, any case in which a find-
ing of minor misconduct has been entered by action of the grievance
48. Id.
49. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(c).
50. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(e).
51. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(f). Rule 3-7.1(f)
provides:
Notice to law firms. When a disciplinary file is opened the respondent shall
disclose to his or her current law firm and, if different, respondent's law
firm at the time of the act(s) giving rise to the complaint, the fact that a
disciplinary file has been opened. Disclosure shall be in writing and in the
following form: "A complaint of unethical conduct against me has been
filed with the Florida Bar. The nature of the allegations are [insert allega-
tions]. This notice is provided pursuant to rule 3-7.1(f) of the Rules Regu-
lating the Florida Bar."
The notice shall be provided within fifteen (15) days of notice that a disci-
plinary file has been opened and a copy of the above notice shall be served
on the Florida Bar.
52. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(g).
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committee or board shall become public information.5 3 Under the for-
mer rules, private reprimands for minor misconduct were treated as
confidential. 4
Once probable cause or no probable cause for further proceedings
has been entered, the proceedings shall become public information. 5
Under the former rules, the proceedings were not public information
until a formal complaint had been filed in the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida, and the proceedings were confidential upon findings of no probable
cause 
5 0
Rule 3-7.1(k) 57 now authorizes the Bar to provide documents
which are a portion of the public record to regulatory agencies pursu-
ant to a subpoena.
Judges may be advised in confidence as to the status of a confiden-
tial disciplinary case and may be provided with a copy of the public
record. 18
The confidential nature of the former and current rule both au-
thorize the furnishing of information or testimony to authorities au-
thorized to investigate alleged criminal activity. 59
For the first time, the amended rules allow the Bar to disclose all
information necessary to correct public statements which are false and
misleading which are made about any otherwise confidential discipli-
nary case.60
Upon a respondent's written waiver, the Bar may disclose the sta-
tus of otherwise confidential disciplinary proceedings and provide copies
of the public record to the Florida Board of Bar Examiners or compa-
rable body, or The Florida Judicial Nominating Committee or compa-
rable body.61
53. Id.
54. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1 (1989).
55. RULEs REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rules 3-7.1(i), ().
56. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rules 3-7.1(1), (2) (1989).
57. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(k) provides:
Production of disciplinary records pursuant to subpoena. The Florida Bar,
pursuant to a valid subpoena, issued by a regulatory agency, may provide
any documents which are a portion of the public record, even if the disci-
plinary proceeding is confidential under these rules. The Bar may charge a
reasonable fee for identification of and photocopying the documents.
58. RULEs REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(1).
59. RULEs REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(m); RULES REGULATING
THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(m) (1989).
60. R.ULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(o).
61. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.1(p).
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The amended rules allow the Bar to charge for reproduction
charges and a reasonable fee incident to a request to review discipli-
nary records or for research into the records of disciplinary proceedings
and identification of documents to be reproduced.62
The Florida Supreme Court stated in its opinion amending the
rules: "[W]e agree with the commission that public respect and confi-
dence primarily in the self-operated lawyer disciplinary system can best
be gained by allowing the public to determine for itself that the griev-
ance system works efficiently, fairly and accurately.""3
1II. AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA
BAR REGARDING PERJURED TESTIMONY
In 1990, The Florida Supreme Court also amended the Rules re-
garding an attorney's duties and obligations concerning a client who
wishes to present or has presented perjured testimony.6'
Rule 4-3.3 was amended to include the following:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . .(4) permit any witness, in-
cluding a criminal defendant to offer testimony or other evidence
that the lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer may not offer testi-
mony which he knows to be false in the form of a narrative unless
so ordered by the tribunal. If a lawyer has offered material evi-
dence and thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall
take reasonable remedial measures. 5
Previously, it was believed that it was acceptable for a lawyer to
allow his client to testify in a narrative fashion if the client intended to
testify falsely. The comment to Rule 4-3.3 explains that legal argument
based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty
toward the tribunal. 66
An attorney has the following obligations if he or she learns that a
client is about to or has offered false testimony or evidence: 1) the law-
yer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be
offered; 2) if it has been offered, that its false character should immedi-
62. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.6(n).
63. See Amendments, 558 So. 2d at 1009.
64. See The Florida Bar re Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar, 557 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1990); RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-3.3.
65. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-3.3(a)(4).
66. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-3.3(a)(4) cmt.
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ately be disclosed; or 3) if the persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must
take reasonable remedial measures.67
A lawyer who knows that his client is about to testify falsely faces
a great dilemma. Ethically, the lawyer cannot allow the client to testify
falsely. However, to prevent the client from testifying falsely, the law-
yer may have to disclose the existence of the client's deception to the
court or opposing party. 8 Such a disclosure can cause severe conse-
quences to the client.
The best alternative is to dissuade the client from testifying falsely
or if the false testimony has already been given, the client should be
persuaded to correct the false testimony. If the client is aware that the
lawyer will disclose the intention to testify falsely or the fact that it has
occurred, then the client should be motivated to correct the situation.
However, the attorney-client relationship can certainly be affected by a
client knowing that the lawyer has or will reveal information harmful
to the client. The comment to Rule 4-3.3 has an excellent discussion of
the lawyer's responsibilities and dilemmas when a client has or will tes-
tify falsely.69
Rule 4-3.3 was amended after the Bar's Special Committee on
Perjured Testimony proposed the amendment to the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.70 The Special Committee on Perjured Testimony was
approved by Florida Bar President Ray Ferrero after a Florida attor-
ney was held in contempt for refusing to continue representation of a
criminal defendant who the lawyer implied intended to lie when
testifying.71
Thus, 1990 amendments to Rule 4-3.3 clarified an attorney's obli-
gation if and when the dilemma of a client intending to or testifying
falsely arises.
67. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-3.3(a)(4).
68. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-3.3(a)(4) cmt.
69. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-3.3 cmt.
70. See Randolph Braccialarghe, Client Perjury: The Law in Florida, 12 Nova
L. Rev. 708, 709 (1988).
71. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This year's survey of Florida evidence has once again followed the
same predictable patterns as seen in previous survey years.1 Hearsay
* J.D., Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center, 1987 (with honors); B.A.,
University of Florida, 1978; Assistant State Attorney Broward County, 1987-90; Part-
ner in the firm of Bruschi, Eng & Koerner, P.A. 1990-92.
The author would like to thank Howard Nelson who helped in the research of this
article and Kee Juen Eng and Hugh L. Koerner who supplied helpful comments during
the writing of this article.
i. This is the sixth annual survey of Florida evidence that the Nova Law Review
has published. A break in the annual survey of evidence occurred in 1988-89. The 1990
Survey of Florida Evidence was brought up to date and included Florida evidence deci-
sions from October 1988 through October 1990. In order to make the Survey of Flor-
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generated the most case law during the survey period, while criminal
decisions outnumbered civil cases in evidentiary case law. The survey
period has been moved up from last year and, consequently, fewer cases
were decided during the survey period.
The only legislative change in the rules of evidence came in section
90.803, the public records exception. The change affects the criminal
case exclusion in public records for matters observed by police officers.
The change appears to affect only drunk driving criminal cases and is,
once again, a legislative overreaction to the public outcry of drunk
driving.
II. RELEVANCE3
An interesting relevance case reached the Florida Supreme Court
during the survey period. The Florida Supreme Court decided the case
of Sims v. Brown4 which involved medical malpractice. In the Sims
case, Mary Brown sued David Sims, a gynecologist, Christian Keedy, a
neurosurgeon, and South Miami Hospital claiming the defendants' neg-
ligence caused her to suffer a stroke either during, or shortly after, an
ida law more useful, the Nova Law Review has changed the publication date of the
survey from the last issue published during the year to the first issue published during
the year.
2. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 255 (West), amending FLA. STAT. § 90.803(8)
(1989).
3. Relevance involves the following three sections of the evidence code:
FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1989).
Definition of Relevant Evidence.
Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact.
FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (1989).
Admissibility of Relevant Evidence.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law.
FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
Exclusion on Grounds of Prejudice or Confusion.
Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading
the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. This section shall
not be construed to mean that evidence of the existence of available third-
party benefits is inadmissible.
Though sections 90.404 to 90.410 involve relevance, no significant cases were reported
during the survey period. Therefore, only the above-referenced sections will be ex-
amined in this article.
4. 574 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1991).
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operation performed by Sims to remove an ovarian cyst.5 Sims re-
quested Keedy to perform a preoperative neurological examination of
Ms. Brown prior to Ms. Brown's surgery. Keedy cleared Ms. Brown for
surgery, but did not write a report until after the operation. Another
doctor for the hospital, a Doctor Albanes, also cleared Ms. Brown for
the surgery. Sims removed the ovarian cyst, and either during, or af-
ter, the surgery, Ms. Brown suffered a stroke. Ms. Brown contended
that had a proper preoperative examination been conducted, any condi-
tion which could have been a factor in the stroke would have been dis-
covered and corrected before surgery.
Ms. Brown's counsel attempted to enter into evidence a 1979 re-
port of the Joint Commission of Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH)
which found a deficiency in the hospital's recording of a patient's cur-
rent history and their physical examination.' The trial judge rejected
this evidence because it was remote in time, a subsequent report issued
by the same commission did not indicate any deficiency in the hospi-
tal's record keeping, and the trial court found the report irrelevant and
confusing.'
In upholding the trial court's rejection of this evidence, the su-
preme court examined two areas. First, the supreme court stated that
for evidence to be relevant, especially when it is remote, "a prior dan-
gerous condition or negligent cause of conduct must be shown to con-
tinue uncorrected up to the time of the act sued upon."1 Because of
the passage of time, the probative value of the report was minimal
since the cause of conduct could not be shown to be continuous. Since
the 'subsequent' report did not indicate that the prior deficient conduct
was continuing, the probative value of the evidence was minimal, thus
rendering it inadmissible. 1 The court examined the logical relevance of
the evidence and stated:
5. Id. On a jurisdictional basis, the supreme court did not hear argument regard-
ing Doctor Sims. However, the supreme court granted review in the case regarding
Doctor Keedy and South Miami Hospital and reversed the district court's order vacat-
ing the jury verdicts for Doctor Keedy and South Miami Hospital.
6. Id. Doctor Albanes report was documented but there is no indication in the
record if it was written before the surgery.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 133.
9. Sims, 574 So. 2d at 133.
10. I'd.
11. Id.
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The chief object in introducing evidence is, to secure a rational as-
certainment of facts; therefore facts should not be submitted to the
jury unless they are logically relevant to the issues. A fact in a
cause must be both logically and legally relevant, for even logical
relevancy does not in all cases render proposed evidence admissible.
A fact which in connection with other facts, renders probable the
existence of a fact in issue, should still be rejected where, under the
circumstances of the case, it is essentially misleading or too
remote.12
Second, the supreme court found that the excluded report was not
legally relevant under section 90.403, since the excluded report was
more prejudicial than probative and created needless confusion which
could mislead the jury. Since the report was remote in time and the
activity was not continuous, the report's probative value was minimal.
The jury could have given undue weight to this marginal evidence and
arrived at an erroneous verdict. 13
Another point in issue was whether the trial judge should have
excluded a manual of the JCAH.' 4 The manual contained standards
for hospitals and interpretive commentaries. The trial judge was willing
to admit the standards but not the commentaries. Brown chose an all
or nothing position and the manual was excluded. In reversing the dis-
trict court, and upholding the trial court's decision to exclude the man-
ual, the supreme court pointed out that there was already testimony in
the record regarding what is required for a patient preoperative exami-
nation. Therefore, the supreme court found that the exclusion of cumu-
lative testimony, the standards and the commentaries, is not an ade-
quate basis for vacating a jury verdict. 15
In Carr v. State6 the district court demonstrates the interplay be-
tween section 90.403 and section 90.404(2)," in reversing the defend-
ant's conviction for possession of cocaine. In Carr, a deputy sheriff ob-
served the defendant talking with other persons in front of a home in
12. Id. at 133-34 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line v. Campbell, 139 So. 886, 890
(1932)).
13. Id. at 133-34.
14. Id. at 134.
15. Id.
16. 578 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
17. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2) (1989) covers similar fact evidence otherwise known
as Williams Rule after Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
847 (1959).
300 [Vol. 16
299
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Bruschi
Lake City. The deputy called the defendant over and asked permission
to search him. After obtaining permission to search, and finding no
contraband, the deputy ran a computer check on the defendant which
revealed an outstanding warrant for a violation of probation. The de-
fendant was handcuffed and taken to a detention center where a second
search revealed two plastic baggies of cocaine allegedly found in the
defendant's left shirt pocket. 9
At trial, defense witnesses testified that the street search of the
defendant was thorough and no contraband was discovered during this
initial search.19 The assistant state attorney, outside the presence of the
jury, sought and received permission to elicit testimony that the de-
fendant was a cocaine user and that he had previously been convicted
of cocaine possession. 0 The assistant state attorney argued that the de-
fendant's prior conviction and cocaine use were admissible to prove
knowledge of the presence of the drug on his person and "that a person
who had possessed cocaine in the past would possess cocaine on the
occasion at issue."2 Over the defendant's objections, the trial court al-
lowed the State's use of the prior conviction and indicated that the 10-
day rule for use of similar fact evidence was not needed since the evi-
dence was offered as impeachment and rebuttal of the defendant's de-
fense that the cocaine was planted on him.2
18. Carr, 578 So. 2d at 398.
19. Id. at 398-99.
20. Id. at 399. It is hard to imagine a more egregious error than to elicit the type
of prior crime the Defendant was convicted of and then use the conviction of the prior
crime to link up evidence needed in the present trial. Unless proper notice and care is
given for this unauthorized use of similar fact evidence, a reversal is almost sure to
follow. One of the most common reasons for reversal of criminal cases is the improper
use of similar fact, Williams Rule, evidence.
Even when notice is properly given for the use of this type of evidence, care must
be taken not to misuse it or allow it to become a feature of the trial. The prosecutor
walks a tightrope, with essentially devastating evidence, when similar fact evidence is
utilized. A. proper understanding of the pitfalls of using similar fact evidence must be
understood by the proponent, otherwise, a reversal is inevitable.
21. d.
22. /d. How the court determined that a previous conviction of cocaine would in
any way rebut whether the cocaine was planted on the defendant in this particular case
is beyond common imagination. It can only be assumed that a complete misunderstand-
ing of the use of Williams Rule pervades or that the trial court record was unclear.
In any event, a common rule of thumb is that if the State in any way perceives the
need for similar fact evidence it should file the ten-day notice. Generally, only if the
similar fact evidence in the case is inextricably interwoven with the facts of the case
will the 10 day notice be inapplicable. See Austin v. State, 500 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1st
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The district court disagreed with the trial court and reversed the
defendant's conviction. The district court found that the credibility of
the defendant was the real jury issue23 and that the evidence of the
defendant's prior conviction for possession of cocaine was not related to
the charge being tried .2  The jury was permitted to infer guilt regard-
ing the present charge because the "Williams Rule" evidence suggested
that the defendant had a propensity to commit this type of crime. Since
the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming, the "Williams Rule" evi-
dence should have been excluded because the probative value was out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
III. WITNESSES
A. The Deadman's Statute
The "Deadman's Statute" concerns an area of evidence which has
not generated much case law over the past few years. The "Deadman's
Statute" is codified in section 90.60225 of the evidence code and is basi-
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Tumulty v. State, 489 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
23. Carr, 578 So. 2d at 400. The issue in this case came down to simply who the
jury chose to believe. Evidence of the crime of possession of cocaine was clear, if you
believed the officer that arrested the Defendant. However, if the jury chose to believe
the defendant's story that the evidence was planted on him (he was thoroughly
searched), then no crime occurred. Clearly, the case came down to one of credibility,
who would the jury believe. The improper admission of similar fact evidence in this
context demonstrates to the jury that since the defendant was involved in another simi-
lar possession crime it was more likely that he would be involved in committing this
crime. This would, of course, devastate any chance the defendant had of being believed
based on the facts of this case only.
24. Id. at 400. The admission of irrelevant similar fact evidence will be presumed
harmful where the evidence of guilt is not overwhelming. However, the admission of
such evidence is not harmful, or reversible, when the evidence of guilt is clear and
convincing. See Keen v. State, 504 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1987); Straight v. State, 397 So.
2d 903 (Fla.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1022 (1981). Though the Florida Supreme Court
uses the term 'clear and convincing,' most courts simply examine the record to see if
the proof of guilt is overwhelming without reference to the impermissible similar fact
evidence.
25. FLA. STAT. § 90.602 (1989). The statute is set out as follows:
Testimony of Interested Persons.
(1) No person interested in an action or proceeding against the personal
representative, heir-at-law, assignee, legatee, devisee, or survivor of a de-
ceased person, or against the assignee, committee, or guardian of an insane
person, shall be examined as a witness regarding any oral communication
between the interested person and the person who is deceased or insane at
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cally a narrow prohibition which prevents the testimony of an inter-
ested person regarding transactions and communications between the
interested person and an individual who has since died." The
"Deadman's Statute" protects the estate of a decedent against false
and fraudulent claims, since the decedent is not able to testify, and
refute oral evidence of claims against his estate.
In Sun Bank v. Saewitz2 the Third District Court of Appeal, in a
two to one decision, discussed the proper application of the "Deadman's
Statute," since its revision and recodification from section 90.05 to sec-
tion 90.602. In Sun Bank, the plaintiff, who was the son of the dece-
dent, brought an action against Sun Bank, as personal representative of
the decedent's estate, to recover money the son allegedly loaned to his
mother, the decedent. In the plaintiff's complaint he attached a copy of
a check for $100,000.00 payable to the decedent and signed by the
plaintiff's wife from their joint account. The word 'loan' appeared on
the check to the decedent. Additionally, the son claimed in the com-
plaint that the check was a loan to his mother with whom he had a
business relationship. Both parties stipulated that the plaintiff and his
wife were interested parties.2 8
At trial, the check and the testimony of the plaintiff and his wife
were admitted into evidence over the objection of Sun Bank. The trial
court entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $100,000.00
and Sun Bank appealed. Sun Bank argued on appeal that the trial
court erred in admitting the check as evidence, since checks are used
for a variety of reasons and do not demonstrate clear evidence of debt
sufficient to avoid the application of the 'Deadman's Statute.' The ap-
pellate court distinguished Sun Bank's argument by demonstrating that
the time of the examination.
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) A personal representative, heir-at-law, assignee, legatee, devisee, or
survivor of a deceased person, or the assignee, committee, or guarding of
an insane person, is examined on his own behalf regarding the oral
communication.
(b) Evidence of the subject matter of the oral communication is offered by
the personal representative, heir-at-law, assignee, legatee, devisee, or survi-
vor of a deceased person, or the assignee, committee, or guarding of an
insane person.
FLA. STAT. § 90.602 (1989).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975). This statutory section was where the original
"Deadman's Statute" was codified.
27. 579 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
28. Id. at 255-56.
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the check in the case sub judice evidenced a debt because of the in-
scription of the word 'loan' on its face, which was endorsed without
restriction. The appellate court felt that under these circumstances the
check constituted a writing which demonstrated an indebtedness and,
thus, was admissible into evidence.29
The appellate court also rejected Sun Bank's second argument
that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the interested
plaintiff and his wife. The appellate court pointed out that section
90.602 only excludes testimony that refers to conversations between an
interested party and a deceased person."0 It does not exclude testimony
by an interested party regarding written transactions or written com-
munications with a deceased person."1
The Sun Bank case drew a sharp dissent from Justice Ferguson of
the Third District Court of Appeal.3 2 Justice Ferguson stated that since
the 'Deadman's Statute' bars critical communications, regarding omit-
ted contract terms, the plaintiff in the case sub judice simply went
through the back door by having inferences drawn from testimony of
dealings with the deceased and other transactions.3" Justice Ferguson
pointed out that the notation on the check does not answer the main
question, that is, whether the decedent rather than the plaintiff, was
the borrower. 3' Justice Ferguson adhered to the court's earlier decision
in Fabian v. Ryan35 and stated "that where the inescapable inference
from the testimony of an interested party would show that the decedent
agreed to a material term or condition which is missing from the writ-
ten contract, the testimony would violate the Deadman's Statute, sec-
tion 90.602."Il
29. Id. at 256. The appellate court also distinguished between the old
"Deadman's Statute," FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975), which precluded interested persons
from acting as witnesses regarding "transactions" and "oral communications" between
the interested person and the deceased, and the revised language of FLA. STAT. §
90.602, which only prohibits such testimony from an interested person insofar as it
concerns "oral communications." Section 90.602 omits any language regarding "trans-
actions" which is not impermissible.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Sun Bank, 579 So. 2d at 258 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 486 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 494 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1096 (1987).
36. Sun Bank, 579 So. 2d at 258 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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IV. OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
During the survey period the Florida courts decided, and reversed,
cases based on improper expert testimony. 87 In Seibert v. Bayport
Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n,38 an architect, Mr. Seibert was charged in
a complaint filed by the Bayport Beach Condominium Association for
damages arising from a defective roofing design and construction, de-
fective fire exit design, defective stucco design and construction, and
defective ceiling slab design. The jury returned a verdict finding Mr.
Seibert not guilty of negligence or building code violations with respect
to the roof, the stucco, and the ceiling slabs, but found him liable for
the defective fire exit design. 9
At trial, the Condominium Association presented an expert wit-
ness to testify regarding Mr. Seibert's liability. Mr. Robert Crain, a
structural engineer, testified that under his interpretation the fire exit
design did not comply with the Standard Building Code.40 Mr. Seibert,
in turn, testified that in his professional opinion the fire exit design did
meet the requirements of the code and had two additional experts, Mr.
Herbert Lovett and Mr. Gary Walker testify on his behalf. 41
Mr. Lovett testified that he interpreted the code as requiring only
the type of fire exit that Mr. Seibert had designed. Mr. Walker testi-
fied that he had been employed by the Southern Building Congress
which had promulgated the Standard Building Code. Mr. Walker testi-
fied that the official interpretation of the code indicated that Mr. Sei-
bert's design of the fire exit was appropriate. After hearing the testi-
mony the jury returned a verdict against Mr. Seibert for damages
regarding the design of the fire exit.42
The Second District Court of Appeal made short shrift of the ex-
pert testimony presented in the lower court and reversed. During trial,
37. Opinion and expert testimony is found in the following sections of the evi-
dence code: FLA. STAT. § 90.701 (1989) (opinion testimony of lay witnesses); FLA.
STAT. § 90.702 (1989) (testimony by experts); FLA. STAT. § 90.703 (1989) (opinion on
ultimate issue); FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1989) (basis of opinion testimony by experts);
FLA. STA'r. § 90.705 (1989) (disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion);
FLA. STAT. § 90.706 (1989) (authoritativeness of literature for use in cross-
examination).
38. 573 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
39. Id. at 890-91.
40. Id. at 891.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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the jury was asked to decide if the fire exits were designed in compli-
ance with the Standard Building Code. To make this determination the
jury needed to know what the code required. This information was
presented to them by expert testimony concerning the interpretation of
the code. This was improper. Expert testimony may only be presented
if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge which will assist
the jury in understanding the evidence, or determining a fact in issue.43
Expert testimony is improper when its only use will be to interpret a
legal question of law." The interpretation of the building code was a
question of law. 5 Therefore, the trial court erred by not interpreting
the meaning of the code and instructing the jury accordingly. Conflicts
in interpretation of the Building Code should have been resolved by the
trial court and not the jury.
In addition to reversing the case for submitting a question of law
to the jury, the Second District Court of Appeal found that the trial
court should have interpreted the Building Code as accepting the de-
sign submitted by Mr. Seibert and then should have directed a verdict
in his favor. 4" The district court came to this conclusion because Mr.
Lovett, who was the chief building inspector when Mr. Seibert submit-
ted his fire exit design, interpreted the code to require only one exit as
designed by Mr. Seibert.4 7 The district court stated that "[wihen an
agency with the authority to implement a statute construes the statute
in a permissible way, that interpretation must be sustained even though
43. Siebert, 573 So. 2d at 891; see FLA. STAT. §§ 90.702, .703 (1989). Though
testimony has been allowed to explain the character of an object in order to determine
if it complies with a statute, ordinance, or code, the actual language of the statute,
ordinance or code was not being interpreted for the jury. The jury, in these cases, had
before it the necessary legal language, the expert testimony was only used to determine
the character or type of object in issue and then to determine its application to the
legal language. See Noa v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 305 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1974);
Grand Union Co. v. Rocker, 454 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
The experts in the case sub judice did not testify regarding the character of an
object but instead presented conflicting opinions as to how the building code should be
interpreted.
44. Id. In this case the jury was permitted to determine the meaning of the code
and then decide whether Mr. Seibert violated the code in his design of the fire exit.
This was improper since an expert cannot testify regarding questions of law, as this is
the court's function. See Devin v. Hollywood, 351 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
45. Id. at 892.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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another interpretation may be possible."' 8 This case is a good illustra-
tion of the proper and improper use of expert testimony.
In Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne"9 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal decided an interesting issue regarding experts. The Holiday Inn
case involved a wrongful death and personal injury action against Holi-
day Inn resulting, in part, from the negligent supervision of an adjacent
parking lot next to a bar run by the hotel. Two groups of individuals
went to the Rodeo Bar operated by the Holiday Inn. Upon leaving the
bar, the two groups exchanged words, which eventually erupted into a
fight. During the course of the fight, one of the individuals was shot
and killed.50
At trial, the judge permitted the plaintiff's expert on grief and be-
reavement to testify and explain the plaintiff's response to the death of
their son.5 1 The expert's qualifications indicated that he had obtained a
Bachelor's Degree, a Master's Degree and a Ph.D. in sociology, and
was working on a post-doctorate at Harvard University in the field of
grief and bereavement. The expert testified that he had been research-
ing and studying grief for fifteen years, 2 and had received federal and
state grants in order to do so. The expert was the author of several
books and publications on death, dying, and grief and bereavement.
The expert had taught at seminars and had provided training as a con-
sultant to hospital staffs, nurses, physicians and social workers. The ex-
pert was clearly qualified in the area of grief and bereavement and the
trial court correctly found the witness an expert.53
The expert witness testified that his research over a fifteen-year
period, and the research of others in the field, indicate that there are
patterns of responses to grief, stages of grief, and factors that intensify
one's responses to grief. The expert explained to the jury that people
can be categorized as falling into either normal patterns of grief or
48. Siebert, 573 So. 2d at 892 (citing Humhosco v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Servs., 476 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)). Since the city's
building inspector's interpretation was entitled to great weight and was not shown to be
clearly erroneous, the trial court erred by not accepting the city's interpretation and
directing a verdict for Mr. Seibert.
49. 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
50. Id. at 324. The individual who was killed was David Rice. His family
brought the wrongful death action.
51. Id. at 335.
52. The facts did not indicate if the expert witness received his grief while work-
ing as a trial attorney in our court system.
53. Holiday Inns, 576 So. 2d at 336.
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complicated patterns of grief. He explained both of these patterns to
the jury and stated that certain factors affect a person's grief, and the
ability of that person to recover from that grief.5 '
The expert testified that he interviewed the plaintiffs before the
trial and was able to explain to the jury the plaintiffs' ordeal in working
their way through the grief process and where they were in the grief
process. The expert testified regarding what factors adversely affected
the plaintiffs' response to their son's death and what factors affected
their ability or inability to recover from their grief. The expert also
indicated the pattern the plaintiffs' grief would take in the future."
In examining the expert testimony in the case, the appellate court
stated that the trial court had the discretion to determine whether a
witness possessed the necessary expertise, and the range of subjects to
which the expert may testify.56 The trial court's findings would not be
disturbed, unless they were clearly erroneous. 57 The appellate court
found that the trial court did not err in designating the witness an ex-
pert in the field of grief and bereavement.
In examining the expert testimony, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal determined that three statutory areas must be examined, sec-
tions 90.702, 90.704 and 90.403. 5' The appellate court concluded that
from these three statutes there are four requirements for determining
the admissibility of expert testimony and stated:
(1) that the opinion evidence be helpful to the trier of fact;
(2) that the witness be qualified as an expert;
(3) that the opinion evidence can be applied to evidence offered at
trial; and
(4) that evidence, although technically relevant, must not present a
substantial danger of unfair prejudice that outweighs its probative
value. 59
The appellate court stated that in addition to the requirement that the
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 335.
57. Id.; see Quinn v. Milard, 358 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
58. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1989) (testimony by experts); FLA. STAT. § 90.704
(1989) (basis of opinion testimony by experts); FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989) (exclusion
on grounds of prejudice or confusion).
59. Holiday Inns, 576 So. 2d at 335 (citing Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), dismissed, 507 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1987)).
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evidence be helpful to the trier of fact, to be admissible the evidence
must also be beyond the ordinary understanding of the jury.60
In examining the present case, the appellate court found that the
expert witness's testimony clearly assisted the jury, since the subject
matter of the testimony was not within the normal, everyday compre-
hension of the jurors. The appellate court stated that "the subject of
grief and bereavement is not an area within the normal every day com-
prehension of jurors, and the expert testimony was properly admitted to
aid the jury in its consideration of the effect of David's death on his
parents. ""' The appellate court also rejected the defendant's argument
that the expert's testimony should have been excluded because its pro-
bative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.62 The
appellate court found that the expert was cross-examined about his re-
liance on the plaintiffs' statements and that he took the statements at
face value.6" The jury was free to reject the expert's testimony based on
his reliance of what the plaintiffs told him." However, the appellate
court stated that the objections to this testimony should go solely to the
weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. 5
In a short but enlightening case, the court in Brown v. Crane,
Phillips, Thomas & Metts, P.A.66 reversed the trial court when oppos-
ing counsel cross examined the plaintiffs' expert witness with unfamil-
iar portions of a book that were not recognized by the expert as being
authoritative nor were independently established as being authoritative.
In the Brown case, the plaintiffs appealed a final judgment entered for
the defendants in a medical malpractice action. The plaintiffs' alleged
that the doctors were negligent in the delivery of their twins, Matthew
and Linsey, which resulted in brain damage and central nervous system
damage to the twins. 7
During the cross-examination of one of the plaintiffs' expert wit-
nesses, the trial court, over objection, permitted defense counsel to read
passages from a chapter in a medical textbook in the presence of the
jury. The expert indicated that he had not read that chapter, but had
60. Id. at 335-36.
61. Id. at 336.
62. Id.
63. Id. at J36-37.
64. Holiday Inns, 576 So. 2d at 337.
65. li. See Botte v. Pomeroy, 497 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986),
rev. denied, 508 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1987).
66. 5135 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
67. Id. at 948.
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authored another section in the book. The Doctor indicated that he did
not recognize any entire book as being authoritative."8
Section 90.706 of the Florida Statutes specifically states:
Statements of facts or opinions on a subject of science, art, or spe-
cialized knowledge contained in a published treatise, periodical,
book, dissertation, pamphlet, or other writing may be used in cross-
examination of an expert witness if the expert witness recognizes
the author or the treatise, periodical, book, dissertation, pamphlet,
or other writing to be authoritative, or, notwithstanding nonrecog-
nition by the expert witness, if the trial court finds the author or
the treatise, periodical, book dissertation, pamphlet, or other writ-
ing to be authoritative and relevant to the subject matter. 6"
The expert witness did not recognize the book in question as being au-
thoritative. In addition, the defense counsel did not attempt to indepen-
dently establish the authoritativeness of the author or the text. There-
fore, the trial court erred in allowing defense counsel to read portions
of the medical text in the presence of the jury.70
V. HEARSAY
A. Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence
The improper use of inconsistent statements as substantive evi-
dence during trial is one of the most abused sections of the evidence
code.71 The misuse generally takes one of two forms. In the first form,
the trial attorney impeaches a witness with prior inconsistent state-
ments. He then, improperly, argues the substance (truth) of these in-
consistent statements to the jury in closing argument. 2 In the second
68. Id.
69. FLA. STAT. § 90.706 (1989).
70. Brown, 585 So. 2d at 948.
71. Attorneys frequently misapprehend the difference in prior inconsistent state-
ments that are used to impeach the credibility of the witness and are, therefore, simply
not hearsay under FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1) (1989), and prior inconsistent statements
that are used as substantive evidence under FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a) (1989). A dis-
tinction between the two is essential to proper courtroom practice and procedure.
72. Prior inconsistent statements cannot be used as substantive evidence. Their
use is merely to demonstrate that the witness gave a prior statement different from the
one given in court. The issue is one of the witnesses credibility, therefore, the truth of
the statement is not in issue. In other words, the prior inconsistent statements are of-
fered to impeach the credibility of the witness and demonstrate to the jury that the
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form, the trial attorney desires to use the prior inconsistent statements
as substantive evidence-for the truth of the matter asserted-but does
not fully comply with Rule 90.801(2)(a) and, consequently, commits
error by arguing these statements as substantive evidence to the jury.
The trial attorney should discern the difference between prior in-
consistent statements, which are nonhearsay," to impeach the credibil-
ity of the witness, and prior inconsistent statements that can be used
for the truth of the matter asserted therein.74 The difference is crucial
and an error in judgment can cause a reversal.
The improper use of prior inconsistent statements resulted in re-
versal in the first degree murder case of State v. Smith.75 In Smith, the
defendant was being tried for the murder of John Cascio. The murder
arose when the victim made sexual advances to the defendant's girl-
friend, Josette Estes. During the investigation of the murder, Ms. Es-
tes, who was seventeen at the time, was brought into a room where a
deputy sheriff and a prosecutor took her statement before a court
reporter.76
During trial, the state had the trial court call Ms. Estes as a court
witness, arguing that the State was unable to vouch for her credibility
because she had given materially inconsistent statements under oath.7
witness has made two inconsistent statements and, therefore, should not be believed.
See United States v. Lay, 644 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 869 (1981).
73. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (1989). Prior inconsistent statements which are
used to impeach the credibility of a witness do not fall within the definition of hearsay
because the statements are not for the truth of the matter asserted but are merely used
to demonstrate that the witness made a statement different from the one being made in
court and, therefore, should not be believed.
74. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a) (1989). Under prior evidentiary rules, the witness
could not be impeached by the party who called him. However, this restriction was not,
and is not, applicable to a statement offered under section 90.801(2)(a). The purpose
for offering the evidence under this section is to prove the truth of the contents of the
prior statement rather than to attack the credibility of the witness.
Two important factors must be considered when using prior inconsistent state-
ments as substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a). First, unlike prior inconsis-
tent statements used for impeaching the credibility of a witness, a prior inconsistent
statement used as substantive evidence must be under oath. Second, in criminal cases it
is unlikely that the prosecution can rely solely on a prior inconsistent statement as the
only evidence available to prove an essential element of a criminal charge. See United
States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1979).
75. 573 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1991).
76. Id. at 308.
77. Id. at 312-13. The outdated argument of vouching for the credibility of your
witness has been put to rest by last year's amendment to § 90.608. See 1990 Fla. Sess.
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The trial court complied with the State's request and allowed the wit-
ness to be called as a court witness.78 The defendant argued on appeal
that the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach the witness
with prior inconsistent statements and allowing the State to rely on
those statements as substantive evidence. The supreme court agreed
and reversed the defendant's conviction.'
The supreme court stated that the purpose of admitting prior in-
consistent statements is to test the credibility of the witness.80 This pur-
pose is misused when the State is allowed to use these statements as
substantive evidence of guilt. The Florida Supreme Court found that
the State had attempted to enter these statements as impeachment and
as substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a)."1 The defendant re-
lied on State v. Delgado-Santos,82 and argued that the interrogation of
Ms. Estes did not satisfy the requirements of section 90.801(2)(a) since
the interrogation was not an "other proceeding" as contemplated by
the statute.
The supreme court examined the meaning of "other proceeding"
in the Delgado-Santos case, affirming and adopting the opinion of the
Third District Court of Appeals, and thus found that "an 'other pro-
Law Serv. 174 (West), amending FLA. STAT. § 90.608 (1989). This change allows a
party to impeach his own witness and brings Florida in line with the Federal Evidence
Code. See FED. R. EvID. 607 ("The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling the witness.").
Additionally, the supreme court found that Ms. Estes had cooperated with the
authorities and that Ms. Estes prior statements were not materially inconsistent such as
to render the State unable to vouch for her credibility. The supreme court found no
adverse, material inconsistencies in the record that would allow calling Ms. Estes as a
court witness.
78. At the time of the trial, a party calling a witness could not impeach the
credibility of that witness. Compare FLA. STAT. § 90.608 (1987) with FLA. STAT. §
90.608 (Supp. 1990). The only way the state could impeach the witness was to have
the witness called as a court witness or to have the witness declared adverse. See FLA.
STAT. § 90.608(2) (1987).
79. Id. at 313.
80. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 313.
81. Id. at 314. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a) (1985). Prior inconsistent state-
ments can, in fact, be used as substantive evidence and for impeachment. See CHARLES
W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 801.7 (1984).
82. 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1986). The supreme court in Delgado-Santos held that
a police interrogation was not an "other proceeding" as contemplated by section
90.801(2)(a). The analysis of this case laid the basis of the supreme court's determina-
tion of whether a prosecutor's investigative interrogation was an "other proceeding"
within the rule.
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ceeding' must be no less formal than a deposition and no more so than
a hearing.""3 The supreme court found that a proceeding implies a cer-
tain degree of formality, convention, structure and regularity and con-
cluded that a police investigative interrogation is not an "other pro-
ceeding" as contemplated by section 90.801(2)(a). 4
The issue then became whether this analysis applies to a prosecu-
tor's investigative interrogation. The Florida Supreme Court concluded
that it did and stated:
When Estes gave the statement at issue, she was brought into a
room where a deputy sheriff and a prosecutor were waiting with a
court reported to interrogate the seventeen-year-old about a homi-
cide in which she had just been involved. No counsel was present to
advise her or to protect Smith's interests; no cross-examination was
possible and no judge was present or made available to lend an air
of fairness or objectivity. This prosecutorial interrogation was
neither regulated nor regularized, it contained none of the safe-
guards involved in an appearance before a grand jury and did not
even remotely resemble that process, nor did it have any quality of
formality and convention which could arguably raise the interroga-
tion to a dignity akin to that of a hearing or trial. Prosecutorial
interrogations such as the one here provide no degree of formality,
convention, structure, regularity and replicability of the process
that must be provided pursuant to the statute to allow any resulting
statements to be used as substantive evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.B
The Florida Supreme Court then concluded that the trial court erred
by allowing the jury to consider Ms. Estes' prior statements to the pros-
ecutor as substantive evidence and reversed the defendant's conviction.
B. Prior Consistent Statements
One of the typical mistakes in using prior consistent statements86
83. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 314-15 (citing Delgado-Santos, 497 So. 2d at 76-77).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b) (1989) states in part:
(2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hear-
ing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is ...
(b) Consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
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is failing to determine if the prior consistent statement took place after
an express or implied charge of improper influence, motive or recent
fabrication. Because the out of court statement is consistent does not
mean it is admissible under this hearsay exception. Illustrating this
point is McDonald v. State,87 where the First District Court of Appeal
examined the use of prior consistent statements. In McDonald, the vic-
tim testified that the defendant forced his way into her apartment and
committed a sexual battery on her. 88 Immediately after the attack, the
victim ran to a next door neighbor's house where she relayed the inci-
dent. Approximately one hour later, the victim told the same story to
the police. The next door neighbor and the police officer were allowed
to testify at trial to the story told them by the victim, over defense
objection.89
The appellate court examined the witnesses' statements and deter-
mined that they clearly constituted prior consistent statements of the
victim. However, the appellate court also found that there was no ex-
press or implied charge of improper influence, motive or recent
fabrication that would justify admitting the statements under section
90.801(2)(b). 90 While the cross-examination of the victim did point out
inconsistencies in the pre-trial and trial versions of the events, there
was no indication that the victim was changing her story at trial or of
improper influence or a motive to falsify. The appellate court concluded
that the prior consistent statements should not have been admitted
under section 90.801(2)(b).
The appellate court stated that the statements were admissible
under a common law exception to the hearsay rule in sexual battery
cases known as the "first complaint" exception, 91 and were admissible
implied charge against him or improper influence, motive, or recent
fabrication.
87. 578 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
88. Id. at 372. The victim's child was asleep.
89. Id.
90. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b) (1989).
91. McDonald, 576 So. 2d at 373; see Monarca v. State, 412 So. 2d 443 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (statements admissible to rebut the inference of consent
which might be drawn from the silence of the victim); see also Ellis v. State, 6 So. 768
(1889) (where the exception was first recognized). The "first complaint" exception has
been swallowed up under what was known as the res gestae exception to the hearsay
rule. See Fitter v. State, 261 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Gray v. State,
184 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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as a spontaneous statement under section 90.803(1)92 or as an excited
utterance under section 90.803(2).11 The appellate court, therefore,
found the error in admitting the victim's statements under
90.801(2)(b) to be harmless and sustained the defendant's conviction.
C. Statements Made for the Purpose of Identification
The use of section 90.803(2)(c) 9' invariably creates problems in
trial which should not occur. Section 90.803 states that "a statement is
not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is sub-
ject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement
is: (c) One of identification of a person made after perceiving him." 95
This section is frequently abused when the proponent insists that every
out of court identification falls under section 90.803(2)(c). Section
90.803(2)(c) is very specific and allows the use of out of court state-
ments of identification when specific prerequisites are met. First, the
declarant must testify at the trial or hearing.96 Second, the declarant
must be subject to cross-examination regarding the statement. Third,
the statement of identification must be made after the declarant per-
ceives the assailant.97
The typical tendency at trial is for the attorney to simply leave out
one of the above-mentioned steps. This is keenly illustrated in Stanford
v. State.98 In Stanford, the victim was attacked at his home by an indi-
92. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(1) (1989).
93. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (1989). The appellate court found that the statement
to the police officer may not have been a spontaneous statement or an excited utter-
ance, but that based on the admissibility of the other statements, this testimony was
merely cumulative and harmless. McDonald, 578 So. 2d at 374.
94. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(c) (1989).
95. Id.
96. Section 90.801(2)(c) makes the testimony of a witness who was present at
the time of the identification admissible, if the person making the identification testifies
at the trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the identification (emphasis
added in text).
97. 'The statement must come after the declarant perceives the identified person.
It will be insufficient to merely identify the defendant to a third party without the
initially perceiving the presence of the identified individual (emphasis added in text).
Section 90.801(2)(c) is applicable regardless of whether the declarant identifies
the individual in court. The failure to repeat the identification in court does not affect
the admissibility of evidence of the prior identification. See Brown v. State, 413 So. 2d
414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Eans v. State, 366 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct.
App. 1979).
98. 576 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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vidual known to him. During trial, the court allowed, over objection,
the testimony of the victim's daughter and a neighbor named Ms.
Hayes, identifying Stanford as the victim's assailant. The daughter and
Ms. Hayes testified to the identification made by the victim naming the
person that he believed committed the crime.99 The daughter testified
that on the day her father was attacked, her mother called her to come
home immediately. Upon finding ambulance attendants treating her fa-
ther, she asked her father who had beaten him and he responded with
the defendant's name. The next door neighbor, Susan Hayes, testified
that when she asked the victim who had beaten him, he also responded
with the defendant's name.100
The appellate court found that the testimony did not fit within the
ambit of section 90.801(2)(c). Section 90.801(2)(c) specifically refers
to a situation where the declarant sees the person after the criminal
episode and identifies that person as the offender. The reasoning is sim-
ple. The out of court identification occurring shortly after the declarant
perceives his assailant allows for a more reliable statement, one that is
fresh in the declarant's mind. To merely allow testimony regarding who
the declarant believes committed the crime, without the need for per-
ceiving the individual, would circumvent the rule and lead to unreliable
and prejudicial statements being placed into evidence.10 1 In the present
case, the appellate court found that although the evidence did not fit
within the parameters of section 90.801(2)(c) it was harmless in light
of other identification testimony and the overwhelming evidence of the
defendant's guilt.102
99. Id. at 738. The victim lost consciousness after the attack and the next thing
he remembered was waking up in a hospital a week later. The victim remembered what
the defendant did to him because he opened his eyes during the attack. Id.
100. Id.
101. If numerous witnesses could be paraded before the court to testify that the
declarant said this person did the crime (without complying with the prerequisites of
section 90.801(2)(c)), it would lead to a situation where the jury could impermissibly
rely on a statement whose reliability is in doubt. The jury could arrive at an erroneous
decision. What if the declarant did not get a good look at the individual, but was
convinced of the person's identity? Unnecessarily bolstering this unreliable testimony
with other out of court statements of identification could lead the jury to improperly
weigh the value of this testimony. The perceptions of individuals change dramatically
when confronted with a stressful crisis. The jury should not be allowed to rely on inher-
ently unreliable evidence as it probative value would be outweighed by the prejudicial
effect this may have on the jury decision making process. This is especially true in close
cases.
102. Stanford, 576 So.2d at 740-41. The reader should not misperceive the im-
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D. Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis
Hearsay statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis 0 3
are treated as an exception to the hearsay rule because of the strong
motivation for declarants to be truthful when making statements to
physicians for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment. Florida law rec-
ognizes the admissibility, as substantive evidence, of statements made
to treating physicians but this exception only permits testimony relating
to causation when it is reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treat-
ment. 10 " Additionally, the statements need not have been made to a
physician. Statements to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or
even family members can be included.
Problems in using section 90.803(4) generally arise when the
statements being entered are not pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 10 5
Although statements which describe the inception or cause of an injury
can fall within this hearsay exception, if they are reasonably pertinent
to the treatment, pure statements of fault do not qualify.10 6
pact of a decision that is affirmed even though an evidentiary error is made during the
trial. If the evidence is overwhelming, the evidentiary error will usually be considered
harmless. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986) (regarding application of
the harmless error standard in Florida). However, in the closer cases, or the cases
fraught with numerous errors, harmless error will not be a safe harbor and evidentiary
errors will cause reversals.
103. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (1989). This section states:
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment by a per-
son seeking the diagnosis or treatment, or made by an individual who has
knowledge of the facts and is legally responsible for the person who is
unable to communicate the facts, which statements describe medical his-
tory, past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as rea-
sonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
Id.
104. See Brown v. Seaboard Airline Co., 434 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1970).
105. See Saul v. MacArthur Found., 499 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (statement that the patient fell by catching the heel of her toe on the carpet not
admissible under section 90.803(4) since the statement was not relevant to treatment or
diagnosis); Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988) (statement by victim
to emergency room doctor that he had been shot admissible under section 90.803(4)
since it was pertinent to treatment and diagnosis of his wounds, but statement that
black people tried to steal his medallion not admissible since it was a fact not pertinent
to treatment or diagnosis).
106. In United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 82-85 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981), the court stated that a statement regarding the incep-
tion or general cause of an injury should be admitted if: 1) the statement is reasonably
1991]
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In Visconti v. Hollywood Rental Service,10 7 the plaintiff sustained
personal injuries as a result of a 'slip and fall' while on the defendant's
property. The plaintiff presented evidence that her fall was caused by
the defendant's negligent maintenance of the floor surface. The defend-
ant's response was that the cause of the plaintiffs injury was not the
lack of proper maintenance on the floor but the defendant's own negli-
gence. During trial the defense admitted, on cross-examination and
over the plaintiff's objections, various hospital and emergency room
medical reports which stated that the Plaintiff "fell coming out of the
pool."' 08 These documents were entered during defendant's cross-exam-
ination of the plaintiff as impeachment of her testimony. 109 The appel-
late court found that the even if a proper foundation had been laid for
the admission of these records, statements which relate to the cause of
the fall are generally not statements made for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment and are, therefore, not admissible under the
hearsay exception as statements made for purposes of medical diagno-
sis or treatment.110
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment; 2) the declarant's motive is to be truthful; and 3) it
is reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in the diagnosis or treatment.
Part three of the analysis is the area most often overlooked by the trial court, yet, is
probably the most important step in determining whether the statement qualifies under
90.803(4).
107. 580 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
108. Id. at 198.
109. Id. The plaintiff denied making the statements reflected in the multitude of
hospital records. Id.
110. Id. The Visconti case is very puzzling from a logical standpoint. Though the
court was generally correct in its assessment regarding the use of section 90.803(4),
based on the limited fact pattern, the dicta in the case was internally inconsistent. If
the material was being entered for impeachment purposes then it was not hearsay at
all, but merely demonstrates that the plaintiff made a statement, at a different time,
inconsistent with the one made in court. The statements of the plaintiff could also have
been considered an admission of a party opponent under section 90.803(18). Therefore,
if the material could have been properly entered into evidence, but was merely entered
under the wrong section of the evidence code, then the error should have been no more
than harmless. The court could have considered that all the medical reports, with other
notations not pertinent for the impeachment or admission, were prejudicial to the plain-
tiff, however, the opinion is silent regarding this concern. The failure to authenticate
this material could have concerned the court, the plaintiff denied having made any such
statements, but, once again, the opinion is silent.
Based on the limited facts it is hard to discern how or why the defense chose to
enter this impeaching material in opposing counsel's case-in-chief, as opposed to calling
the person who heard the statement and then using that person to impeach the plaintiff
[Vol. 16
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A case illustrating the correct use of section 90.803(4) is State v.
Ochoa."' In Ochoa, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's order dismissing the charges of sexual battery against the
defendant, based on defense counsel's ore tenus motion to dismiss at
the completion of an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion in
limine.1"2 The appellate court, after omitting the statements of the vic-
tims that identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the sexual bat-
tery, stated that:
the victims' statements to the physician indicated that they each
had been touched in the genitalia by an adult male. The physical
examination revealed conditions consistent with digital penetration
and inconsistent with an accidental occurrence.118
The appellate court determined that the statements were made for the
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, since the reason for the
visit was for a physical examination." 4 The medical history was, there-
fore, pertinent to his diagnosis and the statements were appropriate
under section 90.803(4).
as suggested by Judge Garrett. Id. (Garrett, J., concurring). This would have been
more effective than merely attempting to enter documentary evidence in the plaintiff's
case-in-chief.
The court also alludes to the fact that the records could have been admissible
under the business records exception, 90.803(6), had the proper foundation been laid.
However, Judge Garrett, in his concurring opinion, correctly points out that the plain-
tiff had no business duty to transmit her statement. This would preclude it from being
entered as a business record. Id. at 198 n.1 (Garrett, J., concurring).
111. 576 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
112. Id. at 859. It is a matter of utter disbelief that a trial court would rule on
an oral motion to dismiss charges on such a serious case, or in any case for that matter,
when the case law and the Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly indicate that there
must be a pending written motion, FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(a) and adequate notice to
the opposing party. It is no less surprising that some of the poorer judicial decisions
come from those judicial circuits that are overburdened with cases. However, this is no
excuse for failure to know, understand, and implement basic fundamentals of the law,
which is oftentimes just plain common sense. Clearly, the ideals of due process, funda-
mental fairness, fair play and common sense seem to be lost in the ever present rush to
move cases. Though attorneys have been criticized for overzealous advocacy bordering
on unethical conduct, poor and unethical lawyering can only be blamed on those judges
who tolerate, and thus tacitly approve, poor preparation and unethical conduct to con-
tinue in the courtroom without severe sanctions being imposed.
113. Id.
114. Id.
1991]
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E. Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity
Business records'15 are recognized as a hearsay exception because
the reliability of these records are demonstrated by: 1) systematic
checking, 2) habits of precision developed by the regular and continu-
ous practices of businesses, 3) the actual experience of businesses in
relying upon the accuracy of its records, and 4) the duty to make accu-
rate records as part of a continuing job or occupation. Whenever the
business records exception is used, there inevitably seems to be an ar-
gument regarding the proper custodian of the records. More and more
attorneys continue to harbor the notion that only the records custodian,
or the person who made the record, is qualified under section
90.803(6)(a) to introduce business records. This is simply incorrect.
Section 90.803(6)(a) specifically states that a "custodian or otherwise
qualified witness" who has the necessary knowledge to testify as to how
a particular record was made can lay the necessary foundation for the
introduction of the record. Any witness who can testify to the method
by which a particular record was made is a "qualified witness."
An excellent example demonstrating the role of the business
records exception is illustrated in Stern v. Gad."6 In Stern, two Colom-
bian emerald dealers, Juan Vargas and Jose Stern, transacted various
business dealings over a period of years. In 1985, Mr. Vargas died. Mr.
Gad, a resident of New York and also a gem dealer, was appointed as
the personal representative of Mr. Vargas' estate. The decedent's
widow found five undated checks among the decedent's effects. The
115. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1989). The business record exception states:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make such memorandum, report, rec-
ord, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness, unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances show lack of trustworthiness. The term "business as used in this
paragraph includes a business, institution, association, profession, occupa-
tion, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(b) No evidence in the form of an opinion or diagnosis is admissible under
paragraph (a) unless such opinion or diagnosis would be admissible under
ss. 90.701-90.705 if the person whose opinion is recorded were to testify to
the opinion directly.
FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6)(a) (1989).
116. 575 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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checks accumulated total was $805,000. The personal representative,
acting on his attorney's advice, deposited the checks. The checks were
returned for insufficient funds.11 Upon the checks being returned for
insufficient funds, the personal representative brought suit for payment
on the five checks. Stern, the defendant in the case, counterclaimed for
return of the checks. Mr. Stern claimed that the balance due the estate
was $60,000, not $805,000. The defense claimed that the checks had
been given to the decedent as security for purchases of emeralds, with
the specific understanding that the checks would not be dated and de-
posited without the consent of Mr. Stern. The defense claimed that the
account had been paid down to $60,000 by other checks. 118
During trial, the court excluded a ledger sheet recording the dollar
transactions of the emerald dealers. The ledger sheet was maintained
by Haim, Mr. Stern's son-in-law, to record the purchases from, and
payments to, the decedent. Haim was a gem dealer in Miami but did
not participate in the transactions between Mr. Stern and Mr. Vargas.
Because Haim resided in Miami, he was asked by Mr. Stern to keep
track of the gem transactions. The personal representative objected to
the introduction of the ledger sheet stating that it did not qualify as a
business record.119
The appellate court stated that the personal representative's con-
clusory allegations were insufficient and found that the ledger was
maintained in the regular course of business.120 The appellate court
based this finding on testimony by Haim that entries in the account
were regularly made and were intended to accurately reflect the out-
standing balance in that account at any particular time. Haim testified
that the data in the ledger came from information provided by Stern
and Vargas, and when Haim wrote checks on the account, those entries
were from his own personal knowledge. 21 Finally, Haim testified that
he, Vargas, and Stern met in February of 1984 and agreed that the
outstanding balance shown on the ledger at that time was accurate.
Based on this testimony the Third District Court of Appeal found that
the ledger sheet qualified as a business record and the trial court erred
by excluding this evidence.1 22
117. Id. at 259.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 261.
120. Id. at 260.
121. Stern, 575 So. 2d at 260.
122. Id. The personal representative also argued that the ledger sheet did not
199 1
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F. The Public Records Exception
Public records are a recognized exception to hearsay.12 8 This ex-
ception recognizes the inconvenience which would result in requiring a
public official who made a public document to testify to information
contained in the document. The public official's duty to accurately rec-
ord matters, the public's scrutiny of the public records, the lack of mo-
tive to falsify such documents, and the force of habit and routine which
goes into recording public documents, provides the necessary assur-
ances of reliability. Consequently, the rule excludes matters observed
by police officers and other law enforcement personnel for logical rea-
sons which would impugn the trustworthiness and reliability of public
documents. It is a common belief that observations by police officers at
the scene of a crime, during investigation, or when a defendant is ar-
rested, are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other
cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between
the police and the alleged defendant.' 2  This exclusion has now been
satisfy the business records exception because Haim did not keep this ledger sheet as a
regular practice in his emerald business. The appellate court found that this particular
ledger sheet was kept at the specific request of, and as an agent for, Mr. Stern, as a
part of Mr. Stern's business. The appellate court correctly pointed out that Mr. Stern
could just have easily hired an independent bookkeeping service or accountant in
Miami to maintain these records and they would have been no less admissible. The fact
that Mr. Stern chose someone familiar with the emerald business should not affect the
admissibility of the ledger as a business record under section 90.803(6) since all the
prerequisites had been met.
The appellate court also refuted the personal representatives allegations that the
business record was not admissible because Haim was not an employee of Stern. A
business record does not cease to be admissible because an independent business con-
tractor acting on behalf of the business prepares the document. Id.
123. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(8) (Supp. 1991), as amended, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 255 (West). This section states:
Records, reports, statements reduced to writing, or data compilations, in
any form, or public offices or agencies, setting forth the activities of the
office or agency, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as
to matter which there was a duty to report, excluding in criminal cases
matters observed by a police officer or other law enforcement personnel,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances show their lack of
trustworthiness. The criminal case exclusion shall not apply to an affidavit
otherwise admissible under s. 316.1934(5).
Id.
124. See CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 803.8 (2d ed. 1984).
The committee notes to section 90.803(8) state that:
The provision that the exception applies to matters observed pursuant to a
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modified.
The only legislative change in the rules of evidence came in section
90.803(8)."' The legislature amended section 90.803(8) to add a final
sentence which provides that the criminal case exclusion for records
and reports of matters observed by a law enforcement officer do not
apply to an "affidavit otherwise admissible under s. 316.1934(5)."12
An affidavit which contains the results of an individual's breath or
blood test, as authorized by section 316.1932 or section 316.1933, is
admissible under the public records exception by section 316.1934(5),
if the statutory requirements are demonstrated in the affidavit. The re-
quirements the affidavit must disclose are:
(a) The type of test administered and the procedures followed;
(b) The time of the collection of the blood or breath sample
analyzed;
(c) The numerical results of the test indicating the alcohol content
of the blood or breath;
(d) The type and status of any permit issued by the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services that was held by the person
who performed the test; and
(e) If the test was administered by means of a breath testing in-
strument, the date of performance of the most recent required
maintenance on such instrument. 27
% This modification belies the logic and purpose behind the public
records exception and cuts against the trustworthiness and reliability of
this exception. The affidavit is prepared in anticipation of litigation,
presumably in an adversarial atmosphere. The reliability of this excep-
tion is emasculated, since the lack of motive to falsify no longer applies
in situations of an adversarial nature. The underlying basis for the pub-
lic records exception, which makes this hearsay statement trustworthy
duty imposed by law "as to matters there was a duty to report; excluding
in criminal cases matters observed by police officers or other law enforce-
merit personnel", was added by the Senate Judiciary-Criminal Committee
to make certain that a defendant's right to confrontation could not be
abridged in a criminal case. The committee adopted the view of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(8) (West 1979) (committee notes).
125. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(8) (Supp. 1991), as amended, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 255 (West).
126. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(8) (1989).
127. FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(5) (1989).
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and reliable, is weakened by the legislative grafting of the rule, which
is, once again, a legislative overreaction to the problem of drunk
driving.128
The fate of this amendment will ultimately be decided in our court
system in the years to come. It will, in all likelihood, not resolve the
evidentiary problems associated with the presentation of this type of
proof but will ultimately only spin off more unnecessary litigation for
our appellate courts to decide. There will be an obvious problem of
whether an affidavit introduced in a criminal trial will violate the de-
fendant's right of confrontation. An affidavit such as this is not firmly
rooted in our jurisprudence and the reliability of these affidavits must
meet the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Idaho v.
Wright.129
G. Statements of a Child Victim
Section 90.803(23)130 creates a limited exception for hearsay
128. Drunk driving is a serious problem plaguing our nation. However, legislative
amendments which are enacted to lessen the state's burden in a criminal case, will not
solve the problem, only add to it. Once again, the legislature's attempt to respond to
the public outcry of drunk driving could backfire on the wrongly accused defendant by
unfairly preventing him from properly confronting the witnesses against him and thor-
oughly cross-examining the witnesses and evidence before the jury.
129. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
130. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1991). This section states:
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by
which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-
of-court statements made by a child victim with a physical, mental, emo-
tional, or developmental age of 11 or less describing any act of child abuse
or neglect, any act of sexual abuse against a child, the offense of child
abuse, the offense of aggravated child abuse, or any offense involving an
unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, or penetration performed in the
presence of, with, by, or on the declarant child, not otherwise admissible, is
admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide suffi-
cient safeguards of reliability. In making its determination, the court may
consider the mental and physical age and maturity of the child, the nature
and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the child to the
offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the child victim,
and any other factor deemed appropriate; and
2. The child either:
a. Testifies; or
b. is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is other corroborative
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statements of children eleven years of age or less, if the statement de-
scribes an act of child abuse, or sexual abuse, as described by the child
victim. The use of section 90.803(23) is limited to children with a phys-
ical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of eleven or less. The ex-
ception should not apply to statements of children who are witnesses
but not victims.13' The exception is applicable to both criminal and
civil cases.
The trial court must hold a hearing outside of the presence of the
jury before a statement may be admitted under section 90.803(23).
This hearing is to determine whether the circumstances surrounding
the making of the statement demonstrates that the statement is relia-
ble. 32 The child does not have to be testimonially competent for the
child's out-of-court statement to be admitted in evidence. 33
During the survey period, the Fifth District Court of Appeal de-
cided an important case concerning out of court statements of a child
victim under section 90.803(23). In Kopko v. State,3" the district court
of appeal examined the issue of repetitive hearsay testimony recounting
the child victim's out-of-court statements describing the criminal sexual
acts.
evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by
the court that the child's participation in the trial or proceeding would
result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in
addition to findings pursuant to section 90.804(1).
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10
days before trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception
pursuant to this subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice
shall include a written statement of the content of the child's statement,
the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding
the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as
necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement.
(c) 'The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the
basis for its ruling under this subsection.
Id.
131. The language of the statute clearly indicates it application is only for the
child victim and not a witness. Contra Russell v. State, 572 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (statements of a child witness, not victim, admissible under section
90.803(23)).
132. See Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923
(1989); State v. Townsend, 556 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Distefano v.
State, 526 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
133. See Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923
(1989); State v. Townsend, 556 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
134. 577 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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The child victim in this case was nine years old when she reported
sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by her stepfather, David Kopko.
The defendant, David Kopko, had been married to the child's mother
for approximately three years. Mrs. Kopko also had one son from a
previous marriage and had one daughter with the defendant. Shortly
after Mrs. Kopko told her oldest daughter, the victim, that she had
decided to leave the defendant, the daughter described various sexual
abuse by the defendant." 5
Mrs. Kopko left the marital home taking all three children. A few
days afterwards she met with a police officer and described the sexual
abuse of her daughter. Afterwards the child victim made a videotaped
statement concerning the incidents of sexual abuse by the defendant.
The statement was taken in the form of an interview with a counselor
for the Child Protection Team (CPT). The child victim was also ex-
amined by a CPT physician but no signs of abuse were discovered. The
defendant eventually sued his wife for divorce and custody of his natu-
ral daughter. The defendant was later charged with sexual battery and
lewd assault on the step-daughter.13 6
At trial, the state called: the child victim; Mrs. Kopko, the child's
mother; the CPT counselor; and, the CPT physician who examined the
child. The child victim's testimony was clear and concise and very simi-
lar to the statements she made to her mother, the CPT counselor, and
the physician. The defense objected to the hearsay testimony of the
CPT counselor and the physician, who related the child victim's state-
ments. "' The trial court overruled these objections.
The defendant testified at trial and denied all the charges. The
defendant described the family situation and testified that he and his
wife fought regularly during their marriage regarding discipline, the
children, and money. The defendant testified that his ex-wife would do
anything to prevent him from obtaining custody of their youngest
daughter.' The jury found the defendant guilty of sexual battery and
lewd assault on a child. The defendant, who had no prior record, was
sentenced to life in prison, with a minimum mandatory sentence of
135. Id. at 957.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 958. The videotape of the child was originally excluded as evidence in
the trial. However, on cross-examination the defense "opened the door" to this evidence
and the trial court allowed the state to play portions of the videotaped interview for the
jury.
138. Kopko, 577 So. 2d at 959.
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twenty-five years."' 9
The appellate court quickly dispatched the issues regarding the
sufficiency of the notice and the trustworthiness of the hearsay state-
ments. The district court found that the lack of notice did not create
reversible error"' 0 and found that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in admitting the hearsay statements."' The appellate court
then turned its attention to what it perceived as the "real problem in
this case . . . why the CPT counselor or doctor should have testified at
all about what the child had said out-of-court, or why the tape was
played.""" The district court's concern centered upon the unnecessary
bolstering of the child victim's statements through a parade of profes-
sional witnesses in a case with no physical evidence to corroborate these
statements:
By having the child testify and then by routing the child's words
through respected adult witnesses, such as doctors, psychologists,
CIPT specialists, police and the like, with the attendant sophistica-
tion of vocabulary and description, there would seem to be a real
risk that the testimony will take on an importance or appear to
have an imprimatur of truth far beyond the content of the testi-
mony. It is worrying to see, in a case such as this one, with virtu-
ally no evidence to corroborate the testimony of either the alleged
victim or the alleged abuser, that only the victim's version of events
is allowed to be repeated through different (professional)
witnesses. 4 s
The district court examined other cases where a "parade" of witnesses
unnecessarily bolstered the child victim's credibility"' and examined
how these district courts analyzed the problem. The district court con-
139. Id.
140. Id. The State's notice requirement was defective because the State did not
set out what factors the State would argue to establish trustworthiness of the state-
ments. The appellate court did not find reversible error due to the untimely notice
because the arguments actually made by the state were discernible from viewing the
tape and did not catch the defense by surprise. Id.
141. Id. The appellate court found that the admissibility of the statements was a
judgment call for the trial court and stated that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in concluding that the hearsay statements were reliable enough to be admitted. Id.
at 960.
142. Kopko, 577 So. 2d at 960.
143. Id. at 960-61.
144. Id. at 961; see Griffin v. State, 526 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1988); Lazarowicz v. State, 561 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1990).
1991]
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cluded that even though the trial court did not err in ruling that the
hearsay statements of the child victim were admissible under section
90.803(23), "it was reversible error to utilize this hearsay exception as
a device to admit prior consistent statements.' 4 5
The district court stated that neither the statute nor the legislative
history discuss the problem of prior consistent statements bolstering the
victim's in-court testimony. " 6 Additionally, the district court noted
that if section 90.803(23) were meant to abrogate prior case law for-
bidding the repetitious use of prior statements to bolster in-court testi-
mony, then such legislative intent should have been made clear. Absent
a clear expression of such intent the district court held that:
where a child victim is able at trial to fully and accurately recount
the crime perpetrated on him or her, it is error to allow the intro-
duction of prior consistent statements made by the child. Where
the child's out-of-court statements are needed to provide evidence
of any aspect of the crime or related events which the testifying or
unavailable child cannot adequately supply, such out-of-court state-
ments are available pursuant to section 90.803(23). "17
Applying this standard to the present case the district court found that
the testimony of the CPT counselor and the CPT physician was merely
an adult's reiteration of the child's prior statements consistent with her
trial testimony and the admission of this evidence constituted reversible
error.1
4 8
Though the district court may have reached the correct result, the
analysis may be flawed. In many instances admitted hearsay statements
will bolster the credibility of the hearsay declarant, in addition to being
entirely consistent with prior testimony and evidence. Hearsay testi-
mony is admissible when subject to a hearsay exception because the
statement is considered reliable and trustworthy and, hopefully, rele-
vant to some point in issue. Under the district court's analysis, even
though the testimony is admissible pursuant to 90.803(23) and rele-
vant, it must be excluded if any of the prior statements are consistent
with the child's previous testimony. This decision will not give the
145. Id. at 962.
146. Id.; see Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988) (where the court
discusses the impropriety of having a witness vouch for the credibility of a hearsay
declarant).
147. Kopko, 577 So. 2d at 962.
148. Id.
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lower courts the guidance necessary to come to an appropriate eviden-
tiary resolution when confronted with a child-victim's hearsay state-
ments. Grafting an exception onto an evidentiary rule such as
90.803('23) is unnecessary and inappropriate.
The proper analysis should not lie with an exception grafted onto
section 90.803(23), but instead should simply lie with the proper evi-
dentiary analysis of relevant evidence. The court should simply deter-
mine if the hearsay statements of the child are logically relevant. In
other words, do the statements prove or disprove a material fact? If the
statements are logically relevant, then are the statements legally rele-
vant? Does some statutory or evidentiary rule, such as section 90.403,
exclude these logically relevant hearsay statements? By simply analyz-
ing the hearsay statements pursuant to section 90.403, the proper anal-
ysis can be arrived at by determining if the probative value of the hear-
say statements are substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence. By applying this analysis, and determin-
ing whether the repetitious, cumulative testimony is substantially out-
weighed by one of the enumerated vices stated in section 90.403, the
need to graft exceptions onto the hearsay rules will be needless.
H. Dying Declarations
Statements made by an unavailable declarant are admissible under
section 90.804(2)(b)I' 9 if they are made while the declarant believed
that death was imminent and the statements concern the cause of what
the declarant believed to be his or her impending death or the circum-
stances of the impending death. The exception is rooted in the belief
that there is a powerful psychological pressure to be truthful when
death is imminent which transcends all other motivations which a de-
clarant may have to fabricate false statements.
149. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(b) (1989). The section is commonly known as the
hearsay exception for dying declarations:
(2) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded under s. 90.802,
provided that the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(b) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal trial,
a statement made by a declarant while reasonably believing that his death
was imminent, concerning the physical cause or instrumentalities of what
he believed to be his impending death or the circumstances surrounding his
impending death.
1991]
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An interesting case was decided by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal during the survey period. In State v. Weir,15° the trial court
declared section 90.804(2)(b) unconstitutional. In declaring the statute
unconstitutional the trial court found that (1) the dying declaration
statute contains an unconstitutional presumption that the dying declar-
ant was speaking the truth; (2) the statute is based on religious beliefs
that a declarant would not want to die with a lie on his lips, a per se
judicial establishment of religion based on life after death; (3) the stat-
ute denies an accused the right to confront his accuser, a confrontation
clause violation and; (4) the evidentiary section impermissibly shifts the
burden of proof to the accused. 51 The district court examined each
section and reversed the trial court's ruling.
Examining the claim that the dying declaration contains an uncon-
stitutional presumption, the district court stated that the "admission of
dying declarations is justified on the grounds of public necessity, mani-
fest justice and the sense that impending death makes a false statement
by the decedent improbable."15 The district court disagreed that the
dying declaration created an irrebuttable presumption of truth. The
district court felt that the hearsay declarant, and the hearsay state-
ment, can be impeached or discredited by other statements contrary to
it.15 3 This would preserve the necessary requirement that the court de-
termine if the proper predicate for the dying declaration has been laid
and after the evidence is admitted it is for the jury to decide how much
weight and credibility the evidence deserves. Additionally, evidence
which demonstrates that the declarant did not accurately observe the
150. 569 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
151. Id. at 899.
152. Id. at 900.
153. FLA. STAT. § 90.806 (1989) specifically allows for a hearsay declarant to be
impeached as if he were a witness:
(1) When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility
of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by
any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant
had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the de-
clarant at any time inconsistent with his hearsay statement is admissible,
regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportu-
nity to deny or explain it.
(2) If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls
the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the
statement as if under cross-examination.
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facts recounted may be grounds for excluding the dying declaration.15"'
Therefore, since the dying declaration can be attacked and demon-
strated to be untruthful as illustrated above, the district court felt it
does not create an irrebuttable presumption of truth.
The district court next examined the claim that the dying declara-
tion constitutes a judicial establishment of religion. The district court
acknowledged that the underpinnings and early use of the dying decla-
ration was premised in part on prevailing religious values in place cen-
turies ago. However, the district court felt that there is a tremendous
psychological pressure to be truthful when death is imminent which
does not spring from purely religious motives. 155
The district court examined the confrontation clause issue and
stated that "[t]his proposition has been soundly defeated by case law
and authorities."' 5 If the statement falls within a firmly rooted hear-
say exception the confrontation clause will not be violated.
Finally, the district court addressed the issue that the dying decla-
ration shifts the burden of proof to the accused. The district court
noted that the dying declaration does not impose any affirmative de-
fense of innocence on the defendant but merely allows evidence to be
admitted because of the public necessity and manifest injustice which
would result in excluding evidence which meets the statutory prerequi-
sites. Ultimately, the burden of proof remains with the State to prove
the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The dying declaration
does not shift the burden of proof to the accused to prove his
innocence. 15
VI. CONCLUSION
Though few dramatic changes occurred during the survey period,
the legislative change in the public records exception will probably be-
gin to generate new case law in the coming year. The change will
surely cause numerous dilemmas as the trial courts are left to deal with
the various evidentiary problems brought on by the legislature's at-
154. Weir, 569 So. 2d at 900 (citing Jones v. State, 12 S.W. 704 (1889)); see
also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 285 (3d ed. 1984).
155. Id. at 901. The court noted that many criminal statutes can be traced back
to Biblical times. The prohibition against murder, or theft, can be traced directly to the
ten commandments. Even so, the district court felt that such a challenge to these stat-
utes on this ground would be absurd. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 902.
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tempt to devise needless short cuts to evidentiary proof. The long range
burden of unraveling these problems will be thrust upon the appellate
courts as more and more attorneys begin to utilize the new evidentiary
changes. If any one thing is certain, it's that the appellate courts will
continue to be busy with more evidentiary issues as the legislature con-
tinues to attempt to fine tune the evidence code and the trial courts
continue to contend with these changes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early spring of 1990, the state legislature dramatically
changed the juvenile delinquency provisions of The Florida Children's
Code.' The legislature also made changes, albeit more modest ones, in
the child welfare section of the Code.2 Florida's revenue shortfall,
which became apparent in the summer of 1990, produced an equally
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A., Colgate
University, 1967; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1970. The author thanks Laurie
Briggs for her assistance in the preparation of this article. This survey article will cover
cases decided through September 30, 1991.
1. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990, codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001-.516
(1989 & Supp. 1990). The legislature also passed the Street Terrorism Enforcement
and Prevention Act of 1990, codified at FLA. STAT. § 874 (Supp. 1990), and the Juve-
nile Delinquency and Gang Prevention Act of 1990, codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.025
(Supp. 1990).
2. See William and Budd Bell Prevention and Protection Act, codified at FLA.
STAT. § 39.002 (Supp. 1990).
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dramatic reduction in appropriations of state funds central to the suc-
cess of these two amendments to the Code., The changes in Chapter 39
only have been in effect for a year' and the appellate courts are now
starting to interpret them. There is some evidence from these opinions
that the failure to provide programs and services to complement the
new juvenile delinquency and the child welfare laws is not lost on the
appellate courts.5 At the same time, they continue to admonish the trial
courts to pay attention to seemingly rudimentary statutory obligations
such as compliance with the Chapter 39 provisions concerning the
length of secure detention for alleged delinquents and articulation of
grounds for dependency findings.
As in past years, nearly all of the appellate decisions come from
the district courts of appeal. Some are pro forma opinions, but others
involve significant issues. In addition, this year the Florida Supreme
Court decided an extremely important case, Padgett v. HRS,6 which
cleared up a major conflict among the district courts of appeal concern-
ing the definition and application of prospective neglect.
This article will review the case law in both the child welfare and
juvenile justice areas of juvenile law since October, 1990." Appellate
decisions lacking significant issues will not be discussed. This survey is
again divided into two sections: juvenile delinquency and dependency. 8
3. Avido D. Khahaifa, Juvenile Law System Assailed, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, Aug. 2, 1991, at 7B.
4. The statute was enacted effective October 1, 1990.
5. See Interest of M.C., 567 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (writ of
habeas corpus will issue where juvenile is confined for more than statutory five-day
maximum while awaiting placement in commitment program).
6. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
7. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 NOVA L.
REV. 1169 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 Survey] (discussing cases decided through Sep-
tember 30, 1990).
8. Chapter 39 of the Florida statutes is divided into six sections. The provisions
relevant to the discussion here are Part II, governing juvenile delinquency, Part III,
governing dependency, and Part VI, governing termination of parental rights. Part VI
of Chapter 39 governs families in need of services and children in need of services.
Although the law was passed three years ago, research discloses no reported opinions
since that time on that section of the law.
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Issues of Right to Counsel and Confessions
The United States Supreme Court ruled in 1966 in Miranda v.
Arizona9 that persons apprehended by police officers are entitled to cer-
tain warnings with regard to constitutionally protected rights and, in
1967, in In re Gault* that juveniles have the right to counsel in delin-
quency proceedings. By statute, Florida has specified that a child is
entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of a delinquency
proceeding.' Two cases decided in the district courts of appeal this
past year involve application of Miranda standards in the context of
waiver of counsel and confessions by children.
The more significant of the two cases is W.M. v. State."2 In a per
curiarn decision with a vigorous dissent by Judge Farmer, the Fourth
District affirmed the delinquency adjudication of the child over his con-
tention that the trial court committed error by denying a motion to
suppress a statement the child gave to the police. The confession was
made by a ten-year-old boy with an IQ of sixty-nine or seventy who
had a learning disability and was placed in a special education pro-
gram. He had no prior record with the police and was held in police
custody for approximately six hours prior to confessing to a series of
burglaries.
The majority explained that it had difficulty with the concept that
a ten-year-old could ever understand, in the sense that an adult could,
the consequences of waiving his constitutional rights to both silence and
counsel and thereafter give a confession. 3 However, the majority did
not substitute its own conclusions for those of the trial court, which had
made substantial findings of fact." ' With all of the factual information
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11. FLA. STAT. § 39.041 (Supp. 1990); see W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1989 Survey of
Florida Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 859, 861-64 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 Survey] (discuss-
ing earlier cases on these subjects); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1988 Survey of
Florida Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1159, 1165-66 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Survey]
(same).
12. 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
13. Id.
14. The appeals court described the trial court's findings in the following man-
ner. The police originally went to the child's home where they spoke with the grand-
mother. They asked to take the child to the police station and asked if the grandmother
wanted to go. She declined. The child was advised of his constitutional rights in the
police car by officers who were described as experienced in dealing with juveniles. The
Dale
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from below, the appellate court concluded it was not free, under the
applicable legal standards, to substitute its own conclusions for those of
the trial court. First, it noted that a confession is not involuntary
merely because the individual making it is a juvenile."5 Second, the
appellate court reasoned that the trial court must resolve the conflicts
of facts and make a decision based upon the totality of the circum-
stances which includes the child's age, intelligence, education, experi-
ence and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his state-
ment. Both of these propositions are correct statements of the law.
Then, without explanation, the majority decided that it could not over-
turn the "thoroughly reasoned" decision of the trial court. 6 Although
never stated, it appears the majority was refusing to conclude that the
factual determinations by the trial court were clearly erroneous. 17 The
dissent, on the other hand, would have done so. The dissent noted, for
example, that the facts showed one of the officers testified that he, the
police had told the grandmother the youngster would not be arrested that day. They
took him to the station and then advised him again of his rights without handcuffing
him. The youngster never asked for a lawyer. He was taken into the detective's office
where he was given a Coke and some candy. He was interviewed by one officer for
approximately a half hour with a second officer present. One of the officers had previ-
ously investigated a shop lifting charge involving the child and had advised the young-
ster of his rights at that time. The child then went with the detectives to the area where
the homes were allegedly broken into by the youngster. The child pointed out where the
burglaries were committed. After he was read his rights, the youngster confessed to
having committed the burglaries and was taken back to the station and ultimately re-
leased to his home. He was arrested the next day. On the way to the station, his rights
were again read to him and the child pointed out locations of other burglaries. Then
another detective spoke with the youngster on the second day and the child was given
his rights again. He said he understood, and they then talked further about the bur-
glary. The child never signed a waiver of rights card nor was any tape recording or
tape recording of any kind made of any of the interviews. Witnesses were then called at
the suppression hearing including the youngster's specific learning disability (SLD)
teacher, the child's guardian/grandmother who suffered from high blood pressure and
heart problems, the principal of the child's school, the officers and the youngster. The
child testified that the officers threatened to hang the child by his neck if he did not
show them the houses involved in the burglary and that he was frightened. The police
denied making the statement, although one officer could not remember.
Id. at 981-82.
15. Id. at 983 (citing T.B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975) and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (for example, the trial court chose to believe the police officers who testi-
fied that they did not threaten the child by hanging him by his neck if he refused to
confess).
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officer, could not remember making a threatening statement to hang
the boy by his neck, as alleged by the child, rather than denying the
statement was made. There was no explanation by the trial court why
it chose to believe the police officers rather than the child.
The dissent would have held, in the alternative, that under Fare v.
Michael C."6 and Arizona v. Fulminante,19 whether rights are know-
ingly and voluntarily waived, based upon the totality of the circum-
stances, is a legal question which the appeals court can answer. Ac-
cording to Judge Farmer, these cases allow him to add together the
factual information to determine as a matter of law whether the waiver
was voluntary. He would have concluded that even though there was no
single objective factor which suggested voluntariness, given that the
burden was on the state, the waiver was involuntary.
The dissent may have the better of the argument both legally and
factually. Both sides are correct in saying that the United States Su-
preme Court has unequivocally held in determining whether a waiver is
voluntary, that the court must decide whether the child understood
based upon the totality of the circumstances. However, that is a ques-
tion of law. Thus, the majority should have reviewed the trial court's
decision based upon the totality of circumstances test. Had it done so,
it would have found no facts that demonstrated the child understood
what a lawyer does, how he might go about obtaining a lawyer, that if
he were indigent he understood what a public defender would do, that
a public defender is also a lawyer, or that he had the mental acuity to
read and comprehend. To the extent there was any evidence showing
that the: child understood, it involved the police officers' conclusory
evaluation. But even there they did not comment on the child's
understanding.
The second case, Z.F.B. v. State2 0 contains a more narrow hold-
ing. The Third District Court of Appeal, in a per curiam opinion with a
dissent by Chief Judge Schwartz, upheld the voluntariness of a child's
confession after being advised of his Miranda rights. In Z.F.B., the
youngster was suspected of being involved in a series of burglaries. The
police went to the child's home and asked permission from his mother
to speak with him. The mother, who was terminally ill, gave permission
for the officers to talk with the boy outside her presence, also advising
the police that the child had a legal guardian. Before questioning him,
18. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
19. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
20. 573 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Dale
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the officers advised the boy of his Miranda rights. 1 The officers ob-
tained a statement from him in the home, but the statement was sup-
pressed by the trial court because of possible coercion when the police
officers offered to help the youngster.2 The child was then taken to the
police station where he was given written Miranda warnings. The
youngster then asked for a lawyer. While the child was in a holding
cell, the police officers telephoned the individual whom the mother indi-
cated was the child's legal guardian. That person arrived at the police
station, spoke with the child, and told an officer that the child wanted
to talk. It turned out this person was not the child's legal guardian. The
child again was given the written Miranda form which he read and
signed. He then gave a statement admitting participation in the crimes.
The trial court denied the child's motion to suppress the confession.
The appellate court upheld the trial court by finding sufficient evidence
of the child's ability to comprehend the meaning of the Miranda warn-
ings and to waive his rights and also that the waiver was knowingly and
voluntarily made. 23 Judge Schwartz, in dissent, disagreed with the ma-
jority's conclusion that the child instituted contact with the police after
the request for the lawyer.24 In his view, unless the child himself initi-
ated further communication, the police could not reinstitute the
interrogation.25
A separate counsel-related issue that, oddly, continues to create
problems, concerns application of the Florida Supreme Court rule re-
quiring written consent by a child to employment of a certified law
student intern as a defense lawyer in a delinquency proceeding. 2' Such
a document must be filed and brought to the attention of the trial
judge.27 In the case of Interest of J.H.,28 the issue was whether the
child intelligently waived the right to have counsel present at certain
relevant hearings by executing an acknowledgement that a certified law
21. Id. at 1032.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1033 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
25. Z.F.B., 573 So. 2d at 1033 (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486
(1990)).
26. See also 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 863; 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at
1179-80 (discussing earlier cases).
27. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 11-1.2(d) (1987) (Rules Gov-
erning the Law School Civil and Criminal Practice Program).
28. 580 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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student would represent him. 9 The court found problems with the writ-
ten form and the procedure. First, the document did not state that the
child had the right to have a supervising attorney personally present
even when required by the trial judge who determines the extent of the
intern's participation." Second, the child was not advised of the right
to assistance of a supervising attorney at the time she entered her plea.
Thus, according to the court, the child could not intelligently waive the
right to be represented by a lawyer.3'
B. Detention Issues
Florida's approach to the use of secure detention to hold children
taken into custody has fluctuated over the past decade.32 With the pas-
sage of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990, the grounds for hold-
ing a child in secure detention have been narrowed somewhat to moder-
ately limit the grounds for initially holding a child.
However, the 1990 amendments made no change in the part of the
statute which provides that a child may only be held in detention for
twenty-one days unless an adjudicatory hearing has started. 33 Over the
last three years, the appellate courts have regularly granted writs of
habeas corpus based upon the trial courts' violation of this rule.34 The
appellate courts' anger continued unabated most recently in B.G. v.
Fryer.3 5 'That case involved a series of four petitions claiming that chil-
dren had been held beyond twenty-one days prior to adjudicatory hear-
ings. 6 The defense raised by the Attorney General on behalf of the
29. Id. at 163.
30. Id. (citing RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule I I-1.2(a))(governing
the Law School Civil and Criminal Practice Program).
31. Id.
32. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7; Bennett A. Brummer & Steven D. Levine,
Incarcerating Children for Their Own Good: Florida's Pre-Trial Detention Practices
Revisited, 60 FLA. B.J. 17 (1986); Jack Levine, Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing
Rehabilitalion Back in Style, 8 NOVA L.J. 255, 260 (1984).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(b) (Supp. 1990). It provides that "[n]o child
shall be held in secure, or nonsecure, or home detention under a special detention order
for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced
by the court."
34. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1171-72.
35. 570 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (the individual respondent in
so many of these cases, Ron Fryer, is the superintendent of the Broward County Re-
gional Juvenile Detention Center).
36. Id. at 431.
Dale
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respondent judge in each case was that there was "good cause" to con-
tinue the child in detention. Good cause, according to the Attorney
General, was the court's thorough review of several documents includ-
ing the child's arrest report, a criminal information file, detention
screening form and an HRS computer printout showing the child's
prior involvement in the court system."7 The Fourth District Court of
Appeals rejected this argument as merely parroting the law. Citing a
lack of any competent evidence to support the conclusory claims of in-
complete investigation or unavailability of unidentified witnesses, the
appellate court granted the writs. The language of the court's decision
in B.G. demonstrates once again its frustration with the trial bench.
The appellate court described the trial court as having "clearly and
consistently misconstrued" the relevant portions of the Florida Juvenile
Justice Act and that to fail to grant the writ would constitute an "evis-
ceration" of the state's detention limitations statute.3 8
The court's anger may have peaked in P.H. v. Fryer.9 In that
case, also involving a writ of habeas corpus in which the child was held
in excess of twenty-one days, the state sought by motion to extend se-
cure detention on good cause grounds asserting that it was unable to
locate a witness. The appellate court found that the state did not show
that the victim or any witnesses were actually unavailable and, there-
fore, there was no good cause to extend the time of the child in secure
detention. The appellate court then granted the writ of habeas corpus.
It also relied upon the earlier holding in E.W. v. Brown,10 to the effect
that the good cause requirement for an extension beyond twenty-one
days is not related to the original basis for detaining the child, but
relates to the explanation for the delay in commencement of the adjudi-
catory hearing. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Judge Letts,
concurring in P.H., noted the following:
As a spate of decisions (in excess of 40) from this court over
the last year will confirm, Judge Lawrence L. Korda does not like
the statutory provisions on juvenile detention. Neither do I. How-
ever, as Gertrude Stein might put it, 'the law is the law, is the law.'
37. Id. at 432.
38. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 39.032(6)(b), (d) (1989) recodified at FLA. STAT. §
39.047(4)(e)7 (1991)).
39. 570 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
40. 559 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also 1990 Survey, supra
note 7, at 1173 (discussing E.W.).
[Vol. 16
339
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
1991]
Surely, of all people, judges must have respect for it.' 1
A separate issue concerning pre-trial secure detention was raised
in W.N. v. Fryer.'2 In that case, a child sought relief on the grounds
that the court continued his placement in secure detention in violation
of the 1990 amendment of Chapter 39 prescribing grounds for place-
ment in secure detention. The youngster had failed to appear in court
and was later taken into custody pursuant to "a court pick up order." '
When he appeared in court the next day, the judge continued him in
secure detention although no new evidence was presented other than
the fact he had been arrested on the court order for failure to appear at
a prior hearing. Chapter 39.037 of the Florida Statutes provides that a
child may be taken into custody for failure to appear at a court hearing
after proper notification. However, under these circumstances, the child
may not be detained unless he meets the criteria of chapter 39.044.""
That statutory section contains two provisions, one providing for initial
detention and the second for continued detention.' 5 If it is determined
that a child will be continued in detention then the provisions of chap-
ter 39.044(2) apply. In the instant case, the trial court made no finding
at the detention hearing that the child met the provisions for continued
detention, which contain standards that are narrower than those for
initial detention. Thus, the appellate court granted the writ."
The appellate courts have labored over a number of years to define
how and under what circumstances a child before the juvenile court
may be held in contempt and incarcerated. In two cases decided in the
mid 1980s, A.O. v. State47 and R.M.P. v. Jones,'8 the supreme court
held that the trial court had no power to find contempt under Chapter
39, but retained inherent authority to punish a child for contempt in-
cluding placement in secure detention for a reasonable period of time.' 9
41. P.H., 570 So. 2d at 1098 (Letts, J., specially concurring).
42. 572 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
43. Id. at 25.
44. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.037-.044 (Supp. 1990)).
45. Id. at 25 n.l (citing Fla. Stat. § 39.044(d)(4) (Supp. 1990). The initial deci-
sion is made by HRS intake personnel when the child is brought to the detention
center. The continued detention decision is made by the court at a detention hearing.
46. Id. at 25-26.
47. 4:56 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1984).
48. 419 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1982).
49. A.O., 456 So. 2d at 1175; R.M.P., 456 So. 2d at 620 (holding that the au-
thority existed outside Chapter 39).
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In 1990, in T.D.L. v. Chinault,50 the Second District Court of Appeals
held that under the 1988 statute a child could not be placed in secure
detention, but with appropriate findings could be punished by incarcer-
ation in county jail.51
As part of its 1990 changes to the Florida Juvenile Justice Act,
the legislature added a new section 52 which set forth procedural rules
for representation by counsel, and notice and an opportunity to be
heard and confront witnesses when a child is subject to contempt of
court."' If the procedures are complied with, it would appear a child
could then be held in secure detention. In A.A. v. Rolle,5"' a child
sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he could not be held
in the local juvenile detention center for contempt under the 1990 law.
The child argued that chapter 39.042 defines detention criteria in such
a way that punishment was eliminated as a grounds for incarceration.55
50. 570 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
51. Id. at 1336; see also 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1186.
52. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10) (Supp. 1990).
53. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10) (Supp. 1990) which provides:
(10) Any child placed into detention for contempt of court shall be repre-
sented by legal counsel as provided in s. 30.041. The following due process
rights must be provided during all stages of any proceeding under this
chapter:
(a) The right to have the charges against the child in writing served a
reasonable time before the hearing.
(b) The right to a hearing before a court.
(c) The right to an explanation of the nature and consequences of the
proceeding.
(d) The right to confront witnesses.
(e) The right to present witnesses.
(f) The right to have a transcript or record of the proceedings.
(g) The right to appeal to an appropriate court.
A child shall not be placed in a jail or other facility intended for the deten-
tion of adults pursuant to this subsection.
54. 580 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
55. Id. at 283; see FLA. STAT. § 39.042 (Supp. 1990) which provides:
(1) All determinations and court orders regarding the use of secure,
non secure, or home detention shall be based primarily upon findings that
the child:
(a) Presents a substantial risk of not appearing at a subsequent
hearing;
(b) Presents a substantial risk of inflicting bodily harm on others as
evidenced by recent behavior;
(c) Presents a history of committing a serious property offense prior to
adjudication, disposition, or placement; or
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The appellate court upheld the trial court's contempt power. It recon-
ciled the definitional language of chapter 39.042 with chapter
39.044(10), explaining that the detention criteria which prohibit pun-
ishment apply only to a child who is alleged to have committed a delin-
quent act. Because a child held in contempt has not committed a delin-
quent act, the detention criteria do not apply.56 Reading the provisions
in pari materia, the court held the child could be securely detained.57
The dangers of inappropriate use of contempt in a delinquency
case were made evident in a Fourth District Court of Appeal case, In-
terest of R.A.58 This was a per curiam denial of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus with an extensive dissent by Judge Glickstein. Appar-
ently, the trial judge ordered the child into secure detention for ninety
days based upon contempt but where the child would be moved to a
residential program where the child would "burn off," to use the trial
court's words, the ninety days of contempt after placement.5 9 However,
because there was no space in the residential program, the trial court
ordered secure detention until the child could be placed.60 Judge Glick-
stein was not concerned with whether the court had the authority to
hold the child in contempt, but with two other issues. First, the trial
court was obligated to comply with proper procedures to find con-
tempt.61 In Judge Glickstein's view, the record was incomplete in this
regard. Second, the intent of the legislature was not to allow a child to
remain in secure detention because of contempt as an alternative to
placement in an HRS program.62
(d) Requests protection from imminent bodily harm.
56. Id. at 283-84.
57. The court distinguished the T.D.L. v. Chinault case on grounds that it was
no longer good law because of the 1990 legislative changes which state that a juvenile
detention center may be used as a sanction for contempt and that the new section
39.044(10) provides that "[a] child shall not be placed in a jail or other facility in-
tended for the detention of adults pursuant to the subsection." Id. at 284 n.4.
58. 575 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Glickstein, J., dissenting).
59. ld.
60. Id. at 808.
61. Failure to comply with due process procedural rights in juvenile contempt
proceedings is common nationwide. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES (Non-criminal Juvenile Detention Has Been
Reduced But Better Monitoring is Needed in Court) (April 19, 1991). See also GARY
CRIPPEN, VALID COURT ORDER EXCEPTION: YES OR No? (1990) (arguing against the
use of contempt on public policy grounds).
62. 575 So. 2d at 807.
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C. Adjudicatory Issues
The procedural device known as nolle prosequi or nol pros"3 has
recently been held to apply in juvenile delinquency cases in the same
manner as in adult criminal cases. Relying on two earlier adult cases,64
the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that the decision to file the nol
pros rests in the sole discretion of the prosecutor. Permission of the
trial court is not necessary. In State v. M.J.B., the prosecution asked
for a trial continuance. When the request was denied, the prosecution
announced that it would nol pros the case.6 5 The defense attorney
asked that the case be dismissed for failure to present evidence and the
court granted the motion. When the state re-filed the petition and the
child moved to dismiss alleging double jeopardy, the trial court dis-
missed and the state appealed.66 As the appellate court put it, "even
though the practice of entertaining a nolle prosequi in re-filing the pe-
tition after a continuance has been denied may seem underhanded, the
state has the discretion to act in this manner. '67
Although Florida's Rules of Juvenile Procedure contain detailed
discovery provisions, issues in this area continue to appear in appellate
decisions.6 8 In Z.B. v. State,"9 a child appealed an adjudication of de-
linquency for two counts of battery on a school official. The discovery
issue involved the trial court's order excluding a defense witness from
testifying. Holding that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate
inquiry as defined in the Florida Supreme Court case of Richardson v.
63. Nolle prosequi is defined as a formal entry on the record by the prosecuting
officer in a criminal case in which he or she declares that he or she will not prosecute
the case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE
& JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 568-69 (1985) (suggesting that unbridled
discretion in the prosecutor to nol pros has resulted in legislation or rules of court in a
number of jurisdictions the purpose of which is to restrain the use of the power. The
most common method is to require the prosecutor to explain the reasons for so doing in
writing).
64. See State v. Padron, 506 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v.
Kahmke, 468 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
65. 576 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 967 (both the majority and concurrence suggested that if there was
other alleged misconduct or if the purpose had been to harass or gain some other unfair
advantage against the accused then it might be possible for the trial court judge to
dismiss the re-filed charges).
68. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.060 (newly renumbered in 1991 from FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.070).
69. 576 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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State,7 0 the appellate court reversed the adjudication and remanded for
a new trial.7 The court found that the child had been guilty of a dis-
covery violation in not advising the state of the identity of a defense
witness until the day of trial. However, the trial court failed to find out
what the witness was prepared to testify about, and then made no in-
quiry or finding as to whether the discovery violation resulted in
prejudice to the state. This, according to the appellate court, was re-
versible error. 2 Furthermore, the trial court had imposed the extreme
sanction of exclusion without exploring other remedies such as a recess
or deposition and whether those alternatives would have cured the
prejudice. This also was reversible error.7
Under Florida law, a delinquency petition must be filed within
forty-five days of the time the child is taken into custody, the juvenile
law analogue to arrest.74 Interpreting the forty-five day rule has been
an ongoing matter in the appellate courts. 5 In B.T. v. State, 6 the First
District 'Court of Appeals faced the question of whether it was proper
for the court to allow the state to file a second amended petition outside
the statutory forty-five day time frame. The amended petition changed
a sexual battery charge from one involving lack of consent to one in-
volving lack of intelligent voluntary consent.7 The prosecution changed
the charge when it was determined that the twenty-two year old men-
tally handicapped cousin, who was the victim of the alleged sexual bat-
tery, was not able to give legal consent.78 The appellate court suggested
that under the facts there was no harm to the child because he was
aware that the state would have to prove either that the victim had not
agreed to the battery or that the consent was not intelligent, knowing,
and voluntary. Further, counsel admitted knowledge and notice of the
original arrest report which said that the victim was mentally disabled.
70. 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971) (known as a Richardson inquiry).
71. Z.B., 576 So. 2d at 1356.
72. Id. at 1357.
73. Id.
74. See FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.048(6)
(Supp. 1990)).
75. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1173-76 (discussing other cases on this
subject).
76. 573 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
77. See FLA. STAT. § 794.011(5) (1989) (a second degree felony); FLA. STAT. §
794.011(4) (1989) (a first degree felony).
78. Id.; B.T., 573 So. 2d at 103-04.
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Thus, there was no claim of surprise. 9 However, because of an appar-
ent conflict among the districts on the issue of what magnitude of
change is necessary to constitute the filing of a new petition, as opposed
to an amendment to the original, the court certified the question as one
of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court.80
In a second case State v. F.T.H.,8" the state appealed from an
order dismissing a delinquency petition for failure to comply with the
forty-five day speedy trial rule. The trial court had ruled that the child
was taken into custody when a police officer approached the youngster,
told him he matched the description of the robbery suspect, asked him
his name, address and phone number, and then took his photograph.
The juvenile and the police officer then went their separate ways and
no arrest was made at that time.82 The appellate court disagreed with
the trial court's conclusion that the youngster had been taken into cus-
tody at that point. Holding that taking a child into custody under
Chapter 39 was akin to arrest of an adult, the court ruled that the
encounter rose to the level of a temporary detention but was not
equivalent to arrest. Thus, the child was not taken into custody. 3 The
court further ruled that physical control as defined in Florida Statute
section 39.01(51) does not include police encounters or temporary in-
vestigatory detention. This conclusion is without citation.
A third case is V.C.F. v. State.8 4 In that case, the child appealed
from a judgment of the circuit court which withheld an adjudication of
79. B.T., 573 So. 2d at 104.
80. Id.; see FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v). The specific question presented
was:
Under the circumstances of this case, does Rule 8.110, F.R.C.J.P.
permit amendment of an original timely petition for delinquency more
than 45 days after arrest to correct the specified subsection of a sexual
battery charge under section [chapter] 794.011, Florida statutes, from
subsection (5) to subsection (4), both involving lack of intelligent volun-
tary consent as there defined?
B.T., 573 So. 2d at 104.
81. 579 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
82. Id. at 912. The encounter lasted 10 to 30 minutes and the delinquency peti-
tion was filed 47 days after the encounter.
83. Id. The term "taken into custody" is found at FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (Supp.
1990) which states: "'Taken into custody' means the status of a child immediately
when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by
law, pending the child's release, detention, placement, or other disposition as authorized
by law."
84. 569 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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delinquency and placement on community control, claiming the trial
court incorrectly denied a motion to dismiss because the state failed to
file within forty-five days of the youngster's arrest in the state of Kan-
sas. The appellate court concluded that because the State of Florida
filed the petition within forty-five days of the date the youngster re-
turned to Florida and was placed in custody of the Florida officials,
there was no violation of the Florida statute.8 The appellate court re-
jected the state's argument that the juvenile speedy trial rule should be
construed in comparison to the Florida rule of criminal procedure on
speedy trial.86 Finding no Florida case on point,8" however, the court
held that in order for the forty-five day rule to make sense, all provi-
sions of Chapter 39 had to be read and interpreted in pari materia.8
First, the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, to which Florida is a signa-
tory,80 provides that a youngster is subject to the laws of the foreign
state when initially taken into custody and remains there until he re-
turns to Florida. Second, Chapter 39 contains sections providing for the
processing of the youngster upon return to Florida.90 These provisions
for processing take time, and if the speedy trial rule were to commence
upon taking the child into custody in a foreign state, the time frames
within which to carry them out might be impossible to meet. The court
concluded that the statute could not be read to interfere with these two
sections of the law.9 1
In Florida, trial court jurisdiction in a delinquency case ceases
when a child reaches nineteen years of age.92 A jurisdictional question
arose in D.M. v. State, where the trial court failed to adjudicate the
child delinquent or withhold adjudication, but set the case for a disposi-
tional hearing five days after the juvenile was to reach the age of
nineteen.9 3 When the child filed a motion to terminate jurisdiction after
his nineteenth birthday, the court entered a nunc pro tunc order adjudi-
cating the child delinquent as of the date of the trial.94 The First Dis-
trict Court of Appeals reversed finding that the purpose of a nunc pro
85. Id.
86. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191.
87. V.C.F., 569 So. 2d at 1365.
88. Id.
89. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.51-.516 (1989).
90. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01, .05 (1989).
91. VC.F., 569 So. 2d at 1367.
92. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(4) (Supp. 1990).
93. 580 So. 2d 634, 635 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
94. Id.
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tunc order is to correct a clerical mistake or refer to judicial acts which
memorialize a previously-taken judicial act. The purpose is not to make
a new or de novo decision, or supply an omitted action by the court
which occurred here.9
5
D. Dispositional Issues
Once adjudicatory and dispositional hearings have been held and
the child is awaiting placement in an HRS facility, Florida statutes
limit the length of time the child can be held in secure detention. Until
the passage of the 1990 law, the period was five days."6 The five-day
rule produced a number of appellate decisions admonishing the trial
courts to comply with that provision.9 7 Perhaps recognizing that the
time constraints were difficult to meet, the legislature amended the law
in 1990 to provide that in addition to the five-day period in secure de-
tention, HRS is allowed an additional ten days from the date of com-
mitment to transfer the child from secure detention to non-secure or
home detention if HRS timely seeks an order for continued detention.9
Regretfully, HRS seems unable to comply with the new rule as
evidenced by the First District Court of Appeals decision in R.L. v.
State.9 9 HRS exceeded both the initial five-day secure detention limit
and the total fifteen-day transfer time limit. HRS argued that because
the child was ultimately released to home detention the case was moot.
95. Id.
96. See FLA. STAT. § 959.12 (1989).
97. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1182-83 (citing cases decided in 1989);
1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 873-74 (discussing a 1989 case).
98. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(11) (Supp. 1990) provides:
When a child is committed to the department awaiting dispositional
placement, removal of the child from detention care shall occur within 5
days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. A child placed
into secure detention care and committed to the department who is await-
ing dispositional placement in a commitment program shall be transferred
by the department into non secure or home detention care if placement
does not occur within 5 days after commitment, excluding Saturdays, Sun-
days, and legal holidays. If the child is committed to a residential pro-
gram, the department may seek an order from the court authorizing con-
tinued detention for a specific period of time necessary for the appropriate
residential placement of the child. However, such continued detention in
secure detention care or transfer to non secure or home detention care
shall not exceed 15 days after commitment, excluding Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays.
99. 578 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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The court disagreed, holding simply that the time frames were violated
and that the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the child should be
granted. 0
Further evidence of HRS' problems can be found in Interest of
M.C.. 101 There the youngster was waiting for placement in a facility for
mentally disturbed children. HRS could not immediately place the
child because of lack of space in appropriate programs. The child re-
mained in secure detention beyond the statutory period. The Court
granted the writ. Then, recognizing that this problem was on-going for
some time, the court opined that "what this shows us is that all of the
legislative changes will mean nothing unless the legislature has com-
mitted resources to expand the treatment programs for juveniles."102 It
remains to be seen whether the necessary appropriations will be forth-
coming from the legislature. If they are not, the appellate courts will be
forced to continue ordering the release of children who need services on
writs of habeas corpus for lack of compliance with statutory time
frames.
A technical but not insignificant issue of appellate practice was
recently presented to the First District Court of Appeals in K.K.P. v.
State.'0 3 In that case, a child was charged with escape from a juvenile
facility in Duval County. The trial court found the appellant had com-
mitted the escape and transferred the matter to the Circuit Court of
Pinellas County, the youngster's county of residence. That circuit court
adjudicated the child delinquent and ordered commitment to HRS.
The child appealed to the First District Court of Appeals which hears
appeals from the Judicial Circuit in Duval County. The child's argu-
ment, in response to an order to show cause at the trial level why the
case should not be transferred to the Second District Court of Appeals,
was that the youngster did not intend to contest the order of disposition
but rather the adjudicatory order. The First District Court of Appeals,
on its own motion, transferred the case to the Second District Court of
Appeals for the following reasons. First, the only order entered by a
circuit court in the First District was the finding that the child had
100. Id. at 863. The court noted that although no placement was available to
HRS and would not be available for months, the statute is mandatory and there must
be compliance. This case demonstrates the on-going problem produced by the lack of
funding for delinquency commitment programs.
101. 567 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
102. Id. at 1039.
103. :580 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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committed the escape and that order was not an adjudicatory order.
Second, even if it was an adjudicatory order, the case was then trans-
ferred to a court in the Second Appellate District for all purposes.
Third, even if the Second District Court of Appeals would agree with
the child's argument that there was insufficient evidence to adjudicate
him, the only relief available would be to discharge the child, an order
which should be directed to the judicial circuit over which the First
District Court of Appeals had no power. 04
Various provisions of the delinquency law governing dispositional
alternatives continue to raise problems as evidenced by recent appellate
court decisions. 105 For example, in M.L. v. State,10 6 the First District
Court of Appeal was asked to decide whether the trial court could
place a child on community control, Florida's term for probation, after
release from commitment when such disposition was not ordered in the
original commitment proceeding. 10 The child had been adjudicated to
have escaped from an HRS facility and was committed to HRS' cus-
tody for an indeterminent term not to exceed the child's nineteenth
birthday or the maximum allowed by law. 108 When the particular com-
mitment program did not work out, a hearing was held on the issue of
imposition of community control following the child's discharge from
the commitment. The child raised the issue of whether the placement
on community control would constitute an improper increase in punish-
ment. A modification of the original disposition order allowing the
change in status was made over the child's objection.
In a technical decision interpreting several provisions, the appel-
late court in M.L. concluded that the modification order was appropri-
ate under the Florida statute. First, the court concluded that the law
allowed the trial court to make an order placing the child on commu-
nity control following discharge from commitment in the initial or-
der.10 9 Second, under the court's general dispositional powers, the court
104. Id. at 308.
105. FLA. STAT. § 39.054 (Supp. 1990).
106. 578 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
107. Id. at 465.
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(3)(e) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.047(3)(e)1-5
(1991)) provides in relevant part:
The court may also require the child be placed in a community control
program following the child's discharge from commitment. Community-
based sanctions may be imposed by the court at the disposition hearing or
at any time prior to the child's release from commitment.
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only retains authority to discharge a child from commitment if in the
original commitment order it retained authority to do so."' The appel-
late court concluded that the trial court could require that a child be
placed in a community control program following the child's discharge
from commitment and that the provision holding that the court had no
authority over the discharge of the child from commitment, unless the
court in its commitment order had stated that it retained jurisdiction,
did not apply. It found the order in this case was a modification which
did not purport to discharge the child from HRS commitment status.'
There are two problems with the court's decision. First, the very
statute the court sought to avoid, chapter 39.11(4), Florida Statutes,
states that a subsequent modification of a dispositional order is permit-
ted only where the trial court retained authority to do so in its original
order."' The trial court failed to do this in its commitment order.
There is no exception to the statute. Second, apparently in an effort to
avoid chapter 39.11(4) which is absolute on its face in precluding fur-
ther court authority over discharge of the child in absence of the ten-
sion of jurisdiction in the commitment order, the appellate court argued
that chapter 39.09(3)(e) actually gave it continuing authority." 3 This
section allows the court to add community-based sanctions prior to the
child's release from commitment and after the initial commitment or-
der. The problem with the court's reasoning is that community-based
sanctions are not the same as community control. Community-based
sanctions may be a part of community control but community control is
far more extensive. Community-based sanctions include restitution,
curfew and revocation of the child's driver's license and they may be
110. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054 (Supp. 1990).
111. M.L., 578 So. 2d at 466.
112. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(4) (1989) (recodified FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (1991))
states:
(4) Any commitment of a delinquent child to the department shall be for
an indeterminate period of time, but the time shall not exceed the maxi-
mum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same offense
.... Under no circumstances shall the court have authority over the dis-
charge of a child from commitment provided in this subsection unless the
court, in its commitment order, states that it retains such authority.
113. Id. at 465-66; FLA. STAT. § 39.09(3)(e) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. §
39.047(3)(e)1-5 (1991)) states in relevant part:
If the court decides to commit a child to the department, the department
shall furnish the court, in order of the preference of the department, a list
of not less than three options for programs in which the child may be
placed.
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considered as part of community control. To read the statute as the
court has is to avoid the language of chapter 39.11(4). " 4
May a court prohibit a child from wearing certain clothing or jew-
elry as a condition of community control? The issue was raised in L.S.
v. State1 5 where the trial court, on recommendation of HRS, imposed
a condition that the child not wear any jewelry. The child had been
adjudicated delinquent for possession of marijuana and sale of cocaine.
The case was a per curiam affirmance upholding the condition with a
dissent by Judge Griffin who argued that the case fit within the test of
Grubbs v. State.116 Judge Griffin reasoned that a condition of commu-
nity control must be related to the offense and that the standard of
conduct imposed be essential to rehabilitation as well as protection of
the public. He believed that there was nothing in the record to indicate
that jewelry was in any way connected with the child or the crimes
committed by the youngster. Nor was there any showing that the use of
jewelry was more typical of drug dealers than law-abiding citizens, or
that prohibiting its use would impair the ability to sell drugs.1 1 7 Fi-
nally, Judge Griffin noted that selection of apparel is a basic means of
personal expression, concluding that "there is not a great difference be-
tween forcing a probationer to wear certain clothing or symbols as a
badge of shame and prohibiting the wearing of certain items.' '1 8
E. Transfer Issues
Appeals involving issues related to the transfer and handling of
juveniles in adult court continued this past year. In certain situations, a
child may be tried in adult court under Florida law.'1 9 One of the re-
quirements calls for the court to decide whether a child should receive
adult or juvenile sanctions when a child has been tried as an adult and
convicted, irrespective of whether the child was waived to adult court
114. In a sense, all of this begs the more significant public policy question of
whether dispositional orders under Florida law should be viewed as rehabilitative in
nature or punitive in nature. If they are punitive in nature, then to modify them to
require the child to suffer a greater penalty smacks of double jeopardy. On the other
hand, if the goal is rehabilitation, then modifications to help the child are appropriate.
115. 575 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
116. 373 So. 2d 905, 909 (Fla. 1979).
117. L.S., 575 So. 2d at 331.
118. Id. at 332.
119. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.02(4), .04(5) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. §
39.059 (Supp. 1990)).
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or the proceeding began in the adult court under the direct file provi-
sions.120 The court must consider six criteria. 12 1 Yet, the trial courts
continue to violate the written binding provisions of the statute which
states that:
Suitability for adult sanctions is determined by reference to
the six criteria and any decisions shall be in writing and in con-
formity with those criteria with the court making a specific finding
of fact and reasons for the decision. 23
In Tighe v. State, s a child who had been sentenced as an adult
on a series of offenses argued on appeal that the trial court had failed
to enter adequate written findings to support the imposition of adult
sanctions. The appellate court found that the record did not reveal that
the trial court made any written findings of fact. The appellate court
explained that even a transcript which is made a part of the appellate
record might satisfy the statute if it contained oral findings of fact and
reasons for the decision, as opposed to being part of the written
record.""'
In Taylor v. State,1 25 the Fifth District Court of Appeal remanded
for findings to support the imposition of adult sanctions in the case
where a youngster, nearly seventeen years old, had been convicted of
attempted first degree murder of a police officer. There, the closest item
to a separate written order containing findings supporting the decision
to impose adult sanctions was a two-part commentary on the sentenc-
ing score sheet stating that the court had made findings as provided by
120. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.052(2), .022(5)(a) (Supp. 1990).
121. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(6) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(6) (Supp.
1990)).
122. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(7)(c) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(c)
(1991)); see also 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1187-88 (describing prior cases in
which the lower courts failed to comply with the statute).
123. 571 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
124. Id. at 84. In a significant concurrence, Judge Dauksch argued that the 1990
Supreme Court opinion in Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1990) should apply to
juveniles. Pope held that where an appellate court reverses an adult departure sentence
because there were no written reasons, the appellate court must remand for resentenc-
ing with no possibility of departure from the guideline. According to Judge Dauksch,
the effect in a juvenile context is a remand with instructions to impose juvenile sanc-
tions. 573 So. 2d at 84.
125. 5,73 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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Chapter 39 that the juvenile sanctions were not appropriate. 12 The ap-
pellate court noted that the state had not asserted on appeal that the
requisite findings were made on the record at the sentencing hearing
which the court of appeal would have accepted had they been made.12 7
Thus, the court remanded.
A separate adult sentencing guideline issue arose in Lang v.
State,"'8 where a child charged as an adult with armed robbery entered
into a plea agreement to reduce the charge to robbery with a weapon
along with a recommendation from the state for a guideline sentence.
The court rejected the defense counsel's plea that it impose juvenile
sanctions or, if it imposed adult sanctions, to withhold adjudication and
place the child on probation or community control. The appellate court
first ruled that a negotiated plea of guilty to a reduced charge and
recommended guideline sentence does not by itself act as a waiver of
the court's obligation to address the six specified criteria for the imposi-
tion of adult sanctions under chapter 39.111(7)(c). Relying on the su-
preme court decision in State v. Rohden,1 29 the court stated that, had
the child waived or bargained away his right to have the court consider
adult sanctions under the Florida Juvenile Justice Act, it would have
upheld the adult sentence. However, it could find no such waiver in the
Lang case. And thus, the trial court was obligated to comply with
chapter 39.111. The appellate court then found like so many appellate
courts before it, that the trial court had failed to make proper findings
for sentencing the child as an adult. For example, a check list used by
the trial court was found not to satisfy the requirements of Chapter 39
because the court is required to render specific findings of fact with the
reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions using all six
criteria. 3o
The problems in Florida's Juvenile Justice System also manifest
themselves in cases involving the lack of dispositional alternatives in
juvenile delinquency cases. Chapter 39 provides that when a court de-
cides that it shall commit a child to HRS, the department shall furnish
a list of not less than three placement alternatives to the court and rank
126. Id. at 174.
127. Id. at 175.
128. 566 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
129. 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984).
130. Lang, 566 So. 2d at 1357 (citing Keith v. State, 542 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); see also 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 881-83 (discussing
Keith and other cases).
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them in order of preference.' 31 In Interest of C.S., 3 2 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's substitution of another
program option for one of the three furnished by HRS, finding that the
trial court cannot do so on the basis of prior case law and the statute. 133
It can be expected that if the state's financial difficulties continue, the
appeals courts will continue to be upset with the placement alternatives
provided by HRS.
III. DEPENDENCY
A. Right to Counsel Issues
Appellate cases involving questions of the role of counsel in the
dependency field regularly come before Florida's courts of appeal."'
They demonstrate the ongoing inability of trial courts to properly ad-
dress the right to and role of counsel in dependency proceedings. By
statute in Florida, the parents are entitled to representation by counsel
in a dependency proceeding. However, Florida's law does not provide
for the absolute right to appointment of counsel free of charge for an
indigent parent.' 35 Any decision to appoint a lawyer is made on an indi-
vidual basis.' 6
Two cases decided this past year exemplify the continuing prob-
lem. In Interest of G.L.O., 37 the appellate court reversed and re-
131. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(e)1 (Supp. 1990).
132. 573 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
133. Id. at 169 (citing M.M. v. Korda, 544 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989); see 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 873 (discussing Korda); 1990 Survey, supra
note 7, at 1185-86 (discussing other recent cases); see also HRS v. R.S., 567 So. 2d
533 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (commenting on trial court exceeding its statutory
authority by specifying, in dicta, the facility in which HRS might place the child).
134. See 1988 Survey, supra note 11, at 1171-74; 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at
885; 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1188-91 (discussing cases decided in past years and
briefly discussing the analytic framework for the right to counsel for parties in depen-
dency proceedings); Michael J. Dale, The Right to Counsel in Dependency Proceed-
ings, Florida Continuing Legal Education Chapter (available currently through the
Nova Law Review and forthcoming from CLE).
135. See FLA. STAT. § 39.406 (1989); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.560. See generally Inter-
est of D.B., and D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
136. See Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1052 (1984); Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975) (setting certain criteria pur-
suant to the Ninth Circuit opinion in Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974)
(to determine whether appointed counsel is required)).
137. 573 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (interestingly, the appellant
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manded an order adjudicating the appellant's son dependent because
the trial court failed to advise the mother of the right to counsel at any
point during the dependency proceeding. In Interest of J.G.,18 the ap-
pellate court affirmed a trial court order refusing to terminate parental
rights and resetting the case for a new dispositional hearing because of
the delay by the state in advising the indigent parents of their right to
counsel in the earlier dependency proceeding. 139 Under Florida law,
HRS is also obligated to advise the parent of his or her right to
counsel. 40
Where parents retain counsel themselves in dependency proceed-
ings, they may, in only very limited situations, seek payment of the
attorney's fees from the state. This issue arose in Interest of A.C., K.C.,
& J.B., Jr.." HRS commenced a dependency proceeding which re-
sulted in a court declaration that one child was dependent based upon
the parents' stipulation to that fact and that the other two children
should return to their parents. Subsequently, the court held HRS and
the child's protective investigator jointly and severally liable for the
parents' attorney's fees." 2 The Second District Court of Appeals held
that the statutory provision governing the award of attorney's fees re-
quired that "the suit must be so clearly devoid of merit based on the
facts or the law as to be completely untenable." 4 3 The court held that
merit is determined at the point the claim is initially presented, and
that there must be a showing that the party made a reasonable effort to
investigate the claims before filing suit.1 ' Applying this test, the court
held that the award of fees could not be sustained because initially
there was a meritorious claim and HRS had made a reasonable
investigation.
Nor does a child possess an absolute constitutional right to counsel
in a dependency proceeding.14 5 However, because of its participation in
the Federal Child Abuse Prevention Act of 1974, Florida provides for a
mother appeared pro se).
138. 577 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
139. Id. at 696. The appellate court described the delay as "outrageous."
140. See FLA. STAT. § 39.406 (1989).
141. 580 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
142. Id. at 884.
143. Id. at 885 (citing FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (Supp. 1990); Whitten v. Progres-
sive Casualty Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1982)).
144. Id.
145. See Interest of D.B. and D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); 1989 Survey,
supra note 11, at 888-889.
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guardian ad litem program to act on behalf of children in dependency
proceedings.146 A combination of Florida statutes, Florida Rules of Ju-
venile IProcedure and an unreported Florida Supreme Court order de-
fine the role of the guardian ad litem and lawyer if appointed as attor-
ney guardian ad litem.'4 7
The cases of HRS v. Cole"46 and Brevard County v. Hammel, 49
involved issues of payment of guardian ad litem attorney's fees. HRS v.
Cole was a dependency proceeding which emanated from an underlying
divorce. When a custody dispute was consolidated with dependency
proceedings, the juvenile court entered an order appointing the district
guardian ad litem program on behalf of the child. It then asked the
program to appoint a specific guardian ad litem which was done.
Thereafter, apparently because the mother defied a visitation order, the
juvenile court on its own motion appointed a lawyer as attorney guard-
ian ad litem for the child and ordered him to locate the youngster.50
Then, the director of the local guardian ad litem program filed a peti-
tion stating that the program itself had appointed a lawyer as "pro
bono attorney" for the guardian ad litem program and asked that this
lawyer be allowed to attend depositions and that his fees to attend
them be paid by the court. Later both the attorney guardian ad litem
for the child and the attorney for the guardian ad litem program filed
motions for payment of attorney's fees.15 ' The trial court ordered the
county to pay the attorney guardian ad litem's fees and HRS to com-
pensate the guardian ad litem program's attorney. HRS appealed."5 2
After discussing the history of Florida's guardian ad litem pro-
gram, the appellate court found, first, that the court could not appoint
the guardian ad litem program and ask it to choose a specific guardian.
Rather, the court should receive a list of qualified persons from the
program from which the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem."8
Second, the appellate court could find no authority for obligating HRS
146. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988); FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Juv.
P. 8.590(c).
147. See Standard 4.0, State of Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program Minimal
Standards of Operation (Fla. S. Ct. Admin. Order, Feb. 7, 1985); FLA. STAT. §
415.508 (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(a).
148. 574 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
149. 575 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
150. Cole, 574 So. 2d at 161.
151. Id. at 162.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 163.
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to pay the attorney's fees for the guardian ad litem program's counsel
because HRS has no statutory responsibility for operating the guardian
ad litem program. The court distinguished earlier decisions which held
that HRS could be responsible for payment of attorney's fees to a
guardian ad litem attorney appointed pursuant to the Florida statute.154
In fact, the guardian ad litem program is operated through the Office
of the State Administrator, a part of the supreme court and not by
HRS.
Brevard County v. Hammel concerned a far simpler matter. The
trial court had entered an order granting an attorney guardian ad li-
tem's motion for an order compensating him the day after his motion
was filed and without providing an opportunity to the county to be
heard in opposition. The court granted the county's writ of certiorari,
quashed the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. 155
Significantly, the court did not reach the issue of whether HRS or Bre-
vard County was the appropriate entity to pay the attorney's fees as-
suming the county had been given adequate notice and opportunity to
be heard.
More important than the issue of who pays the attorney guardian
ad litem is the question of the proper role of the guardian ad litem in a
dependency proceeding. 151 There is a growing body of case law on the
subject.1 57 The most recent case is In re J.M. and R.M.1 58 There the
guardian ad litem appealed from an order denying the guardian's peti-
tion for dependency and alternative motion for rehearing. The case be-
gan when an HRS child protection investigator filed an affidavit re-
questing detention of the children and thereafter filed a dependency
petition on the basis of information from a physician that one of the
children had experienced significant physical trauma. The court then
appointed a guardian ad litem nominated by the local guardian ad li-
tem program to represent the child's interests.1 59 At the adjudicatory
154. Id. (citing In re M.P., 453 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev.
denied, 472 So. 2d 732 (1985); Interest of R.W., 409 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), rev. denied, 418 So. 2d 1279 (1982); FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (Supp. 1990)).
155. Hammel, 575 So.2d at 773.
156. The guardian ad litem also plays an important role in termination of paren-
tal rights proceedings. See footnotes 148-65 and accompanying text in this article.
157. See 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 888-89; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note
7, at 1201 (discussing prior decisions).
158. 579 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
159. Id. at 821. It is interesting to note that at the adjudicatory hearing HRS,
the parents, and the guardian ad litem were represented by separate counsel.
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hearing, the court found that HRS had failed by a preponderance of
the evidence to prove dependency.
Approximately two weeks later, the guardian ad litem filed a peti-
tion for dependency and, in the alternative, a motion for new hearing'60
on the basis of a statement made by one of the children to an adult
care-giver at a residential facility. The guardian ad litem argued that
HRS had been aware of this statement, but had not advised the guard-
ian ad litem of it. The guardian argued that a separate party's notice to
HRS or its agents does not constitute notice to the guardian. The trial
court rejected both arguments by finding that the evidence was not
newly-discovered and attributed HRS' knowledge to the guardian.
Treating the motion for a new hearing as a motion for rehearing, the
trial court denied it as not timely filed. It then dismissed the guardian's
petition for dependency.
The appellate court found that the guardian ad litem functions in-
dependent of, and has separate party status from, HRS in a depen-
dency proceeding. 161 The appeals court also noted that the guardian ad
litem program is administered by the Office of the State Administrator
under the supervision of the supreme court, whereas HRS is a separate
administrative agency.162 The court then held that pursuant to Florida
Statute section 39.404(1), the guardian ad litem is a person who may
commence a dependency proceeding. 163 Pursuant to discovery rules, the
guardian also was entitled to learn from HRS the names and addresses
of all persons who might have relevant information as well as obtain
statements given to HRS by these persons.6  Because HRS failed to
provide discovery, the information constituted newly-discovered evi-
dence upon which the guardian, as an independent party, was entitled
to file either a petition for dependency or a motion for a new hearing.
The appellate court reversed and remanded to consider the newly-dis-
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ .503(a), .508 (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.540,
8.590; HRS v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
162. Id. This case raises the interesting issue of who then should be paying
guardians ad litem. Some of the older case law suggests that HRS can be made to pay
apparently because of Florida's funding under the Federal Adoption Assistance Act the
flow of which funds passes through HRS.
163. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(1) (Supp. 1990) provides in relevant part that "any
.. . person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed of them and believe
that they are true, may file a dependency petition."
164. In re J.M. and R.M., 579 So. 2d at 822 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.770(a)(2)(i)-(iii)).
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covered evidence and such other evidence as deemed necessary to de-
cide the dependency issue. 165
B. Procedural Issues
Confidentiality in dependency proceedings and the public's right to
know raises thorny constitutional problems. Two cases decided recently
elucidate the issues. In Florida Publishing Co. v. Brooke,'66 a Jackson-
ville newspaper's reporter asked the First District Court of Appeal to
review an order of the circuit court in Duval County which prohibited
them from publishing the contents of a letter from a licensed psycholo-
gist in a dependency proceeding.' 7 The appellate court granted the pe-
tition and quashed the order for three reasons. First, it interpreted
chapter 39.408(2)(c) which allows a trial court to close a dependency
proceeding in the court's discretion and in certain proceedings man-
dates that they be closed.168 It held that this confidential proceedings
section could not reach the letter which was no longer part of the pro-
ceedings. Second, it held that Florida's statutory provision governing
the maintenance of court records by the clerk did not provide authority
for the trial judge to restrain publication because the letter was not a
court record as defined in the relevant statute. 69 Third, it found that
the judge's order constituted prior restraint in violation of the newspa-
per's rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
165. Id. at 823.
166. 576 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
167. Id. at 844. The letter which the newspaper wished to publish came from a
psychologist, was sent to an HRS official and was sharply critical of HRS actions and
its employees. Copies of the letter were forwarded to the court, the attorney-guardian
ad litem for the child and through the court to other counsel as record. Ultimately, the
child's mother gave a copy of the letter to the newspaper reporter.
168. Id. at 845 citing FLA. STAT. § 39.408(2)(c) (Supp. 1990) which provides in
relevant part:
(c) All hearings, except as hereinafter provided, shall be open to the pub-
lic, and no person shall be excluded therefrom except on special order of
the judge, who, in his discretion, may close any hearing to the public when
the public interest or the welfare of the child, in his opinion, is best served
by so doing. All hearings involving unwed mothers, custody, sexual abuse,
or permanent placement of children shall remain confidential and closed to
the public. Hearings involving more than one child may be held simultane-
ously when the several children involved are related to each other or were
involved in the same case. The child and the parents or legal custodians of
the child may be examined separately and apart from each other.
169. Id. at 845 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.411 (Supp. 1990)).
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tion and article I, section 4, of the Florida Constitution. The court
could find no facts which would overcome the presumptive unconstitu-
tionality of prior restraint. 70
The issue of confidentiality came up in an entirely different con-
text in Brown v. Pate.17 1 In that case, a parent moved to disqualify the
judge con grounds which included a claim that the judge had opened the
dependency proceedings to members of the news media contrary to
chapter 39.408(2)(c), the same confidentiality provision which was in-
volved in the Brooke case. The father argued that trying the case in the
media was not in the best interests of the children, that the court's
order making the matter public was received by the media prior to the
father's counsel, that the court had made comments about its concern
about allowing the children to have access to their father, and that the
court had made comments implicating the father in the homicide of his
wife, for which homicide he later had been found not guilty in a crimi-
nal case. 7 12 The appeals court rejected all of the grounds for recusal
and specifically found that the court's decision to open the hearing to
the media was not a basis for disqualification.1 73
A procedural case with significant overtones is HRS v. D.H.171 A
boy had been found dependent because the mother was hospitalized
and comatose, the father was in jail, and a legal guardian turned the
child over to HRS because that person could no longer care for him. 175
In a dependency proceeding, the court ordered the care, custody and
control of D.H. to be placed in HRS. Six months later, when HRS filed
its standard petition for review and the court learned that, in the in-
terim, the child had been charged with homicide and jailed, the court
vacated the order of dependency and left the child in the total care of
the jailers. 70
The appellate court noted that Florida law gives the court the op-
tion to terminate jurisdiction over the child after the statutory six-
170. Id. at 846 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539, 558
(1976); Landmark Communication, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 849 (1978) (Stew-
art, J., concurring); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977);
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979)).
171. 577 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
172. Id. at 646-47.
173. Id. at 647. Whether the ruling was correct as a matter of law was not
before the court.
174. 575 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1382-83.
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month period of review. 177 It held that the court also had authority to
continue jurisdiction and keep the child in the care of HRS. 7 8 Then, in
pointed language, it said:
All children need someone to look after their welfare and to be
concerned for them. That need does not end upon, nor is it dimin-
ished by, incarceration. A good argument could be made that this
child now needs someone to look after him more than ever; some-
one other than just a lawyer, who will only look after his legal
needs.1 7
9
Finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to
accede to the wishes of HRS, which would have continued to care for
the child, the appellate court reversed the order terminating jurisdic-
tion and remanded for further proceedings. 80
C. Adjudicatory Issues
Challenges to the trial court's findings of fact are regularly liti-
gated in the appellate courts. 8' A rather frustrated appellate bench
continues to see cases in which the trial court fails to state the facts
upon which a dependency finding is made as required by Florida stat-
ute.1"' As in the case of delinquency proceedings, where the trial court
fails to articulate the basis for a transfer to adult court or sentence as
an adult, the failure to state the facts upon which a dependency finding
is made is reversible error. 188 However, recent appellate cases also sug-
gest that the courts of appeals may go beyond the statutory mandate
and decide whether, irrespective of the failure to make factual findings,
evidence exists in the record to support the determination of depen-
dency.' 84 Luszczyk v. HRS 8 5 is a typical case. The trial court removed
177. See id. at 1383 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.453(l)(b) (Supp. 1990)).
178. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(7) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. §
39.072(7) (1991)) which states that an indictment for murder does not remove the
court's jurisdiction over the child).
179. D.H., 575 So. 2d at 1383.
180. Id.
181. See 1988 Survey, supra note 11, at 1175-78; Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note
11, at 893; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1192-93.
182. FLA. STAT. § 39.409(3) (1989); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.650.
183. See 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 1173-74; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note
7, at 1191-93.
184. See Interest of T.S., 557 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
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a youngster from the mother's home and placed the child in the tempo-
rary custody of the paternal grandparents without making written find-
ings of fact. The appeals court simply found that the failure to make
the findings was reversible error, there being no record.lse
In Interest of D.H. and M.H.,8'8 the issue was whether the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure required findings of fact in addition to the
conclusion that the child was not dependent in a trial court order which
denies aL dependency petition - the opposite of the usual issue on appeal
which involves the failure to make written findings of dependency. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying
the petition for an adjudication of dependency, but certified the ques-
tion to the Florida Supreme Court in light of its finding that Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 8.650 only speaks to findings of fact in the case of
the determination of dependency. s8
In Williams v. HRS, 89 the court was also faced with an order of
adjudication of dependency which failed to contain the statutory-man-
dated findings. Similarly, the order of disposition failed to comply with
requirements related to the "reasonable efforts" that HRS must make
to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of a child from his
home. 9 The court found that the failure to comply with the statutory
requirements was reversible error. 19' It also commented that the dispo-
sitional order could not be salvaged because it neither tracked the facts
of the dependency petition nor referred to a previous order which con-
tained the proper findings.192 The court's explanation of the need for
1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1193 (criticizing this approach).
185. 576 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
186. Id. at 432. The opinion is silent as to why the court did not look to the
record for factual findings. Perhaps the answer is that the court also found other rea-
sons to reverse. The court noted the failure to hold a hearing on the evidentiary issue of
the trustworthiness of the child's out of court statement to two psychologists pursuant
to Florida Statute § 90.803(23). The appellate court also reversed on the basis that the
trial court committed error by allowing a psychologist, HRS caseworkers and the
guardian ad litem to testify as to their opinions that the child was telling the truth.
187. 575 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
188. Id. at 762.
189. 568 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
190. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 39.41(4) (Supp. 1990).
191. William, 568 So. 2d at 997. In this particular case, the question was
whether the parents had abused their child through excessive use of corporal
pjinishment.
192. I'd. (relying upon the holdings in Castellanos v. HRS, 545 So. 2d 455 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
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finding of facts is particularly illuminating and contains reasoning simi-
lar to that expressed by this writer in the past." The court commented
that irrespective of the statutory obligation to make findings, "it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to review the basis upon which the trial court
arrived at its determination of dependency in the absence of those find-
ings." 94 The court recognized that the legislative mandate to make
specific findings "can be overdone and are burdensome."1 95 But, as the
court added, the requirement seems logical, and the findings are useful
to assist the parties and others to understand the court's reasoning for
finding dependency and its plan for remedial action.1 96 It also creates a
record for the court to look back to in subsequent proceedings, aids a
successor judge, and allows the court to make later decisions without
having to review the entire record. 97
In Hardy v. HRS,198 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeals also
was faced with an appeal from an adjudication and disposition of de-
pendency in which the trial court failed to restate the factual basis for
the court's finding of dependency in its dispositional order. The appel-
late court in Hardy rejected this argument as not violative of chapter
39.409(3) because the trial court had made the proper factual findings
when it entered its initial order after the adjudicatory hearing. Judge
Peterson, concurring, distinguished the facts from Williams v. HRS"9
and added that he believed the better practice would be to place the
findings in order of the court or incorporate them by reference in later
orders."'
In Interest of D.G. and P.G.,2 °' the court did not find dependency
after a two-day hearing but withheld adjudication. The parent ap-
pealed by arguing that a finding of no dependency and a withholding of
adjudication of dependency are mutually exclusive. The appellate court
agreed relying upon Florida Statute chapter 39.409 which governs or-
ders of adjudication. 0  If the trial court wished to order the parents'
193. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1193.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 568 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
199. 568 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
200. Hardy, 568 So. 2d at 1316.
201. 568 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
202. Id. FLA. STAT. § 39.405 (1989) provides:
(1) If the court finds that the child named in a petition is not dependent, it
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home placed under the supervision of HRS as a disposition, there must
have been a dependency finding with a decision that no other action
than home supervision was required. In this case, the finding of the
trial court was inconsistent with this order. Therefore, the appellate
court remanded.2 °3
Finally, in Interest of S.W., E.J. and L.M.,204 the issue was
whether a "single" incident allegation that on one day a mother repeat-
edly hit one of her children with a belt constituted abuse.205 The evi-
dence showed that the mother repeatedly hit the child with the belt,
that the child was taken to the Child Protection Team doctor under
contract with HRS later the same day, and that the physician found
evidence of recent bruises including some to the face which were con-
sistent with belt marks. The appellate court noted that the marks on
the face also might have been consistent with a fall which the mother
claimed the child suffered when the youngster ran away after the inci-
dent. 206 Significantly, no treatment was required for any of the child's
injuries. The appellate court reversed the finding of dependency as to
the child who was struck and two other siblings who, on the basis of the
language of the Florida statute, were at risk. The statute states that
"abuse means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or
sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause a child's physical, mental,
or emotional health to be significantly appear impaired." 07 The appel-
late court, after finding that the facts did not match the statutory defi-
nition, commented on the underlying events. Apparently, the mother
awoke to find one child attempting to feed a younger child a mixture of
bleach and baby oil. The mother then spanked the daughter for the
behavior.2 8 The court recognized that the reaction may have been ex-
cessive and that the mother may have been agitated. It found that
while it did not condone the reaction, the actions of the mother were
shall enter an order so finding and dismissing a case.
(2) If the court finds that the child named in a petition is dependent, but
finds that no action other than supervision in his own home is required, it
may enter an order briefly stating the facts upon which its finding is based,
but withholding an order of adjudication and placing the child's home
under supervision of the Department . . ..
203. D.G., 568 So. 2d at 1001.
204. 581 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
205. Id. at 235; see FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (Supp. 1990).
206. S.W., 581 So. 2d at 235.
207. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (1989) (emphasis added).
208. S.W., 581 So. 2d at 235.
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not sufficient to warrant a finding of dependency. 0 9
D. Child Abuse Reporting Issues
Mandatory reporting of child abuse and neglect is governed by
Florida Statute chapter 415.054.210 In addition to listing the persons
who must report suspected abuse or neglect, establishing a central
abuse registry and tracking system, establishing a procedure to investi-
gate the reports, the statute sets up certain due process procedures
whereby the alleged perpetrator may challenge the report.2 11 Two re-
cent cases involved such efforts.
In D.J. v. HRS,112 a parent appealed from a final order by HRS
denying a request to have her name expunged from the child abuse
registry. HRS investigated a report of child abuse involving appellant's
four-year-old son. An HRS investigator had seen a scratch on the
child's face and a bruise on the child's neck. The mother told the inves-
tigators two days earlier she had slapped the child for throwing objects
and not minding her. The appellate court overruled the hearing officer's
conclusions for several reasons. First, the officer did not make any spe-
cific findings of excessive corporal punishment as required by the
law.2 13 Second, the court rejected the hearing officer's finding that the
evidence created a rebuttable presumption of abuse. The court viewed
that standard as inconsistent with its own prior decision in B.R. v.
HRS.21 '4 The court took the position that whether corporal punishment
is excessive must be shown in each instance by "competent, substantial
evidence", and all relevant issues presented must be considered "with-
209. Id.
210. Child abuse reporting systems are required in states such as Florida that
receive funding under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 5106 (1988)). See Bessarov, Recognizing Child Abuse: A Guide for the
Concern (1990) (critically analyzing the child abuse reporting system in the United
States).
211. FLA. STAT. §§ 415.504(4)(c)l.a-j (1991).
212. 565 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
213. Id. at 863 (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(a)1 (Supp. 1990)).
214. Id. (citing B.R. v. HRS, 558 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
B.L. v. HRS, 545 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989)). Significantly, the B.R.
case is contrary to a First District Court of Appeals opinion in B.L.. The court in B.R.
adopted the dissent in B.L. In B.L., the court held that there was no rational connection
between the length of time that a bruise remained visible and the ultimate fact of
excessive punishment.
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out resort to arbitrary presumptions fixed by the passage of time."2115
Finally, in M.O. Mc.C. v. HRS116 a stepmother of a child also
sought review of an HRS order which denied a request to expunge her
name from the child abuse registry. The court reversed because it also
found that there was no competent, substantial evidence to support the
hearing officer's conclusion that there was excessive corporal punish-
ment. However, in this case, the appellate court's reversal was based
solely on the fact it viewed the facts as not constituting excessive pun-
ishment. At issue was paddling of a step child pursuant to a code of
discipline which had been set up for the youngster by his father and
step mother with the aid of an outside professional. The court rejected
the significance of the fact that the paddle broke during the incident. It
had previously broken and had been repaired with common glue. The
court found no evidence of extraordinary force. The court disagreed
with the conclusion that the parent did not exercise sound judgment
and found no deviation by the parent from the code of discipline nor
that an inordinate number of hits were used.217
While the appellate cases in the dependency field often involve
horrific physical and psychological injury to children, occasionally a
case appears which demonstrates that not all claims are as they appear.
One such case is Interest of C.G. and C.B.218 C.G. complained of vagi-
nal irritation and her mother bought and applied an over-the-counter
ointment. Although the treatment appeared at first to be working,
when the irritation persisted for two weeks the mother took the child to
the doctor. The physician diagnosed trichomonas which is usually, but
not always, sexually transmitted. 219 The family cooperated with the
physician in reporting the diagnosis to HRS. Because the family was
215. B.R., 558 So. 2d at 1027, 1029.
216. 575 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
217. Id. at 1355. For a detailed summary of the legislative scheme for prevention
of abuse and neglect employing the state abuse registry, see B.R. v. HRS, 558 So. 2d
1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
218. 570 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
219. Trichomonal vaginitis is an infection of the vagina caused by Trichomonas,
a tiny one-celled organism. Symptoms of the infection are similar to those of yeast
infections . . ., and the two infections can occur together. However, the discharge of
trichomonas vaginitis is usually heavy, unpleasant smelling and greenish-yellow in
color. Trichomonal vaginitis is common and not thought to be dangerous, but it can be
irritating and painful. And because the disease is usually transmitted through sexual
intercourse, it is likely that the sexual partner also has it. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
FAMILY MEDICAL GUIDE 602 (1982).
Dale
366
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
anxious to learn what caused the infection, family members were tested
voluntarily with negative results. Then, they sought a second opinion by
taking the child to a board certified gynecologist, who disputed the di-
agnosis of trichomonas. HRS commenced a dependency proceeding
based on medical neglect. There were no allegations of sexual abuse.
The basis for the petition appeared to be the fourteen-day treatment
with an over-the-counter medication. Describing the evidence as bu-
reaucratic overkill, the Fourth District explained that the trial court
removed both children from their home including a child who was
never alleged to have been neglected. They were placed in foster care
for a long period of time. Upon returning the children to their home,
the juvenile court withheld adjudication of dependency and ordered
protective supervision of both children with a guardian ad litem and a
direction for family therapy.220 In what may best be described as an
understatement, the appellate court concluded, "surely seeking medical
attention when it appears that an over-the-counter medication is not
curing" without more "does not support a finding of child neglect and
the separation of children from their parents."22
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Padgett v. HRS 2 is a major decision by the Florida Supreme
Court. It holds that the prior termination of a parents' rights in one
child can support the severing of the parents' rights in another child.
Padgett was an appeal from a Fifth District Court of Appeal decision
which had initially certified the question of prospective abuse, neglect
or abandonment. 223 The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the question
to determine whether a prior termination as to one child could be used
to sever the parental rights to a different child.224
A review of the facts helps place the court's detailed legal analysis
and decision in context. The mother and father appealed from an order
terminating their parental rights to their child, W.L.P. Two years
before W.L.P. was born, five children born to the father during a previ-
ous marriage were committed to HRS for adoption. These children had
been found to be dependent based upon extreme neglect by the father
220. C.G., 570 So. 2d at 1137.
221. Id.
222. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
223. See Padgett v. HRS, 543 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
224. 577 So. 2d at 566.
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and his, prior wife. 225 The year before the birth of W.L.P., the mother
gave birth to a child that was promptly placed in HRS custody and was
permanently committed for adoption. It is unclear from the opinion
whether a finding of dependency was ever made as to this child. Two
days after W.L.P. was born, HRS filed a petition for detention of
W.L.P. and the court subsequently entered an order of dependency
finding both parents unfit.226 The parents and HRS signed a perform-
ance agreement which authorized the return of W.L.P. if the parents
could demonstrate sufficient parenting ability after undergoing psycho-
therapy and taking parenting classes.227 Although the opinion does not
say so, it would appear that the return of the children to the parents
became impossible and the agency then sought to terminate their pa-
rental rights. While the termination proceeding was pending, two addi-
tional events occurred. The mother staged a bizarre fake rape of herself
and sexually abused a four-year-old girl who was in her care. 228 The
circuit court entered an order permanently terminating parental rights
and freeing W.L.P. for adoption. The parents appealed claiming that
the statute did not allow for termination of parental rights based upon
prospective mistreatment, that such a test was speculative, that it in-
volved a fundamental liberty interest decision which must be left to the
legislature, and that under the facts the evidence was insufficient to
make a finding of prospective neglect.229
The Florida Supreme Court refocused the issue on whether the
prior termination of parental rights in other children could serve as
grounds for permanently severing rights in the present child. It cor-
rectly sought to answer the question based both on statutory and con-
stitutional grounds. First, it held that the Florida Juvenile Justice Act
provides. statutory authority for this kind of decision. The court pointed
to chapter 39.464 which, until it was amended in 1990, provided that
termination of parental rights could be based upon severe or continuous
abuse or neglect of the child before the court "or other children. 230
225. Id.
226. Id. at 567.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 568.
229. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 568.
230. Id. at 569 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.464 (1987)). Entitled Elements of Proce-
dure for Termination, this section provides in relevant part:
(2) Extraordinary Procedures.
(a) Whenever it appears that the manifest best interests of the child de-
mand it, the state may petition for termination of parental rights without
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The court next held that prior case law employed public policy
grounds to uphold the practice of terminating parental rights based
upon evidence of neglect of children other than the one before the
court .23  The public policy rationale rejects the requirement that a
child suffer actual abuse or neglect before it can be permanently re-
moved from a caretaker who has seriously mistreated others and cannot
be rehabilitated.3
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court held that the practice does not
violate the constitutionally protected liberty interests of the natural
parents. The court was clear, however, in its assertion that the parents'
familial interest, which includes raising children free from control by
the state, is both long-standing and fundamental. 33 The balance to be
struck, according to the Florida Supreme Court, is in favor of the
child's "entitlement to an environment free of physical and emotional
violence at the hands of his or her most trusted caretaker."2 3"' The
court found that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
offering a performance agreement or permanent placement plan to the
parents ....
(b) The state may petition under this subsection only under the following
circumstances:
2. Severe or continuous abuse or neglect of the child or other children by
the parent that demonstrates that the parent's conduct threatens the life or
well-being of the child regardless of the provision of services as evidenced
by having had services provided through a previous performance agree-
ment or permanent placement plan.
This statutory section has since been amended but still includes the provision for termi-
nating parental rights based upon abuse or neglect of other children. That section reads
as follows:
(3) Severe or Continuing Abuse or Neglect.
The parent or parents have engaged in conduct towards the child or to-
wards other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of
the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life or
well-being of the child regardless of the provisions of services. Provision of
services is evidenced by having had services provided through a previous
performance agreement, permanent placement plan, or offer of services in
the nature of a case plan from a child welfare agency. A current perform-
ance agreement or placement plan need not be offered to the parent or
parents, and the petition may be filed at any time before a performance
agreement or permanent placement plan has been accepted by the court.
231. Id. at 569-70.
232. Id. at 570.
233. Id.
234. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 570.
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children against clear threats of abuse, neglect or death. The court then
set up a multi-part test for termination based upon evidence of abuse or
neglect of other children. First, the state must make a showing by clear
and convincing evidence. Second, it must show that reunification with
the parent "poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child. 23 5
Third, -the evidence may be abuse or neglect of a different child.
Fourth, termination of parents' liberty based rights to their children
must be the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious
harm. Fifth, in most cases HRS must show its good faith effort to reha-
bilitate the parents and reunite the family through a performance
agreement or other plan for the present child.2 36 Sixth, lack of financial
resources cannot support permanent termination of parental rights.13 7
Finally, the parent's intelligence is ordinarily not relevant to the
inquiry.2 38
Padgett is defensible as a matter of statutory analysis, public pol-
icy, and constitutional law. The termination statute can properly be
read to allow for a transfer of neglect such that the neglect of one child
will serve as the basis for neglect of a second. Public policy historically
obligates the state, as parens patriae, to protect the interests of chil-
dren. That protection, when balanced against constitutional rights of
familial integrity, weighs in the favor of protecting the rights of chil-
dren over those of parents, but only when there is compelling need to
do so.239 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court's test for the grounds under
which the termination can occur, strikes a proper balance between the
interests of parents and children.
There are, however, two problems with the opinion. One is more
significant than the other. First, by reframing the question to be
whether neglect of one child can form the basis for termination of pa-
rental rights to another, the court fails to fully acknowledge and defend
the fact that it is still upholding the right of the trial court to predict
that neglect will occur in the future. Of course, Padgett is not a case
where there is evidence of either present or past neglect of the child
before the court and the court is faced with deciding whether it will
occur in the future. Rather, the court is allowing the fact finder to
decide whether a particular child will be abused and neglected in the
235. Id. at 571.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.464(5) (Supp. 1990)).
238. /d.
239. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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future based upon evidence of abuse of another child in the past. That
is still clearly a predictive process. The supreme court should acknowl-
edge it as such and justify it.2" 0 Second, on a more technical level, the
supreme court might have employed different phraseology describing
this kind of decision-making as involving "transferred neglect." Such
language more precisely defines what the supreme court was holding.
Padgett demonstrates the serious nature of termination proceed-
ings. Among the other elements necessary to be proven at a termination
of parental rights hearing is that the parent was informed of his or her
right to counsel in the dependency proceedings." 1 In Belflower v.
HRS,4 2 the appellate court reversed the finding of termination of pa-
rental rights based upon the clear failure of proof as to advising the
parents of their right to counsel at the dependency proceeding. How-
ever, Belflower is significant because it also held that, even when a peti-
tion for termination of parental rights is denied, the court may still
decide whether the child shall remain in foster care or be returned to
the parent with or without protective supervision.24 The justification
for such consideration is the best interest of the child.2"4 Furthermore,
in that particular case, because the parent failed to appeal from the
adjudication of dependency within thirty days as provided by Florida
law, 2" the adjudication of dependency remained standing although it
was not a valid basis for termination of parental rights.2"6 Thus, the
trial court also had continuing jurisdiction in light of the outstanding
dependency adjudication to decide whether the youngster required fur-
ther supervision or foster care or might be safely returned home.24
In dicta which seems at odds with the Florida statute, the appel-
late court commented that because there was no fundamental constitu-
tional right to counsel at a dependency proceeding, the underlying de-
pendency adjudication is not void ab initio for failure to advise the
240. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); (upholding the right to predict
future behavior in the context of pre-trial detention of juveniles and adults as not viola-
tive of the individual's constitutionally based liberty interests).
241. FLA. STAT. § 39.467(3)(c)1 (Supp. 1990).
242. 578 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
243. Id. at 828 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.468(2) (Supp. 1990)).
244. Id.
245. See FLA. STAT. § 39.413 (Supp. 1990); In re D.M.S., 528 So. 2d 505 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
246. Belflower, 578 So. 2d at 829.
247. Id. at 828.
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parents of their right to counsel.2 4 8 The problem with the court's asser-
tion is that the second proposition does not follow from the first. Flor-
ida, by statute, requires that the parents be advised of the right to
counsel in a dependency proceeding. 49 What the Florida law does not
provide is the appointment of counsel if the parent is indigent. Thus, if
the court and HRS fail to advise the parent of his or her right to coun-
sel in a dependency proceeding, even though the parent may have to
pay for the lawyer, if the parent appeals in a timely fashion, the adjudi-
cation of dependency will fall. This is not a matter of constitutional law
but a matter of compliance with the Florida statute. Although the dicta
is suspect, the court in Belflower was correct in holding that a depen-
dency proceeding is not void ab initio when a parent is not advised of
the right to counsel in a dependency proceeding. It remains up to the
parent to challenge that failure on appeal. Finally, the right to counsel
free of charge for a parent in a dependency proceeding under Florida
law is to be determined on a case by case basis employing the test the
Supreme Court set out in Potvin v. Keller.2 60
The important question of what individual may commence a pro-
ceeding to terminate parental rights was raised recently in Norris v.
Spencer."' A child had been placed in the care of the appellant care-
takers by the child's natural mother. The child was subsequently de-
clared dependent and the caretakers were appointed custodians of the
child. The natural mother entered into a case plan with HRS and then
asked the court to return custody of the child. The parents' motion was
denied and thereafter, the custodians filed a petition for severance of
parental rights. The mother moved to dismiss252 on grounds that the
custodians lacked standing to commence termination of parental rights
proceedings. The motion was granted and the custodians appealed. The
appellate court held that HRS is not the only party entitled to bring a
petition for termination of parental rights. In fact, the court stated that
the ability to protect a child from unreasonable action or inaction by
248. Id. at 829.
249. FLA. STAT. § 39.465(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
250. 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975). In Potvin, the Florida Supreme Court set up a
five-part test to determine whether a parent should be provided with counsel in a de-
pendency proceeding. They are: (1) the potential length of the parent/child separation;
(2) the degree of parental restriction on visitation; (3) the presence or absence of pa-
rental consent; (4) the presence or absence of disputed facts; (5) and the complexity of
the proceedings in terms of witnesses and documents.
251. 568 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
252. Id. at 1317.
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HRS is facilitated by the ability of third parties to commence petitions
to terminate parental rights. It therefore reversed.253
V. CONCLUSION
The appellate courts seem to have had little difficulty in interpret-
ing the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990 in the cases that have
come before them. The appellate courts continue to express concern
about the legislature's failure to properly fund delinquency programs.
And the appellate courts continue to upbraid the trial courts for their
failure to comply with basic statutory applications, both in the delin-
quency and dependency areas. It remains to be seen whether the trial
courts will at long last listen to appellate judges. Padgett is a major
decision by the Florida Supreme Court in the dependency field, having
finally answered the question of what constitutes prospective or trans-
ferred neglect and how it should be tested. While the decision may not
be quite as precise as it could be, it does resolve the issue in this
jurisdiction.
253. Id.; see also Interest of C.B., 561 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Interest of J.M., 569 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Interest of J.R.T.,
427 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its last two terms, the Supreme Court of Florida handed down
fifteen opinions regarding diverse aspects of local government law. This
article surveys that body of decisional law. In particular, it reviews per-
tinent Florida Supreme Court decisions with regard to election law,
sovereign immunity, local government liability under section 1983, mu-
nicipal finance, preemption of local legislation, impact fees, county re-
sponsibility for indigent criminal defendants' appeals costs and munici-
pal liability for the attorneys' fees of public officials.1
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center; J.S.D., Colum-
bia University School of Law, 1989; LL.M., Columbia University School of Law, 1982;
J.D., New York University School of Law, 1974; B.A., Columbia University, 1970.
The author thanks David B. Earle for his capable research assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article.
1. This article considers decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida handed down
between October 1, 1989 and July 15, 1991. It does not attempt to treat the local
government law decisions of the United States District Courts for Florida, of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit or of Florida courts other than
the Supreme Court. Similarly, it does not discuss Florida Supreme Court decisions in
non-local government areas that are substantively related to local government law only
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II. ELECTIONS
During the period of this survey, local election law received more
attention from the Florida Supreme Court than any other single aspect
of local government law. The court decided five cases in this field, on
matters ranging from the validity of referenda to special laws concern-
ing school board elections to the recall of municipal governing officials.
People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County of
Leon2 concerned the validity of a local referendum that created a local-
option sales tax as the revenue source for a $60 million bond issue for
construction of a new jail and other capital improvements. Leon
County named People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement
(PATRM), a political action committee which had previously brought
two unsuccessful suits to set aside the result of the referendum, as de-
fendant in a bond validation proceeding. In that context, several chal-
lenges were raised to the referendum. One of these was based on the
contention that local government agencies had used public resources
and funds to mount an informational campaign in favor of the referen-
dum, thereby violating the "neutral forum" of the election.3 The su-
preme court soundly rejected this claim and stated that local govern-
ments are "not bound to keep silent in the face of a controversial vote
that will have profound consequences for the community."4 Rather, in
the court's view: "Leaders have both a duty and a right to say which
course of action they think best, and to make fair use of their offices for
this purpose." Any rule to the contrary would "render government
feckless" and would absolve democratic government of its "duty" to
"lead the people to make informed choices through fair persuasion.""
The supreme court also refused to credit an argument that by in-
cluding the campaign slogan "Take Charge . . . It's Your Future,"
and by describing planned capital improvements contemplated by the
referendum as "critical," the wording of the ballot language had un-
fairly biased the electorate.7 The supreme court indicated that the lan-
guage in question did reflect "a slight lack of neutrality that should not
insofar as one of the parties happened to be a political subdivision of the State of
Florida.
2. 583 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1991).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Leon, 583 So. 2d at 1376.
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be encouraged." 8 It concluded, however, that inasmuch as the remain-
der of the ballot plainly stated that a "yes" vote meant that new taxes
would be imposed, the referendum was not so confusing to the voters as
to be "clearly and conclusively defective."'
Finally, the supreme court gave short shrift to PATRM's notion
that the procedure established by section 102.168 of the Florida Stat-
utes, which requires that county canvassing boards be named defend-
ants in taxpayer lawsuits challenging elections, is the only proper
method of resolving challenges to local referenda. The court noted that
section 75.02 of the Florida Statutes authorizes counties to litigate the
validity of tax assessments levied in connection with bond issues. 10 It
also observed that section 100.321, Florida Statutes, plainly states that
the opportunity for taxpayers to file a lawsuit challenging a referendum
is closed as soon as a bond validation proceeding is filed in the same
matter." Thus, once taxpayers are joined as defendants in bond valida-
tion proceedings, they are obligated to raise all of their objections to
the validity of tax assessment referenda in the context of those proceed-
ings, or be "forever barred from raising them again."' 2
The supreme court considered the validity of another county refer-
endum election in Wadhams v. Board of County Commissioners."
There a majority of the voters of Sarasota County had approved an
amendment to the county charter providing that the county's Charter
Review Board shall conduct its business "only during the year, and
prior to that time, in which a general election is held in 1988, and
every four years thereafter."' This charter amendment appeared on
the ballot unaccompanied by any statement summarizing and explain-
ing it. Reversing rulings of the trial court and the Second District
Court of Appeal, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated the results of
the referendum. It held that the proposed amendment had failed to
comply with section 101.161(1) of the Florida Statutes, which requires
that public measures submitted to votes of the people contain "an ex-
planatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief pur-
pose of the measure." 5 Citing the leading case of Askew v. Firestone,6
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Leon, 583 So. 2d at 1378.
13. 567 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1990).
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 101.161(1) (1991)).
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the supreme court opined that the purpose of section 101.161(1) is to
assure that the electorate is advised of the true meaning and ramifica-
tions of a proposed amendment."7 By failing to contain an explanatory
statement of the amendment, the ballot at issue in Wadhams had failed
to inform the public that there was presently no restriction on Charter
Review Board meetings and that the chief purpose of the amendment
was to curtail the Charter Review Board's right to meet. 8 This was not
apparent from the face of the ballot.19
The supreme court disagreed with the Sarasota County Board of
County Commissioners' argument that public hearings, advance publi-
cation of the proposed amendment, and media publicity had afforded
the voters of Sarasota County an "ample opportunity" to become in-
formed on the amendment's effect. Instead, the court indicated, the
ballot summary must bear the burden of informing the public-a bur-
den that should not fall only on the press and opponents of the
proposal.2 0
Similarly, the court rejected the county commissioners' contention
that approval by the voters cures any defects in the form of the submis-
sion. It reasoned the defect in the referendum at issue "went to the
very heart of what section 101.161(1) seeks to preclude" and that "no
one can say with any certainty what the vote of the electorate would
have been if the voting public had been given the whole truth.'
Finally, the court refused to credit the proposition that challenges
to allegedly defective referenda are barred if they are instituted subse-
quent to a special election. It indicated that, in effect, that argument
asserts that "hoodwinking the public is permissible unless the action is
challenged prior to the election" and stated "although there would
come a point where laches would preclude an attack on the ordinance,
such is not the situation in the present case where the suit was filed
only a few weeks after the election. '"22
Justice Kogan dissented. In his opinion, the language of the ballot
in question did advise the electorate of the meaning and ramifications
of the amendment, particularly in light of the advance publicity that
16. 420 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982).
17. Wadhams, 567 So. 2d at 416.
18. Id. at 416-17.
19. Id. at 417.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Wadhams, 567 So. 2d at 417.
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the referendum had received." In this case, Justice Kogan believed, the
election was properly conducted and the petitioners had received suffi-
cient advance notice of the proposed ballot to allow them to challenge
its form before the election. Their failure to do so should bar their
claim."'
In re Koretsky" involved the issue of whether section 100.361 of
the Florida Statutes applies to a municipality that has adopted no pro-
visions for recall elections. The statutory section contains a comprehen-
sive scheme for the recall of governing officials of municipalities and
charter counties. Inter alia, it states: "the provisions of this act shall
apply to cities and charter counties which have adopted recall
provisions."2 6
After briefly reviewing pertinent legislative history, the supreme
court gave this statutory language a narrow reading. It stated that "the
only conclusion we can draw from this inclusion is that the legislature
was limiting the recall procedure to those governing bodies that pro-
vided for recall and declined to impose it on such bodies which have no
such provisions. '127
Justice Grimes dissented on the view that the legislation at issue
should be read more broadly. Grimes pointed out that other subsections
of the same statute provide that "it is the intent of the Legislature that
the recall procedures . . . shall be uniform statewide" and that the act
authorizes and provides for voter recall of "any member of the gov-
erning body of a municipality. 12 8 In view of these sub-sections, he con-
cluded that the statute was clearly intended to operate, in and of itself,
as authorization for the removal of members of municipal governing
bodies. 9
Justice Grimes' dissent stated one additional concern. He believed
that the majority's reading of section 100.361 would permit cities that
presently have municipal recall procedures to repeal those procedures
at any time, simply to escape the potential for a recall of their gov-
erning officials. In Grimes' opinion, that scenario would be contrary to
the public interest. Thus, he viewed the majority's approach as incon-
23. Id. at 423 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. 557 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990).
26. hi. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 100.361(9) (1987)).
27. Koretsky, 557 So. 2d at 25.
28. Id. (Grimes, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
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sistent with the maxim that statutory ambiguities should be resolved by
interpretations that best serve the public interest."0
In Kane v. Robbins,"' the Florida Supreme Court declined to over-
turn its earlier holding, in the same case, that non-chartered county
school board members may not be elected in a non-partisan election
authorized by special law.32 The incumbent Martin County School
Board moved for rehearing or clarification of the supreme court's origi-
nal decision in the case, arguing that opinion would invalidate all acts
and decisions of the School Board since 1976, and would impair the
delivery of educational services to Martin County children until a new
school board election is held. 33 The supreme court dismissed these con-
cerns as unfounded. It pointed out that the official acts of a de facto
officer are as valid and binding upon the public and third persons as are
the acts of an officer de jure. Thus, the lawfulness of the acts of Martin
County School Board members who had been elected in invalid non-
partisan elections could not be doubted. Moreover, the court concluded,
official acts of the incumbent school board members would continue to
be valid until such time as new school board members are duly
appointed.3
The 1989 Kane v. Robbins decision was also considered in another
case involving the validity of a non-partisan election of county school
board members, School Board of Palm Beach County v. Winchester. 6
In that situation, Palm Beach County had been electing school board
members in non-partisan elections since 1971, pursuant to a special act
of the Florida legislature. In 1985, the County adopted a charter pro-
viding that the validity of any pre-existing county ordinances shall con-
tinue as if the charter had not been passed. Following the Kane deci-
sion, Palm Beach County sought a declaratory judgment that its
method of electing school board members was valid. The county con-
tended that because it had become a charter county, it was subject to
the exception contained in article III, section 1 l(a)(1) of the Florida
Constitution which exempts, inter alia, chartered counties from the
prohibition on special laws pertaining to the election of officers. 36 The
30. Id.
31. 556 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1990).
32. Id. at 1385. This original Kane v. Robbins decision is summarized in Joel A.
Mintz, Local Government Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 919, 930 (1990).
33. Id. at 1381.
34. Id.
35. 565 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1990).
36. Id.
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Florida Supreme Court agreed, noting that it was obligated to construe
statutes as constitutional wherever such a construction was reasonably
possible. Consequently, the court found that it was reasonable to up-
hold Palm Beach County's school board election system because it was
not challenged prior to Palm Beach County's becoming a chartered
county, and because its provisions are presently constitutional under ar-
ticle III, section 11 (a). The Kane case was distinguished because it had
not involved a chartered county.37
Justices Ehrlich and Grimes dissented in separate opinions. Justice
Ehrlich reasoned that the statute that authorized non-partisan county
school board elections in Palm Beach County was unconstitutional at
its inception and that the adoption of a charter "does not in some mys-
terious, mystical manner make it constitutional." 8 Referring to the
majority's opinion as "judicial legerdemain" and "bad law," Ehrlich
stated,
the travesty of the whole scenario is that now that the county is
chartered it no longer needs to rely on special acts of the legislature
to bring about non-partisan elections of the school board. The
county itself has the authority to enact such a provision as the one
at issue. Yet it has never done so. 39
Justice Grimes indicated that even though he could sympathize
with the majority's "unspoken desire" to avoid disrupting an impending
school board election in Palm Beach County, he saw no rational basis
for doing: so. 40 He wrote: "I know of no legal theory by which it could
be said that the adoption of the home rule charter breathed life into the
constitutionally invalid special law. "41
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In its last two terms, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two
cases with regard to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Its first deci-
sion concerned the pre-judgment interest liability of local governments
and its second involved their post-judgment liability for interest
payments.
37. 1d. at 1351.
38. Id. at 1352 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Winchester, 565 So. 2d at 1353 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
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In Broward County v. Finlayson,2 the sovereign immunity issue
arose in the context of a labor contract dispute between the county and
its emergency medical technician (EMT) employees. These employees
had entered into a contract that provided for a regular work week of
fifty-six hours, with overtime rates to be paid for all hours worked in
excess of scheduled shifts. At the same time, the county's civil service
rules, written for all county employees, stated in pertinent part that
"Overtime is work beyond the normal hours of any scheduled work
week. After forty (40) hours actually worked employee[s] will be paid
at the rate of time and one-half.' 4
After an unsuccessful grievance proceeding, the plaintiff filed a
class action on behalf of herself and other EMT's seeking overtime pay
for work done in excess of forty hours per week." At trial, a jury found
that the EMT's annual salary was payment for only forty hours per
week and judgment was entered providing that each class member was
owed retroactive overtime pay for the entire period of the labor con-
tract in question.'8
On appeal, Broward County argued that sovereign immunity pro-
hibits an award of pre-judgment interest against a subdivision of the
state in a contract dispute.46 The supreme court was not persuaded.
Affirming, in part, a decision of the district court, the court relied on
Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections'7 for the princi-
ple that the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state
from action for breach of a contract it has entered into, so long as that
contract is fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law.48
The supreme court then considered whether Broward County
should be required to pay the plaintiff pre-judgment interest from the
date that the contract was entered into or the date of the plaintiff's first
claim for overtime wages. Noting that the County had been unaware
that the EMT's believed themselves entitled to sixteen hours of over-
time per week until the date of the plaintiff's first demand for overtime
compensation, the court ruled that it would be inequitable to allow the
plaintiff to recover pre-judgment interest for any period prior to that
42. 555 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1990).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1211-12.
45. Id. at 1212.
46. Id.
47. 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984).
48. Finlayson, 555 So. 2d at 1213.
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date.49
In dissent, Justice McDonald took the view that under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, the state and its political subdivisions should
not be liable for interest on its debts unless that liability is called for
specifically by a statute or a contract.50 Finding no statutory authoriza-
tion for suits against the state for breach of employment contracts, Mc-
Donald concluded that no interest on the unpaid overtime was due the
plaintiff.5
Palm Beach County v. Town of Palm Beach52 concerned a dispute
over the sufficiency of county property tax levies for roads and bridges.
After winning a judgment that the county's levies were insufficient, the
Town appealed a trial court remedial order that made no allowance for
post judgment interest. 53 It relied on section 55.03 of the Florida Stat-
utes which provides that, in general, judgments or decrees entered on
or after October 1, 1981 shall bear interest at the rate of twelve per-
cent a year.54 The supreme court agreed with the Town. Rejecting an
argument that section 55.03 was inapplicable because interest may only
be awarded when the right to interest can be implied from the lan-
guage of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the court held that
the county's immunity from suit had been established in an early phase
of the suit and could not be relitigated.55
Justice Overton dissented. He opined that, when the legislature
passed section 55.03, it had not intended to apply post-judgment inter-
est to disputes of this type between governmental entities. 56 In Justice
Overton's view, Palm Beach County had been exercising a governmen-
tal function, and acting in a legislative capacity, when it levied tax as-
sessments in the manner it did. 57 Thus, even if it had been wrong, the
county was not properly subject to a claim of postjudgment interest.
Such a result, he believed, is punitive to taxpayers, who must pay the
county's interest costs along with any assessments levied for road and
bridge purposes. 58
49. id.
50. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1214.
52. 579 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1991).
53. Id.
54. FLA. STAT. § 55.03(1) (1991).
55. Palm Beach, 579 So. 2d at 720.
56. Id. at 721.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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IV. SECTION 1983 LIABILITY
During the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court of
Florida handed down two opinions regarding the liability of municipali-
ties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. One of these cases concerned state trial
courts' subject matter jurisdiction over section 1983 suits against mu-
nicipalities. The other case focused on the circumstances in which
subordinate municipal officials may be held to have been delegated fi-
nal municipal policy-making authority.
In Town of Lake Clarke Shores v. Page," a former police officer
with the Lake Clarke Shores Police Department brought a section 1983
action against the town. He alleged that his civil rights had been vio-
lated because town officials had terminated his employment in response
to a letter, published in the Palm Beach Post, in which Page had ex-
pressed his opinion about the effect of stress upon police officers.60
The trial court dismissed the action, holding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over section 1983 actions. The Fourth District
Court of Appeals reversed and the Florida Supreme Court unanimously
agreed with the Court of Appeals.6 Quoting extensively from a recent
United States Supreme Court decision, Howlett v. Rose,6" the Florida
Supreme Court held that state trial courts do, in fact, have subject
matter jurisdiction over section 1983 actions against municipalities.
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that
municipal corporations and similar governmental entities are "persons"
within the meaning of section 1983.6 Furthermore, state courts which
entertain section 1983 suits against such entities are bound to accept
Congress' abrogation of municipal sovereign immunity in those
actions."
In Raben-Pastal v. City of Coconut Creek,65 the plaintiffs brought
a section 1983 action against the city based upon the failure of its chief
building official to lift a stop-work order he had issued as to plaintiff's
residential construction project. The plaintiffs had eliminated a number
of cracks in newly constructed structures, as they had been ordered to
do by the building official, and an engineering firm retained by the City
59. 569 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 1990).
60. Id. at 1257.
61. Id. at 1256.
62. 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990).
63. Id. at 2432.
64. Page, 569 So. 2d at 1257.
65. 573 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1990).
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had certified that the necessary repairs were completed. Despite this,
the building official refused to rescind his stop-work order for another
five months. 6
Following a trial in which a jury had returned a sizeable verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs, the trial court set aside the jury verdict and dis-
missed the suit. The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's action and the Florida Supreme Court agreed. 7
In a unanimous opinion, the supreme court considered whether the
building officials' actions had established official city policies. It dis-
cussed two leading United States Supreme Court opinions, Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati,68 and City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik9 and cited
Prapotnik for the principle that, in a section 1983 action, the discre-
tionary actions of a subordinate local official will not be deemed to con-
stitute an official municipal policy unless it is clear that the
subordinate's discretionary decision was not constrained by official poli-
70cies and was not subject to review.
Applying that rule to the facts, the court noted that the South
Florida Building Code, which governs the regulation of construction
projects in Broward County, vests building officials with the power to
impose stop-work orders on particular projects. However, the same
Code also provides that any decision made by the building official on
matters regulated by the Code was subject to review by a Board of
Rules and Appeals, upon written application to the Secretary of the
Board. For this reason, a decision by a building official affecting a stop-
work order was not "final," and the building official whose actions were
challenged in this case could not be considered a "final policy-maker"
for the City of Coconut Creek.7
V. MUNICIPAL FINANCE
In its last two terms, the Supreme Court of Florida considered two
appeals from judicial validations of municipal bond financing
agreements.
State v. School Board of Sarasota County72 concerned the valid-
66. Id. at 299.
67. Id. at 298.
68. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
69. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
70. Coconut Creek, 573 So. 2d at 301.
71. Id. at 302.
72. 561 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1990).
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ity of nearly identical agreements supporting bond issues that had been
entered into by the school boards of Sarasota, Collier and Orange
Counties. The court summarized the agreements in question as follows:
These agreements provide for the lease of public lands owned by
the [school] boards to not-for-profit entities (by way of ground
leases), the construction of improvement of public educational fa-
cilities upon the leased lands, the annual leaseback of the facilities
to the school boards (by way of facilities leases), and the convey-
ance of the lease rights of the not-for-profit entities to trustees (by
way of trust agreements). The trustees are to market the bonds and
disburse funds to finance construction of the facilities. Title to the
public lands remains in the respective school boards. Title to the
facilities constructed with the proceeds of the bonds passes to the
respective school boards at the end of the term of the ground lease
Money from several sources, including ad valorem taxation,
will be used to make the annual facilities' lease payments. If, in
any year, a board does not appropriate money to pay the lease, the
board's obligations terminate without penalty and it cannot be
compelled to make payments. The board then has two options. It
may purchase the facilities and terminate the ground lease. Alter-
natively, it may surrender possession of the facilities and lands for
the remainder of the ground lease and is free to substitute other
facilities for those surrendered. The trustee may relet the facilities
for the remainder of the lease's term or sell its interest in the leases
to generate revenue to pay bondholders.7 3
Challenging the validity of these agreements, the State of Florida
asserted that the trustees and not-for-profit entities that they refer to
were not authorized to seek validation of the agreements in proceedings
pursuant to section 75.02 of the Florida statutes.7 ' The state contended
that while the benefits of chapter 75 validation proceedings are prop-
erly conferred on political subdivisions of the state, in this case it was
really the not-for-profit entities and the trustees, rather than the school
boards, who were employing chapter 75 procedures to obtain judicial
approval of the bond financing arrangements. Citing its decision in
State v. Brevard County,75 the supreme court disagreed.7 ' The court
73. Id. at 550-51.
74. Id. at 552.
75. Id.
76. 539 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1989).
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summarily found that the boards were, in fact, proper plaintiffs in a
section 75.02 action."
The supreme court then considered whether a voter referendum
was required with respect to the agreements at issue. It ruled that even
though the agreements were partially supported by ad valorem reve-
nues, a referendum was not mandated by article VII, section 12 of the
Florida Constitution because the agreements specified that "neither the
bondholders nor anyone else could compel use of the ad valorem taxing
power to service the bonds."7 8
Similarly, the court rejected the contention that a referendum was
mandated by section 230.23(9)(b)(5) of the Florida Statutes which re-
quires an approving referendum where a school board pays rental fees,
for necessary grounds and educational facilities, from funds received
from ad valorem taxation pursuant to an agreement for a period
greater than twelve months.79 As interpreted by the supreme court, this
section amounts to "no more than a codification of the referendum re-
quirement set forth in the constitution." 80
Finally, the court declined to apply other cases in which it had
reversed bond validations by lower courts. It distinguished County of
Volusia v. State81 on the basis that the obligations at issue in Volu-
sia-supported as they were by a pledge of all legally available unen-
cumbered revenues other than ad valorem taxation, along with a prom-
ise to maintain fully the programs and services that generated the non-
ad valorem revenue-constituted, in effect, a promise to levy ad
valorem taxes. 82 The supreme court also distinguished Nohrr v. Bre-
vard County Educational Facilities Authority,83 in which it held that
the predecessor to article VIII, section 12 required an approving refer-
endum for a bond-supporting agreement which granted a mortgage
with a right of foreclosure. In contrast, the court reasoned, the present
case did not involve a mortgage with right of foreclosure. Moreover, in
this case, the bondholders were "limited to lease remedies; and the an-
nual renewal option preserved the school board's full budgetary
flexibility.'84
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. FLA. STAT. § 230.23(9)(b)(5) (1989).
80. School Bd., 561 So. 2d at 553.
81. 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982).
82. School Bd., 561 So. 2d at 553.
83. 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971).
84. School Bd., 561 So. 2d at 553.
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice McDonald labeled the majority's
conclusion that the financial scheme in question was not supported by a
pledge of ad valorem taxation as "pure sophistry" and an approval of
"form over substance. ' 85 McDonald noted that "if ad valorem taxes
are not levied and paid each year for the duration of the agreements,*
the school boards default not only all interest acquired under the agree-
ment for the remainder of the agreement, but they also lose the right to
use the preowned property for the remainder of the agreement."88 In
practice, he reasoned, no school board would do that. Thus, for all
practical purposes, the school boards in this case bound themselves to
levy, collect and pay ad valorem taxes to finance new school construc-
tion-an arrangement which requires approval by referendum under
the Florida Constitution.8
In State v. City of Orlando,88 the Florida Supreme Court consid-
ered an entirely different municipal bond financing scheme. There, the
state challenged the validity of a $500 million bond issue, the proceeds
from which would be used to make loans to, or buy the debt instru-
ments of, other local governmental units in the State of Florida.89
Under the arrangement in question, bond revenues could be lent by the
City of Orlando to finance a variety of local agency projects, including
the purchase of liability coverage contracts, the funding of self-insur-
ance reserves and the building of roads, water systems, jails, utility fa-
cilities, and sports facilities. 90 While local agencies were to be liable to
the extent of their respective obligations under the loan agreements, the
bonds themselves were not to be deemed "a debt liability or obligation
of the state or any political subdivision or municipality." 91
The Florida Supreme Court found this municipal financing ar-
rangement to be flawed in two critical respects. First, the proposed
bond issue "failed to provide enough details by which its legality could
be measured." 92 It did not identify the particular governmental entities
to whom bond revenues would be lent, the revenues from which those
entities would repay their loans or the specific projects or uses to which
85. Id. at 554.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 576 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1991).
89. Id. at 1316.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1317.
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bond funds would be put.93 In addition, the proposed financing arrange-
ment neglected to estimate the amount of profits that the City of Or-
lando might expect.9 Also, it failed to mention what "paramount pub-
lic purpose" those profits would be used for.95
Beyond this lack of specificity-which the supreme court conceded
could probably be corrected by amendment of the documents that con-
trolled issuance of the bonds-the court noted a second and "deeper"
problem. The primary purpose of the bond issue in question "was to
obtain proceeds that would be used to invest for a profit."96 In the
court's opinion, this purpose contravened article VIII, section 2(b) of
the Florida Constitution, which limits municipalities to the conduct of
municipal government, the performance of municipal functions and the
rendering of municipal services.9 In the court's view, "making a profit
on an investment is an aspect of commerce more properly left to com-
mercial banking and business entities."98 For this reason, the supreme
court invalidated the City of Orlando's proposed bond issue. 99 The
court held, however, that its ruling was prospective only, and that "it
did not prohibit the investment of bond proceeds pending later expendi-
tures on the project contemplated by a bond issue." 100 The court also
indicated that its opinion should not be construed to limit the ability of
municipalities to invest any previously borrowed funds used for valid
municipal projects.101
VI. STATE PREEMPTION OF LOCAL LEGISLATION
Florida Power Corporation v. Seminole County0 2 concerned the
validity of county and city ordinances that required Florida Power Cor-
poration (FPC) to relocate underground a set of overhead power lines
that FPC maintained along a two lane county road. The city's ordi-
nance required FPC to bear the entire cost of the undergrounding pro-
93. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1317.
94. ld.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
98. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1317 (quoting State v. Panama City Beach,
529 So. 2(1 250, 257 (Fla. 1988) (McDonald, C.J., dissenting)).
99. See City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1317.
100. Id. at 1310.
101. Id.
102. 579 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1991).
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ject. The county's ordinance was nominally silent as to who would bear
that cost. However, it unequivocally declared that the county would not
do so."0 '
FPC sued the city and county for declaratory judgment and in-
junctive relief against enforcement of the ordinance, contending that
the ordinances invade the exclusive authority of the state Public Ser-
vice Commission to regulate rates and service. The utility company was
unsuccessful at the trial court level, but the Florida Supreme Court
reversed. 104 Noting that the Florida Statutes grant the state Public Ser-
vice Commission broad power "to prescribe fair and reasonable rates
and charges, ' 10 5 and that requiring FPC to place its power lines under-
ground clearly affects its rates, if not its service, the court held that
"the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission ...preempts the
authority of the city and county to require FPC to place its lines
underground. 10 6
The supreme court gave a narrow construction to section
337.403(1) of the Florida Statutes. That section provides that utility
equipment placed along public roads that is found to interfere unrea-
sonably with "the convenient, safe, or continuous use, or the mainte-
nance, improvement, extension, or expansion, of such public road,"
shall be "removed or relocated" by the utility at its own expense107
The court held that this provision "does not grant localities the power
to mandate the type of system to be used by a utility, or to determine
who should pay for such a system."' 0 8 However, it does allow "for the
removal or relocation of utility facilities when necessary to accommo-
date expansion or maintenance."1 09 In addition, the court opined that
the statutory words "removed or relocated" do not suggest conversion
of an overhead electric system to an underground system as a condition
of use of the right of way-a requirement which the court described as
"extraordinary." 10
Finally, the supreme court observed that the legislature had vested
the Public Service Commission with the authority to require conversion
103. Id.
104. Id. at 106.
105. Florida Power Corp., 579 So. 2d at 106 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. §
366.05(1) (West Supp. 1991)).
106. Id. at 107.
107. Id. at 108 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN § 337.403(1) (1991)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Florida Power Corp., 579 So. 2d at 108.
390 [Vol. 16
389
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Mintz
of overhead distribution lines to underground lines if the Commission
believes that such a conversion would be "feasible" and "cost effec-
tive." 1 In view of this, the court reasoned, permitting cities to man-
date unilaterally the conversion of overhead lines would run "contrary
to the legislative intent that the Public Service Commission have exclu-
sive regulatory authority over this subject."11
VII. IMPACT FEES
Si. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Association1
concerned the validity of an impact fee on new residential construction
to be used for new school construction.114 The impact fee ordinance
was immediately applicable in unincorporated areas of St. Johns
County. However, it was ineffective within the boundaries of any mu-
nicipality in the county until that municipality entered into an interlo-
cal agreement with the county to collect the impact fees from appli-
cants for new building permits.
In reviewing the constitutionality of this ordinance, the supreme
court applied a "dual rational nexus test," which it explained as
follows:
[Tihe local government must demonstrate a reasonable connection,
or rational nexus, between the need for additional capital facilities
and the growth in population generated by the subdivision. In addi-
tion, the government must show a reasonable connection, or ra-
tional nexus, between the expenditures of the funds collected and
the benefits accruing to the subdivision.'1
The court had little difficulty concluding that the ordinance in question
satisfied the first prong of this test."' The court rejected as "simplistic"
a contention the "impact fee [was] nothing more than a tax" insofar as
it concerned the many new residences that would have no impact on
the public school system. During the useful life of the new dwelling
units subject to the fees, the court noted, school age children would
111. Id.; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.04(7)(a) (Supp. 1991).
112. Id.
113. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991).
114. Id. at 636.
115. Id. at 637.
116. Id. at 638.
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come and go. 17 The St. Johns County impact fee, which was based
upon a comprehensive study of projected growth and educational de-
mands, was rationally designed to provide the capacity to serve the
educational needs of all new dwelling units." 8
The supreme court then turned to the second prong of the dual
rational nexus test. It observed that, as written, the impact fee "ordi-
nance permitted the St. Johns County School Board to spend the funds
to build a new school that would serve only the increased needs of a
municipality caused by growth within that municipality.""' However,
unless the municipality had signed an interlocal agreement with the
county to collect impact fees, the funds to build that school would come
from impact fees paid by development in unincorporated areas. This
arrangement ran afoul of the requirement that the expenditure of col-
lected impact fees be reasonably connected to the benefits that accrue
to the units those fees are collected from. For this reason, the court
mandated that no impact fee be collected under the ordinance until
such time that municipalities containing "substantially all" of the mu-
nicipal population of St. Johns County have entered into interlocal
agreements with the county. 120
Since the propriety of imposing impact fees to finance new schools
was an issue of first impression in Florida, the supreme court went on
to examine other issues raised by the St. Johns County impact fee ordi-
nance in dicta. It ruled that a subsection of the ordinance that created
an alternative method of fee calculation collided with the requirement
of the Florida Constitution that there be a uniform system of "free
public schools."'' As construed by the county, this provision created
the potential that impact fees would in fact become user fees to be paid
primarily by those households that actually contain public school chil-
dren. However, the court severed the offending subsection under a sev-
erability clause of the ordinance, since its severance did not impair the
operation or effectiveness of the remainder of the ordinance. 2
The supreme court rejected an argument that the ordinance con-
flicts with the requirement of a "uniform system" of public schools con-
117. Id. at 637-38.
118. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d at 638.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 639.
121. Id. at 638.
122. Id. at 640.
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tained in article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution.12 S It opined
that the Constitution mandates neither uniform sources of school fund-
ing among the several counties nor equal funding and equivalent educa-
tional programs in every school district. "Inherent inequities, such as
varying revenues because of higher or lower property values or differ-
ences in millage assessments, will always favor or disfavor some dis-
tricts."" "' The Constitution only requires that every student be provided
an equal chance to achieve basic educational goals prescribed by the
legislature.1 25
Similarly, the supreme court rejected claims that the impact fee
ordinance interjected the county into an area in which school boards
have been given exclusive authority. It stated that article IX, section
4(b) of the Florida Constitution, that gives school boards the authority
to tax, does not limit county involvement in school financing. Further-
more, section 230.23 of the Florida Statutes, which implements article
IX, section 4(b), does not place upon school boards the exclusive duty
to secure adequate public school financing. Moreover, several other en-
actments make clear that the legislature contemplated that counties be
involved in educational funding, rather than preempted from such
involvement.12 6
Finally, the court concluded that the ordinance in question does
not create an unlawful delegation of power. In its view, the ordinance
properly calls for the county to make the fundamental policy decisions,
including determinations as to the amount of the fees and how they are
to be collected, at the same time as it limits the school board's discre-
tion in expending funds for new educational facilities. 27
VIII. COUNTY RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDIGENT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS' APPEALS COSTS
In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Ju-
dicial Circuit Public Defender'28 was a consolidation of five cases in
which six Florida counties challenged an order of the Second District
Court of' Appeal regarding the prosecution of criminal appeals by the
123. Northeast Fla. Builders Assn, 583 So. 2d at 640.
124. Id. at 641.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 642.
127. Id.
128. 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
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Public Defender for the Tenth Judicial Circuit. This order was issued
sua sponte by the Second District Court in response to a tremendous
backlog of appeals to that court by indigent defendants in which briefs
were substantially overdue.M The principal requirements of the order
in question were summarized by the supreme court in this way:
The court's order prohibits Mr. Moorman, [the Public Defender
for the Tenth Judicial District], from accepting appeals from any
judicial circuit other than the Tenth in which the notice of appeal
was filed after May 22, 1989. The order further mandates that cir-
cuit judges within each circuit appoint that circuit's public de-
fender to handle appeals from that circuit. If a public defender
from one of those circuits has a conflict, the order requires that
they [sic] file motions to withdraw so that the circuit judge may
appoint other counsel to represent those clients at the expense of
the local government. 180
The counties challenged this order on several grounds. First, they
argued that the order abridged their due process rights because the
counties were not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard before
the order was issued, even though it will have a substantial financial
impact on them. The supreme court was unpersuaded. It noted that the
order under review was "merely the most recent in a series of efforts"
by the same court to deal with the same problem.131 "All interested
parties, including the counties, [had] been given an opportunity to re-
spond" in connection with at least two of these prior efforts. 32 The
issues remained the same, as did the counties' response. Beyond this,
the court reaffirmed and reiterated its decision, in Escambia County v.
Behr,33 that counties are not entitled to respond to motions to with-
draw by public defenders merely because of their financial interest in
the outcome of those motions.'
The counties also contended that the state should compensate pri-
vate attorneys who must be appointed as a result of conflicts of interest
created by state's underfunding of public defenders. 33 They suggested
129. Id. at 1131.
130. Id. at 1132-33.
131. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d at 1133.
132. Id.
133. 384 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1980).
134. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d at 1135-36.
135. Id. at 1135.
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that the state had, in fact, assumed that burden in 1981, when the
legislature deleted language from section 27.53(2) of the Florida Stat-
utes that tied the payment of court-appointed attorneys in non-capital
cases to a statute addressing payment of such attorneys in capital
cases.133 Once again, the supreme court disagreed. It stated that even
though the amendment to section 27.53(2) had indeed removed lan-
guage explicitly placing the burden of compensating court-appointed
attorneys on the counties in non-capital cases, no language was added
assigning that responsibility to the state. As a result, the remaining
statute left an ambiguity to be resolved by examination of the legisla-
tive history of the 1981 amendment to section 27.53(2).131
The court performed such an examination, including an analysis of
the jurisdiction of the legislative committees which considered the bill
that amended section 27.53(2), and a review of a staff analysis of that
bill prepared for the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee. It revealed
that the bill was not intended to shift the responsibility for compensat-
ing court appointed attorneys from the counties to the state. Therefore,
the supreme court reasoned, that obligation remains on the counties.'3 8
In support of this conclusion, the court cited section 925.037 of the
Florida Statutes,139 which created a pilot program to reimburse the
counties for fees paid to court-appointed counsel in capital and non-
capital conflict of interest cases. It stated:
This new statute is good evidence that the legislature views the pri-
mary responsibility for compensating court-appointed attorneys as
being on the counties, that the 1981 amendment to subsection
27.53(2) did not alter that scheme, and that the legislature is only
now beginning to address the tremendous financial burden the
scheme places on the counties. 40
The supreme court further observed that appropriation of funds of
the operation of government is a legislative function and that the judi-
ciary cannot compel the legislature to exercise a purely legislative pre-
rogative."' Thus, even though the counties may well be correct in as-
serting that the state should accept complete financial responsibility for
136. Id. at 1135-36.
137. Id. at 1137.
138. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d at 1135-36.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1137-38.
141. Id. at 1138.
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the public defenders, the legislature is the proper forum to address that
concern.
142
IX. ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR REPRESENTATION OF CITY
OFFICIALS
Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach" involved claims by three
members of the Fort Walton Beach City Council for reimbursement of
attorney's fees expended for their private representation in matters
arising from their actions as council members. The officials had suc-
cessfully brought an action to enjoin a recall petition calling for their
removal from office. They had also defended against a federal civil
rights claim which had been dismissed by the plaintiff, with prejudice,
as part of a settlement in which the plaintiff received some relief. Re-
versing the trial court and the First District Court of Appeal, the su-
preme court held that the city council members were entitled to reim-
bursement of their attorney's fees."'
With respect to their lawsuit to enjoin the recall petition, the court
agreed with the lower courts that the council members could not re-
cover attorney's fees under section 111.07 of the Florida Statutes, a
provision that is limited to reimbursing the attorney's fees of governing
officials who are prevailing defendants. 1 5 Notwithstanding this, how-
ever, the supreme court ruled that the council members were entitled to
recover their attorney's fees under common law." 6
The court cited a line of decisions that establish that public offi-
cials have a common law right to legal representation, at public ex-
pense, to defend themselves against litigation arising from the perform-
ance of their official duties while serving a public purpose. It stated
that for public officials to be entitled to such publicly financed legal
representation, two conditions must be satisfied: 1) the litigation in
question must arise out of or in connection with the performance of
their officials duties and 2) the litigation must serve a public purpose. 7
Applying this principle to the facts, the supreme court concluded
that the council members' lawsuit to enjoin the recall petition met both
142. Id.
143. 568 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1990).
144. Id. at 919.
145. FLA. STAT. § 111.07 (West Supp. 1991).
146. Thornber, 568 So. 2d at 918.
147. Id. at 917.
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of the requisite requirements. Because the recall petition was a re-
sponse to the council members' dismissal of Fort Walton Beach's city
manager and police chief, the court found it sufficiently connected to
the council members' official performance to satisfy the first prong of
the test.1"8
In addition, in the court's view, the council members' action in
defending against the recall petition served useful public purposes.
Their lawsuit ensured the effective and efficient functioning of the city's
governing body, and protected city offices from untimely and illegal re-
call petitions. The court reasoned that officials should not have to incur
personal expenses to insure that a recall committee follows proper pro-
cedures.'4 9 Even though the case presented an "unusual twist," in that
the council members initiated the litigation in question, rather than de-
fending against it, the actions of those officials amounted to a defense
against an improper recall petition. 15 Thus, they should not be pre-
cluded from recovering their attorney's fees under common law.' 6 '
The supreme court also concluded that the common law doctrine
that served as the substantive basis for the council members' recovery
was not superseded by section 111.07.152 It noted that the statute itself
was silent as to whether it superseded the common law, and that there
was nothing in the legislative history of the statute that supported an
implication that the common law was being derogated. Applying the
well established principle that a statute will not be held to change the
common law unless that statute explicitly and clearly exhibits an intent
to do so, the court held that section 111.07 is not the exclusive mecha-
nism authorizing an award of attorney's fees to public officials involved
in litigation arising from the performance of their public duties. 5 '
The supreme court then turned to the council members' claim of
attorney's fees for their defense of a federal civil rights suit against
them by the former police chief of Fort Walton Beach. 54 That action
had resulted in a settlement which called for the plaintiff to voluntarily
dismiss his claim, with prejudice. In exchange, the plaintiff was rein-
stated as police chief, placed on permanent disability leave, reimbursed
148. Id.
149. Id. at 917-18.
150. Id. at 918.
151. Thornber, 568 So. 2d at 918.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 919.
154. Id.
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his past lost wages, and given a pledge that the city would not interfere
with his worker's compensation claim. 15
Notwithstanding the relief obtained by the plaintiff in this settle-
ment, the court concluded that the council members had "prevailed" in
the action and were entitled to attorney's fees under section 111.07 as
prevailing defendants. 15 6 The court observed that, under the settlement,
all of the plaintiff's relief was awarded by the city and the mayor, who
had been co-defendants in the police chief's civil rights action. The
council members had been merely signatories to the stipulated settle-
ment; they did not contribute monetarily. The court also relied on the
general rule that when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the
defendant is considered the prevailing party.157
Finally, the supreme court responded to the council members' con-
tention that, under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes, they were
entitled to recover their attorney's fees in the instant litigation. The
court disagreed. It held that the purpose of section 57.105 was narrow.
The section was meant to discourage "baseless claims, stonewall de-
fenses, and sham appeals in civil litigation," by assessing attorney's fee
awards on losing parties who engage in these activities. 58 In this case,
that provision was inapplicable. The city's defense of the council mem-
bers' attorney's fees claims did not completely lack a justiciable issue of
either law or fact. Thus there was no basis for a section 57.105
award. 59
155. Id.
156. Thornber, 568 So. 2d at 919.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 920.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey focuses on the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court
which will be of interest to Florida real property lawyers and real es-
tate professionals. Included are three cases from other courts which the
author thinks are worthy of attention. The time frame covered by this
survey is October 1, 1990 to August 1, 1991.
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center.
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II. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
A. Real Estate Sales Contracts-Liquidated Damages
Lefemine v. Baron.1 Justice Grimes wrote the opinion in which
Justices Overton, Ehrlich, Barkett, Kogan and Chief Justice Shaw con-
curred. Justice McDonald dissented without opinion.
The buyers2 signed a contract to buy a residence. When they were
unable to obtain financing for the purchase, they sued for the return of
their ten percent deposit. The sellers3 counterclaimed, asserting that
the deposit represented liquidated damages.4 The sellers prevailed in
the circuit court and that decision was affirmed by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal5 in a decision which was in direct conflict with an
earlier decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, Cortes v. Adair.6
The question before the supreme court was whether the deposit
forfeiture clause was valid. Liquidated damages clauses are valid in
Florida if they meet the two part test established in Hyman v. Cohen.,
The test requires that,
1. the damages must not be readily ascertainable at the time of the
drawing of the contract; and
2. the amount must not be so grossly disproportionate to any rea-
sonably expected damages as to indicate that it was chosen to in-
duce performance rather than to liquidate damages.
The first part of the test was not an issue in this case.
An amount chosen for the purpose of preventing a party from
breaching would, by definition, be a penalty.8 Thus the second part of
the test is a method of determining if the parties actually intended to
create a penalty clause, regardless of what it is labeled, rather than a
liquidated damages clause. If intended as a penalty, the clause would
1. 573 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1991).
2. Daniel and Catherine Lefemine were the buyers.
3. Judith W, Baron was the seller.
4. The real estate broker, S & N Kurash, Inc., cross-claimed against the seller
for one-half of whatever the seller might recover. The broker's right to recover was not
discussed by the supreme court.
5. 556 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
6. 494 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
7. 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
8. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-31
(3d ed. 1987).
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not be enforceable. This case illustrates that part two of the test is not
the only way to determine whether the parties had an impermissible
intent.
The amount involved here would not, per se, have made this clause
fail the test. In dicta, the supreme court agreed with the district and
circuit courts that the loss of ten percent of the purchase price9 was
neither unconscionable nor so grossly disproportionate to the amount of
damages which might reasonably flow from a breach of the sales con-
tract as to show it was intended only to induce full performance. How-
ever, there was another factor to consider in this case. The contract
provided that upon default,
the deposit(s) ...may be retained or recovered by or for the ac-
count of Seller as liquidated damages . . . and in full settlement of
any claims; whereupon all parties shall be relieved of all obligations
under the Contract; or Seller, at his option, may proceed at law or
in equity to enforce his rights under the contract.10
Florida courts had previously invalidated lease provisions which gave
lessors similar options to keep security deposits or seek actual dam-
ages.11 Those precedents had first been applied to a real estate sales
contract by the third district in the case providing the conflict here,
Cortes v. Adair.12
The supreme court interpreted those precedents "to mean that the
existence of the option reflects that the parties did not have the mutual
intention to stipulate to a fixed amount as their liquidated damages in
the event of breach."13 In a true liquidated damages situation, the
buyer takes the risk that the seller's provable actual damages might be
lower than the liquidated amount, and the seller takes the risk that his
provable actual damages might be higher than the liquidated amount.
However, the addition of the option here changed the very nature of
9. In this case the deposit was $38,500. 573 So. 2d at 327.
10. Id. at 327-28.
11. Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953); Glynn v. Roberson, 58 So. 2d
676 (Fla. 1952); Stenor, Inc. v. Lester, 58 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1951); Pappas v. Deringer,
145 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
12. 494 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The supreme court clarified
this point by noting that although the contract in Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d
129 (Fla. 1970), also gave the seller the option of retaining the deposit as liquidated
damages, that case did not deal with that issue. Lefemine, 573 So. 2d at 329.
13. 573 So. 2d at 329.
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the clause. With the option, the clause merely provided a minimum
liability for the breaching buyer, shifting the risk from the seller to the
buyer so that the seller might be able to prove higher actual damages.
Consequently, the court concluded that the deposit forfeiture clause
here was not intended to be a liquidated damages clause and so, appar-
ently for it is unstated, this clause must have been intended as a pen-
alty clause.
The court's conclusion makes sense. A penalty clause is one which
"is designed to deter a party from breaching his contract and to punish
him in the event the deterrent is ineffective.""' Since this clause was
not intended to fix the amount of the damages, what other purpose
might it have had other than to deter the buyers from breaching and to
punish them if they did breach? Because penalty clauses are unenforce-
able in Florida, this seller will have to prove her actual damages.
It is important to note that the court expressly limited its opinion
to the facts of this case. It stated:
"[w]e express no opinion with respect to whether the same result
would occur if the Uniform Commercial Code were applicable to
this transaction, nor do we imply that a liquidated damages clause
which merely provided the option of pursuing equitable remedies
would be unenforceable. 1 5
But there is no readily apparent reason to think the outcome would be
different under the UCC. 1'
14. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 14-31.
15. 573 So. 2d at 330 n.5.
16. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1991) provides:
Liquidation of Limitation of Damages; Deposits.
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agree-
ment but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the antici-
pated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss,
and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a
penalty.
U.C.C. § 2A-504 (1991) provides:
Liquidation of Damages.
(1) Damages payable by either party for default, or any other act or omis-
sion . . ., may be liquidated in the lease agreement but only at an amount
or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the then anticipated harm
caused by the default or other act or omission.
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B. Attorney's Fees
The court decided four cases involving attorney's fees. The first
was Stockman v. Downs.17 Justice Grimes wrote the opinion for an
unanimous court which included Chief Justice Shaw and Justices Over-
ton, McDonald, Barkett and Kogan. The court was presented with the
following certified question:
MAY A PREVAILING PARTY RECOVER ATTORNEY'S
FEES AUTHORIZED IN A STATUTE OR CONTRACT BY A
MOTION FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER
ENTRY OF A FINAL JUDGMENT, WHICH MOTION
RAISES THE ISSUE OF THAT PARTY'S ENTITLEMENT
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE FIRST TIME?
The question was answered in the negative.
The prospective buyer of real estate signed a purchase contract
which included a clause providing that the prevailing party in any liti-
gation arising out of the contract would be entitled to recover all costs,
including attorney's fees. When that prospective buyer sued the sellers
for fraud and breach of contract, the complaint included a claim for
attorney's fees based upon that provision. The defendant-sellers raised
affirmative defenses, but did not make a claim for attorney's fees until
after the court had entered the final judgment in their favor based upon
a jury verdict. The court had retained jurisdiction for the taxing of
costs and the award of attorney's fees, but the court ruled that it was
too late for the defendant-sellers to claim attorney's fees.
Florida case law had distinguished between claims for attorney's
fees based upon contract and statute. When the claim was based upon
contract, it had to be specifically pled or it would be waived. However,
it had not seemed necessary to plead a claim for attorney's fees based
upon statute. Two recent supreme court cases had held it proper for a
party to file a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees based upon con-
tract.18 However, those cases were distinguishable because the prevail-
ing parties in both cases had pled their claims for attorney's fees in
their complaints, although they waited to enter their proof until after
17. 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
18. Finkelstein v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1986)
(dealing with attorney's fees under FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1983)); Cheek v. McGowan
Elec. Supply Co., 511 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1987) (dealing with attorney's fees under the
provision of a promissory note).
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final judgment.
The court held that a party to litigation is entitled to notice that
the opponent is going to seek attorney's fees. Important decisions about
the course of the litigation, including decisions to pursue the litigation
or to settle, cannot be made properly without knowing whether the op-
posing party is going to ask for attorney's fees. Therefore, to allow the
matter to be brought up for the first time in a post-judgment motion is
unfair. Consequently, the court ruled that a party must plead a claim
for attorney's fees whether that claim is based upon contract or upon a
statute. 19 While the holding with respect to attorney's fees under a stat-
ute is clearly obiter dictum, it behooves the prudent attorney to plead a
claim for attorney's fees, whatever the source.
It is odd that the court would base its conclusion upon the need to
protect a litigant from unfair surprise. It seems likely that the only
surprise in this case was the one suffered by the successful defendants.
The court mentions no evidence that the plaintiff was caught by sur-
prise. Nor does the court mention any evidence on the record that the
plaintiff would have been prejudiced in any way. In fact, the court
demonstrates that the plaintiff was well aware of the provision because
she made a claim for attorney's fees in her own complaint.
The court did note that there is an exception to the rule. A party
may waive its objection to its opponent's failure to plead a claim for
attorney's fees. Such waiver may be express or it may be implied from
the party's conduct which recognizes or acquiesces to the claim. Two
examples of implied acquiescence were provided. One example was
where the claim for attorney's fees had been raised in the pretrial con-
ference and the plaintiff's pretrial statement listed defendant's attor-
ney's fees claim as an issue. The second example was where the parties
had stipulated during trial that the question of attorney's fees would be
heard subsequent to the final hearing. The record in this case revealed
neither implied nor express acquiescence.
Insurance Company of North America v. Acousti Engineering
Company of Florida20 involved the consolidated review of three con-
19. The court pointed out, however, that this ruling did not address the question
of whether the ruling would apply to attorney's fees sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1988
(1980) due to the United States Supreme Court's decision in White v. Hew Hampshire
Department of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445 (1982). Stockman, 573 So. 2d at
838 n.4.
20. 579 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1991).
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struction arbitrations.2 The Florida Arbitration Code,2" in Florida
Statutes section 682.11, states: "Unless otherwise provided in the
agreement or provision for arbitration, the arbitrator's and umpire's ex-
penses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel
fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as pro-
vided in the award." Apparently there was no contractual provision for
attorney's fees. The prevailing parties sought them under the statute2"
which provides for the award of attorney's fees in successful actions
against insurers.
In a per curiam opinion, the supreme court concluded that section
682.11 does not prohibit a successful party to an arbitration from re-
covering attorney's fees for the attorney's services during the arbitra-
tion if those are provided for by contract or statute. Furthermore, the
attorney's fees recoverable under section 627.428 does include attor-
ney's fees incurred during arbitration. However, section 682.11 does
prohibit the arbitrator from making the award of attorney's fees. That
award must be made by a court. In reaching these conclusions, the
court explicitly adopted the reasoning of the opinion of the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in Fewox v. McMerit Construction Co.24
The supreme court also issued two opinions dealing with the award
of attorney's fees in the probate of a decedent's estate.2 However,
these were still subject to revision by the court at the time that this
article was written and so their discussion will have to await next year's
survey.
C. Real Estate Purchase Options
Lassiter v. Kaufman.2 Justice Harding wrote the opinion in which
Justices Overton, Barkett and Kogan concurred. Justice Grimes con-
curred in the result and wrote an opinion in which Justice Overton con-
21. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Acousti Eng'g Co., 549 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Fewox v. McMerit Constr. Co., 556 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989); Park Shore Dev. Co. v. Higley S., Inc. 566 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
22. FLA. STAT. ch. 682 (1991).
23. FLA. STAT. § 627.428 (1987).
24. 556 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The unanimous en banc opin-
ion was written by Judge Ryder.
25. In re Estate of Warwick, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (Apr. 1991); In re Estate
of Platt, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (Apr. 1991).
26. 581 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1991).
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curred. Chief Justice Shaw and Justice McDonald dissented without
opinion.
The lessee had exercised his option to purchase the leased prop-
erty, but then the parties disagreed about purchase price and the buyer
sought specific performance. The option had only specified that the
price would be not less than $200,000. The court apparently concluded
that the price was to be the fair market value, although how it came to
this conclusion is left a mystery. But that still left open the question of
whether the fair market value was to be the value of the fee simple
absolute or the fee encumbered by the existing lease. There was expert
testimony that the freehold encumbered by the lease had a market
value of only $275,000, but the value of the unencumbered fee would
be $1,684,000.
The trial court had solved the question by "mechanically" apply-
ing the doctrine of merger.27 Apparently, the logic was that the lease
would be extinguished upon the conveyance to the buyer if merger oc-
curred and so the buyer was acquiring, and should pay for, a fee simple
which was not subject to a lease. The supreme court criticized that
approach by indicating that whether equity would allow merger de-
pended upon what would best serve justice and the intent of the parties.
The supreme court reviewed the two district court precedents2 8 and
went to great efforts to reconcile its conclusion with those cases.
The court indicated that the role of the merger doctrine is only to
help interpret an ambiguous option term. It can be used because it
helps reveal the intent of the parties based upon whether the parties
intended for merger to occur. But this author sincerely doubts whether
these parties, or most parties to options, have any idea, let alone inten-
tions, about the phenomenon of merger. It is hardly likely parties who
were sophisticated enough about real estate law to consider the possi-
bility of merger would have signed an option worded like the one in
Lassiter.
In the end, the supreme court decided it was "unnecessary to de-
termine whether merger should occur or not"2 9 because this option
clause was not ambiguous. The option was for the purchase of the "fee
title" as might be distinguished from a fee subject to an existing lease.
Because the option was for the purchase of the "fee title," the purchase
27. Id. at 148.
28. Palm Pavilion of Clearwater, Inc. v. Thompson, 458 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Contos v. Lipsky, 433 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
29. Lassiter, 581 So. 2d at 149.
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price should be the value of the unencumbered fee simple; i.e.,
$1,684,000.
However, the court went on to state that the result would have
been the same even if the doctrine of merger had been applied. The
court states that "the term 'fee title' expresses an implied intent to
merge.""0 If the court was stating that henceforth it will be implied as
a matter of law from such a term that the parties intended a merger,
then so be it. The court has the power to make such pronouncements,
but the policy which would justify such a pronouncement should be
articulated because it is certainly not apparent. Furthermore, to sug-
gest this term reveals the parties' state of mind regarding merger is
surely a judicial fantasy.
This author agrees with Justice Grimes' concurrence. He stated,
"I do not think the doctrine of merger has much to do with the out-
come of this case"31 because it involved a simple matter of contract
interpretation. He pointed out that the purchase price should be con-
trolled by the intent of the parties and that the words used by the par-
ties should be used to determine that intent. He proceeded to suggest a
general rule which would accomplish the important public purpose of
eliminating the confusion produced by poor drafting: "fIn the absence
of specific language to the contrary in the lease, I would hold that the
option price would always be computed as if the property were unen-
"932cumbered by the lease ....
D. Mortgage Foreclosure
Haven Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian.3 3 Justice McDon-
ald wrote the unanimous opinion in which Chief Justice Shaw and Jus-
tices Overton, Barkett, Grimes and Kogan concurred.-4
The court held unconstitutional that part of Florida Statute sec-
tion 702.0135 which required the severance of all counterclaims in a
mortgage foreclosure action. In this case, the mortgagor had asserted
both affirmative defenses and counterclaims. These were based upon
allegations that the lender concealed the serious financial troubles of
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 149.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1991).
34. Justice Harding did not participate.
35. FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1987). This section has not been modified by the legis-
lature in the period between its enactment in 1987 and the present.
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the development, and its own financial involvement in the development,
from potential buyers to whom it was providing mortgage financing.
In the circuit court, the lender successfully moved to sever the
counterclaims based upon the mandate in section 702.01 that "the
court shall sever for separate trial all counterclaims . . ." in mortgage
foreclosures. The lender then convinced the trial court to strike the af-
firmative defenses because they were based upon the same grounds as
the stricken counterclaims and, because the court had eliminated all
the defenses, to grant summary judgment in the lender's favor. The
First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding the statute unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it conflicted with the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,36 a conclusion requiring review by the supreme court under arti-
cle V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. The supreme court
affirmed.
Matters of substantive law are within the province of the Florida
legislature, but matters of judicial practice and procedure are within
the exclusive realm of the supreme court. In exercising its power, the
court had adopted the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1.270(b),
in contrast to the statute's mandatory language, allows a judge to sever
counterclaims in order to further convenience or to avoid prejudice.
The court distinguished this case from VanBibber v. Hartford Ac-
cident & Indemnity Insurance Co."7 where it examined the statute
which prohibited the joinder of insurance companies in suits against
their insureds. In VanBibber, the court had found the statute was based
upon a clear legislative intent and policy to create substantive rights.
Consequently, the statute prohibiting joinder was not an unconstitu-
tional attempt by the legislature to regulate procedure. However, the
legislative history behind the mandatory severance provision did not re-
veal a similar clear legislative intent to create substantive rights. 8 The
House Commerce Committee had reported that it was but one of a
number of amendments which were designed "to create a simple, equi-
table, and inexpensive method by which a mortgage lender could en-
force an assignment of rents contract."3 9 Absent the legislative intent
to create a substantive right, the court apparently concluded that this
36. Kirian v. Haven Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 560 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
37. 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983).
38. E.g., the substantive right to foreclose mortgages undelayed by
counterclaims.
39. Kirian, 579 So. 2d at 733 n.l.
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was simply a part of "the machinery of the judicial process .... "'I
As such, the legislature's mandatory rule was unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the supreme court found that the trial court had
erred in striking the affirmative defenses merely because the grounds
for those defenses were the same as the grounds for the counterclaims.
The court pointed out that "counterclaims and affirmative defenses are
separate and distinct terms." '41 So a rule allowing or requiring the sev-
erance of a counterclaim should not be applied to affirmative defenses.
Further, "[a] court cannot grant summary judgment where a defend-
ant asserts legally sufficient affirmative defenses that have not been re-
butted.' ' 2 Of course, it may be argued that this is merely obiter dic-
tum, but it is so completely sensible that it should be followed.
If the trial court had stricken the affirmative defense because it
was based upon inappropriate grounds, that would have been one thing,
but there was no such ruling. Nor could there have been because fraud
and misrepresentation are appropriate affirmative defenses to an action
in equity such as foreclosure. It almost seems that the trial court based
its ruling on a misguided election of remedies theory, i.e., the mortga-
gor was required to choose between using fraud and misrepresentation
as a defense or as a counterclaim, and having used it as a counterclaim,
it was precluded from using it as a defense. Whatever the justification
for the trial court's ruling, it is hoped that this precedent will prevent
similar rulings.
E. " Homestead
City National Bank of Florida v. Tescher.3 Justice Harding
wrote the unanimous opinion in which Chief Justice Shaw and Justices
Overton, McDonald, Barkett, Grimes and Kogan concurred.
Article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution provides that
"homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by
spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised to the
owner's spouse if there be no minor child." In this case, the decedent
owned homestead property and was survived by a spouse, though not
by a minor child. Read literally, as was argued on behalf of one of
40. Id. at 732 (quoting In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66
(Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J., concurring)).
41. Id. at 733.
42. Id.
43. 578 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1991).
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decedent's adult children, the constitution would seem to prohibit
homestead property from being devised to anyone except the spouse,
and the homestead in this case had not been devised to the spouse.
Since the spouse, in this case the husband, had previously renounced
his rights to the decedent's estate, under the laws of intestate succes-
sion, the property would be inherited by the decedent's two adult
children.
The supreme court disagreed. It concluded that the husband's
valid waiver of all rights to homestead in an antenuptial agreement was
the legal equivalent, at least for purposes of this constitutional provi-
sion, of his having died first. Applying this legal fiction, the decedent
was survived by neither spouse nor minor children. Consequently, the
prohibition from devising the property was inapplicable. As the will
had a valid residuary clause, the home could pass by it to the residuary
legatees.
The court looked to the historical purpose of the homestead provi-
sion. It was designed to preserve the family by protecting a) surviving
spouses and b) surviving minor children from the loss of the family's
homestead by restraining the decedent's ability to transfer it. However,
restraints on alienation, particularly alienation by devise, should be
narrowly construed. Decedent's death left no one who was entitled to
the provision's protection. Its interpretation should be narrowed so that
it would not be applied in this inappropriate situation. The court
adopted this legal fiction to simplify the narrowing process.
F. Mechanics' Liens44
Stresscon v. Madiedo." Justice Harding wrote the opinion in
which Chief Justice Shaw and Justices McDonald, Barkett, Grimes
and Kogan concurred. Justice Overton dissented without opinion.
Florida Statute section 713.16(2) provided"' that when a payment
was to be made by the owner to a construction contractor, the owner
could make a written demand for a written statement of the account
made under oath from any person who might claim a mechanics' lien.
44. Technically, mechanics' liens have been replaced by construction liens in
Florida. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-109, § 1; see FLA. STAT. § 713.001 (Supp. 1990).
45. 581 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1991).
46. FLA. STAT. § 713.16(2) (1987). Section 713.16(2) was unchanged as of the
time this article was written, although Florida Laws chapter 90-109 transformed the
topic into "Construction Lien Law." FLA. STAT. § 713.001 (Supp. 1990).
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Failure to provide the statement, or making a false or fraudulent state-
ment, would cause the loss of the lien. In this case, a sub-contractor
had received a letter demanding a written statement of its account and
had sent a timely and accurate statement, but the statement had not
been under oath. The sub-contractor attempted to cure this oversight
by filing an affidavit that the statement was accurate in the foreclosure
action. The trial court was unimpressed and had granted summary
judgment against the sub-sub-contractor and the Third District Court
of Appeal affirmed, certifying the following question to the supreme
court:
MAY THE FAILURE TO NOTARIZE AN OTHERWISE
TIMELY AND ACCURATE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT
UNDER SUBSECTION 713.16(2), FLORIDA STATUTES
(1987), BE CURED BY VERIFICATION AFTER THE FACT,
SO LONG AS THERE IS NO PREJUDICE TO THE OPPOS-
ING PARTY?
The supreme court agreed with the district court and answered the
question in the negative.
The court decided this was a simple matter of statutory interpreta-
tion. The court had previously pointed out that mechanics' liens are
purely statutory creatures and, consequently, strict compliance with the
statute's requirements is "a prerequisite for a person seeking affirma-
tive relief under the statute."47 The statute required that a lienor would
lose the lien if it failed to provide a written statement under oath
within thirty days of demand. When that had not occurred, the lien
was lost. This section simply does not allow for cure or for accepting
for substantial compliance, even where that does not prejudice another
party, as do some other sections.
G. Landlord and Tenant
Fitzgerald v. Cestari.4 8 Justice Ehrlich wrote the opinion for an
unanimous court. A seven year-old-child was injured when she ran
through a sliding glass door of the house which her parents were leas-
ing. The door was not made of safety glass and was not marked by
decals so it would be visible when closed. The trial court granted the
47. 581 So. 2d at 160 (quoting with approval Gonas v. Home Elec. of Dade
County, Inc., 537 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
48. 569 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1990).
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landlord's motion for summary judgment which was supported by affi-
davits that the glass was in the door when the lessors purchased the
house, that the glass was not marked as to type, and that the type of
glass was not readily discoverable.
The complaint alleged two separate grounds of liability. The first
was that the lessors "were negligent for failing to ascertain that the
door was not made of safety glass and for failing to conform their
premises to the Southern Standard Building Code which requires
safety glass be used in sliding glass doors."' 9 The supreme court ac-
knowledged that a landlord does have a duty to reasonably inspect resi-
dential premises before the tenant moves in and does have a continuing
duty to exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous conditions of
which it has notice. However, the landlord does not have a duty to have
an expert determine if an unmarked glass door is made of the type of
glass required by the building code. Furthermore, the landlords could
not be held liable for failure to repair a defect of which they did not
have notice.
The court does not discuss the question of whether the landlords
could have been held strictly liable for leasing residential premises in a
defective or dangerous condition.50 Nor does it suggest what might be
the effect of leasing residential premises which are in violation of the
building code. It merely indicated the issue would not be discussed as
the claim was not raised in the trial court that liability should be based
upon the code violation.5'
The second claimed basis for liability was the landlord's failure to
place decals on the sliding glass doors. The supreme court concluded
that the landlords did not have a duty to place decals or the like on the
glass doors visible because they did not constitute "the type of 'danger-
ous condition' which a landlord is in a better position than the tenant to
guard against." If a warning of the presence of the closed sliding glass
door is needed, the tenants in possession of the premises have that
responsibility.
49. Fitzgerald, 569 So. 2d at 1260.
50. See Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116 (Cal. 1985).
51. Fitzgerald, 569 So. 2d at 1260 n.2.
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III. INTERESTING OPINIONS FROM OTHER COURTS
A. Seller's Duties to Buyer: Florida Third District Court of
Appeal
Futura Realty v. Lone Star Building Centers, Inc."3 This case in-
volved a per curiam opinion by Judges Nesbitt, Baskin and Jorgenson.
The buyer of real property claimed a) that the seller had commit-
ted fraud by failing to reveal pollution problems and also that b) the
seller and a prior owner were strictly liable for the harm to the site
caused by the use of ultrahazardous chemicals. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and the district court affirmed.
The Florida Supreme Court had imposed on the seller the duty to
disclose facts which would materially affect the value of the property
which were not readily observable and were not known to the purchaser
in Johnson v. Davis.53 The supreme court had held that the seller's
duty "is equally applicable to all forms of real property, new and
used."54 However, the third district ignored the plain meaning of that
statement and found that "when read in context, as it must be, [that
statement] clearly applies solely to the sale of homes." 55 The district
court based its conclusion on how it divined the supreme court might
approach a nonresidential case, but without any articulated analysis.
It is possible to distinguish between residential and commercial
transactions on a number of theories: equitable, economic or moral. In
a commercial transaction, the parties might be assumed to be of equal
bargaining power and to operate at arm's length rather than the une-
qual positions of developer and home buyer. But disparity in bargaining
power was not considered a factor by the supreme court in Davis and,
in fact, did not appear to exist in that case which involved individual
sellers rather than a developer.
Nor can economics be seen as supporting the district court's posi-
52. 578 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
53. 4.80 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
54. Id. at 629.
55. Futura Realty, 578 So. 2d at 364. The reference to context might possibly be
to the fact that the supreme court in Johnson v. Davis only discussed the sale of homes,
for that was what the case concerned. Consequently, when articulating the rule, the
supreme court phrased it as "where the seller of a home knows of facts materially
affecting the value of the property .... " 480 So. 2d at 629. However, the district
court opinion did not specify that it was this language upon which it relied in making
its decision.
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tion. It might be argued that the cost of repairing latent defects can
efficiently be passed on to the customers of the buyer's business while a
home buyer has no similar efficient mechanism to spread its similar
costs. However, that would ignore the fact that this ruling will probably
increase the cost of every commercial real estate purchase by requiring
buyers to expend money looking for latent defects about which the
seller already is aware. Certainly it would be more efficient to require
the seller to reveal facts within its knowledge rather than to require
every commercial buyer to engage in an extensive and expensive search
for latent defects. Moreover, it is not an efficient mechanism for
spreading the cost to buyer's business customers. The buyer's search for
latent defects will often fail to disclose existing problems because, being
latent, the problems may not be discovered. The only beneficiaries of
this policy are professional inspectors.
It may be possible to justify the district court's position on the
basis of a philosophy which favors leaving the common law undis-
turbed. The departure from the common law in Davis seems to be
based on moral philosophy rather than economics; i.e., that it is good or
right to protect consumers and that sellers who fail to reveal what they
know about latent defects are behaving wrongfully. But if the point is
to encourage correct behavior, it is irrational to allow conduct by com-
mercial sellers which would be considered blameworthy by residential
sellers. What possible benefit could there be to society from the exis-
tence of a "double standard" in this area? It should also be noted that
consumers are no less able, in general, to hire inspectors to discover
latent defects than are buyers of commercial property.
It may be arguable that it is the nature of commercial property
which makes the commercial sale distinguishable from a residential
sale. Perhaps there is something about commercial property that makes
it more likely that a latent defect will remain undiscovered by the dili-
gent inspection of a prudent buyer. However, there is nothing evident
in this case to suggest anything that might provide the basis for a rea-
soned distinction as a matter of law. This author concludes that the
district court has erred in failing to apply the principle of Davis v.
Johnson to the sale of a commercial property. It has been reported that
the buyers have sought review by the Florida Supreme Court based
upon the claim that the decision in this case conflicts with the decisions
of other districts." It will be interesting to see whether the supreme
56. Gibbs, What's the Duty of Commercial Land Seller?, MIAMI REVIEW, Au-
gust 20, 1991, at 3.
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court agrees with this author when the court considers the issue,
whether in this or some other case.
On the second issue, the district court seems to have fared better.
Under the common law of Florida, a landowner has a duty not to per-
mit ultrahazardous activity57 which causes harm to a neighbor's land. 8
In this case, the plaintiff sought to have the scope of the landowner's
duty expanded to protect subsequent owners of the same land. The
court reasoned that a subsequent owner can protect itself from the
harm by carefully inspecting the property before acquiring it and by
providing for the possibility of such harm, or risk of it, in the negotia-
tions over the price. That distinguishes the subsequent owner from the
otherwise defenseless neighbor whom the strict liability rule evolved to
protect. Of course, the court's reasoning on this issue would make more
sense if the seller were required, based upon Davis v. Johnson to reveal
the existence of latent defects, particularly hazardous defects, such as
existed in this case.
B. Arbitration: Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal
Laniewicz v. Rutenberg Construction Co."0 Judge Sharp wrote the
opinion in which Judges Cobb and Gorshon concurred.
The buyers of a new house sued the seller/builder for damages
arising from construction defects in the home. The sales contract in-
cluded a provision that: "[a]ll claims or disputes between the Buyer
and Seller arising out of this agreement shall be decided by arbitra-
tion ... "60 Accordingly, the matter was referred to arbitration.
The arbitrator decided that there were construction defects which
were the fault of the builder. But because the defects had not been
fixed over the two year period and because the defects could most eco-
nomically be fixed if the builder took the house back, the arbitrator
decided that the sale should be rescinded. The buyers objected. That
was not the relief which they had sought, but the circuit court con-
firmed the: arbitration award.
The District Court of Appeal reversed on two grounds. First, re-
57. The process by which the environmental hazards accumulated at the site are
described in Seaboard Systems Railroad v. Clemente, 467 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
58. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 (1868); Great Lakes Dredging & Dock Co.
v. Sea Gull Operating Corp., 460 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
59. 580 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
60. Id. at 204 n.1.
1991]
414
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
scission is an equitable remedy and, as such, it is available only where
the remedy at law; i.e., monetary damages, would be inadequate. Of
course, the claimant had not bothered to enter evidence on that point
because it was not an element of the relief sought. Second, rescission is
a remedy which a party may elect. But here, neither party had elected
rescission. Consequently, the arbitrator had no basis for awarding it.
Consequently, the circuit court should not have confirmed the award.
Thus far, the discussion reveals nothing remarkable about this
case. However, the court goes on to comment that, "we are essentially
reviewing an arbitrator's award which finds that the arbitration con-
tract should be rescinded."61 That introduced an interesting question.
Can an arbitrator make such an award? It may be argued that an arbi-
trator ordering rescission of the contract containing the arbitration
clause would eliminate the contractual authority of the arbitrator, elim-
inating the effect of the arbitration award. Completing the circle, that
would eliminate the rescission award, leaving the contract in effect. The
court posited, in dictum, that "[w]e are hesitant to say that under no
circumstances could an arbitrator determine that a contract should be
rescinded .... ."" but it is unclear that this is even the point which
the court is addressing and the court did not provide any more on the
point.
There is little doubt that under the Federal Arbitration Act 3 re-
scission based upon fraud in the inducement is a question which can be
decided by arbitrators based upon the logic that the arbitration clause
is a separate contract.6 4 Florida courts have followed similar logic,
drawing the distinction between the arbitrable claim that the overall
contract was subject to rescission 65 and the claim that the arbitration
clause was the product of fraudulent inducement which must be de-
61. Id. at 204.
62. Id.
63. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
64. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see
also Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1987);
Merit Stainless Steel, Inc. v. Nippon Stainless Steel Co., 818 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1987);
Union Mutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 524 (1st
Cir. 1985); Manning v. Interfuture Trading, Inc., 578 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991).
65. Shearson/Lehman Bros. v. Ordonez, 497 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assocs., 412 So. 2d 871, 874 n.3
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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cided by the court. 66
Of course, since the obligation to arbitrate is contractual, the
scope of the arbitration can be limited by the contract. In this case,
there was no hint that the parties intended to limit the type of relief
which the arbitrator could award. But the problem here was that the
way the clause was drafted left it open, at least arguably, to different
interpretations. If the parties really intended that "[a]ll claims or dis-
putes arising out of this agreement" were to be decided by arbitration,
then logically they must have intended that the arbitration clause sur-
vive the extinguishment of the contract by its merger into the deed at
the closing. Similarly, they also must have intended that the arbitration
clause survive any rescission of the contract of sale because the parties
intended that the arbitration clause be an independent agreement.
Such matters should be considered when an attorney is drafting an
arbitration clause. The attorney should be careful to indicate clearly
that the arbitration clause is intended to (or not to) include the possi-
bility of an arbitration award of rescission and that it is intended to (or
not to) survive the closing of a real estate sale. Of course, similar con-
sideration in drafting of all the other clauses, e.g., attorney's fees
clauses, is also appropriate.
C. RICO: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit
United States v. One Single Family Residence.67 Circuit Judge
Hatchett wrote the opinion for the panel, which also included Judges
Clark and Dubina, affirming the decision of District Judge Lenore Car-
rero Nesbitt.
Two brothers purchased a vacant lot with plans to build a house
there and sell it for a profit. When the federal government filed a for-
feiture complaint" alleging that the lot had been bought and improved
with drug proceeds, brother Gary claimed that he was an innocent
owner and his investment was comprised of funds from legitimate
sources. The government showed that brother Curtis had "very few re-
ported legitimate sources of income or employment, a bad credit rating,
66. Spitz v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 502 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
67. 933 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1991).
68. The complaint was filed under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1990).
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and a reputation as a drug smuggler." 69 Consequently, the government
contended, Gary's knowledge of the illegal source of his brother's share
deprived Gary of his innocent owner status under the statute, leaving
him defenseless in the forfeiture action.
The Court of Appeals framed the issue as follows: "[Wihether a
property owner who is aware that a co-owner has purchased and im-
proved the real property with drug proceeds may qualify as an innocent
owner whose interest in the property is exempt from forfeiture under
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)?" And the Court of Appeals answered the ques-
tion in the negative. It was uncontested that there was a substantial
connection between the property and Curtis' involvement with the drug
trade. The burden of proof was on Gary to prove a) that he lacked
actual knowledge that his co-owner's investment was made with tainted
funds and b) that his own investment was made with money from en-
tirely legitimate sources in order to qualify as an "innocent owner."
Gary did not carry his burden and, consequently, lost his land.
The court rejected the rationale of United States v. Premises
Known as 2639 Meeting House Road"0 which concluded that Congress
had not intended to deprive legitimate investors of their property. The
court decided to classify people as falling into one of only two possible
categories, innocent or wrongdoer. "If one is an innocent owner, no
amount of that person's or entity's funds are forfeitable . . . .On the
other hand, if one is a wrongdoer, the full value of the real property is
forfeitable because some of the funds invested are traceable as the stat-
ute dictates .. ..*",' Thus it appears that a form of the doctrine of
caveat emptor, which is becoming so outmoded in other areas of law, is
alive and well in RICO law.
The court did, however, recognize that RICO has some limits.
Forfeiture is unavailable against a co-owner who learns about the ille-
gal sources of his co-owner after having made the investment," but
only if he makes every reasonable effort possible to withdraw from the
co-ownership after learning of the problem. Moreover, the burden of
69. One Single Family Residence, 933 F.2d at 978.
70. 633 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
71. One Single Family Residence, 933 F.2d at 981-82.
72. Id. at 982 n.5.
73. This is the "Calero-Toledo dicta." United States v. One Single Family Resi-
dence, 683 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Fla. 1988), interpreted language in Calero-Toledo v.
Peterson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974), to require an "innocent owner"
claimant to have done everything reasonably possible to prevent illegal use of his
property.
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proof is on the co-owner who is claiming to be innocent of any knowl-
edge of the connection to the tainted money. Failure to carry that bur-
den will mean the loss of the property. The moral of this case, for those
who had not heard it before, is to be very careful with whom you get
involved. Big Brother is watching you, and it is just possible that Big
Brother is going to seize your land.
IV. CONCLUSION
These cases illustrate that real estate law is neither for the faint-
of-heart nor the ill-informed. Real estate lawyers cannot rely upon the
law remaining static, but the basic skills of drafting, of contract inter-
pretation and of statutory interpretation are still at the crux of the
most important disputes. The critical time for the modern real estate
lawyer to exercise those skills is before any document is drafted,
whether that document be a real estate purchase option, a real estate
purchase contract, a will, an affidavit or a complaint.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although Florida appellate courts did not issue numerous
landmark opinions this past survey year, several well-recognized Flor-
ida legal doctrines were reexamined and in some instances, the preex-
isting boundary lines of those legal doctrines were changed. Several sig-
nificant appellate court decisions have recognized further exceptions to
the exclusiveness of liability afforded employers for injuries that occur
to employees during the course and scope of their employment found in
* Associate, Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri, Holton & Douberley, P.A.;
J.D., Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center.
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Florida's Workers' Compensation Act.' Additionally, various appellate
court decisions have caused the Florida Supreme Court to reexamine
the parameters of Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine which
holds owners of automobiles liable for injuries occasioned by the negli-
gent operation of their automobiles by others with the owner's permis-
sion.' Appellate courts at the intermediate appellate level have been
confronted with applying and attempting to harmonize statutes and a
rule of civil procedure which are aimed at producing more settlements
and less litigation in Florida courts by allowing parties to offer to settle
civil cases, accompanied by the sanction of the award of costs and at-
torney's fees awarded against the party who unreasonably rejects a set-
tlement offer.3
Finally, the legislature has been somewhat active in amending
statutes which impact upon Florida's tort laws. Specifically, the legisla-
ture has acted to immunize employers from civil liability for disclosure
of information concerning the performance of a prior employee." Addi-
tionally, the legislature has acted to allow motorsport race course oper-
ators to immunize themselves from liability by obtaining a signed
waiver from the participant.5 These areas are discussed in the text be-
low and in the order introduced.
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE "EXCLUSIVITY OF REMEDY" FOUND
IN FLORIDA'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
A. Florida Courts Expressly Recognize an Intentional Tort Excep-
tion to an Employer's Immunity for On-the-Job Injuries6
For the first time in Florida, the First District Court of Appeal in
1. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (1991).
2. The decision in Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 74 So. 975 (1917), is
recognized as the genesis of Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
3. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1991); FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1991); FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.442.
4. FLA. STAT. § 768.095 (1989).
5. FLA. STAT. § 549.09 (1989).
6. FLA. STAT § 440.11(1) (Supp. 1990). This statute reads in pertinent part:
The liability of an employer prescribed in s.440.10 shall be exclusive and
in place of all other liability of such employer to any third party tortfeasor
and to the employee, the legal representative thereof. . . and anyone oth-
erwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admi-
ralty on account of such injury or death . . ..
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Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp. expressly recognized that an
employee's remedy for work-place injuries does not rest exclusively in
Florida's Workers' Compensation Act when it is alleged that the em-
ployer committed an intentional tort. In Cunningham though, the First
District Court of Appeal started from the erroneous premise that the
Florida Supreme Court in Fisher v. Shenandoah General Construction
Co.8 and Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Products, Inc.' held that an em-
ployee can bring a cause of action for an intentional tort against his
employer. 10 Instead, the Florida Supreme Court in Fisher and Lawton
expressly declined the offer to decide whether Florida's workers' com-
pensation law precludes an action sounding in intentional tort against
employers.1" In both Fisher" and Lawton,'3 the cases failed to present
a record and allegations which demonstrated the existence of an inten-
tional tort. Accordingly, the question of whether such employer con-
duct is excepted from civil liability pursuant to Florida's Workers'
Compensation Act was not reached by the Florida Supreme Court.
In Fisher, the Florida Supreme court held that the allegation
Fisher was killed when the employer knowingly exposed him to noxious
gases and "in all probability" knew such exposure would cause injury
or death did not allege sufficient facts demonstrating the existence of
an intentional tort. 4 In Lawton, the Florida Supreme Court rejected
Lawton's claims of intentional tort where grounded upon allegations
that Lawton's employer fraudulently failed to provide guards on a
punch press that crushed Lawton's hand, after the employer was in-
formed of the need for the guards by numerous written notifications by
the manufacturer."5
The First District in Cunningham also referred to Byrd v. Rich-
ardson-Greenshields Security, Inc. in support of its ruling.' 6 However,
the Florida Supreme Court in Byrd did not hold that an action sound-
7. 558 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 574 So. 2d 139
(1990).
8. 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986).
9. 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986).
10. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 95.
11. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 882; Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 879.
12. 498 So. 2d 882.
13. 498 So. 2d 879.
14. 498 So. 2d at 883-84.
15. 498 So. 2d at 880-81.
16. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 95 n.1 (citing Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields
Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989)).
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ing in intentional tort by the employer is outside the ambit of Florida's
workers' compensation law. Rather, the court found that the sexual
harassment claim involved an injury to one's dignity and self esteem,
which is not compensable under Florida's workers' compensation law.17
The Byrd court, in following Strothers v. Morrison Cafeteria,8 ex-
pressly stated that it did not matter whether the act of sexual harass-
ment by the employer is intentional. Furthermore, the court used a
two-part test to determine what types of injuries are compensable:
First the injury must 'arise out of' the employment in the
sense it is caused by a risk inherent in the nature of the work in
question. It is immaterial whether the injury is caused by an inten-
tional or unintentional act, so long as the act arose out of this
type of risk . . . 19
In any event, the Cunningham court examined the allegations in
the third amended complaint which attempted to allege fraud and bat-
tery as intentional torts committed by the employer. The plaintiff al-
leged that the employer consciously and intentionally failed to warn her
of the presence of toxic substances in the plant where she worked "with
a deliberate intent to injure" and that the conduct was "substantially
certain" to "cause injury or death."20 The plaintiff alleged that she was
"deliberately" and "intentionally" battered by reason of the employer
"knowingly" exposing the plaintiff to toxic substances by removing la-
bels from containers and by "deliberately" diverting a smoke stack so
that noxious fumes were delivered back to the plant where she
worked.21 The complaint further alleged a knowing and intentional fail-
ure to provide ventilation22 with a specific intent to injure the
plaintiff.23
The Cunningham court found that these allegations were sufficient
17. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Fla.
1989) (noting that an injury to self-esteem does not inhere in the work place).
18. 383 So. 2d 623, 628 (Fla. 1980).
19. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1104 n.7 (emphasis added) (citing Strother, 383 So. 2d
at 624-26).
20. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 95.
21. Id. at 95-96.
22. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that the employer engaged in a "fraudulent
and malicious" scheme to save money which included the false representations made to
the plaintiffs regarding the ventilation and the need for safety equipment. Id.
23. Id. at 96.
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to state a cause of action amounting to intent against the employer.,
The court distinguished Fisher's on the basis that the plaintiff's allega-
tions in Fisher alleged that injury or death would occur "in all
probability" instead of to a "substantial certainty. '2 6 Accordingly, the
"substantial certainty" standard was recognized by the Cunningham
court as sufficient to support a claim for intentional tort as an exception
to Florida's Workers' Compensation Act. 7
Following on the heels of Cunningham was the recent Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal decision in Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc.2 8 Con-
nelly involved an appeal from the trial court's entry of final summary
judgment which was based on the theory that Workers' Compensation
is the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 9 Karen Connelly brought the action
against her husband's employer, Arrow Air, Inc., for the wrongful
death of her husband, a co-pilot killed on take-off from Gander, New-
foundland. Mr. Connelly was on board flight 920 which was traveling
from the Middle East under a contract which Arrow Air had with the
Multinational Force and Observers to transport troops between the
Middle East and the United States.30
There was some evidence, mostly in the form of congressional tes-
timony, that the management of Arrow Air consciously disregarded
Federal Aviation Administration regulations and disregarded proper
maintenance practices.3 1 The Third District found that because there
was evidence that Arrow Air's officials knew of the allegedly poor
maintenance practices, such evidence created a jury issue as to whether
Arrow Air acted in the belief that harm was substantially certain to
occur.82 The dissent noted that the Florida Supreme Court in Lawton"3
required that the evidence show that the employer's conduct would
cause injury to a "virtual certainty" and that violation of safety regula-
24. [d. at 97.
25. .498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986).
26. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 97.
27. Id. Unfortunately, in deciding Cunningham, the court failed to state the legal
basis for reaching the conclusion that an intentional tort exception exists to the exclu-
sivity of remedy found in Florida's workers' compensation law.
28. 568 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 1307
(1991).
29. Id. at 449.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 449-50.
32. Id. at 451.
33. 498 So. 2d at 880.
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tions and negligent maintenance practices do not equal intent.34
It may now be sufficient in Florida to allege the formula that neg-
ligence plus negligence equals intent, and as a result, employers will
probably be subjected to another wave of lawsuits despite the "exclu-
sivity of remedy" provision found in workers' compensation law. If em-
ployers intentionally injure their employees, they should not be able to
find haven under Florida's Workers' Compensation Act. However, it
now appears that negligent conduct, when magnified by adjectives and
coupled with conclusory allegations, can elevate an employer's conduct
from negligent to intentional.
B. The Third District Court of Appeal has Recognized an Ex-
ception to the Exclusivity of Remedy Found in Florida's Work-
ers' Compensation Law Based upon the "Dual Persona"
Doctrine
The recent case of Percy v. Falcon Fabricators, Inc. was initially
brought by an employee, Percy, against her employer and others for
injuries sustained during the course and scope of her employment and
caused by an allegedly defective pressure cooker at a Kentucky Fried
Chicken (KFC) outlet.3" The trial court entered summary judgment for
the employer, KFC National Management Company, on the basis of
the exclusivity of remedy found in Florida's workers' compensation
law.3s
Although not found in the record before the trial court, on appeal,
the plaintiff contended that KFC National Management could be liable
to her in tort on the basis of the "dual persona" doctrine.3 7 The dual
persona doctrine provides that a corporate employer is liable in tort for
injuries caused to employees by a defective product manufactured by a
corporation which merges with the corporate employer after the prod-
uct is manufactured. The basis for the doctrine rests upon the theory
that a corporate successor is liable for the torts of the predecessor cor-
poration, because the predecessor's corporate liability is not extin-
34. Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
35. 584 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
36. Id.
37. Id. The dual persona doctrine has its origin in basically two sources. See
Billy v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 412 N.E.2d 934 (N.Y. 1980); 2A ARTHUR
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 72.80, 78.83 (1990).
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guished by reason of the merger. 88 The employee/plaintiff is then al-
lowed to circumvent the exclusivity of remedy provision of the
Workers' Compensation Act upon the theory that the employer is
viewed as having a second persona as a third party tortfeasor since a
separate corporation manufactured the product prior to the merger,
and the plaintiff had no employment relationship with the predecessor
corporation. As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in Celotex Corp.
v. Pickett, "'[w]e will not allow such an acquiring corporation to jetti-
son inchoate liabilities into a never-never-land of transcorporate
limbo.' "89 However, it is recognized by the dissents in Pickett that a
corporation should not be held vicariously liable for an act that it did
not commit or authorize.4 0
In line with these dissents, one court has rejected the dual persona
doctrine where the injury occurs following the corporate merger."' That
court reasoned that no tort liability can be transferred to the successor
corporation if the injury and damages occur after the merger since
there is no tort liability until there are damages."2 Florida also adheres
to the rule that there can be no tort liability until there is an injury.' 3
A conceptual problem with the reasoning underlying the dual persona
doctrine is that a predecessor corporation should not escape liability
due to merger with the employer corporation; also, potential plaintiffs
should still have a remedy even after the merger, so that employees
have a remedy against the successor corporation in the position of the
employer, under Florida workers' compensation law. Thus, the obliga-
tion for injuries is not jettisoned into "transcorporate limbo."
Currently, the Percy decision is still under appellate review as it
apparently conflicts with Roberson v. Nooter Corp. which declined to
apply the "dual capacity" doctrine as a vehicle for the plaintiff to sue
his employer for injuries sustained while using a product manufactured
by a subsidiary of the parent corporate employer." The Third District
Court of Appeal attempted to distinguish Roberson by stating that the
"dual capacity" doctrine and not the dual persona doctrine was re-
jected and that Roberson did not involve a corporate merger between
38. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1106(1)(c) (Supp. 1990).
39. 4.90 So. 2d 35, 38 (Fla. 1986) (quoting Wall v. Owens Corning Fiberglass
Corp., 602 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D. Tex. 1985)).
40. Id. at 39 (Overton and McDonald, JJ., dissenting).
41. Quick v. All Tell Mo., Inc., 694 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
42. Id.
43. McIntyre v. McCloud, 334 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
44. 459 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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the corporate employer and the manufacturer.' However, Roberson
did involve the merger between a manufacturer of a product and the
employer after the product was manufactured.'6 In addition, in a cor-
porate merger situation, there is little reason for a court to distinguish
between the terms "dual capacity" and dual persona because the term
"dual capacity" refers to the theory that an employer can be liable by
acting in another capacity, such as a landlord, vendor or products man-
ufacturer.'7 However, a merger occurred in both Roberson and Percy;
thus, the theory of liability in each case is really grounded upon the
dual persona doctrine. In any event, the Third District Court of Appeal
has added the dual persona doctrine to a growing list of exceptions to
the exclusivity of remedy found in Florida's workers' compensation law.
III. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT REEXAMINES THE
"DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY" DOCTRINE
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court reexamined Florida's dan-
gerous instrumentality doctrine in the course of determining whether
that doctrine applied to long-term lessors of motor vehicles.' 8 In Krae-
mer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.' and in Abdala v. World
Omni Leasing,"' the Florida Supreme Court was asked to revisit the
applicability of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine with a view to-
wards determining whether Florida Statute section 324.021(9)(b) ex-
empted long-term lessors of motor vehicles from tort liability under the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine if certain insurance and contract re-
quirements outlined in the statute are met. 1
45. Percy, 584 So. 2d at 18 n.3.
46. See Roberson, 459 So. 2d at 1156.
47. See generally 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION § 72.81(a) (1990). The "dual capacity" doctrine has been criticized by Larson as
subject to misapplication and abuse. Id.
48. The first decision that recognized the "dangerous instrumentality doctrine"
in Florida holds an owner of a motor vehicle liable for injuries caused by operators of
that vehicle with the owner's permission. Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 74 So.
975 (Fla. 1917).
49. 572 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1990)
50. 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991).
51. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (1987). The statute reads:
Owner/lessor. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes
or existing case law, the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehi-
cle for one year or longer which requires the lessee to obtain insurance
acceptable to the lessor which contains limits not less than $100,000.00/
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Initially, numerous intermediate appellate courts were confronted
with attacks upon this statute. Perry v. GMAC Leasing Corp. was the
first case where a district court considered such attacks and held that a
long-term lessor is exempt from liability under the dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine by reason of section 324.021(9)(b).5 The court
stated that the statute did not conflict with Florida's constitutional
right of access to the courts6" and that there was no right at common
law to sue long-term lessors. 4 Therefore, the court determined that the
plaintiff was not unconstitutionally denied a prior right to sue long-
term lessors."' Essentially, the Second District Court of Appeal analo-
gized the position of the long-term lessor, such as GMAC, with that of
a conditional vendor who held only legal title and had no beneficial use
of, or right of control over, the motor vehicle. Further, the court noted
that the statute did not place a cap on damages which limited the
plaintiff's right to recovery since the plaintiff had an unlimited right of
recovery against the lessee. 6 For these reasons, the court held that the
long-term lessor should not be exposed to liability under the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine.5
The Second District Court of Appeal reaffirmed Perry in Kraemer
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.58 In addition to reiterating the
basis for its decision in Perry, the Second District rejected the plain-
tiff's contention that there is no reason for distinguishing those cases
which hold a short term lessor of a vehicle liable under the dangerous
300,000.00 bodily injury liability and $50,000.00 property damage liabil-
ity, shall not be deemed the owner of said motor vehicle for the purpose of
determining financial responsibility for the operation of said motor vehicle
or for the acts of the operator in connection therewith; further, this para-
graph shall be applicable so long as the insurance required under such
lease agreement remains in effect.
Id.
52. 549 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
53. Id. at 681; see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
54. Perry, 549 So. 2d at 681.
55. Id.
56. Id. Indeed, section 324.021(9)(b) requires the highest minimum level of lia-
bility and property damage insurance mandated by the Florida Legislature. See FLA.
STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (1987).
57. Perry, 549 So. 2d at 682 (citing Palmer v. Evans, 81 So. 2d 635 (Fla.
1955)).
58. 556 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), quashed, 572 So. 2d 1363
(1990).
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instrumentality doctrine from long-term lessors." The Kraemer court
noted that in short term rental agreements, the owner retains much
more control over the use of the motor vehicle since the owner can
direct who can drive the automobile, where it is to be driven and where
the automobile must be returned. 60 Subsequently, numerous other in-
termediate appellate courts have followed the reasoning found in Perry
and Kraemer and have come to the same conclusion."1
Nevertheless, on review, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the
Second District's decision in Kraemer.62 The Florida Supreme Court
rejected the argument that long-term lessors should not be liable under
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by reason of the long-term les-
sor's lack of beneficial use and control over the vehicle.63 The court
noted that the same notion was rejected in Lynch v. Walker" and in
Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard," which involved a short term
lease. The supreme court reaffirmed that the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine has been applied with very few exceptions since the 1920s and
therefore, refused to adopt the requirement that a long-term lessor of a
motor vehicle must have beneficial use and control over the vehicle
before liability for its negligent use can attach under the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine.66
59. Kraemer, 556 So. 2d at 434. An excellent discussion of the distinction and
the interplay between the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and the legislatively man-
dated minimum financial responsibility requirements for operation of motor vehicle is
found in Judge Altenbernd's concurrence. See id. (Altenbernd, J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Raynor v. De La Nuez, 558 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990); Tsiknakis v. Volvo Finance N. Am., 566 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990); approved sub nom. Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 583 So. 2d 330
(1991); Folmar v. Young, 560 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), amended, 16
Fla. L. Weekly D1688 (4th Dist. Ct. App. June 26, 1991) (en banc).
62. 572 So. 2d 1363.
63. Id. at 1364-65.
64. 31 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1947).
65. 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959).
66. Kraemer, 572 So. 2d at 1365. It is interesting to note that although the Flor-
ida Supreme Court rejected the element of beneficial use and control over the vehicle
as a predicate to impose liability upon a long-term lessor for its use, the supreme
court's opinions issued during the same era as Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86
So. 629 (Fla. 1920), indicate that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was adopted
upon the ground that there must be an element of control by the owner over the driver.
In White v. Holmes, 103 So. 623, 624 (1925), the court reversed a finding that an
owner of an automobile for hire was vicariously liable for the operation of the motor
vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the owner did
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In Kraemer, the Florida Supreme Court further rejected the no-
tion that a lease is analogous to a conditional sales contract and thus,
that the long-term lessor is exempt from ownership liability under Flor-
ida Statute section 324.021(9)(a) (1986). e The court noted that the
lease in Kraemer imposed numerous restrictions on the use of the vehi-
cle, thus evincing that GMAC still retained control over it, unlike the
terms of a conditional sales agreement or mortgage. 68 Although the
court held the long-term lessor liable as an owner under the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine, the Florida Supreme Court left open the door
as to application of section 324.021(9)(b) which, by its enactment, the
legislature intended to exempt long-term lessors from ownership liabil-
ity under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine if certain statutory
contractual and insurance requirements are met.69 The Florida Su-
preme Court eventually closed the door opened by Kraemer in Abdala
v. World Omni Leasing, Inc. where the court confronted the conten-
tions that the statute unconstitutionally denied the rights to access to
the courts, equal protection, and due process."
not furnish the driver. Id. The court distinguished the holding in Southern Cotton Oil
Co. v. Anderson and explained: "The rules of liability stated in Anderson v. Southern
Cotton Oil Company, 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, (Fla. 1917) . . . and Southern Cotton
Oil Company v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 . . . have referenced to the facts of
those cases showing a relation of employer and employee or principal and agent."
White, 103 So. at 264. Indeed, the supreme court in Engelman v. Traeger, 136 So. 527
(1931), expressly rejected strict application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine
to owners unless there existed a principal/agent-master/servant relationship between
the owner and the driver. This rejection of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was
recognized by the Florida Supreme Court and overruled in Lynch v. Walker, 31 So. 2d
268, 27172 (1947).
67. Kraemer, 572 So. 2d at 1366. The pertinent Florida statute provides:
Owner/Lessor-a person who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle; or,
in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the condi-
tional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of
the condition stated in the agreement with an immediate right of posses-
sion vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor
of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee
or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purposes of this Chapter.
FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (1987). The supreme court failed to address section
324.021(9)(b) in Kraemer since neither party argued that it even applied. See 572 So.
2d at 1366 n.5.
68. Kraemer, 572 So. 2d at 1366.
69. Regarding legislative intent, see the excerpts of the legislative debate quoted
in Kraemer, 572 So. 2d at 1364-67.
70. 583 So. 2d 330, 332 (Fla. 1991).
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The court began by reiterating its holding in Kraemer that long-
term lessors are liable for the damages caused by their lessees under
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.7 1 Next, the court addressed
whether the statute which exempts long-term lessors from that liability
violates the constitutional provision guaranteeing access to Florida
courts.7 2 The supreme court rejected the argument that there had al-
ways been a right of action against persons standing in the position of
long-term lessors at common law in Florida.73 The court explained that
the legislature has stated that Florida's common law consists of the
common and statutory laws of England in existence on July 4th,
1776.7" No cause of action existed against lessors of instrumentalities
in England on July 4th, 1776 or even in Florida prior to Kraemer."'
The court thus found that the statute was not violative of Florida's
constitutional right of access to the courts.76
The Florida Supreme Court also rejected the claim that the stat-
ute violated the plaintiff's equal protection and due process rights."
The court stated that there is a rational basis for the legislation due to
the legislative recognition that a long-term lease is really an alternative
financing arrangement and that long-term lessors, similar to banks that
hold mortgages on vehicles, were properly excluded from the definition
of "owner" for purposes of determining vicarious responsibility for op-
eration on the motor vehicle. 78 Furthermore, the court disposed of the
petitioner's contention that the statute violated the right to equal pro-
tection by finding that plaintiffs that are injured most are not discrimi-
nated against7 9 since all plaintiffs, regardless of the severity of their
injuries, have the right to sue the long-term lessees in the event of
injury.80
As the progression of recent appellate decisions illustrate, the
71. Id. at 331-32.
72. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
73. Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 333.
74. Id. at 332; see FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1989).
75. Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 332; see Kraemer, 572 So. 2d 1363.
76. Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 333.
77. Id. at 333-34.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 334.
80. Id. The court failed to note that Florida Statute section 324.091(9)(b) re-
quires the highest minimum amount of liability and property damage coverage in the
state and which also provides a higher minimum source of recovery for injured plain-
tiffs. See FLA. STAT. § 324.091(9)(b) (1987).
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"dangerous instrumentality doctrine" is applied with the same vitality
as ever. However, the Florida Supreme Court has properly recognized
that long-term lessors are excepted from vicarious liability as "owners"
of motor vehicles, because they, like other financial institutions, are in-
stitutions through which the public may acquire automobiles and
should not be liable in tort for the operation of those vehicles.
IV. OFFERS AND DEMANDS FOR JUDGMENT OR SETTLEMENT
Numerous cases are weaving their way through Florida's appellate
courts involving the issues of how and whether the offer of or demand
for judgment provisions found in two Florida statutes81 and a rule of
civil procedure promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court 82 apply in a
given case. Both the statutes and the rule have as their goal the early
termination of civil litigation, including tort litigation, via settlement.
However, because both the Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court
have attempted to reach the goal of attaining rapid and reasonable set-
tlements, appellate courts have been confronted with the task of decid-
ing whether the statutes conflict with the supreme court's constitutional
rule making authority.8 3
The history of the offer of judgment rule began in 1972 when the
Florida Supreme Court added Rule 1.442 to the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.84 At this time, rule 1.442 was the same as rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.8 5 Both provided that the sanction of costs be
awarded against a party after an offer of judgment is made by a party
who rejects the offer if the judgment obtained was not more favorable
than the offer.86
81. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1986). Section 45.061 has
been effectively repealed by the Florida Legislature for all causes of action arising after
October 1, 1990. FLA. STAT. § 45.061(6) (1991). Section 768.79 is applicable only to
those causes of action arising October 1, 1990. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 n.l (1991).
82. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
83. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11(a). This constitutional provision reads: "The Su-
preme Court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts . . . ." Id.
84. In re The Florida Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So. 2d 21, 40-41 (Fla.
1972).
85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68. It is interesting to note that the Rules Committee at
the time of adopting Rule 1.442 could not foresee the extent of its use when it com-
mented: "The committee believes that it will not be used often based on information
about the equivalent Federal Rule." In re Florida Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265
So. 2d 21, 40-41 (Fla. 1972).
86. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442. The writer will not delve into, or compare, the various
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Thereafter in 1986, the legislature enacted Florida Statute section
768.7987 which allowed recovery of reasonable costs and attorney's fees
from the date of filing to demand for judgment.8 8 The statute provided
that if the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is twenty-five percent less
time limitations and the procedural complexities of the rule, or each statute, regarding
accepting or rejecting offers as it is beyond the scope of the survey. For an examination
of these aspects of the rule and statutes see Bruce J. Berman & Jamie A. Cole, New
Offer of Judgment Rule in Florida: What Does One Do Now? 64 FLA. B.J. 38 (1990)
87. Section 768.79 states:
(l)(a) In any action to which this part applies, if a defendant files an offer
of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the de-
fendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees
incurred from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment obtained by
the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall
set off such costs and attorney's fees against the award. Where such costs
and attorney's fees total more than the judgment, the court shall enter
judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for the amount of the
costs and fees, less the amount of the plaintiff's award. If a plaintiff files a
demand for judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30
days and the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 per-
cent greater than the offer, he shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs
and attorney's fees incurred from the date of the filing of the demand. If
rejected, neither an offer nor demand is admissible in subsequent litigation,
except for pursuing the penalties of this section.
(b) Any offer or demand for judgment made pursuant to this section shall
not be made until 60 days after filing of the suit, and may not be accepted
later than 10 days before the date of the trial.
(2)(a) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of
subsection (1), the court may, in its discretion, determine that an offer of
judgment was not made in good faith. In such case, the court may disallow
an award of costs and attorney's fees.
(b) When determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees
pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all other rele-
vant criteria, the following additional factors:
1. The then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim that was subject
to the offer.
2. The number and nature of offers made by the parties.
3. The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
4. Whether the offeror had unreasonably refused to furnish information
necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the offer.
5. Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions of
far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.
6. The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the offeror
reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be prolonged.
FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1986).
88. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(l)(a).
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than the original offer, costs and attorney's fees would be awarded
against the plaintiff." However, if the plaintiff recovered a judgment
twenty-five percent greater than the offer of judgment, then an award
of costs and attorney's fees is made against the defendant.90
Next in 1987, the legislature promulgated Florida Statute section
45.061 which again sought to impose sanctions for unreasonable rejec-
tion of an offer of settlement." The statute dictated that an award of
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1987). This statute provides:
(1) At any time more than 60 days after the service of a summons and
complaint on a party but not less than 60 days (or 45 days if it is a
counteroffer) before trial, any party may serve upon an adverse party a
written offer, which offer shall not be filed with the court and shall be
denominated as an offer under this section, to settle a claim for the money,
property, or relief specified in the offer and to enter into a stipulation dis-
missing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. The
offer shall remain open for 45 days unless withdrawn sooner by a writing
served on the offeree prior to acceptance by the offeree. An offer that is
neither withdrawn nor accepted within 45 days shall be deemed rejected.
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude the
making of a subsequent offer. Evidence of an offer is not admissible except
in proceedings to enforce a settlement or to determine sanctions under this
section.
(2) If, upon a motion by the offeror within 30 days after the entry of
judgment, the court determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably,
resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of litiga-
tion, it may impose an appropriate sanction upon the offeree. In making
this determination the court shall consider all of the relevant circum-
stances at the time of the rejection, including:
(a) Whether, upon specific request by the offeree, the offeror had unrea-
sonably refused to furnish information which was necessary to evaluate the
reasonableness of the offer.
(b) Whether the suit was in the nature of a 'test-case', presenting ques-
tions of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.
An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a de-
fendant if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent greater than the
offer rejected, and an offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably
rejected by a plaintiff if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent less
than the offer rejected. For the purposes of this section, the amount of the
judgment shall be the total amount of money damages awarded plus the
amount of costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the plaintiff or
counter-plaintiff prior to the making of the offer for which recovery is pro-
vided by operation of other provisions of Florida law.
(3) In determining the amount of any sanction to be imposed under this
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costs and attorney's fees be entered by the court if the offer was unrea-
sonably rejected. 2 The offer is presumed to have been unreasonably
rejected if the judgment entered was at least twenty-five percent less
than, or greater than, the offer, depending upon whether made by the
defendant or the plaintiff respectively."
Since both the Florida Supreme Court and the legislature spoke on
the same subject, the appellate courts have been faced with the task of
deciding whether any constitutional conflict exists and thus, whether
the statutes or the rule are constitutionally infirm. The Florida Su-
preme Court was first to address the issue of whether the statutes con-
flicted with rule 1.442 in The Florida Bar re: Amendment to Rules of
Civil Procedure (offer of judgment). 4 In this opinion, the court de-
clined to address the rule committee's concerns that the adoption of
Rule 1.442 by the Florida Supreme Court infringed upon the legisla-
ture's power to enact substantive law, and the court implicitly recog-
nized that it was not so clear that the sanction provided for in Rule
1.442 is solely procedural in nature. 5 The court also declined to rule on
the constitutionality of the substantive aspects of sections 768.79 and
section, the court shall award:
(a) The amount of the parties' costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, investigative expenses, expert witness fees, and other ex-
penses which relate to the preparation for trial, incurred after the making
of the offer of settlement; and
(b) The statutory rate of interest that could have been earned at the pre-
vailing statutory rate on the amount that a claimant offered to accept to
the extent that the interest is not otherwise included in the judgment.
The amount of any sanction imposed under this section against a plaintiff
shall be set off against any award to the plaintiff, and if such sanction is in
an amount in excess of the award to the plaintiff, judgment shall be en-
tered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in the amount of
the excess.
(4) This section shall not apply to any class action or shareholder deriva-
tive suit or to matters relating to dissolution of marriage, alimony, nonsup-
port, eminent domain, or child custody.
(5) Sanctions authorized under this section may be imposed notwithstand-
ing any limitation on recovery of costs or expenses which may be provided
by contract or in other provisions of Florida law. This section shall not be
construed to waive the limits of sovereign immunity set forth in s. 768.28.
FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1987); see also supra note 81 and accompanying text.
92. FLA. STAT. § 45.061(2)(b) (1987).
93. Id.
94. 550 So. 2d 442 (1989).
95. Id.
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45.061 in that non-adversarial setting. 96 However, the court held that
to the extent the statutes conflicted with the procedural aspects of the
rule, the statutes were unconstitutional. 97
The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Milton v. Leapai ruled that
section 45.061 unconstitutionally infringed upon the Florida Supreme
Court's rule making authority. 8 The Fifth District recognized the su-
preme court's prior holding that the statute's procedural aspects in-
fringed upon the court's rule making authority.9' The district court de-
termined that the substantive portion of the statute could not be
severed from the procedural aspects of the statute and declared the
statute unconstitutional in its entirety. 100 In rendering its decision, the
court attempted to distinguish the conflict created between its decision
and A.G. Edwards & Sons v. Davis, which held section 45.061 as sub-
stantive in its entirety. 10 1 However, it is interesting to note that in
Curenton v. Chester,102 a different panel of the Fifth District Court of
Appeal seemed to narrow Milton's holding by reading it to declare sec-
tion 45.061 unconstitutional only as to its procedural aspects.
The Fifth District was next confronted with the flip side of the
constitutional contention that section 45.061 infringed upon the Florida
Supreme Court's rule making authority. 10 3 In Reinhardt v. Bono, the
court was concerned that promulgation of Rule 1.442 may have en-
croached upon the legislature's constitutional authority to create sub-
stantive law,' 0 4 but declined to rule on the issue, holding only that the
Florida Supreme Court can consider the constitutionality of its own
96. Id. at 443.
97. Id. However, the Second District Court of Appeal has held section 45.061(2)
and (3) to be substantive in nature. See A.G. Edwards & Sons v. Davis, 559 So. 2d
235 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (following Richardson v. Honda Motor Co., 686 F.
Supp. 303 (M.D. Fla. 1988) and Hemmerle v. Bramalea, Inc., 547 So. 2d 203 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); see also Tarpon Springs Arcade Ltd. v. City of Tarpon
Springs, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D1924 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 26, 1991).
98. 562 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (currently on review in the
Florida Supreme Court).
99. 1d. at 807.
100. Id. at 807-08.
101. Id. at 808 (citing A.G. Edwards & Sons v. Davis, 559 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
102. 576 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
103. Reinhardt v. Bono, 564 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
104. Id. at 1234 (citing The Florida Bar re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Proce-
dure Rule 1.442 (Offer of Judgment), 550 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1989)).
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rules.'0 5
Additionally, section 768.79 has also failed to withstand a consti-
tutional attack brought in the First District Court of Appeal. 1'0 In
Hughes v. Goolsby, the First District expressly declared the statute un-
constitutional. 10 The court stated that the reasoning of the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in Milton when declaring section 45.061 uncon-
stitutional also applied to section 768.79.106 Thereafter, the court
certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of section 768.79's
constitutionality as being one of great public importance.109
In practice, section 45.061 is the only statute that sanctions both
defendants and plaintiffs for rejecting offers of settlement in truly mer-
itless cases; the defending party is allowed to recover its costs and at-
torney's fees where the plaintiff fails to obtain any judgment."10 A re-
quirement that a plaintiff recover a judgment before a defendant can
be awarded a sanction against the plaintiff has the effect of rewarding
plaintiffs bringing truly meritless claims but who still reject reasonable
offers of settlement or judgment. The purpose of the statute and the
rules is not furthered by this result."'
In any event, it will ultimately be up to the Florida Supreme
105. Id. at 1235.
106. See Hughes v. Goolsby, 578 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1989)).
109. Id.
110. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1987); see, e.g., Memorial Sales v. Pike, 579 So. 2d
778, 779-80 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that, unlike section 768.79(l)(a)
and Rule 1.442, section 45.061(2)(b) does not require that a judgment be entered in
favor of the plaintiff in order for that statute to apply). However, the Second District
Court of Appeal has recently followed those cases construing Rule 1.442 and section
768.79 requiring that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff must be recovered in order
for that rule to operate; therefore, a defendant is not entitled to sanctions pursuant to
section 45.061 unless the plaintiff recovers a judgment. Westover v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
581 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The Westover court erroneously followed
Kline v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 568 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2nd Dist.Ct.App. 1990),
which construed section 768.79 and Rule 1.442 to require that a judgment must be
recovered by the plaintiff since both expressly required that a judgment be entered in
favor of the plaintiff. Id.
111. It now appears that the legislature has acted to resolve any conflict created
by Florida Statute section 45.061 by effectively repealing section 45.061 and inserting
the curious provision, which apparently conflicts with the historical note and applies to
policies, or contracts, after the effective date of 10-1-90: "This section does not apply to
causes of action that accrue after the effective date of this act." FLA. STAT. § 45.061(6)
(Supp. 1990).
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Court and the legislature to harmonize, or eliminate the redundancy,
between the rule and the statutes. Regardless of whether by rule or by
statute, sanctions should be awarded to those who present meritless
claims or defenses and thereafter, unreasonably reject offers to compro-
mise cases requiring useless judicial labor be expended.
V. RECENT LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS THAT HAVE IMPACTED
UPON FLORIDA TORT LAW
The Florida legislature, by enacting Florida Statute section
768.095 codified the common law qualified privilege employers had
previously enjoyed when communicating their opinions about former
employees to potential employers.112 The statute provides that employ-
ers who disclose information about a prior employee pursuant to a re-
quest by the prospective employer are presumed to be acting in good
faith."' The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that the prior employer lacked good faith." In
order to rebut the presumption of good faith, the plaintiff must show
112. The text of section 768.095 reads:
768.095 Employer Immunity from Liability; Disclosure of information re-
garding former employees.
(1) An employer who discloses information about a former employee's job
performance to a prospective employer of the former employee upon re-
quest of the prospective employer or of the former employees presume to
be acting in good faith, and, unless lack of good faith is shown by clear
and convincing evidence, is immune from civil liability for such disclosure
or its consequences. For purposes of this section, the presumption of good
faith is rebutted upon a showing that the information disclosed by the for-
mer employer was knowingly false or deliberately misleading, was ren-
dered with malicious purpose, or violated any civil right of the former em-
ployee protected under Chapter 760.
(2) This act shall take effect July 1, 1991, or upon becoming a law, which-
ever occurs later, and shall apply to causes of action accruing after that
date.
FLA. STAT. § 768.095 (Supp. 1990).
Prior to enactment of section 768.096, case law recognized that an employer had a
qualified common law privilege to communicate their opinions of their former em-
ployee's performance to prospective employers. Boehm v. American Bankers Ins.
Group, Inc., 557 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Kellums v. Freight Sales
Centers, Inc., 467 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Biggs v. Cain, 406 So. 2d
1202 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
113. See FLA. STAT. § 768.095 (1989).
114. Id.
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that the employer disclosed information which the employer knew to be
false, deliberately misleading, was given with a malicious purpose or
which violated a right of the employee under Florida Statutes chapter
760 which prohibits discrimination against a person on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, handicap, or marital statutes. 116
The Florida legislature's enactment of section 768.095 clarified the
burden of proof allocated to litigants in actions brought by employees
against their former employers for untrue or inaccurate comments. Ad-
ditionally, the statute identifies what type of evidence is necessary for a
plaintiff to overcome the statutory presumption of good faith. These
evidentiary standards and burdens were absent from previous decisional
law which recognized that an employer has a qualified privilege to
communicate his opinions about an employee's performance to a pro-
spective employer.
The legislature has also taken action to exempt operators of a
closed course motorsport facility from liability to nonspectators. By en-
acting Florida Statute section 549.09,116 the legislature now allows an
115. See FLA. STAT. § 760.01 (1977).
116. 549.09 Motorsport nonspectator liability release.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Closed-course motorsport facility" means a closed-course speedway or
racetrack designed and intended for motor vehicle competition, exhibitions
of speed, or other forms of recreation involving the use of motor vehicles,
including motorcycles.
(b) "Nonspectator area" means a posted area within a closed-course
motorsport facility, admission to which is conditioned upon the signing of a
motorsport liability release, which is intended for event participants, and
which excludes the "spectator area" as defined in paragraph (c).
(c) "Spectator area" means a specified area within a closed-course motor-
sport facility intended for admission to the general public, whether or not
an admission price is charged, or to which admitted persons of the general
public have unrestricted access including the grandstands and other gen-
eral admission seating or viewing areas.
(d) "Posted" means a nonspectator area enclosed by a fence or wall at
least 6 feet high in all areas where nonparticipants might gain entrance,
and at least 3 feet high in any other areas, with signs having letters at
least 4 inches high restricting entry, including, but not limited to, signs
reading "Nonspectator Area," displayed not more than 500 feet from the
entrance to the nonspectator area and at each entrance to the nonspectator
area.
(e) "Negligence" means all forms of negligence, whether misfeasance or
nonfeasance and failure to warn against an existing or future dangerous
condition but does not include gross negligence, recklessness, or willful and
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operator of a closed course motorsport facility to require the signing of
a liability release form as a condition of entry into any nonspectator
part of the facility. The statute further sets forth the requirements re-
garding contents of the form.
VI. CONCLUSION
This survey year, Florida courts have further attenuated the al-
ready beleaguered statutory immunity previously afforded employers
by the Workers' Compensation Act. As an unintended counter balance,
the courts have eliminated a potential party defendant in automobile
negligence cases by recognizing the conditional statutory tort immunity
given long-term lessors by the legislature. It appears that this past sur-
vey year, through common law decisions, the courts have expanded av-
enues of recovery for plaintiffs. At the same time, the courts have also
respected legislative directives regarding limiting tort liability.
wanton conduct.
(f) "Motor vehicle" means an automobile, motorcycle, or any other vehicle
propelled by power, other than muscular power, used to transport persons
and which operates within the confines of a closed-course motorsports
track.
(g) "Nonspectators" means event participants who have signed a motor-
sport liability release.
(2) Any person who operates a closed-course motorsport facility may re-
quire, as a condition of admission to any nonspectator part of such facility,
the signing of a liability release form. The persons or entities owning, leas-
ing, or operating the facility or sponsoring or sanctioning the motorsport
event shall not be liable to a nonspectator, or his heirs, representative or
assigns, for negligence which proximately causes injury or property dam-
age to the nonspectator within a nonspectator area during the period of
time covered by the release.
(3) A motorsport liability release may be signed by more than one person
so long as the release form appears on each page, or side of a page, which
is signed. A motorsport liability release shall be printed in 8 point type or
larger.
Section 2. This act shall take effect October 1, 1991.
FLA. STAT. § 549.09 (1989).
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WHEREAS, the [Florida] Legislature finds that there is a finan-
cial crisis in the workers' compensation insurance industry, causing
severe economic problems for Florida's business community and
adversely impacting Florida's ability to attract new business devel-
opment to the state. .. .1
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the above statement, it is little wonder that the Florida Leg-
islature set out to enact a comprehensive change in the workers' com-
pensation law in this state. Actually, the groundswell for change had
been building in the late 1980s, particularly from various business
groups which claimed that workers' compensation insurance coverage
for their employees was becoming extremely cost prohibitive. The pro-
position that escalating workers' compensation costs were a problem
was supported by various sources referred to by the Legislature. For
example, the Florida Economic Growth and International Development
Commission, created in 1988, concluded that Florida's reputation as a
high cost workers' compensation state inhibited economic growth.2
Also, the Florida Chamber of Commerce published a report concluding
that workers' compensation costs were a significant negative factor on
the state's business climate and urged reforms in the worker's compen-
sation laws which had placed Florida in a competitive disadvantage vis-
a-vis other states.' Additionally, a joint legislative committee found
that Florida had experienced one of the highest five-year period pre-
mium increases in the country for workers' compensation insurance. In-
surance rates were fifty-four percent higher than the national average,
and seventy-five percent higher than other southeastern states." This
same legislative report also focused on the medical and indemnity bene-
fits paid to employees under Florida's workers' compensation law and
concluded those benefits were substantially higher than the national av-
erage.' Specifically, medical benefits were forty-two percent higher in
Florida than the national average and thirty-eight percent higher than
1. Comprehensive Economic Dev. Act of 1990, ch. 90-201, 1990 Fla. Laws 894,
899 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 440 (Supp. 1990)).
2. Id. at 897-98.
3. Id. at 898.
4. Id. at 899.
5. Comprehensive Economic Dev. Act of 1990, ch. 90-201, 1990 Fla. Laws 894,
899 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 440 (Supp. 1990)).
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the southern state average.6 Likewise, indemnity benefits were thirty-
one percent higher than the national average and sixty percent higher
than the southern state average.7
Legislative reform actually began in 1989 with several significant
changes in the existing law.8 Some of these changes included: the im-
plementation of a work place drug testing policy;8 a requirement that
all construction industry employers having one or more employees
carry workers' compensation coverage; 10 and, changing the threshold
for wage loss benefits to include not just a permanent impairment rat-
ing, but also the need for a work-related physical restriction." Further-
more, bad faith was eliminated and replaced with a modified twenty-
one day rule for establishing entitlement of an attorney's fee by the
injured worker's attorney to be paid by the employer/carrier. 12 Consid-
erable case law has developed since the adoption of the bad faith stan-
dard in 1989, and even technical omissions or commissions of an em-
ployer/carrier were found to constitute bad faith. Thus, finding bad
faith combined with a demonstrated economic loss to the injured
worker provided the basis for an award of attorney's fees to the injured
worker's attorney which was to be paid by the employer/carrier.' 3
Case decisions pointed out that the workers' compensation system
was intended to be self-executing and carriers had an affirmative duty
to timely investigate and provide needed benefits to injured workers."
Rehabilitation services under section 440.49 of the Florida Statutes
were also eliminated and replaced with something called training and
education.' 5 While the rehabilitation services necessary to restore the
injured worker to suitable gainful employment had previously been the
responsibility of the employer/carrier, training and education was to be
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(e)2 (1989).
9. Ft.A. STAT. § 440.09(6)(a) (1989).
10. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(14)(b)2 (1989).
11. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)1 (1989).
12. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(3)(b) (1989).
13. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(3)(b) (1987).
14. King Motor Co. v. Parisi, 445 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Holiday Care Center v. Scriven, 418 So. 2d 322, 326 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Florida Erection Serv., Inc. v. McDonald, 395 So. 2d 203, 209 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
15. See Comprehensive Economic Dev. Act of 1990, ch. 90-201, sec. 40, 1990
Fla. Laws 894, 980 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.49 (Supp. 1990)).
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provided by the Division of Workers' Compensation, unless voluntarily
offered by the employer or carrier.16
II. THE COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
1990
The new Comprehensive Economic Development Act of 1990 (the
Act), affected the entire workers' compensation system including the
amount of benefits payable, various medical provisions, and appellate
procedure. The following is a summary of the major changes made by
the Legislature in 1990.
A. Definitions
In response to a growing concern for the increase in claims for
stress-related injuries in the work place, the definition of "accident"
was amended.1 7 Specifically, "[a] mental or nervous injury due to
stress, fright or excitement only. . .[is] deemed not to be an injury by
accident arising out of the employment."1 8 The definition of "em-
ployee" was broadened to include partners, sole proprietors, 19 and cor-
porate officers of companies actively engaged in the construction indus-
try.20 This further tightened the coverage requirements which were
initially directed at the construction industry in 1989.21 Prior to that,
the term "employment" included all private employments in which
three or more employees were employed by the same employer. How-
ever, effective October 1, 1989, an exception to this general rule was
carved out for the construction industry providing that all construction-
related private employments having one or more employees, who were
employed by the same employer, were included under the employment
definition. 22 The 1990 law also provided that the term "employee" ex-
cluded an independent contractor not subject to the control and direc-
tion of the employer as to actual conduct. 23 However, the term "em-
ployee" was also amended to include the construction industry worker
16. Id.
17. See FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1) (Supp. 1990).
18. Id.
19. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.02(13)(c), (d)(4) (Supp. 1990).
20. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(13)(d)4 (Supp. 1990).
21. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(14)(b)(2) (1989).
22. Id.
23. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(13)(d)1 (Supp. 1990).
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who was otherwise an independent contractor. 4
The definition of "wages" was revised to eliminate many fringe
benefits included in the average weekly wage calculation (AWW).15
Previously, a substantial body of case law developed regarding what
constituted fringe benefits. 6 In practice, the failure of the employer/
carrier to include fringe benefits was often based on a fair market re-
placement basis. Thereafter, the reasonable value of fringe benefits was
defined as the actual cost to the employer. Effective July 1, 1990, the
only fringe benefits to be included in the AWW are health insurance,
the reasonable value of permanent year-round residential housing pro-
vided to an employee, and housing for migrant workers unless provided
after the time of injury.27 This amendment eliminated a multitude of
previously defined fringe benefits from the AWW calculation including
life, disability and accident insurance,2 8 uniforms, 9 vacation,30 vested
pension plans,"1 parking,32 and meals.3
Two other major changes in the wages definition involve gratuities
and concurrent employment. In practice, claims of many service-ori-
ented employees, such as bartenders and waitresses, commonly involve
litigation over the amount of tips to be included in the AWW calcula-
tion. Employers would "look the other way" when their service person-
nel (who are usually paid a minimum hourly wage) under-reported
tips, but would vigorously protest when those same employees-when
injured on the job-sought workers' compensation benefits based on the
full amount of tips earned. Inclusion of tips obviously could make a
significant difference in an employee's compensation benefits. The In-
dustrial Relations Commission, and later Florida's First District Court
of Appeal, have indicated disapproval of an employer's indifference to
24. Id.
25. See Comprehensive Economic Dev. Act of 1990, ch. 90-201, sec. 9, 1990 Fla.
Laws 894, 908 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.02(24) (Supp. 1990)).
26. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
27. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(24) (Supp. 1990).
28. Mobley v. Winter Park Memorial Hosp., 471 So. 2d 591, 593 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
29. Rhaney v. Dobbs House, Inc., 415 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
30. Vida Appliances, Inc. v. Gates, 416 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
31. Tampa v. Bartley, 413 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
32. Rhaney, 415 So. 2d at 1278.
33. Id.
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accurate tip reporting through decisions which hold that an injured
worker's unreported tips would be included in the AWW calculation if
there was evidence suggesting the employer knew tips were being re-
ceived but not reported. 4 However, unreported tips would not be in-
cluded in the AWW calculation if the employer had provided a reason-
able reporting system with which the employee had failed to follow. 35
The 1990 amendment codified the notion that gratuities are considered
wages only "to the extent reported to the employer in writing as taxa-
ble income."3"
Perhaps one of the more controversial changes in the 1990 amend-
ment involved the elimination of wages earned in concurrent employ-
ment. Previously, an injured worker having two jobs was entitled to be
compensated on the basis of wages earned at both jobs, assuming that
the injured worker was unable to work at either job following the in-
jury and the concurrent employment was of a type covered under the
Act. 37 Under the new definition, wages now include only those wages
earned on the job where the injury occurred and does not include wages
from concurrent employment. 38 The only exception to this rule is the
concurrent earnings of a volunteer firefighter.39
B. Coverage
The Legislature continued to address and refine the law relative to
the interrelationship between alcohol or drug abuse and injuries in the
work place. In section 440.102(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes, "drug"
was defined as "alcohol, including distilled spirits, wine, malt bever-
ages, and intoxicating liquors; amphetamines; cannabinoids; cocaine;
phencyclidine (PCP); hallucinogens; methaqualone; opiates; barbitu-
rates; benzodiazepines; synthetic narcotics; designer drugs; or a metab-
olite of the substances listed."140 The Act continued to provide that inju-
ries "occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee" or the
influence of narcotic drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants "not pre-
scribed by a physician" that impaired the employee's normal faculties
34. See, e.g., Hanks v. Tom Brantley's Tire Broker, 500 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
35. Id.
36. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(24) (Supp. 1990).
37. See FLA. STAT. § 440.02(23) (1989).
38. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(24) (Supp. 1990).
39. Id.
40. FLA. STAT. § 440.102(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
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were not compensable. 1 It is legally presumed that the injury was pri-
marily occasioned by intoxication given evidence of a .10 percent (or
greater) blood alcohol level or influence of a drug upon a positive test
confirmation.4 Where the employer does not have a drug-free work
place program, the presumption may be rebutted by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that intoxication or drug influence did not contribute to
the injury.4 3 Furthermore, if before the accident, "the employer had
actual knowledge of and expressly acquiesced in the employee's pres-
ence at the workplace while under the influence," the presumption is
inapplicable.
As initially provided in the 1989 law,"" the employer who has
"reason to suspect" that an injury was primarily occasioned by intoxi-
cation or use of any drug may require the employee to submit to a test
for the detection of any or all drugs."" Seeking to provide employers
with some guidance, the legislature defined "[r]easonable suspicion
drug testing" as that based on a belief that the employee has or is
using drugs in violation of the work place policy.46 Such belief is to be
made in light of specific facts and inferences drawn therefrom.47 These
facts and inferences may be based on:
(1) direct observation of drug use or the associated physical symp-
toms; (2) abnormal or erratic behavior or significant work perform-
ance deterioration; (3) report of drug use by reliable and credible
source independently corroborated; (4) evidence of drug test tam-
pering with current employer; (5) information that employee has
caused or contributed to accident; and, (6) evidence that employee
has used, possessed, sold, solicited, or transferred drugs while work-
ing or while on the employer's premises or while operating the em-
ployer's vehicle, machinery or equipment.48
If the employee refuses to submit to a test for nonprescription con-
trolled substances or alcohol, it is presumed, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence otherwise, that the injury was primarily occasioned
41. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(3) (Supp. 1990).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(6)(a) (1989).
45. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(7)(a) (Supp. 1990).
46. FLA. STAT. § 440.102(1)(i) (Supp. 1990).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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by alcohol or a nonprescription controlled substance49 and benefits are
not payable.50
The 1989 law provided for a twenty-five percent reduction of in-
demnity benefits where the employee's injury was caused by a "willful"
refusal to use a safety appliance provided by the employer.51 Presuma-
bly in an effort to lessen the employer/carrier's burden of proof to sup-
port this partial defense, the 1990 law substituted the term "knowing"
for willful.52
The 1990 legislation also sought to address the compensability is-
sue in several categories which commonly arise5" and have given impe-
tus to their own sub-body of case law. These cases have usually turned
on the specific facts presented and have produced widely recognized
rules of compensability.
1. Recreational and Social Activities
Injuries by accident occurring at recreational or social activities
are not compensable unless the activity was an expressly required inci-
dent of employment and produced a substantial and direct benefit to
the employer beyond a general improvement in employee health and
morale.5 ' This provision is a codification of a three-prong test previ-
ously adopted by Florida's First District Court of Appeal in Brockman
v. City of Dania.55
2. Going or Coming
The general rule that an injury occurring while going to or coming
from work does not arise out of, and in the course of, employment now
applies even where the employer has provided some means of transpor-
tation.56 This is contrary to previous decisional law providing generally
that employer-provided transportation, incident to the employment con-
tract, is the exception to the going and coming rule.57 However, an em-
49. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(7)(b) (Supp. 1990).
50. See FLA. STAT. 440.09(3) (Supp. 1990).
51. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(4) (1989).
52. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(4) (Supp. 1990).
53. See generally FLA. STAT. § 440.092 (Supp. 1990).
54. FLA. STAT. § 440.092(1) (Supp. 1990).
55. 428 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
56. FLA. STAT. § 440.092 (Supp. 1990).
57. See, e.g., Martinez v. A & D Elec. Contractors, 510 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st
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ployee's injuries which occur going to or coming from work in em-
ployer-provided transportation remain compensable if, at the time of
the accident, the employee was "engaged in a special errand or mission
for the employer."5
3. Deviation from Employment
Injuries occurring while an employee has deviated from the course
of employment, including the leaving of the work premises, are not
compensable unless the deviation was either expressly approved by the
employer or in response to an emergency and designed to save life or
property ."
4. Traveling Employee
In an effort to limit what had become a general rule that injuries
occurring to traveling employees were nearly always compensable, the
new law provides that the traveling employee must be actively engaged
in the employment duties including travel to and from the place where
the duties "are to be performed and other activities reasonably required
by the travel status."" While it remains unclear how "other activities
reasonably required"61 will be interpreted, this amendment was clearly
aimed at cases where traveling employees have sustained what were
held to be compensable injuries in activities seemingly far removed
from the employment and more of a personal nature.
In Gray v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,62 a flight attendant sustained a
broken nose in a pickup basketball game at a YMCA located near the
hotel where the attendent was staying.6 3 The incident occurred on a
two-day layover. 6 ' Citing Larsen's treatise, on workers' compensation
law, the court noted that the "traveling employees" rule was applicable
and stated that:
"Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer's
Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 519 So. 2d 987 (1987).
58. FLA. STAT. § 440.092 (Supp. 1990).
59. FLA. STAT. § 440.092(3) (Supp. 1990).
60. FLA. STAT. § 440.092(4) (Supp. 1990).
61. Id.
62. 475 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
63. Id. at 1289.
64. Id.
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premises are held . . . to be within the course of their employment
continuously during the trip, except when a distinct [departure] on
a personal errand is shown. Thus, injuries arising out of the neces-
sity of sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants away from home
are usually held compensable." 65
In a two-to-one decision, the appellate court reversed a finding of
noncompensability and held that exercise (in the form of basketball)
was necessary as an activity reasonably required for the employee's
personal health and comfort. 66
In a second case, Garver v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,6 7 again involv-
ing a flight attendant, the employee was injured in a motor vehicle ac-
cident during an extended layover."8 With her morning return flight
canceled and rescheduled for midnight, the employee arranged lunch
with a friend who lived in the area.69 After lunch, they started out for
the friend's house about twenty miles from the restaurant.7 0 After trav-
eling about five miles, the accident occurred.7 1 Announcing a new test
for a traveling employee's injury sustained while not actively perform-
ing employment duties, the appellate court held such injury is compen-
sable "'if the injury arises out of a risk which is reasonably incidental
to the conditions and circumstances of employment.' ",72 Interestingly,
this was also a two-to-one decision. A thoughtful dissent was written by
the same judge who earlier had dissented in Gray.3
C. Medical Services and Supplies
Several of the 1990 changes under the medical provision of the
Act had as their impetus the sometimes truly adversarial nature of the
system. An "[i]ndependent medical examination" was defined as an ob-
jective medical or chiropractic evaluation of an injured employee's
65. Id. (quoting ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 25.00 (1979)).
66. Id. at 1290.
67. 553 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
68. Id. at 264.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Garver, 553 So. 2d at 267 (quoting Cavalcante v. Lockheed Elec. Co., 204
A.2d 621, 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1964)).
73. See id. at 268-69 (Nimmons, J., dissenting); Gray, 475 So. 2d 1290 (Nim-
mons, J., dissenting without opinion).
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medical condition and work status.7 4 In apparent response to the ero-
sion of' the employer/carrier's traditional right to authorize medical
care, the new law provides that referrals may not be made by health
care providers to other providers or facilities without prior authoriza-
tion from the carrier or self-insured employer, except in emergency
situations.75
Previously, the employer/carrier's right to seek an independent
medical examination (IME) was grounded in section 440.25(6) of the
Florida Statutes, which provided that the physician conducting such an
examination was to be either designated, or at least approved, by the
judge of compensation claims (JCC).Y The 1990 Act gave the em-
ployer/carrier the right to schedule an IME with a doctor of its own
choice without court approval in the following situations:
(1) [W]hen the authorized doctor fails to provide medical reports;
(2) to determine if overutilization by a health -care provider has
occurred; (3) to determine if a change of doctors is necessary; or,
(4) to determine if treatment is necessary or where the employee
appears not to be making appropriate progress.7
In the absence of agreement between the parties, the doctor conducting
the IME shall not become the treating physician. 8 It should be noted
that some doctors who conduct IMEs refuse to become the treating
physician even where the parties are in agreement.
The new law has also sought to address the procedure to be fol-
lowed where the employer/carrier wishes to deauthorize a previously-
authorized treating physician. 9 Previously, the statute provided that a
carrier was required to seek an order of deauthorization from the
JCC.80 Furthermore, in Cal Kovens Construction v. Lott,81 the First
District Court of Appeal made it clear that once a satisfactory doctor-
patient relationship had been established, the employer/carrier seeking
to deauthorize that doctor must obtain an order approving the
74. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(c) (Supp. 1990).
75. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(a) (Supp. 1990).
76. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(6) (1989).
77. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(b) (Supp. 1990).
78. Id.
79. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(c) (Supp. 1990).
80. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(a) (1989).
81. 473 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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deauthorization and designation of a newly-authorized physician. 2 The
1990 Act provided for peer review83 and utilization review8" whereby
treatment by a medical care provider could be reviewed by a panel of
physicians having the same specialty.88 If it was determined that overu-
tilization had occurred, the medical care provider could be
deauthorized without a judge's order provided alternative medical care
was offered.88 If there is a finding of overutilization, the division of
workers' compensation may order the doctor to show cause why he or
she should not make repayment.87 The law also continued to provide
that a physician was barred from payment under the Act upon three
findings of overutilization. 88
The subject of attendant care also continued to receive the legisla-
ture's attention. Without a doubt, awards of attendant care had be-
come increasingly frequent during the late 1980s. In 1988, the Act had
been amended to provide that nonprofessional attendant or custodial
care provided by a family member was to be reimbursed at the federal
minimum wage if the family member was unemployed.89 If the family
member chose to leave employment in order to provide the attendant/
custodial care, he or she would be paid at a rate equal to his or her
hourly wage at the previous employment which could not exceed the
customary hourly rate for such care in the community.90 "Family
member" was also defined as "spouse, father, mother, brother, sister,
child, grandchild, father-in-law, mother-in-law, aunt or uncle."'"
In 1989, the Act was again amended to limit the compensation of
family members for nonprofessional attendant/custodial care to no
more than twelve hours per day.9 2 In 1990, seeking to further define
the parameters of attendant care reimbursement, the Legislature indi-
cated that both professional and nonprofessional custodial care must be
performed at a physician's direction and control.93 Attendant or custo-
82. Id. at 252-54.
83. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(f) (Supp. 1990).
84. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(i) (Supp. 1990).
85. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.13(1)(f)-(i) (Supp. 1990).
86. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(c) (Supp. 1990).
87. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(d) (Supp. 1990).
88. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(c) (Supp. 1990).
89. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(e)1 (1989).
90. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(e)2 (1989).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
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dial care was defined as care usually rendered by trained professionals
and beyond the scope of household duties. 94 The doctor must state that
the home or custodial care is required because of the compensable acci-
dent and must describe the nature and extent of the duties to be per-
formed with a reasonable degree of particularity. 8 Codifying existing
case law, family members can be reimbursed only for care which goes
beyond the scope of routine household duties normally performed as a
gratuity.96
Another one of the more controversial provisions of the 1990 Act
involved the obligation of the court to order an IME under any of the
following circumstances:
where there is disagreement in opinions of medical providers; where
two providers have determined there is no medical evidence sup-
porting the employee's complaints or the need for further medical
treatment; or, where the providers agree that the employee is able
to work. 97
If one or more of these situations exist, the judge must, within fifteen
days upon the written request of any party, order an IME to be per-
formed by a doctor chosen from a list promulgated by the division of
workers compensation. 8 Under this so-called "Super-Doc" feature of
the statute, the opinion of the independent medical examiner is pre-
sumed correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence otherwise.19
The independent medical examiner's report is to be sent within thirty
days from the order providing for the examination.100 All indemnity
benefits "shall terminate" during any period the employee fails to coop-
erate in performance of the independent medical exam. 101
A final change in the medical service provision of the Act ad-
dressed the expert witness fee charged by health care providers to give
deposition testimony. 02 Typically, most medical evidence is offered at
the merits hearing through deposition. Prior to this amendment, expert
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(i)3.a (Supp. 1990).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(i)3.c (Supp. 1990).
101. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(i)3.a (Supp. 1990).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(k) (Supp. 1990).
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fees charged by providers ranged from $150 to $500 and occasionally
more. The amendment provides that the expert witness fee cannot ex-
ceed $200.03
Initially, this fee cap created some problems, but as time has
passed, it has become less so. While the legislation had a commendable
purpose of attempting to provide some control and uniformity on medi-
cal expert witness fees, it may have contributed to the undesirable
trend of an increasing number of health care providers refusing to treat
workers' compensation patients as a result of the reimbursement for
their services being reduced according to a maximum fee schedule. The
dwindling availability of medical care providers to treat injured em-
ployees is becoming an increasing problem in everyday practice.
D. Compensation for Disability
1. Permanent Total Disability
In order to establish entitlement to permanent total disability
(PTD) benefits, the employee has the burden to show an inability to
perform even light work on an uninterrupted basis as a result of physi-
cal limitations. A 1990 amendment added a geographical component to
this burden of proof providing that the employee must demonstrate an
inability to do light work which is available within a 100-mile radius of
the injured employee's home.104
2. Temporary Total Disability
The length of time for which temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits may be received was reduced from 350 weeks to 260 weeks. 105
Catastrophic temporary total disability benefits (i.e. the increased ben-
efit for the severely injured) were eliminated for the permanent and
total loss of use of an arm, leg, hand or foot because of organic damage
to the nervous system.'06
3. Permanent Impairment and Wage-Loss Benefits
The legislature provided that a three-member panel and the divi-
103. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(k) (Supp. 1990).
104. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(1)(b) (Supp. 1990).
105. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(2)(a) (Supp. 1990).
106. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(2)(b) (Supp. 1990).
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sion were to establish a uniform disability rating guide.1 07 For post-July
1, 1990 injuries, the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry Dis-
ability Schedule is to be used until the new rating guide is developed. 1 8
Retaining the language of the 1989 amendment, an injured worker
with a permanent impairment and one or more work-related physical
restrictions may be entitled to wage-loss benefits." 9
The wage-loss formula was amended to reduce the amount of ben-
efits payable.'10 Additionally, the legislature indicated that wage-loss
forms and job search reports must be filed with the carrier within four-
teen days after the time benefits are due."' Failure to timely file the
forms and job search reports, demonstrating that the employee made a
minimum of five job searches, will result in no payment of benefits for
that respective period of time."'
Also, a significant change in wage-loss entitlement was made.
Prior to July 1, 1990, an injured employee with a permanent impair-
ment and work-related physical restriction could receive wage-loss ben-
efits for up to 525 weeks after reaching maximum medical impair-
ment." ' Under the new law, the length of time for which wage-loss
benefits can be received is tied directly to the impairment rating as-
signed." 4 For example, an employee with a three percent permanent
impairment is eligible for wage-loss benefits for up to twenty-six
weeks."' At the other end of the spectrum, an employee with a perma-
nency of twenty-four percent or greater is entitled to the maximum
length of wage-loss benefits, which is 364 weeks."' In addition to re-
ducing the number of weeks for which wage-loss benefits could be re-
ceived, a number of defenses were also codified."" The right to wage
loss benefits ends if, in a two-year period, there are three occurrences of
the following:
(1) the employee voluntarily terminates employment for reasons
107. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(a)3 (Supp. 1990).
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)1 (Supp. 1990).
110. Id.
111. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)2 (Supp. 1990).
112. Id.
113. See FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)4.c (1989).
114. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)4.d (Supp. 1990).
115. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)4.d.(I) (Supp. 1990).
116. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)4.d.(V) (Supp. 1990).
117. See FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)5 (Supp. 1990).
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unrelated to the injury; (2) refusal of suitable employment within
the employee's ability; (3) termination from employment due to the
employee's own misconduct as statutorily defined; and, (4) the em-
ployee voluntarily limits his or her own income.118
Each of the three occurrences must arise in different bi-weekly peri-
ods.119 Also, with each occurrence, the employee may be disqualified
from receiving workers' compensation benefits for three bi-weekly
periods. 120
The 1990 Act also provided for the termination of wage-loss bene-
fits if the employee is convicted of criminal violations ranging from sec-
ond degree misdemeanors to capital felonies.12 1 "Convicted" is defined
as "adjudication of guilt, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere" or "a jury
verdict of guilty when . . . adjudication is withheld" and probation is
imposed.12 2 Wage-loss benefits are also terminated if the employee is
imprisoned for motor vehicle/uniform traffic control offenses thereby
affecting the ability to perform his usual or other appropriate
employment.12 3
4. Temporary Partial Disability
As with wage-loss benefits, the formula for temporary partial disa-
bility was changed resulting in reduced benefits.12'
5. Fraud
Another major change in the 1990 Act involved the defense of
fraud in the hiring process .12 Theretofore, the landmark case, Martin
v. Carpenter,126 provided a three-prong test which the employer/carrier
had to satisfy in order to defeat compensability: 1) the employee know-
ingly misrepresented the existence of the previous condition; 2) the em-
ployer relied on the misrepresentation thereby hiring the employee; and
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)6 (Supp. 1990).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(4) (Supp. 1990).
125. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(a) (Supp. 1990).
126. 132 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1961).
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3) that such reliance resulted in consequent injury to the employer. 12 7
However, benefits are now payable for an aggravation or accelera-
tion of a preexisting condition unless the employee falsely represents in
writing that he or she was not previously disabled or received compen-
sation because of such previous disability, impairment, anomaly or dis-
ease. 128 Employer reliance on the misrepresentation of a preexisting
condition is no longer required.
E. Death Benefits
In 1989, the Act was amended to eliminate the termination of
death benefits to a deceased employee's spouse who remarries. Pursu-
ant to the 1990 amendment, the spouse who remarries is entitled to a
lump sum payment equal to twenty-six weeks of compensation at the
rate of fifty percent of the average weekly wage.1 29 If such lump sum
causes the $100,000.00 benefits limitation to be exceeded, the spouse
who remarries shall receive the remaining balance.130
F. Claim Procedure
Claims for benefits under the 1990 Act must be dismissed if they
lack the required specificity. 131 The legislative intent is the avoidance of
needless litigation or delay in payment of benefits by requiring claim-
ants to provide sufficiently detailed information to the employer/carrier
so a timely and informed decision on the benefits requested can be
made. However, if the claimant is unrepresented, the division shall pro-
vide the necessary assistance in filing a claim that conforms to the
specificity requirements.132
Emphasizing the role of the division in cases of disputed claims,
the legislature has indicated the division is to take a proactive position
in preventing and resolving disputes.133 If after investigation, the divi-
sion determines that the claimed benefits are due, it shall assist the
employee in securing those benefits.3 4 If the division determines the
127. Id. at 406.
128. FLA. STAT. 440.15(5)(a) (Supp. 1990).
129. FLA. STAT. § 440.16(1)(b)2 (Supp. 1990).
130. Id.
131. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(1)(e)4 (Supp. 1990).
132. Id.
133. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(1)(h) (Supp. 1990).
134. [d.
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claimed benefits are not due and owing, the division must inform the
employee accordingly."3 5 The division decision is not res judicata, but
may be considered by the JCC or mediator.13 6
G. Payment of Compensation
Prior to July 1, 1990, lump sum settlements under the Act took
only two forms. The first, under Florida Statutes section 440.20(12)(a)
permitted the employer/carrier's release of liability for all benefits
other than future medical care, training and education. This form of
settlement could only occur where the employee was at least three
months past maximum medical improvement.1 37 The second form of
pre-July 1, 1990 settlement was pursuant to Florida Statutes section
440.20(12)(b). This settlement, commonly referred to as a total lump
sum washout, provided for a full discharge of the employer's liability in
cases where it was denied that a compensable accident or injury had
occurred and a written notice to controvert had been filed.138 Interest-
ingly, this form of settlement since the July 1989 amendment specifi-
cally excluded discharge from training and education expenses.13
There is now a third form of settlement available under limited
circumstances which is a true total washout.1 40 The requirements are
that the employee has: 1) reached MMI; 2) a five percent or less per-
manent impairment rating; and 3) not received medical treatment for
at least three months.141
The amount of settlement is determined by a statutory formula
consisting of the compensation rate multiplied by three producing a
product which is then multiplied by the permanent impairment rat-
ing." 2 This form of settlement mandates that the claimant be responsi-
ble for payment of his or her own attorney's fees and fully discharges
the employer/carrier for all benefits including medical expenses, train-
ing and education. 4 3
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(12)(a) (Supp. 1990).
138. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(12)(b) (Supp. 1990).
139. Id.
140. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(12)(c) (Supp. 1990).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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H. Claims Procedure and Hearing Requests
1. Mediation
The 1990 Act retained the provision for mediation, while eliminat-
ing a major objection to the original 1989 legislation involving attorney
participation. In its initial form, neither party could be represented at
the mediation. Now, the employer/carrier may be represented if the
employee has counsel. " '
2. Pre-Trial Hearings
A pre-trial hearing is to be held between thirty and sixty days af-
ter the request for an application for a hearing has been filed. 1"5 All
parties shall be given at least fifteen days notice of the pre-trial hear-
ing. 1" A final hearing is to be set at the pre-trial hearing which allows,
absent consent of the parties otherwise, at least ninety days to conduct
discovery.14 7 Final hearings are to be held within 120 days after the
pre-trial hearing." 8
I. Attorney's Fees
In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the JCC is to consider
only benefits the attorney was responsible for securing when applying
the statutory formula. 49 Under the 1990 Act, the term "benefits se-
cured" does not include future medical benefits provided beyond five
years after the date the claim was filed.1 50 This obviously has the po-
tential to limit the amount of attorney's fees awarded in connection
with successful prosecution of a claim for medical benefits for which
the evidence supports the need for lifetime medical care.
J. Self-Insurers
An extensive provision was included in the 1990 Act relative to
144. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(3)(b)1 (Supp. 1990).
145. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(3)(b)3 (Supp. 1990).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(2) (Supp. 1990).
150. Id.
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employers seeking to be self-insured for workers' compensation pur-
poses.16' The employer may be required to post an indemnity bond or
securities to procure payment of compensation. A company seeking
to be self-insured must have trained personnel who can ensure that
benefits are provided and a safe working place available.6 3 The self-
insured employer must also carry reinsurance for actuarial stability.'6 '
If the employer fails to maintain the required financial security, the
authority to self-insure shall be revoked unless a certified opinion of an
independent actuary estimating future compensation benefits is pro-
vided and a security deposit is made. " Failure to do so will result in
revocation of the employer's authorization to self-insure. 56 At that
point, the employer must provide a certified actuarial opinion regarding
estimated future compensation payments for claims incurred while self-
insured and post a security deposit equal thereto. 157 Such actuarial
opinions are to be provided at six month intervals until such time as the
claims incurred have no remaining value.6 8 Failure to provide reports
or security deposit gives rise to a cause of action in circuit court against
the employer by the Florida Self-Insured Guarantee Association to re-
cover a judgment equal to the present value of estimated future com-
pensation payments and attorney's fees."'
The new Act also provides a third alternative to a company
purchasing traditional workers' compensation coverage or becoming
self-insured. The employer can obtain a twenty-four hour health policy
which provides medical benefits and an insurance policy which provides
the indemnity benefits required by the Act. 6
K. Penalty for Failing to Secure Compensation
An employer failing to have workers' compensation coverage is
guilty of a second degree misdemeanor and may be enjoined from em-
ploying individuals and doing business until payment for compensation
151. FLA. STAT. § 440.38(1)(b)1 (Supp. 1990).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. FLA. STAT. § 440.38(1)(b)2 (Supp. 1990).
156. Id.
157. FLA. STAT. § 440.38(1)(b)3 (Supp. 1990).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. FLA. STAT. § 440.38(1)(e) (Supp. 1990).
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is secured. 161 If upon being provided written notice, the employer fails
to show evidence of workers' compensation coverage, a $500.00 penalty
shall be assessed.102 If coverage is not obtained within the next ninety-
six hours, a daily penalty of $100.00 will be assessed until the employer
complies.'63
L. Special Disability Trust Fund
The schedule of preexisting physical conditions giving rise to a
conclusive presumption that the employer considered the condition to
be permanent or likely to be a hinderance or obstacle to employment
was amended to add obesity. 6 To qualify under the provision, the em-
ployee had to be thirty percent or more over the average weight desig-
nated for that employee's height and age. 6 '
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
In Scanlon v. Martinez,'66 the plaintiffs filed an action for declara-
tory and injunctive relief seeking a determination as to the validity of
portions of chapter 89-289 and chapter 90-201 of the Laws of Florida.
The plaintiffs consisted of a group of individuals as well as some labor
organizations. 6 ' It was the plaintiffs' position that sections of the Com-
prehensive Economic Development Act of 1990 violated certain consti-
tutional provisions, including due process, separation of powers and the
single subject rule under the Florida Constitution.' 68
The Circuit Court of Leon County held that chapter 90-201 of the
Laws of Florida did, in fact, violate the single subject rule contained in
the Florida Constitution. 69 The court found that the subject matter of
161. FLA. STAT. § 440.43 (Supp. 1990).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. FLA. STAT. § 440.49(2)(f1.x (Supp. 1990).
165. Id.
166. 44 Fla. Supp. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1990).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 171. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6 provides:
Every Law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title. No law
shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only. Laws to revise or
amend shall set out in full the revised or amended act, section subsection,
or paragraph of a subsection. The enacting clause of every Florida law
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the Act, the economic growth and development of Florida, was too
broad and that the disparate topics were not reasonably and rationally
related to the subject of the bill. 17 0 Chapter 90-201 was, therefore, held
to be constitutionally invalid in its entirety.17 1
The circuit court then addressed the alleged separation of powers
violation under the Florida Constitution.1 72 It analyzed the section of
chapter 90-201 which created the Industrial Relations Commission
within the executive branch. While an executive branch entity, the new
law provided that the IRC judges were subject to Supreme Court Judi-
cial Nominating Commission appointment and retention.1 7 Further,
the law provided that the governor must reappoint any IRC judge who
received a favorable report from the Judicial Nominating Commis-
sion. '7 The circuit court held that the retention provision, together
with the fact that the IRC judges were subject to disciplinary proceed-
ings by the JNC, violated the separation of powers rule and therefore,
chapter 90-201 was invalid in its entirety for this reason as well.' 75
In addition to finding the entire Act constitutionally invalid, the
circuit court also addressed several specific provisions. It found that the
"Super-Doc" provision lacked a rational basis in providing that the
opinion of the court-appointed doctor should carry greater credibility
that the opinions of other doctors.' 76 The court also found that this
provision usurped the fact-finding responsibility of the JCC and con-
cluded that this section violated both the due process and access to
courts guarantees. 77
The circuit court also held that chapter twenty of the Act, provid-
ing that the employee seeking permanent total disability benefits must
show that he or she is unable to do even light work available within a
100 mile radius of home, violated the access to courts guarantee of the
Florida Constitution because it was not a reasonable alternative to
common law rights otherwise available.' 78 Constitutional deficiencies
were also found in chapter twenty of the Act amending the wage loss
shall read: "Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida".
170. Scanlon, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d at 171.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 171.
175. Scanlon, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d at 172.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 173.
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provision by providing for a shifting burden of proof based on the
amount of permanency.' The circuit court likewise found that the
sunset provisions of chapter 89-289 and backward repealer provision of
chapter 90-201 were an invalid attempt by the legislature to sunset
general laws.' 80 The circuit court did rule that constitutional frailties of
the individual provisions outlined above were, however, severable and
therefore declined to declare the entire Act unconstitutional on that
basis. 8' The circuit court held that the sunset provision of chapter 89-
289 and all of chapter 90-201 of the Laws of Florida were invalid.' 82
Following the Leon County Circuit Court announcement of its
opinion on December 5, 1990, the legislature met in a special session in
order to address the objections enunciated to the new legislation. Out
of this special session emerged two different bills which served to sepa-
rate the workers' compensation provisions 8 ' from the international af-
fairs and trade subject matter. 8' Both bills essentially readopted the
provisions initially contained in chapter 90-201 and with minor excep-
tion, provided for retroactive application to July 1, 1990. The legisla-
ture also passed chapter 91-2, House Bill 1 I-b, which provided for the
repeal of Florida Statutes section 20.171(5) (chapter 90-201 of the
Laws of Florida), which had created the Industrial Relations Commis-
sion, and section four, chapter 90-201 of the Laws of Florida, relating
to IRC rules of adoption by the Florida Supreme Court. This bill also
provided for the repeal of section 440.4415 regarding creation of the
Workers' Compensation Oversight Board and legal counsel.
In addition to the above provisions, chapter 91-2 of the Laws of
Florida, House Bill 11-b, also amended the Act relative to the con-
struction industry. The definition of "employee" was amended to per-
mit no more than three officers of a corporation involved in the con-
struction industry to make an election of exemption from the Act by
filing written notice pursuant to Florida Statutes section 440.05. It also
provided that partners or sole proprietors in the construction industry
are considered employees unless they elect to be excluded and file writ-
ten notice. As with corporations in the construction industry, no more
than three partners in a partnership actively involved in the construc-
179. Id.
180. Scanlon, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d at 173.
181. Id. at 174.
182. Id. at 175.
183. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 91-1 (West).
184. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 91-5 (West).
1991]
462
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
tion industry may elect to be excluded from the Act.
Chapter 91-2 also amended section 440.05 regarding the notice of
waiver of exemption as it applies to every sole proprietor, partner or
corporate officer actively engaged in the construction industry.185 Upon
receipt of a proper written notice, the division must issue a certificate
of the election to the party so making it. A copy of the election certifi-
cate is to be sent to the workers' compensation carrier that is otherwise
providing coverage for the sole proprietorship, partnership or corpora-
tion. The election certificate remains valid for two years or until the
election is revoked, whichever occurs first. Additionally, any contractor
responsible for compensation under section 440.10 can register with
any subcontractor's carrier thereby being entitled to receive written no-
tice of any cancellation or non-renewal of coverage. Further, the con-
tractor may require any subcontractor to provide evidence of workers'
compensation coverage or a copy of the subcontractor's certificate of
election. Any subcontractor who has elected to be exempt from the Act
must provide a copy of the election certificate to the contractor. If the
contractor or third party payor becomes liable for payment of compen-
sation to an employee of a subcontractor who has made an invalid elec-
tion to be exempt, the contractor or third party payor may recover
from the sole proprietorship, partnership or corporation all benefits
paid or payable, plus interest, unless the contractor and subcontractor
had a written agreement that coverage was to be provided by the
contractor.186
Following the 1991 special legislative session, during which the
above amendments were passed, the Florida Supreme Court, in a
deeply divided opinion, announced its decision in Martinez v. Scan-
Ion. 87 This decision had been received by way of certification from the
First District Court of Appeal as a case of great public importance.188
This list of parties to the action and non-parties submitting amicus cu-
riae briefs reads like a list of who's who in the business and labor
world.189
185. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 91-2 (West).
186. Id.
187. 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991).
188. Id.
189. Id. The list included Associated Industries of Florida, the Florida Chamber
of Commerce, National Counsel on Compensation Insurance, Employers Insurance of
Wausau, Tampa Bay Area NFL, Inc., South Florida Sports Corporation, Professional
Firefighters of Florida, Inc., the AFL-CIO and IBEW, Communication Workers' of
America, Florida Police Benevolent Association, Florida Construction, Commerce and
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Turning to the trial court opinion, the supreme court noted that
the plaintiffs alleged in the declaratory action that they were taxpayers,
employers, employees or labor organizations who were interested in and
had doubt as to their rights under the 1989 and 1990 amendments. 190
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing
to bring suit, that some of the claims were either premature or moot
and that the amendments were constitutional.19'
Reviewing the declaratory judgment statute,' 92 the court noted
that an individual may seek declaratory relief only where it can be
shown tlhere exists a bona fide, actual present need for the declara-
tion. 198 The court's majority stated it had serious reservations that the
action was properly the subject of the declaratory judgment act. 9 " It
noted the parties had given little or no mention to this procedural issue.
However, while cautioning trial courts to exercise their discretion in
such cases involving constitutional challenges, the court declined to dis-
miss the action itself.19
Citing case law, the court rejected the argument that the provi-
sions of the 1990 law, with the substantial reduction in benefits, vio-
lated the, constitutional right of access to courts.' 96 While acknowledg-
ing the reduction in benefits, the court found the law to be a reasonable
alternative to tort litigation noting that full medical care and wage loss
benefits, regardless of fault, continued to be available without delay
and uncertainty. 97 It also noted that in situations which were previ-
ously compensable, but no longer so because of the amendment, em-
ployees were still free to prosecute their claims in tort. 98
The court next addressed the constitutional challenge for violation
of the single subject requirement. It agreed with the lower court that
Industry Self-Insurer's Fund, Florida Association of Self-Insurers, Florida Group Risk
Administrators Association, Inc., Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Florida Chamber
of Commerce Self-Insurance Fund, Employers Association of Florida, Florida Fruit
and Vegetable Association Self-Insurer's Fund, Lee County Electrical Cooperative and
Harper Brothers, Inc. Self-Insured Employers. Id.
190. Id. at 1169-70.
191. Id. at 1170.
192. FLA. STAT. § 86 (Supp. 1990).
193. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1170.
194. Id. at 1171.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1171-72.
198. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1172.
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chapter 90-201 violated this principle and was therefore unconstitu-
tional.199 However, the State of Florida argued that this constitutional
problem had been cured by virtue of the January 1991 special session
which separated chapter 90-201 into distinct bills, one addressing inter-
national trade and the other workers' compensation."° While acknowl-
edging merit in the state's argument, the court noted that it was being
asked to scrutinize the constitutionality of a statute that was no longer
in existence. 10' Noting that the 1991 Act was not before it, the court
indicated that if it were subsequently found unconstitutional as a result
of the reenacted provisions, the validity of the 1990 Act would still be
in question.2 0 2 While suggesting that it could remand the case back to
the trial court for reconsideration in the light of the 1991 amendments,
the court chose to retain jurisdiction in the interest of judicial
economy. 0
The court found that the separation of powers violation had been
resolved by the 1991 Act and the issue was therefore moot.2 0 However,
it also stated that the trial court erred when finding the entire Act un-
constitutional as a result of the separation of powers violation. The
court found that the IRC provisions and creation of the Workers' Com-
pensation Oversight Board were severable and even if unconstitutional,
would not render the entire Act invalid 05 Further, the trial court
should not have considered these provisions under the Declaratory
Judgment Act because the plaintiffs were unable to show their rights
were affected by them.20 6
As with the separation of powers argument, the court also noted
that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate their rights were actually af-
fected by the individual provisions of the 1989 and 1990 Acts which
were attacked on various other constitutional grounds.2 7 Since the
plaintiffs could show only that their rights might be affected in the fu-
ture by these provisions, they were not properly the subject of a declar-
atory judgment action. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that chap-
ter 90-201 was unconstitutional for violation of the single subject rule
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1172-73.
202. Id. at 1173.
203. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1173 n.5.
204. Id. at 1173.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1174.
207. Id.
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was affirmed, as was its holding that the 1990 law did not violate any
constitutional access to courts provision. The remainder of the trial
court's holding was reversed.20 8
The Florida Supreme Court then addressed the issue as to what
effective date should apply to its ruling. Previous case law suggested
that whether or not a statute was void ab initio depended on whether
the legislative body passing the law had the power or authority to do
so. Here, the issue was not one of the legislature's constitutional au-
thority to pass chapter 90-201, but rather the form of the law itself.2"9
The supreme court pointed to previous opinions, both its own210 and
those of the United States Supreme Court "1' where statutes had been
declared unconstitutional, but the decisions were given prospective ef-
fect only.212 The rationale common to these decisions involve equitable
principles and the avoidance of injustice or hardship resulting from a
retroactive application. 213 The legislature's declaration that the 1991
curative statutes were to be given application retroactively to the effec-
tive date of the 1990 Act was cited by the court. While refusing to rule
on these retroactive provisions of the 1991 Act, the court concluded
that its holding of chapter 90-201 as unconstitutional in its entirety was
prospective only.2" 4
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kogan agreed that the 1990
statute was unconstitutional for violation of the single subject rule.2"'
He found all other issues raised therefore moot, noting that the court
later address the constitutionality of the 1991 Act, if challenged.
In an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Barkett (joined by Chief Justice Shaw and Justice Kogan) agreed that
the 1990 Act violated the single subject rule and therefore other issues
raised were premature. 216 However, Justice Barkett dissented to the ex-
tent that the majority opinion was to be given prospective application
only. While acknowledging existence of legal precedent supporting pro-
spective application, Justice Barkett's disagreement with these deci-
208. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1174.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So. 2d 433 (Fla.
1973).
211. See, e.g., Ciprano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
212. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1175.
213. 1d.
214. Id. at 1175-76.
215. Id. at 1176 (Kogan, J., specially concurring).
216. Id. (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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sions was evident. In her view, a statute declared facially unconstitu-
tional is null and void from its inception.
IV. CONCLUSION
While it is now clear that the Comprehensive Economic Develop-
ment Act of 1990, chapter 90-201, has been declared unconstitutional,
there remain many questions as to what direction the workers' compen-
sation law of this state will take in the foreseeable future. Certainly, as
Justice Kogan suggested in his concurring opinion, the door remains
open for a separate constitutional challenge to the 1991 statute. How-
ever, as a result of the curative 1991 legislation which addressed the
constitutional objections to the 1990 Act, it is perhaps more likely that
further constitutional challenges will be more narrow, focusing on spe-
cific provisions of the 1991 Act as amended.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-eight years since the condominium concept was in-
troduced in Florida, condominiums have not only changed Florida's
skyline, but its economic and political climate as well. This article will
briefly review, from this author's firsthand experience, past events
which influenced the development of the Florida Condominium Act
and provide insight into those factors which led to the extensive revi-
sions of 1991.
Initially, we can appreciate the extent of the political, social and
economic impact that condominium communities have had on the state.
The Florida Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes
estimates that there are approximately 20,000 condominium associa-
tions operating more than one million residential units. An estimated
2.5 to 3 million Floridians presently reside in condominiums. In per-
forming their management and administrative functions, condominium
associations spend in excess of $100 million each month for services,
encompassing a diverse spectrum from lawn and pool maintenance to
security and legal services. Tens of millions of additional dollars are
spent every year on building repairs and replacements. These expenses
are in addition to the billions of dollars spent on the initial condomin-
ium construction.
Real property taxes on condominiums pump hundreds of millions
of dollars into state and local coffers annually. These dollars go toward
the increased governmental support services required to meet the grow-
ing population of communities impacted by condominium development.
Services include new roads, police and fire protection, hospitals, sanita-
tion, shopping and entertainment.
The condominium association, established to provide a vehicle for
coordinating the interests of co-owners in the maintenance and opera-
tion of their shared or owned facilities, has become a means of rapid
dissemination of information to tens of thousands of individuals. As a
result, condominium communities have become a focal point for candi-
dates seeking political office. Legislators, keenly aware of the potential
political clout of condominium communities, are quick to respond to
alleged abuses within the condominium field. This is evidenced by the
fact that the Florida Condominium Act has been amended nearly every
year since its inception in 1963. While most amendments brought
about reforms, some amendments were passed to placate the desires of
local constituents without much forethought as to their impact on the
1991]
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condominium concept.'
II. STATUTORY HISTORY
The Florida Condominium Act was enacted in 1963 as enabling
legislation designed to give statutory recognition to air right convey-
ances. At the time of its enactment, Florida was experiencing a period
of economic growth, high employment and spiraling inflation. Florida
led the nation in both population gain and construction growth. The
boom was approaching its peak. Retirees and tourists were emigrating
to Florida in unprecedented numbers. The demand for housing out-
stripped the available supply tenfold. Entire unbuilt condominium com-
munities were sold out with little more than promises of future con-
struction. Out of this chaos developed problems never envisioned by the
authors of the Condominium Act.
Buyers were given unrealistic completion dates. Estimated opera-
tional budgets were purposely understated. Completed condominium
units and support facilities differed in both design and quality from
artists' renditions in sales brochures and model units. For instance, car-
peting and fixtures in completed units substantially differed from the
quality found in model apartments. In addition, use of devices such as
"sweetheart management contracts," which usurped the owners' au-
thority granted by the Condominium Act, and compulsory 99-year rec-
reation leases with unconscionable escalation provisions, prompted one
of the Condominium Act's authors to warn in 1964 that if developers
persisted in perverting the Condominium Act, it would ultimately be
necessary to qualify condominiums through a state regulatory commis-
sion. Condominium purchasers generally were unaware of the con-
tracts and leases because, during this period, Florida law did not re-
quire disclosure to purchasers. Consequently, few disclosures, if any,
were ever provided by developers.
With the sole exception of escalation clauses in compulsory leases,
the area of abuse which created the greatest anguish to condominium
purchasers was that of construction deficiencies. These defects had va-
rious causes. The most prevalent among these was the fact that con-
1. The amendment to section 718.115(1), which allowed the "cost of mangrove
trimming" to be included as a common expense, is a classic example of a legislative
response to a constituent request. See FLA. STAT. § 718.115(1) (Supp. 1990), amended
by FLA. STAT. § 718.115(1)(a) (1991) (deleting the "cost of mangrove trimming"
provision).
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struction lenders were more concerned with the amount and profitabil-
ity of their loans than the competence of the borrowers. Additionally,
many of these condominium projects received virtually no municipal
inspection. Consumers, inexperienced in the technical language of
building codes, were forced to rely upon municipal building inspectors
for assurance that their home or condominium would be built in accor-
dance with the applicable building codes. Purchasers considered the is-
suance of Certificates of Occupancy as a stamp of approval, indicating
that the buildings had met all code requirements and had been con-
structed in accordance with approved plans and specifications. In real-
ity, many structures which did not meet current building codes were
issued Certificates of Occupancy. In 1976, a grand jury investigating
construction practices in Dade County during the early 1970s reported
that a former inspector told us that inspection practices of the last sev-
eral years have resulted in the construction of buildings which could be
blown away in another 1926 hurricane. The evidence we heard supports
this statement.
In 1971, in an effort to avoid the necessity of more severe regula-
tory control, the Florida Legislature passed amendments to the Condo-
minium Act, in essence, finally acknowledging the existence of consum-
ers. Minimal disclosures were required from developers. Unit owners
were given the right, following transition, to cancel pre-transition con-
tracts entered into by developers for the operation and maintenance of
condominium property. However, these early efforts were mostly "too
little, too late." In 1972, in response to pressures from consumer
groups, an 18-member condominium commission was organized to
bring together individuals representing the various interests of the in-
dustry. The commission concluded that amendment of the statutes had
been deemed to be more important and more easily obtainable than the
creation of a regulatory agency. They also concluded that even though
a majority of the commission was philosophically opposed to the use of
ground leases and leases of recreational and other commonly used facil-
ities in the creation of condominiums it was not realistic to recommend
the prohibition of such leases. Various other recommendations were
made, but did not become law for several years.
In 1974, many of the recommendations of the condominium com-
mission became law. Major revisions, requiring full disclosure by devel-
opers, were added to the Condominium Act. Included was a require-
ment of a prospectus describing everything from recreational and other
commonly used facilities, to the number of units that would be served
by each facility. A new formula for relinquishment of developer control
1991]
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ended the developer's virtual perpetual control of condominium
associations.
Open board meetings and access to records were also mandated.
Tighter regulations were established for the use of buyers' deposits. To
protect consumers from faulty construction, the common-law-evolved
concept of "implied warranties" was statutorily imposed. The Act es-
tablished broad guidelines affecting all aspects of condominium living,
yet still lacked enforcement procedures and penalties for non-
compliance.
This problem was partially rectified in 1975 with the creation of
the Florida Division of Land Sales and Condominiums. The Division,
established as a depository for the condominium documents of all Flor-
ida condominiums, has grown in the ensuing decade into a complete
regulatory agency with rule-making and enforcement authority. Today,
the Bureau of Condominiums is the largest of four bureaus that com-
prise the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile
Homes, under the auspices of the Florida Department of Business Reg-
ulation, with offices in Tallahassee, Hollywood and Tampa.
Legislation designed to discourage the use of recreational leases
was also adopted in 1975. Escalation clauses in leases or agreements
for recreation or other commonly used facilities were prohibited.
Courts would later restrict the application of this section to leases en-
tered into after the effective date of the amendment.
In 1976, the entire Condominium Act was again rewritten. This
action was the result of a mandate by the 1975 legislature to the Flor-
ida Law Revision Council (now defunct) to eliminate ambiguities and
inconsistencies in the Condominium Act which were created by the
patchwork amendments of the prior years. The revised and renumbered
Act has been amended nearly every year since then. As a result of new
concepts, experience and judicial interpretation, new legislation has
been added addressing operational problems and other areas of poten-
tial abuse. Specifically, this new legislation has encompassed conversion
to time-sharing, the manner of delivering notice to owners of the an-
nual meeting, defining what documents constitute the "official" records
of the association, mandatory reserves and the methods of accounting,
removal of board members, and arbitration of disputes.
The decade of the 1980s was marked as a period of rapid develop-
ment of appellate decisions providing guidance in interpreting legisla-
tive intent and areas not specifically covered by the Condominium Act.
It was also a period which witnessed an increase in friction between
unit owners and their boards concerning the manner in which the con-
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dominium was being operated. For instance, unit owners commonly
complained about the ability of boards to perpetuate themselves in of-
fices through proxy abuse. As alleged incidents of board improprieties
escalated, condominium unit owners began organizing legislative action
committees. Among the groups advocating for legislative reforms to
protect the interests of condominium unit owners was SCORN (Secure
Condominium Owners Rights Now). SCORN persuaded State Repre-
sentative Ron Silver to introduce legislation during the 1990 Legisla-
tive Session which created a commission to study alleged abuses. The
legislature created the Condominium Study Commission with the fol-
lowing mandate:
It shall be the duty of the Commission to conduct public hearings
throughout the State and to take testimony regarding issues that
are of concern with respect to condominiums and to receive recom-
mendations for any changes to be made in the Condominium Law.2
The commission held nine public hearings. The final report of the Con-
dominium Study Commission was issued in February, 1991.
The legislature responded by enacting sweeping reforms governing
the manner in which condominiums operate. The following is an exami-
nation of the impact of the 1991 amendments on the development and
operation of Florida's condominiums.'
III. 1991 AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM ACT
A. Operations
1. Let The Sunshine In
Unit owner dissatisfaction with a board's conduct in operating the
condominium is often exacerbated by the denial of an opportunity to
speak out on issues being considered by the board or a committee.
While unit owners were granted the right to attend board meetings,4
the right to speak was left totally up to the board's discretion. In many
2. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 218.
3. The effective date of most amendments to the Condominium Act is April 1,
1992. Several became effective, however, on January 1, 1992; e.g., FLA. STAT. §§
718.112(2)(b), (d); § 718.501(2)(a) (1991).
4. F.A. STAT. § 718.112(2)(c) (1991) (this provision first took effect January 1,
1977).
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instances, boards merely rubber stamped recommendations made by
committees which met behind closed doors.
Effective January 1, 1992, unit owners will be given the right to
speak at membership meetings and the annual meeting with reference
to all designated agenda items.' This right will be extended to board
meetings and committeeO meetings after April 1, 1992. 7 While the as-
sociation is given the right to adopt rules governing the frequency, du-
ration and manner of unit owner statements, these rules must meet a
reasonable standard. It is anticipated that most boards will adopt
guidelines similar to those used by governmental bodies. Individuals de-
siring to speak should be required to complete a registration card indi-
cating their name, unit number and the agenda item they wish to ad-
dress. The board should establish time limitations for each speaker.8 In
order to maintain decorum at the meeting, it will be important for the
board and members to avoid turning the public forum section of meet-
ings into public debates. While it may be appropriate for speakers to
ask questions of the board, or vice-versa, there is no specific mandate
compelling board members to engage in discourse with unit owners.
To ensure that unit owners are kept informed of topics which will
be discussed at board and unit owners' meetings, notice of meetings
must be conspicuously posted on the condominium property at least 48
continuous hours preceding the board meeting and fourteen days pre-
ceding the unit owners' meeting.9 Such notice must include the meeting
agenda.10 In addition, fourteen days prior to a board meeting, written
notice must be given of any non-emergency special assessments or
5. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d) (1991).
6. "Committee" means a group of board members, unit owners, or board mem-
bers and unit owners appointed by the board to make recommendations to the board or
take action on behalf of the board. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(6) (1991).
7. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(c) (1991).
8. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.7D-23.002 (proposed) (operations of the associa-
tion would preclude any limitation greater than three minutes).
9. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(c) (1991) (board meetings) and FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(d)2 (1991) (unit owner meetings). As to FLA. STAT. 718.112(2)(c) (1991),
it is uncertain what repercussions would follow proof of 47.5 hours notice as opposed to
the 48 hours mandated notice for board meetings. The law is silent concerning the
burden of proof needed to demonstrate 48 continuous hours of notice. See id. One
might speculate that a video camera focused on the notice in a manner similar to that
used to guard the British Crown Jewels will suffice.
10. See FLA. STAT. §§ 718.112(2)(c), (d)2 (1991). The board must, by rule,
adopt a specific location on the condominium property upon which all notices of unit
owner meetings shall be posted. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)2 (1991).
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amendments to rules regarding unit use that will be proposed, dis-
cussed, or approved."
Unit owners are also given the opportunity to tape record or video-
tape meetings of the board.' 2 While the Division is mandated to adopt
rules governing the tape recording and video taping of meetings,' 3 it is
uncertain how this right will apply at Paradise Gardens Condominium,
a large nudist condominium outside Tampa, Florida.
2. Democratization of the Elections Process
No single process has created more ill will or more vocal objection
than the use of proxies for the election of board members. Notwith-
standing the right of unit owners to be nominated from the floor at the
annual meeting,' the potential for election of such a candidate is nil in
situations where board-solicited proxies constitute the overwhelming
participation at the annual meeting.
After January 1, 1992, proxies will no longer be permitted in the
election of directors.' 5 To ensure all unit owners equal access to the
ballot box, the association must implement the following election
procedure:
[60 Day Notice] Not less than 60 days before a scheduled election,
the association shall mail or deliver, whether by separate associa-
tion mailing or included in another association mailing or delivery
including regularly published newsletters to each unit owner enti-
tled to vote a first notice of the date of the election.'8
[Qualifying for Office] Any unit owner or other eligible person17
11. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(c) (1991).
12. Id.
13. Id.; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.7D-23.002 (proposed) would only allow such
audio and video equipment which does not produce distracting sound or light emissions
and also would allow the board to adopt rules which preclude a unit owner recording a
meeting from moving about the room.
14. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)1 (Supp. 1990) (repealed effective January 1,
1991).
15. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(b)2 (1991). This provision does not apply to
time share condominiums.
16. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)3 (1991).
17. While most bylaws restrict board members to record unit owners, there is no
statutory prohibition against anyone serving on a condominium board. In fact, the cur-
rent board dilemma, coupled with the unwillingness of many unit owners to serve on
condominium boards, may ultimately necessitate the hiring of professional directors.
19911
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desiring to be a candidate for the board shall give written notice to
the secretary of the association not less than 40 days before a
scheduled election."8
[Second Notice with Campaign Literature and Ballot] Not less
than 30 days before the election meeting, the association shall mail
or deliver a second notice of the mailing to all unit owners entitled
to vote together with a ballot which shall list all candidates.1 9 Upon
request of a candidate, the association shall include an information
sheet, no larger than 8 /2 inches by 11 inches furnished by the
candidate,2" to be included with the mailing of the ballot, with the
costs of mailing and copying to be borne by the association.2 1
[Prohibition Against Marking Another's Ballot] No unit owner
shall permit any other person to vote his ballot, and any such ballot
improperly cast shall be deemed invalid. 22
[Civil Penalty] Any unit owner violating the provisions of this sec-
tion may be fined by the association.23
18. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)3 (1991).
19. The written ballot shall indicate in alphabetical order by surnames, each and
every unit-owning eligible person who desires to be a candidate for the board and who
gave written notice to the association not less than forty days before the scheduled
election. No ballot shall indicate which candidate or candidates are incumbents on the
board. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.7D-23.0021(9).
20. The association may need to incorporate a disclaimer in its notice in order to
avoid potential liability for the dissemination of libelous language. An association may
not edit, alter or otherwise modify the content of the information sheet. FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r.7D-23.0021(7).
21. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)3 (1991). Not less than thirty days before the
scheduled election, the association shall mail or deliver to the eligible voters at the
addresses listed in the official records a second notice of the election, together with a
ballot and any information sheets timely submitted by the candidate. Accompanying
the ballot shall be an outer envelope addressed to the person or entity authorized to
receive he ballots and a smaller inner envelope in which the ballot shall be placed. The
exterior of an outer envelope shall indicate the name of the voter and the unit or unit
numbers being voted and shall contain a signature space for the voter. The inner envel-
ope shall be placed within the outer envelope and the outer envelope shall be sealed. If
a person is entitled to cast more than one ballot, separate inner envelopes shall be used
for each ballot. The voter shall sign the exterior of the outer envelope in the space
provided for signature. The envelope shall either be mailed or hand-delivered to the
association. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.7D-23.0021(8).
22. Id. The prohibition against marking another's ballot does not preclude a unit
owner needing assistance in casting a ballot from obtaining such assistance. See id.
23. Id. The right of an association to fine is conditioned upon the declaration or
bylaws providing for fining authority. See FLA. STAT. § 718.303(3) (1991). It is not
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3. Annual Budget/Statutory Mandated Reserves
In an effort to encourage condominium owners to set aside monies
for future repair and maintenance, the Condominium Act was
amended in 1984 to require that reserve funds be established for "capi-
tal expenditures" and "deferred maintenance." ' A threshold of
$10,000 was established in 1986. Effective April 1, 1992, reserve ac-
counts must be established for roof replacement, building painting and
pavement resurfacing, regardless of the amount of deferred mainte-
nance expense or replacement cost. In addition, reserve accounts will
continue to be required for any other item when the deferred mainte-
nance expense or replacement cost exceeds $10,000.5
The 1991 legislature addressed several other aspects of reserve re-
quirements. First, it clarified the use of interest earned on reserve ac-
counts by providing that the interest accruing on reserve accounts re-
main in the reserve account, unless its use for other purposes is
approved in advance by a vote of a majority of the voting interest pre-
sent at a duly-called meeting of the association.2 6 Second, it further
clarified the right of a developer-controlled association to waive statuto-
rily mandated reserves. A developer-controlled association may vote to
waive the reserves for the first two years of the operation of the associa-
tion. Thereafter, waiver or reduction will require approval of a majority
of non-developer voting interests present at a duly-called meeting of the
association.
4. Kickbacks
In order to end what has become a growing problem for condomin-
iums, namely, the practice of vendors bribing officers, directors and/or
managers to secure favorable contracts, the 1991 amendments provide
clear whether a condominium whose declaration or bylaws fails to provide fining au-
thority could levy a fine for violation of this section.
24. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f) (1991). A "capital expenditure" is an ex-
pense that results from the purchase of an asset whose life is greater than one year in
length or the replacement of an asset whose life is greater than one year in length or
the addition of an asset which extends the life of the previously existing asset for a
period greater than one year. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 7d-23.004 (1991). "Deferred
Maintenance" is an expenditure for maintenance or repair that will result in extending
the life of an asset for a period greater than one year. Id.
25. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)2 (1991).
26. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)3 (1991).
27. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)2 (1991).
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that no officer, director, or manager" "shall solicit, offer to accept, or
accept any thing or service of value exceeding $100.00, for which con-
sideration has not been provided for his own benefit or that of his im-
mediate family, from any person providing or proposing to provide
goods or services to the association. '29 Any officer, director or manager
who knowingly violates this provision is subject to civil penalty of up to
$5,000.30
An exhaustive debate precipitated the commission's recommenda-
tion concerning the value of gifts which an officer, director or manager
could receive without violating the laws. Of primary concern was the
imposition of penalties in a situation in which a manager might receive
a christmas gift given by one without intention of influencing the man-
ager's decision. The commission ultimately recommended a $10 ceiling,
which was later changed to $100 by the legislature. Specifically ex-
cepted from the application of this section are gifts or services received
in connection with trade fairs or educational programs.3 1
5. Access to and Inspection of the Association Records
a. Access to Books and Records
In the beginning, unit owners who sought access to the associa-
tion's books and records were denied such access or told that the books
were maintained elsewhere. Over the years, the legislature addressed
this problem by requiring that the official records be maintained in the
county where the condominium is located, or within 50 miles (now re-
duced to 25 miles) if maintained in another county.32 In addition, the
association is compelled to maintain the records from the inception of
the association. 3
28. Applies to those managers who are required to be licensed pursuant to FLA.
STAT. § 468.432 (1991). See FLA. STAT. § 718.111(l)(a) (1991).
29. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(l)(a) (1991). H.B. 841 being considered by the 1992
Legislature would repeal the $100.00 cap precluding receipt of anything of value.
30. See id. (referring to FLA. STAT. § 718.501(l)(d) which allows the Division to
impose a civil penalty individually against any officer or board member who willfully
and knowingly violates a provision of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and sets a maxi-
mum fine for each offense of $5,000).
31. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1)(a) (1991).
32. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(12)(b) (1991) (the 1991 amendments changed mileage
from 50 to 25 miles).
33. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(12) (1984) (effective October 1, 1984). It was designed
to require developer-controlled associations to have records available for unit owner
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b. Inspection of the Books and Records
An important aspect of a unit owner's right to inspect the books
and records involves a determination of what constitutes the "official
records." This was clarified in 1984 with the addition of the "Official
Records" section of the Act which lists those items constituting the
official records.3 4
At first, unit owners were gratified that they had the right to in-
spect the records. Following the decision in Winter v. Playa del Sol,
Inc.,35 the Act was further amended to provide that the right to inspect
the records includes the right to make or obtain copies of said
records.36 However, in this age of electronic marvels, some unit owners
abused the right. Unit owners have been known to appear at associa-
tion meetings or the association office with a portable copier in tow.
Following a circuit court's affirmation of an association's right to re-
strict excessive inspections, 7 the Act was again amended, this time to
authorize the association to adopt reasonable rules regarding the fre-
quency, time, location, notice and manner of record inspection and
copying.3 8
Concerned that some boards might use their rule-making authority
to frustrate unit owner's efforts, the legislature amended the Act to
provide that associations must deliver the records within five working
days of receipt of a written request, or pay damages to the unit owner
in an amount equal to three times the actual damages, but not less
than $500.s"
In addition to imposing a penalty for delaying access to the
records, the legislature expanded the definition of official records to in-
clude, "all other records of the association not specifically included in
the foregoing which are related to the operation of the association." '
This expanded definition is certain to create controversy. For instance,
attorneys are scrambling to figure out ways to avoid publication of le-
inspection.
34. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(12) (1984) (effective October 1, 1984).
35. 353 So.2d 598, 599 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("The right to inspect
public records carries with it the right to make copies.").
36. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(12)(c) (1984) (effective October 1, 1984).
37. O'Brien v. Sterling Village Condominium, Inc., No. 83-5997 (Fla. 15th Cir.
Ct.), aftid, 471 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
38. FLA. STAT. § 718.11](12)(c) (Supp. 1990) (effective October 1, 1990).
39. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(12)(c) (1991).
40. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1 2)(a)1 5 (1991).
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gal opinions concerning pending litigation, which presumably now fall
within the definition of official records. Additionally, associations
should now explore potential conflicts with state or federal privacy leg-
islation, insofar as the amended language will now compel associations
to open, for unit owner scrutiny, confidential screening investigative
reports.41
To insure that every unit owner has an opportunity to learn of his/
her rights and responsibilities as a condominium owner, every pur-
chaser may now request and receive a complete set of the current con-
dominium documents, as well as the question and answer sheet pro-
vided for by section 718.504.42 The association must maintain, as part
of the official records, an adequate number of copies of the declaration
of condominium, articles of incorporation, by-laws, rules, and all
amendments to each of the foregoing, as well as the question and an-
swer sheet on the condominium property."3 The association may charge
its actual cost for preparing and furnishing these documents to those
requesting same."
6. Hurricane Shutter Specifications
Having learned a lesson from the effects of Hurricane Hugo along
the South Carolina coast in 1989, the legislature was quick to adopt a
provision mandating boards to approve the installation or replacement
of hurricane shutters, notwithstanding the fact that the installation of
hurricane shutters might be determined to be a material alteration of
the type normally requiring board or membership approval."5 The
board must adopt hurricane shutter specifications for each building
within each condominium operated by the association. Specifications
should include color, style, and any other factors deemed relevant by
the board.
46
41. See Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988), which
limits disclosure of information obtained from credit reports.
42. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(12)(c) (1991).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. FLA. STAT. § 718.113(5) (1991); see Sterling Village Condominium v. Brei-
tenbach, 251 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct, App. 1971).
46. FLA. STAT. § 718.113(5) (1991).
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7. Fidelity Bonding
In an effort to identify dishonest individuals who could potentially
misappropriate association monies, the Act was amended in 1978 to
require all persons who control or disburse funds of the association be
bonded."' The original legislation contained no stated amount for the
bond. In 1981, the Act was amended to provide for bonds in the
amount of $10,000 per person. 8 Effective April 1, 1992, the amount
will be increased to $50,000 per person. 8 Previously, associations oper-
ating one or more condominiums, which in the aggregate contained 50
or fewer units, were exempt from bonding requirements." The 1991
amendments deleted this exception; effective April 1, 1992, all associa-
tions must comply with the fidelity bonding provision, regardless of size
or number of units.5 1
8. Insurance
Initially, condominium associations were responsible for maintain-
ing insurance on the common elements and condominium property.
Unit owners were responsible for insuring the non-supportive internal
walls of their units and their personal property. This "bare wall" ap-
proach was mandated until the late 1970s when a fire destroyed much
of the Sabal Palm Condominium. In the aftermath of the fire, it was
discovered that most unit owners maintained traditional "tenant" type
coverage, insuring only personalty, not the internal unit walls or fix-
tures. To avoid a recurrence of the Sabal Palm experience, the Act was
amended to require that the association provide coverage for all im-
provements to the property initially installed by the developer or
"replacements thereof."' 52 Difficulty with determining the replacement
value of upgraded appliances and fixtures resulted in another amend-
ment, deleting the reference to "replacements thereof." 53 That solution,
47. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(1) (1978) (effective October 1, 1978).
48. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(1) (1981) (effective July 1, 1981).
49. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(j) (1991). H.B. 841 being considered by the 1992
Legislature would modify the bonding requirements by creating a sliding scale based
upon the size of a community and its revenues.
50. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)0) (Supp. 1990).
51. See 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 103 (West) (deleting exception from bonding
requirement for 50 or fewer units).
52. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(9)(b) (1979) (effective October 1, 1979).
53. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(9)(b) (1980) (deletion of provision effective October 1,
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analogous to throwing the baby out with the bath water, created more
problems than solutions. Accordingly, the Act was again amended.
This time, the Association was required to cover replacements of "like
kind and quality" in addition to the initial improvements. 5 The
amended law worked for a short time until a few shrewd unit owners
found that by dropping bottles of bleach on their carpeting, they were
able to compel the association's carrier to give them new carpeting. It
readily became apparent that requiring the association to insure certain
components, over which it had no maintenance control, was unreasona-
ble. Thus, in 1984, the Act was once again amended to exclude from
the association's coverage floor, wall and ceiling coverings within the
condominium units.5  Further experience suggested the need to expand
upon the excluded coverage. In 1991, the pendulum swung back toward
the center between the "bare wall" concept of 1963 and the full cover-
age approach of 1980. Effective April 1, 1992, in addition to floor, wall,
and ceiling coverings, unit owners will become responsible for insuring
electrical fixtures, appliances, air conditioning or heating equipment,
water heaters and built-in cabinets contained within their units.56
While it is clear that the amendment will not affect coverage in effect
as of April 1, 1992, a determination must be made regarding the appli-
cation of this legislation to condominiums created after October 1,
1979, if the condominium documents require the association to insure
all improvements to the property.57
9. Assessments and Liability; Lien and Priority; Interest
Collection
a. Collecting Assessments from Mortgagees
A unit owner is liable for all assessments which come due while he
is the unit owner, regardless of how title is acquired.58 This includes
owners who purchased at a judicial sale. 59 The grantee is jointly and
severally liable with the grantor for all assessments left unpaid at the
1980).
54. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(9)(b) (1981).
55. See FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(b) (1991).
56. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(b) (1991).
57. See Pomponio v. The Claridge of Pompano Condominium, Inc., 378 So. 2d
774 (Fla. 1979) (relating to re-retroactive statutes).
58. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a) (1991).
59. Id.
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time title is transferred from grantor to grantee. This liability does not
prejudice any right the grantee may have to recover from the grantor
the assessments paid by the grantee6°-unless the acquirer of title is a
first nortgagee. 61 From inception of the condominium concept through
April 1, 1992, first mortgagees have enjoyed a special status regarding
payment of assessments. When the mortgagee of a first mortgage of
record, or a purchaser at a public sale from the first mortgagee's fore-
closure 2 judgment or as a result of a deed in lieu of foreclosure, ac-
quired title, the acquirer of title or his successors and assigns were not
liable for assessments which became due prior to acquiring title. This
privilege, coupled with the practice of delaying foreclosure until market
conditions warranted, has created havoc within condominiums already
experiencing tight financial conditions. Associations are often forced to
carry delinquent units for years while waiting for the lender to fore-
close. The condominium commission recommended that this privilege
be abolished, thus placing lenders in the same shoes as all acquirers of
title. But, the lender's lobby was successful in replacing the commis-
sion's recommendation with a compromise provision which does little to
alleviate the problem.
For mortgages recorded after April 1, 1992, mortgagees who ac-
quire title to the unit by foreclosure or by a deed in lieu of foreclosure
are not liable for the share of common expenses or assessments which
come due prior to taking title, as long as the mortgagee records its deed
in lieu of foreclosure or files a foreclosure proceeding within six months
after the last payment of principal or interest received by the mortga-
gee."3 And in no event shall the mortgagee be liable for more than six
months of the unit's unpaid common expenses of assessments accrued
60. Id.
61. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(7) (1991).
62. In amending section 718.116, the drafter deleted, in its entirety, the language
of section 718.116(7) which addressed the rights of, not only a mortgagee of a first
mortgage of record, but also a purchaser of a condominium unit at the public sale
resulting from a first mortgagee's foreclosure. See 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 130 (de-
leting a portion of section 718.116(7)). The revised statute is silent as to the obligations
of a purchaser from the first mortgagee's foreclosure. This has lead some to speculate
that a foreclosure purchaser might be liable for unit assessments to the same extent as
any other judicial purchaser. The drafter also inadvertently deleted the language which
imposed upon all the unit owners the liability for sharing in the assessments eliminated
by the mortgage foreclosure. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(a) (1991). The sixth month period is extended for
any period of time during which the mortgagee is precluded from initiating such proce-
dures due to the bankruptcy laws. Id.
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before the acquisition of the title to the unit by the mortgagee.6 4
b. Application of Assessment Payments
In 1990, the Condominium Act was amended to establish a prior-
ity for applying payments against a unit owner's obligation.65 Section
718.116(3) provided that "[a]ny payment received by an association
shall be applied first to any interest accrued by the association, then to
any administrative late fees, then to any costs and reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in collection, and then to the delinquent assessment." 66 It
was unclear what impact, if any, a restrictively-endorsed check would
have on the statutorily-mandated process. The Act has now been
amended to provide that the statutory priority shall control "notwith-
standing any restrictive endorsement, designation, or instruction placed
on or accompanying a payment. 67
c. Lien Priorities-The "Super Lien"
There had been an on-going debate as to whether an association's
lien, once recorded, relates back to the date of recording of the declara-
tion of condominium, or the date on which it is actually filed in the
public records.68 The determination of whether the lien is effective from
recording, or whether it relates back to the date of recording the decla-
ration, affects the lien's priority in relation to other intervening liens,
judgments or claims against a unit. To insure that an association's lien
will remain superior to all but a first mortgagee of record, effective
April 1, 1992, an association's lien will be effective from and shall re-
late back to April 1, 1992, or the date of the recording of the original
declaration of condominium, whichever occurs last.69
64. Id.
65. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(3) (Supp. 1990).
66. Id.
67. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(3) (1991).
68. See FLA. STAT. § 718.116(5)(a) (Supp. 1990). The association has a lien on
each condominium parcel for any unpaid assessment with interest and for reasonable
attorney's fees incurred by the association which are incidental to the collection of the
assessment or enforcement of the lien. Prior to the 1991 amendments, the Act provided
that the lien did not become effective until recorded in the public records of the county
where the condominium is located. Id.; see In re Maas, 69 B.R. 245 (M.D. Fla. 1986);
Bessmer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980).
69. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(5)(a) (1991).
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d. Attorney's Fees
The right to recover reasonable attorney's fees is extended to both
lien foreclosure actions and an action to recover a money judgment for
unpaid assessments. 0
10. Bingo/The "Sunrise Lakes" Amendment 71
After Broward County's Bingo Administrator refused to renew the
bingo license of several large condominiums, legislators came to their
aid by introducing legislation which would permit condominium as-
sociations qualifying as exempt organizations under Section 528 of the
Internal Revenue Code to conduct bingo games. 72 As amended, the law
mandated that associations conducting bingo games do so in accor-
dance with section 849.093, Florida Statutes.7 3 In addition, section
718.114 provided that the right to conduct bingo games was condi-
tioned upon the return of all the gross receipts from such games to the
players in the form of prizes.7 ' In addition, the gross receipts of the
games were not to be used for any purpose other than payment of
prizes. 7" If, at the conclusion of play on any day, there remained pro-
ceeds which had not been paid out in prizes, the association was pre-
cluded from imposing any charge on the players at the next scheduled
game until the previous proceeds were exhausted.7 ' Further, any person
involved in conducting the game had to be a resident of the particular
community sponsoring the game.77
Section 849.093(2)(a) allows a qualified organization to deduct
70. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(6)(a) (1991).
71. On October 1, 1991, Circuit Judge George Reynolds, III, in the circuit court
for the Second Judicial Circuit in Leon County, issued a temporary injunction in the
case of Largo Veterans Council v. Department of Business Regulation, Case No. 91-
3922. The court found that the public's interest would be served by enjoining the DBR
from enforcing the criminal penalty and injunctive relief section of the Act. Subse-
quently, the Legislature, during a special session, eliminated the newly-adopted lan-
guage and specifically readopted the former language, now modified to allow condo-
miniums and other associations to conduct bingo games without a state license and
without state taxation.
72. See FLA. STAT. § 718.114 (Supp. 1990).
73. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.114, 849.093 (Supp. 1990).
74. FLA. STAT. § 711.114 (Supp. 1990).
75. 1d.
76. Id.
77. 1d.
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from the proceeds of bingo operations the actual business expenses
which are directly related and essential to the operation, conduct and
playing of bingo. While other associations were able to take advantage
of these deductions, condominium associations were precluded from do-
ing so. The 1991 amendments address this oversight. The amendment
has been incorporated into the substantially revised text of section
849.093, governing all bingo operations within the state. These changes
impose strict licensing, financial reporting and record-keeping require-
ments on associations conducting bingo operations. In so doing, the leg-
islature has scrapped most of the changes to section 718.114 that were
enacted in 1990.78 The revised statute seemingly applies to all commu-
nity associations, including mobile homeowner associations. As under
the old version of the statute, in order to be "authorized" to conduct
bingo games, an association must be tax exempt under either section
501 or section 528 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. However,
even if authorized, the association must still obtain a license from the
state. In addition, the association must have been in existence in the
state for not less than three years prior to filing an application for a
license. 9
The statute expressly preempts and supersedes all existing county
and local ordinances on the subject (except zoning requirements) as of
its effective date.80 This means that condominium associations desiring
to conduct bingo games must obtain a state license and comply with
both the statute and supplemental regulations to be adopted by the Di-
vision of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, of the Department of Business Regu-
lations. The new statute extensively regulates the actual conduct of
games, including such matters as: game rules; qualification to work for
the bingo game; equipment to be used; security; prize amounts; hours
and frequency of operation; use of receipts and a prohibition against
possessing or consuming alcoholic beverages in any room where bingo
is held.81 Bingo games may only be conducted in facilities owned or
leased full time by the association and are only open to association
members, condominium residents and their guests.8"
78. See 1991 Fla. Sess. Law 103 (deleting certain provisions relating to the oper-
ation of bingo games).
79. See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1991).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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11. Master Antenna Television Systems and Cable Television
The controversy surrounding condominium master cable or an-
tenna television systems stems from the issue of whether unit owners
can be compelled to pay for these services as a common expense. A
look at an analogous situation which arose at Century Village with re-
spect to bus transportation services may aid in understanding the
controversy.
For most of the evolution of the Florida Condominium Act, the
determination of what was chargeable as a common expense was fairly
simple. As recited in the 1987 Act, common expenses included "[t]he
expense of the operation, maintenance, repair, or replacement of the
common elements, costs of carrying out the powers and duties of the
association, and any other expense designated as a common expense by
this Chapter, the declaration, the documents creating the condomin-
ium, or the by-laws."83 Then came the Century Village bus case.84 One
of the Century Village condominium associations had contracted for
bus transportation service for its members to areas outside the condo-
minium property. The contract provided for the association to pay a
lump sum for the service; the unit owners were not required to pay for
individual trips. The association then assessed a pro rata portion of this
lump sum as a common expense against all unit owners. Certain unit
owners refused to pay the assessment and the association placed a lien
on their units, ultimately pursuing a foreclosure claim, which the trial
court granted.8 5
On appeal, the Fourth District Court correctly noted that the con-
dominium documents of Century Village did not provide for bus trans-
portation to be chargeable as a common expense (the simple statement
of which under the Act would have precluded charging the same as a
common expense).86 However, the court proceeded to muddy the wa-
ters regarding common expenses by boldly proclaiming, in direct con-
tradiction of the Act, that:
In the instant case, the bus transportation service is not condomin-
ium property nor is it a recreational facility. As such, it does not
fall 'within the realm of either 718.111 or 718.114, Florida Statutes
83. See FLA. STAT. § 718.115(1) (1987).
84. Rothenberg v. Plymouth #5 Condominium Ass'n, 511 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
85. Id. at 651.
86. Id.
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(1983), and therefore the association does not have the power to
assess the cost for this service as a common expense against the
unit owners.8 7
As a result of this case, in 1988, an amendment was offered that
continues to wreak havoc on the condominium concept. The Act al-
ready provided that any expense designated as a common expense by
the Condominium Act, the declaration, or by-laws could be a common
expense. But via the amendment, the legislators attempted to list those
services which would constitute common expenses. This implied that a
non-listed service would be precluded from being a common expense. 88
As amended in 1988, section 718.115(1) provided:
Common expenses include the expense of the operation, mainte-
nance, repair, or replacement of the common elements, costs of car-
rying out the powers and duties of the association, and any other
expense designated as common expense by this chapter, the decla-
ration, the document creating the condominium or the by-laws.
Common expenses also include reasonable transportation services,
insurance for directors and officers, road maintenance and opera-
tion expenses, in-house communications, and security services,
which are reasonably related to the general benefit to the unit
owners even if such expenses do not attach to the common ele-
ments or property of the condominium. However, such common
expenses must either have been services or items provided from
the date the control of the board of administration of the associa-
tion was transferred from the developer to the unit owners or must
be services or items provided from the condominium documents or
by-laws.8 9
Despite the rewording of the statute, condominium boards contin-
ued to wrestle with the question of whether they could enter into bulk
cable television contracts, and charge the costs to unit owners as a com-
mon expense. On December 8, 1988, the Division, relying upon Roth-
enberg v. Plymouth #5 Condominium Association0 and the 1988
87. Id. at 652.
88. See Towerhouse Condominium, Inc. v. Millman, 475 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985)
(applying the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning the mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of another).
89. FLA. STAT. § 718.115(1) (Supp. 1988) (effective July 1, 1988) (emphasis
added).
90. 511 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
[Vol. 16
489
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Poliakoff
amendments to section 718.115(1), declared that cable television ser-
vices only constitute a common expense in two instances. First, cable
television services could be defined as a common expense in the condo-
minium documents or by-laws by amendment. Second, the services
were chargeable as a common expense if they were being provided at
the time control of the board of administration of the association was
transferred from the developer to the unit owners.
With support from cable television industry, legislation was intro-
duced which bifurcated the delineation of common expense under sec-
tion 718.115. Category one included:
the expense of the operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, or
protection of the common elements and association property, costs
of carrying out the powers and duties of the association, and any
other expense, whether or not included in the foregoing, designated
as common expenses by this chapter, the declaration, the docu-
ments creating the association, or the by-laws.91
Also included within this category was the following:
If approved by the board of administration, the cost of mangrove
trimming92 and the cost of a master television antenna system or
duly franchised cable television service obtained pursuant to a bulk
contract are common expenses.9"
The second set of common expenses consisted of those categories
created in 1988, which, as previously noted, must have either been pro-
vided from date of transition or as part of the condominium documents.
The condominium commission heard testimony from senior citi-
zens on fixed incomes, widows and widowers, and individuals with sight
and hearing impediments, all of whom opposed compulsory cable tele-
vision. The commission recommended that the board's ability to obli-
gate unit owners to cable television be limited to those situations in
which the members approve the cable contract in advance by a major-
ity of all voting interests. The commission further recommended that
individuals with hearing and visual impediments be exempted from the
91. FLA. STAT. § 718.115(1)(a) (1991) (emphasis added) (it reflects additions to
the section effective October 1, 1990).
92. See 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 103 (deleting the "mangrove trimming" provi-
sion from section 718.115).
93. FLA. STAT. § 718,115(1)(b) (1988).
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cable television obligation.
Assisted by an effective lobbyist, 9' the cable television industry
was successful in modifying the commission's recommendations to
place the burden of cancellation of a cable contract on the unit owners,
and to provide for a minimum term of two years. 95
As amended, the new law provides that the cost of a master an-
tenna television system or duly franchised cable television service ob-
tained pursuant to a bulk contract shall be deemed a common expense
if provided for in the declaration, or if designated as such in a written
contract between the board and company providing the service. 96 Any
contract made by the board after April 1, 1992 for a community an-
tenna system or duly franchised television service may be canceled by a
majority of the voting interests present at the next regular or special
meeting of the association.97 Any member may make a motion to can-
cel the contract, but if the motion fails to obtain the required majority,
the contract is deemed to be ratified for its full term. 8
Contracts for a master antenna television system or duly
franchised cable television service shall provide for the right of any
hearing-impaired or legally blind unit owner, who does not occupy the
unit with a non-hearing-impaired or sighted person, to discontinue the
service without incurring disconnect fees.99
An interesting twist to the common expense equation occurs in sit-
uations when less than 100% of the units are connected to a master
television antenna system or cable television. In situations of 100%
participation, the expense is apportioned among the unit owners in ac-
cordance with the percentage or fraction of sharing common expenses
contained in the documents. If less than 100%, everyone pays equally,
regardless of the common expense formula in the documents.
12. Proxies
To the condominium unit owner activist, it is the proxy100 which
94. Peter Dunbar, formerly a State Representative and Counsel to Florida State
Governor Bob Martinez.
95. FLA. STAT. § 718.115(1)(b)l (1991).
96. Id.
97. Id., § 718.115(l)(b)l.
98. Id.
99. FLA. STAT. § 718.115(1)(b)2 (1991).
100. "Proxy" is defined as the "authorization given by one person to another so
that the second person can act for the first .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1103-04
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lies at the root of all condominium operational problems. For it is
through the misuse of proxies that SCORN contends dishonest direc-
tors were able to perpetuate themselves in office and control all aspects
of an association's operation.
Effective January 1, 1992, unit owners will not be able to vote by
general proxy, except for a very limited number of purposes. 101 Limited
proxies0 2 shall be used for the following purposes:
i. for votes taken to waive or reduce reserves.
ii. for votes taken to amend the declaration pursuant to section
718.110, Florida Statutes.
iii. for votes taken to amend the articles of incorporation or bylaws
iv. for any other matter for which the Condominium Act requires
or permits a vote of the current officers.103
As previously noted, no proxy, limited or general, may be used in the
election of board members. 10 To insure that unit owners have the ben-
efit of knowing how their fiduciaries vote, the prohibition against proxy
voting by directors is expanded to include a prohibition against the use
of secret ballots.'0 5
(5th ed. 1979). As applied to the condominium setting, it refers to the granting of one's
right to vote at an association meeting to a third party.
101. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(b)(2) (1991). General proxies may be used to estab-
lish a quorum (a quorum is the minimum voting interest which must be present to
conduct association meetings). Id. In addition, general proxies are permitted to be used
in other matters for which limited proxies are not required, and may also be used for
non-substantive changes to items for which limited proxies are required and given. Id.
This latter right is critical for it allows some corrective measures to be taken concern-
ing proposed amendments, which otherwise would necessitate re-noticing of an
amended item for a future meeting.
102. A limited proxy is the assignment of one's right to vote to a third party
when the assignment is restricted to that of voting in a predetermined manner. An
example of a limited proxy would be: "I hereby instruct my proxy to vote for the pro-
posed amendment to Article X(2)(I)."
103. Id. Notwithstanding the apparent mandated use of limited proxies as evi-
denced by the phrase, "limited proxies shall be used," the clarifying statement at the
end of the subsection, namely, that "notwithstanding the provisions of the subpara-
graph, unit owners may vote in person at unit owner meetings," would indicate the use
is permitted, but not mandatory. See id.
104. Id.
105. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1)(b) (1991).
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13. Vote Required to Acquire, Convey or Lease Real
Property
The vote required to acquire, convey, lease, or mortgage associa-
tion property'"6 is generally stated within the declaration of condomin-
ium. If the declaration fails to specify the procedures for acquiring,
conveying, leasing or mortgaging association property, then approval of
seventy-five percent of the total voting interests will be required.10 7
14. Commingling
A condominium association is an entity which is responsible for
the operation and management of the condominium property, as distin-
guished from "the condominium" which is the form of property owner-
ship. An association may operate more than one condominium. 0 8
When an association operates more than one condominium, since there
is no mutuality of ownership of the condominium(s), the association
must maintain separate books and records for each condominium it op-
erates.109 Prior to the 1991 amendments, it had been common practice
for an association operating more than one condominium to commingle
the funds into a single operating account, so long as it maintained sepa-
rate records. Also, management companies operating one or more con-
dominiums often established accounts in the name of the management
company for the benefit of the condominium. Reserve funds were often
commingled with the operating funds.
However, effective April 1, 1992, all monies of a condominium
must be maintained separately in the association's name." 0 And, no
manager or business entity required to be licensed under section
468.432,"' and no agent, employee, officer or director of a condomin-
106. "Association property" is property, real and personal, owned, leased, or
dedicated to the association, for the use and benefit of the members. FLA. STAT. §
718.103(3) (1991). Association property is not part of the "common elements," which
denotes that part of the property submitted to condominium ownership which is an
appurtenance to the condominium units. See FLA. STAT. § 718.103(12) (1991).
107. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(7) (1991).
108. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1)(a) (1991).
109. See FLA. STAT. § 718.111(12)(a)11 (1991).
110. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(15) (1991). It is still unclear whether the requirement
that the funds be separately maintained in the association's name will preclude the
practice of commingling multiple condominium funds into a single association account,
as long as separate records are maintained.
11l. Companies and individuals performing management services for associa-
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ium association, will be permitted to commingle any association funds
with his funds or with the funds of any other condominium association
or community association." 2
15. Waiver of Audit Requirement by Developer-Controlled
Association
A condominium association is required to deliver to each unit
owner a complete financial report of actual receipts and expenditures
for the previous twelve months, within sixty days following the end of
the fiscal or calendar year."13 In lieu of this requirement, the Division
may require the association to deliver a complete set of either compiled,
reviewed or audited financial statements for the preceding fiscal
year." 4 However, the requirement of providing a complete compiled,
reviewed and audited financial statement does not apply to associations
for which a majority of the voting interests of the association present at
a duly-called meeting" 5 vote to waive the requirement for a particular
year."
6
In order to preclude a developer-controlled association from being
able to circumvent the legislative intent by continuously voting to waive
the reporting requirements, the Act has been amended. The amend-
ment provides that, in an association in which turnover of control has
not occurred, the developer may vote to waive the audit requirement
for the first two years of the operation of the association, after which,
tions operating more than 50 units or having a budget(s) in excess of $100,000 must be
licensed if the company or individual controls or disburses funds of a community asso-
ciation, prepares budgets or other financial documents for a community association,
assists in the noticing or conducting of community association meetings, and coordi-
nates maintenance for residential development and other day to day services involved
with the operation of a community association. See FLA. STAT. § 468.431(2) (1989).
112. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(15) (1991).
113. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(13) (1991).
114. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(14) (1991).
115. Id. Meetings called pursuant to this section must be held prior to the end of
the fiscal year, and the waiver is only effective for one year. Id.
116. Associations having annual receipts in excess of $100,000 but less than
$200,000 shall at a minimum prepare and deliver compiled financial statements; as-
sociations having annual receipts of at least $20,000 but less than $400,000 shall at a
minimum, prepare and deliver reviewed financial statements, and associations having
annual receipts of $400,000 or more shall prepare and deliver audited financial state-
ments. Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r.7D-23.004 (1991). Section 718.111(14) and Rule 7D-
23.004 do not apply to a condominium of 50 or fewer units.
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waiver of an applicable audit requirement shall be by a majority of
voting interests other than the developer. 117 A strict interpretation of
the amendment would limit its application to associations with annual
receipts of $400,000 or more because these are the only ones for which
financial reports must be audited. An association voting to waive the
financial reporting requirements of section 718.111(14) must still com-
ply with section 718.111(13). In addition, provisions in a condominium
declaration requiring a stricter reporting standard than that mandated
by section 718.111(13) or (14) will control.
16. Application of Excess Special Assessments
Funds collected pursuant to a special assessment can only be used
for the specific purpose or purposes for which the special assessment
was levied.11 8 Up until the passage of the 1991 amendments, it was
unclear whether any excess funds from the special assessment had to be
refunded to the unit owner, or whether they could be placed in the
general revenue accounts of the associations. The question has now
been answered. Any excess funds remaining after completing the pro-
ject for which the special assessment was levied may, at the discretion
of the board, either be returned to the unit owners or applied as a
credit toward future assessments. 9
17. Contracts for Products and Services; In Writing; Bids;
Exceptions
Related to the kickback amendment 20 are the contract and com-
petitive bid requirements of section 718.3026. Designed to assure unit
owners that the board is acting in their best interest, the provisions
establish certain criteria for letting contracts for the purchase, lease, or
rental of materials or equipment to be used by the association in ac-
complishing its purposes under the Act.121 It governs all contracts for
the provision of services. 22 A contract which will not be fully per-
117. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(14) (1991).
118. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(10) (1991).
119. Id.
120. See FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1)(a) (1991) ("No officer, director or manager
• . . shall solicit, offer to accept, or accept anything or service exceeding $100 .
121. See FLA. STAT. § 718.3026(1) (1991).
122. Id.
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formed within one year from its making,1" or one which requires pay-
ment by the association in the aggregate amount of $5,000 on behalf of
any condominium operated by the association, must be in writing.124
Additionally, all contracts entered into by the association on behalf of a
condominium in the aggregate amount exceeding $5,000, are subject to
competitive bidding.12 5
The statute is silent as to the number of bids required. But it spe-
cifically provides, despite the competitive bid requirement, that an asso-
ciation is not required to accept the lowest bid.128 Also, an association
may obtain needed products and services in an emergency without sub-
mitting to the competitive bid process. 2 7 In addition, competitive bids
are not required in those situations in which the business entity with
which the association desires to enter into a contract is the only source
of supply within the county serving the association. 28 Exempted from
the application of the section are contracts with attorneys and
accountants.12
9
It is important to remember that the provisions of section
718.3026 are in addition to those in section 718.3025. Parties providing
maintenance or management services to a condominium must, in addi-
tion to complying with section 718.3026, also include within their con-
tract the specified provisions mandated by section 718.3025.
18. Enforcing the Covenants Against Tenants and Invitees of
a Unit Owner
The law is well-developed concerning the enforcement of covenants
and restrictions against a violating unit owner. However, the ability to
enforce the covenants against a violating tenant or guest of an owner is
in doubt without following the circuitous process of suing the owner to
compel him to enforce the restriction against his tenant. In an effort to
expedite the process, thereby giving an association the authority to pro-
ceed directly against an owner's tenant or invitee, the legislature
123. Given the literal translation, the provision would apply to all contracts
which will not be fully performed within one year of their execution as opposed to one
year from the effective date, which is obviously not the intent.
124. FLA. STAT. § 718.3026 (1991).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. FLA. STAT. § 718.3026(2)(b) (1991).
128. FLA. STAT. § 718.3026(2)(c) (1991).
129. FLA. STAT. § 718.2036(2)(a) (1991).
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amended the Act to incorporate into the lease the provisions of the Act,
as well as those of the declaration and by-laws. 130 In addition, the asso-
ciation is empowered to seek relief directly against any tenant or invi-
tee violating the Act or the condominium documents."'
19. Unit Owner Enforcement
A unit owner sued by the association for an alleged violation of the
covenants must pay his/her pro rata share of the common expense as-
sessed to cover the cost of the litigation, even when the unit owner is
determined by the courts not to be in violation of the covenants. To
afford a unit owner who has prevailed in action brought by the associa-
tion the opportunity to be "made whole," a provision was added to the
Act to allow the unit owner the right to recover reasonable attorney's
fees and such other amounts as determined by the court to be necessary
to reimburse the unit owner for his share of the assessment levied by
the association to fund its expenses of litigation.132 Of course, the unit
owner will be obligated to pay his pro rata share of the assessment
levied for said purpose. 133
20. Fines
One alternative means of enforcing minor violations of the cove-
nants and restrictions is fining. The authority for fining was initially
found in the not-for-profit corporation laws. Section 617.10(3), Florida
Statutes, provided that the corporation might, in its by-laws, delegate
to its board the power to assess fines in such sums as may be fixed, or
the limits or occasions determined by said by-laws. The first reported
use of the fining authority occurred at the Winston Tower 100 Condo-
minium in North Dade County. 34 Mr. Rosenthal was fined by the as-
sociation for repeatedly leaving the condominium parking garage
through the entrance, rather than the exit. The trial court confirmed
130. FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1) (1991).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. No unit owner may be excused from paying his pro rata share of the com-
mon expenses unless all unit owners are similarly excused. Although the unit owner
cannot theoretically be made 100 percent whole, he will be able to recover most of the
costs and expenses.
134. Rosenthal v. Winston Tower 100 Ass'n, Inc., No. 75-23064 (SP Dade
County Ct. 1976).
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the association's authority to levy fines. 18 5 It wasn't until several years
later that the ability to place a lien on the unit and foreclose the lien, in
order to collect the fine, was resolved.
In Elbadaramany v. Oceans Seven Condominium Association,1 6
the condominium association attempted to foreclose a lien it placed on
the unit of Mr. Elbadaramany for parking his boat and boat trailer in
the condominium parking lot. The Florida Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal determined that a fine against a unit was not a common expense
assessable against all units, and thus was not susceptible to being liened
or foreclosed.13 7 The Elbadaramany decision was codified by the legis-
lature the same year, with the addition of fining authority to the en-
forcement provision of section 718.303.138 The enactment specifically
prohibited a fine from becoming a lien against a unit, and limited the
maximum amount of a fine to $50.111 In addition, it required notice
and an opportunity for a hearing to the unit owner. 1 0 Still unresolved
was the question of whether a fine could be levied for each day of a
recurring, violation, and whether there was any limitation on the total
amount of a fine. These questions were answered by the 1991 amend-
ments. Effective April 1, 1992, the maximum amount of each fine was
increased from $50 to $100; however, a ceiling of $1,000 for a continu-
ing violation was imposed. ""
21. Frequently Asked Questions and Answers
A future condominium purchaser will be provided with a separate
sheet entitled "Frequently asked Questions and Answers" by the asso-
ciation."" The intent is to provide prospective purchasers with a sum-
mary of key questions affecting elements of ownership of their condo-
minium units. Included in the question answer sheet must be
information pertaining to the following: voting rights; unit use restric-
tions, including restrictions on the leasing of a unit; recreation rental, if
applicable; assessments, including the basis for levying assessments. 14 3
135. Id.
136. 461 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
137. [d.
138. FLA. STAT. § 718.303(3) (1984) (effective October 1, 1984).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. FLA. STAT. § 718.303(3) (1991).
142. FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (1991).
143. Id.
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The question and answer sheet must also state and identify any court
cases in which the association is currently a party of record and for
which the association may face liability in excess of $100,000." The
question and answer sheet shall be maintained as part of the associa-
tion's official records.", 5
22. Alternative Dispute Resolution; Voluntary Mediation;
Mandatory Nonbinding Arbitration
While there have been many advocates for alternative means of
resolving internal condominium disputes,"' early legislative efforts147
failed because they were neither mandatory nor binding. Furthermore,
the absence of prevailing party legal fees provided little incentive for an
association to utilize the voluntary arbitration procedures of the Divi-
sion. With the enactment of the 1991 amendments, alternative dispute
resolution is now mandatory within certain defined parameters,"18 and
voluntary mediation is encouraged." 49 While parties to any dispute may
voluntarily agree to binding arbitration, in the condominium setting,
only disputes which fall within the specified provisions of the Act are
subject to its "mandatory nonbinding arbitration" provisions. 5' The
term "dispute," as defined in the Act, only covers disagreements be-
tween two or more parties which involve the authority of the board of
directors, or arises under any law or association document requiring a
owner to take action, or not take action regarding its unit.' 5' Also in-
144. Id.
145. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(12)(a)(14) (1991).
146. See Martin v. Key Largo Kampground, Inc., 501 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1987) ("We remain hopeful, though not optimistic that the legislature will
provide a forum to settle disputes of this nature without employing the full panoply of
trial and appellate procedures.").
147. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1982); FLA. STAT. § 718,112(2)(L)
(1986).
148. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1991). The language of the Act was modeled after
provisions of the Montgomery County, Maryland Community Association Dispute Res-
olution Law [Bill 44-89 adopted February 27, 1990]
149. See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(2) (1991).
150. The term "mandatory non-binding arbitration" appears to be contradictory
of itself. It is necessary due to the provision in the Florida Constitution which provides
that "the courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury .... " See FLA.
CONST. art 1, § 21. As a result, any mandatory alternative dispute resolution in process
must afford the parties the right of review by the courts.
151. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1) (1991). See FLA. STAT. § 718.111(12)(c) 1991
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cluded in the definition of a "dispute" is a disagreement between the
parties involving the alteration or addition to a common area or ele-
ment, the failure of the association to properly conduct meetings or
elections, the failure to give proper notice of a meeting, and the failure
to allow inspection of the books and records.152 While disagreements
that primarily involve title to any unit or the common elements, war-
ranties and the levy of and collection of assessments are specifically
excluded from mandatory arbitration.' 5" These are not the only dis-
agreements excluded, other disputes not specifically covered by the pro-
visions of the Act would be excluded as well.
Where mandatory arbitration applies, the parties must arbitrate
their disputes prior to instituting a court action. 54 Arbitration is to be
conducted by the Division. 55 Arbitrators must be members in good
standing with the Florida Bar, and full-time employees of the Divi-
sion."5 6 The arbitration is to be conducted pursuant to rules of proce-
dure promulgated by the Division. 57 The decision of the arbitrators
shall be final if a complaint for a trial de novo is not filed within thirty
days."'58 In an effort to discourage unnecessary delays in the enforce-
ment of the arbitration decision, a party seeking a review of the arbi-
trator's decision will be assessed the other party's arbitration costs,
court costs, and other reasonable costs, including attorney's fees, inves-
tigation expenses, and expenses for expert or other testimony or evi-
dence incurred after the arbitration hearing, if the judgment upon the
trial de novo is not more favorable than the arbitration decision.' 59 If
the judgment is more favorable, the party who filed a complaint for
trial de novo and won will be entitled to court costs and attorney's
fees. 160 Enforcement of a final decision of the arbitrator is through the
(an additional penalty for failure to provide records within five working days after re-
ceipt of a written request).
152. Id.
153. I'd.
154. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4)(a) (1991).
155. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4) (1991).
156. Id.
157. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4) (1991). As of the writing of this article, the pro-
posed Rules of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes
for mandatory non-binding arbitration, Rule 7D-45.001 to .048, were still in the draft-
ing stage.
158. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4)(c) (1991). In a trial de novo, the decision of the
arbitrator is admissible in evidence. FLA. STAr. § 718.1255(4).
159. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4)(d) (1991).
160. Id.
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circuit court in the jurisdiction where the arbitration took place."'
B. Creation, Application
1. Jungle Den
Given the alternatives of either submitting property to condomin-
ium ownership or avoiding the complex regulatory scheme by adopting
a non-condominium format, perhaps a homeowner association, most de-
velopers will elect the latter. It is therefore particularly disconcerting
for one making that election to be told that the condominium laws will
be applied to their "non-condominium" property owners' association.
The question of whether a property owners' association 162 that is re-
sponsible for the operation and maintenance of non-condominium prop-
erty is subject to the condominium laws was first addressed in Palm
Beach Leisureville Community Ass'n v. Raines.' A companion case""
decided the question of prevailing party legal fees. Given the fact that
attorney's fees are only awarded when provided by statute or contract,
the determination of whether the prevailing party in the initial
Leisureville case was entitled to recovery of attorney's fees under sec-
tion 718.303(1) became critical. In Raines v. Palm Beach Leisureville
Community Association, Inc.,' 65 the court answered in the negative.
Several years later, the Florida Supreme Court was given the opportu-
nity to revisit the question. The Third District Court of Appeal had
determined that a homeowners' association which had membership
comprised solely of condominium unit owners, which operated on as-
sessments of unit owners, and whose function encompassed some main-
tenance and control of condominium property, was an "association"
under the Condominium Act.'6 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court
161. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4)(e) (1991). A petition of enforcement cannot be
granted unless the time for appeal by the filing of a complaint for trial de novo has
expired. Id.
162. Homeowners Association (HOA) or Master Association, as distinguished
from a Statutory Condominium Association.
163. 398 So.2d 471 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
164. Raines v. Palm Beach Leisureville Community Ass'n, Inc., 413 So. 2d 30
(Fla. 1982).
165. Id.
166. See Siegel v. Division of Florida Land Sales & Condominiums, 453 So. 2d
414 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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reversed 167 and reaffirmed its decision in Raines. The court held that a
homeowners' association which might eventually be partially comprised
of non-condominium dwellers, and presently had authority to impose
assessments upon properties which were not condominium property
within the scope of the Condominium Act, was not a Condominium
Association.168
The issue became clouded in 1988 after the Florida Fifth District
Court of Appeal determined that a recreation association, organized to
provide an entity for ownership, operation, and management of recrea-
tional facilities for the use of all present and future condominium unit
owners, was in substance and foundation acting as a condominium as-
sociatiort, and therefore, subject to the Condominium Act." 9 In an ef-
fort to resolve the controversy, the definition of "association" in the
Condominium Act has been amended to include "any entity which op-
erates or maintains other real property in which condominium unit
owners have use rights, where unit owner membership in the associa-
tion is composed exclusively of condominium unit owners1 70 or their
elected or appointed representatives and where membership in the asso-
ciation is a required condition of unit ownership. '17 1
2. Undivided Share in the Common Elements
An essential component of every unit is that unit's proportion of
fractional interest in the common elements. In a residential condomin-
ium, the proportional or fractional share of the ownership must be the
same as the fractional or proportional share of the common expenses.172
Beyond said requirement, there has never been any guideline for estab-
lishing a uniform relationship among units based upon size or location.
In fact, as long as ownership and sharing were the same, and as long as
the relationship was disclosed, it could be totally arbitrary and/or pur-
posely designed to benefit a particular unit at the expense of others. To
preclude the potential for abuse,173 the legislature amended the act so
167. Department of Business Regulation v. Siegel, 479 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1985).
168. Id.
169. Downey v. Jungle Den Villas, 525 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
170. See Siegel, 479 So. 2d 112 (applying a constituency test).
171. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(2) (1991).
172. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(4)(g) (1991).
173. For example, a developer building the entire penthouse floor for his personal
unit might allocate the percentage of ownership in the common elements and propor-
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that for condominiums created after April 1, 1992, the ownership share
of the common elements assigned to each residential unit shall be based
upon the total square footage of each residential unit in uniform rela-
tionship to the total square footage of each of the other residential units
in the condominiums or on an equal fractional basis.174
3. Ceiling Imposed on Vote Requirement to Approve
Amendments to the Declaration
Drafters of condominium documents have traditionally retained
the ability to permanently control development concepts by imposing
severe limitations on the ability of a condominium to amend its decla-
ration of condominium without the written consent of every unit owner.
For example, a developer selling to foreign investors could insure the
purchasers of their long term ability to lease their units by restricting
the right to prohibit leases without the consent of every owner. For
condominiums created after April 1, 1991, the right to impose long
term controls will be significantly diminished. Except for the right to
continue to require 100% consent in order to materially alter or modify
the appurtenances17 5 to a unit, or create a time share unit,17,6 no decla-
ration recorded after April 1, 1992 shall require that amendments be
approved by more than four-fifths of the voting interests. 177 The right
of the developer to unilaterally amend the condominium documents
without the consent of unit owners will be limited to certain specific
situations.17 8 In addition to the imposition of a ceiling, there is now a
floor. The minimal threshold for approving amendments for condomini-
ums recorded after April 1, 1992, is a majority of the total voting
interest.19
Requiring the consent of mortgagees to an amendment to the dec-
laration for declarations recorded after April 1, 1992, will similarly be
limited to amendments materially affecting the rights or interests of the
tional sharing in the common expenses at a nominal level, shifting the operational bur-
den for his unit to the other unit owners.
174. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(4)(f) (1991).
175. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1991).
176. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(8) (1991).
177. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(1)(a) (1991).
178. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(2) (1991). This limitation does not apply to time
share condominiums. Id.
179. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1991).
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mortgagees.'8 0
4. Developer Maintenance Guarantee
A condominium developer may elect to guarantee the operating
budget for a stated period of time, in lieu of paying assessments for
developer-owned units.""1 There has been an on-going controversy con-
cerning the developer's right to extend the guarantee period without the
consent of the unit owners. After April 1, 1992, the guarantee may
provide that after the initial stated period, the developer has an option
to extend the guarantee for one or more additional stated periods. 182
5. Transfer of Association Control
In the early years of condominiums, developers were able to main-
tain perpetual control over the operation of condominium communities
through the use of devices such as long-term sweetheart management
contracts or by reserving the right in the condominium documents to
select or manage the association board. Among the first rights afforded
unit owners during an era of consumer reforms was the right at a speci-
fied time to have representation on the board and, ultimately, to have
the right to control the board."8 3 These rights were tied to closing on a
given number of condominium sales.' 8 An economic downturn could
leave a developer holding a large inventory of units and thus ensure
virtually perpetual control. Provisions designed to force transition when
the developer was no longer building or selling'85 did not alleviate the
180. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(l) (1991).
181. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(9)(a)2 (1991). A developer guaranteeing the budget
must obligate itself to pay any amount of common expenses incurred during the guar-
antee period that is not covered by the assessments receivable from other unit owners.
Id.
182. Id.
183. See FLA. STAT. § 711.66 (1974) (effective October 1, 1974).
184. Unit owners were entitled to elect a majority of the members of the board
three years after seventy-five percent of the units that would be operated ultimately by
the association were conveyed to purchasers; or, three months after ninety percent of
the units that would be operated ultimately by the association were being conveyed to
purchasers. See FLA. STAT. § 711.66(1) (1974) (effective October 1, 1974).
185. Developers were compelled to turn over control when all units were com-
pleted but some were no longer being offered for sale in the ordinary course of business.
See FLA. STAT. § 711.66(1) (1974); see also FLA. STAT. § 718.301(1)(d) (1977) (pro-
viding for control when a developer is no longer constructing units).
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problem. To insure the right of unit owners to ultimately take control
of their associations, the Act has again been amended. Established is
an outside turnover time requirement of seven years after recordation
of the declaration of condominium for associations operating a single
condominium, or seven years from recordation of the declaration of the
first condominium it operates for an association operating more than
one condominium."' In the case of a phase condominium, the time re-
quirement is seven years after recordation of the declaration creating
the initial phase. 8 "
Following transition, the developer, at the developer's expense, is
obligated to turn over to the association the financial records of the
association, reviewed by an independent certified public accountant.'1 8
The scope of the report is clarified by the 1991 amendments. It is now
mandated that the financial records be audited for the period from the
incorporation of the association or from the period covered by the last
audit."'
6. Warranties
The duty owed by a design professional to the ultimate purchaser
of a condominium unit and the association was thought to have been
well settled.' 90 However, the question as to the liability of a design pro-
fessional for negligence in design was clouded by the holding of the
Second District Court of Appeal in Seibert, AIA, Architect & Planner,
P.A. v. Bayport Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n.'9' In order to resolve any
doubt, the Florida Legislature amended section 718.203 to specifically
add design professionals, architects and engineers to the list of those
who warrant the fitness of their work in the construction of condomin-
ium buildings.192
186. FLA. STAT. § 718.301(1)(e) (1991); a proposed division rule has construed
this amendment as having prospective application only. It would apply to condomini-
ums created after April 1, 1992. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.7D-23.003(l 1) (proposed).
187. Id.
188. FLA. STAT. § 718.301(4)(c) (1991).
189. Id.
190. See Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development Concepts Corp., 373 So. 2d 689
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
191. 573 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
192. FLA. STAT. § 718.203(2) (1991).
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7. Leasehold Condominiums
The right to declare leasehold estates to condominiums was clari-
fied in 1976 with the enactment of section 718.401. This section pro-
vides that a condominium could be created on lands held by a devel-
oper under lease, if, on the date the first unit is conveyed by the
developer to a bona fide purchaser, the lease has an unexpired term of
at least 50 years.193 The 1991 amendments allow for the creation of
commercial condominiums and time-share condominiums on leaseholds
with unexpired terms of 30 years. 194
8. Powers and Duties of Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums and Mobile Homes
There was little to compel a recalcitrant officer or director of a
condominium association to follow the strict mandates of the Act. Not-
withstanding the pronouncement within the Act that the officers and
directors have a fiduciary relationship to the unit owners,195 a director
was not personally liable for monetary damages to the corporation or
any other person for any statement, vote, decision, or failure to act,
regarding corporate management or policy, unless the director
breached or failed to perform his duties as a director, and this breach
or failure to perform constituted a violation of criminal law or was a
transaction for which the director derived an improper personal bene-
fit.' 9 ' Although the Division had the authority to institute enforcement
proceedings against an association violating the Act, 19 7 and assess a
civil penalty for the violation, 98 the parties ultimately responsible to
pay for the violation were the unit owners. As amended, effective April
1, 1991, the Act now allows the Division to seek enforcement directly
against an officer or director, issue a cease and desist order directly
against an officer or director, and/or impose a civil penalty directly
193. FLA. STAT. § 718.401 (1977).
194. FLA. STAT. § 718.401(l) (1991).
195. See FLA. STAT. § 718.111 (1)(a) (199 1). This language first appeared in the
Act in 1974 in response to the lobby efforts of condominium activist David Osterer.
See FLA. STAT. § 711.12 (1974).
196. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0831 (Supp. 1990). A director appointed by a devel-
oper to the board of directors of a condominium or cooperative association are not
extended this protection. Id.
197. FLA. STAT. § 718.501(1)(d) (Supp. 1990).
198. FLA. STAT. § 718.501(1)(d)4 (Supp. 1990).
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against an officer or director violating provisions of the Act. 199 The con-
dominium commission recommended that the association be precluded
from indemnifying the violating officer or director. However, this rec-
ommendation was not adopted by the legislature.
An important new tool in the Division's arsenal is the right of the
Division to conduct random investigations of associations.'" Such in-
vestigations may be instituted without reasonable cause to suspect that
a violation of the rules has occurred.20 1 After giving an association
twenty days advance written notice, the Division may review the finan-
cial operations and other operational aspects of the association. If a
review reveals evidence of irregularity, the Division may perform a
compliance audit.20 2 If upon completion of the audit, a violation of stat-
ute or rule is determined to exist, the Division may recover the fees and
costs of the audit from the association regardless of whether the viola-
tions are voluntarily reconciled by the association. At the conclusion of
its investigation the Division shall give the association a reasonable op-
portunity to cure any operational deficiency. If the association agrees to
do so, no civil penalty will be levied for a non-recurring violation.20 3
To assist condominium owners and the directors in understanding
their rights and responsibilities, the Division is mandated to provide
training programs. 20 " To insure unit owners access to the Division, it is
statutorily-mandated that a toll-free number be provided.20 5
To pay for all these additional services, the annual fee paid by
each unit increases from $1 to $4 for a period of two years. Thereafter,
the fee shall be $3 per unit.20 6
199. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.501(1)(d)(2), (4) (1991). H.B. 841 being considered by
the 1992 Legislature defines "willfully and knowingly" to mean the division informed
the officer or board member that his action or intended action violated the law and that
the board member refuses to comply with the requirement.
200. FLA. STAT. § 718.501(1)(k) (1991). H.B. 841 being considered by the Flor-
ida Legislature would repeal this provision.
201. Id. Critics of this provision question the right of any agency to appear on
private property without probable cause. Some equate the Division's new authority to
that enjoyed by the KGB in pre-detente Russia.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. FLA. STAT. § 718.501(l)(1) (1991).
205. FLA. STAT. § 718.501(1)(m) (1991).
206. FLA. STAT. § 718.501(2)(a) (1991).
[Vol. 16
507
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Poliakoff
9. Non-Developer Disclosure
In an effort to afford all prospective condominium owners an op-
portunity to learn of their rights and responsibilities as condominium
owners prior to being obligated to purchase, the buyer must receive at
the seller's expense a current copy of the declaration of condominium,
articles of incorporation, by-laws and rules and regulations, as well as
the "Question and Answer Sheet '12 7 required by the Act.208 The buyer
has the right to unilaterally void the contract within seven days of the
receipt by the buyer of the aforesaid documents.209 The seller may ob-
tain a set of documents from the Association. 0
10. Ombudsman 1'
In an effort to assist condominium unit owners seeking Division
assistance in avoiding bureaucratic entanglements, an office of the Con-
dominium Ombudsman is created. 12 The ombudsman will act as a liai-
son between the Division and unit owners, assisting the unit owner
when necessary in the preparation and filing of a complaint to be inves-
tigated by the Division. 13 In addition, the ombudsman is granted such
powers as are necessary to carry out the duties of his office,21 4 including
but not limited to having access to and use of all files and records of
207. See FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (1991) (requiring a page entitled "Frequently
Asked Questions and Answers," in the format required by the Division).
208. FLA. STAT. § 718.503(2)(b)l (1991). This provision only applies to resale of
a residential unit by a unit owner who is not a developer.
209. Id.
210. See FLA. STAT. § 718.111(15) (1991) (the association may charge its actual
costs for preparing and furnishing these documents to those requesting same).
211. H.B. 841 being considered by the Florida Legislature may repeal this
provision.
212. FLA. STAT. § 718.5015(1) (1991). The Ombudsman, who must be an attor-
ney licensed to practice in Florida, will be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the
Joint Legislative Auditing Committee. FLA. STAT. § 718.5015(2) (1991). Although the
Ombudsman's principal office will be in Leon County on the premises of the Division,
the Ombudsman is to be independent of the Division. FLA. STAT. § 718.5015(1) (1991).
The Ombudsman and his/her staff are prohibited from political involvements. FLA.
STAT. § 718.5015(2) (1991).
213. The Condominium Study Commission considered and rejected a proposal
which would have provided legal assistance to unit owners filing complaints with the
Division.
214. FLA. STAT. § 718.5016 (1991).
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the Division. 15 The ombudsman is also granted the power to prepare
reports and make recommendations, prepare legislation, and propose
orders to the Division, the Governor, the Advisory Council on Condo-
miniums, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives on any matter within the Division's jurisdiction. 16
11. Advisory Council on Condominiums
A seven-member Advisory Council on Condominiums was created
as a vehicle for receiving input from the public regarding issues of con-
cern and recommendations for changes to the Condominium law.1 17 In
addition, the Advisory Council is given the responsibility for reviewing,
evaluating and advising the Division concerning the revision and adop-
tion of rules, as well as recommending improvements, if needed, to the
Division education program. 8
C. Miscellaneous
In an effort to conform the definition of a "time share estate"
within the Condominium Act to that used in the Time Share Act, 1
section 718.103(22) was rewritten to provide that a "time share estate"
means any interest in a unit under which the exclusive right of use,
possession or occupancy of the unit circulates among the various pur-
chasers of a time share plan pursuant to chapter 721 on a recurring
basis for a period of time."
IV. CONCLUSION
The beauty of our laws is their ability to change to meet the needs
of society. As new concepts have been coupled with the condominium
215. FLA. STAT. § 718.5016(1) (1991).
216. FLA. STAT. § 718.5016(2) (1991).
217. FLA. STAT. § 718.5019(1) (1991). Two members are to be appointed by the
Speaker of the House, two appointed by the President of the Senate, and three ap-
pointed by the Governor. Id. At least one appointee must represent time share condo-
miniums. Id. To insure continuity on the Board, a staggered appointment will be effec-
tuated by having one appointee of the Governor, the Speaker and President serve one
year terms, while the others serve a two year term. Id.
218. FLA. STAT. § 718.5019(2) (1991).
219. 1990 Fla. Laws. ch. 721.
220. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(22) (1991).
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format, as our experiences have expanded, and as court interpretations
have suggested the need, new legislation has been added to address op-
erational problems and new areas of potential abuse. Legislation con-
ceived twenty-eight years ago to recognize the condominium concept of
property ownership has grown into a body of law governing almost
every aspect of communal living. The result is a mechanism designed to
insure and protect the viability of the condominium concept.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's law on undue influence in testamentary matters, like
Caesar's Gaul, may be divided into three historical phases. In the first
phase, Florida courts developed what might be called a totality of the
circumstances test to determine the presence of undue influence exer-
cised upon a testator. In the second phase, a burden-shifting eviden-
tiary presumption was developed. The third phase, that began with the
landmark Carpenter' case, saw a marked, fundamental change in the
significance accorded the presumption of undue influence developed in
the second phase. This article will trace the development of Florida's
law of undue influence and examine the possible effect of Florida's evi-
dence code on the strength of presumptions. Finally, this article will
suggest that the Carpenter presumption has occupied too central a role
in undue influence litigation and that both the Bench and Bar should
reexamine the approach to undue influence developed in the first phase.
* Circuit Court Judge for the 19th Judicial Circuit; Masters in Arts and Judicial
Studies, University of Nevada, 1991; J.D., with honors, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1975; A.B., cum laude, Loyola University of Chicago, 1970.
1. In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1971).
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II. THE INITIAL PHASE
Florida courts initially developed a fact-specific test to determine
the presence of undue influence. The 1919 case of Newman v. Smith2 is
illustrative of this approach. In Newman, the testator, shortly before
his death, executed a will that left all his property to his second wife
and disinherited his only child, a daughter.' The facts of the case indi-
cated that a prior will provided for an equal division of the estate be-
tween the daughter and the stepmother." Moreover, the testator had on
numerous occasions expressed an intention to provide for his daughter.'
There was also considerable medical evidence concerning his mental
capacity insofar as it related to his susceptibility to the influence of
others.' Additional evidence suggested that the stepmother, during the
father's last illness and hospitalization, attempted to prevent the daugh-
ter from seeing her father.7 Finally, the evidence revealed a close, af-
fectionate relationship between the daughter and the father 8 as con-
trasted with the less than cordial relations between the decedent and
the stepmother.9 This antipathy also extended to the stepmother's
family. 10
The Newman court initially defined undue influence as "over-per-
suasion, coercion, or force that destroys or hampers the free agency and
willpower of the testator."" The court also recognized that "undue in-
fluence can seldom, if ever, be established by direct evidence," but is
often "conclusively shown by its results." 2 Undue influence, the court
held, must "be proven when it appears the testator was of sound
mind." 3 The burden of proof can be satisfied if a "legitimate inference
from the facts and circumstances in the case""' supports such a conclu-
sion. The Newman court found that the following factors in the case
supported a finding of undue influence: 1) an entire change from for-
2. 82 So. 236 (Fla. 1918).
3. Id. at 237.
4. Id. at 238.
5. Id. at 242.
6. Id. at 242-45.
7. Newman, 82 So. at 249.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 242.
I0. Id.
11. Id. at 246.
12. Newman, 82 So. at 251.
13. Id. at 246.
14. Id. at 251-57.
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mer testamentary intentions; 2) an unnatural disposition of property; 3)
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will; 4) the suscep-
tibility of the testator to influence; 5) the conduct of the stepmother in
preventing the daughter from visiting her father; and 6) the poor rela-
tions between the wife and testator."5 The court found in this case what
it characterized as "numerous indications of undue influence." 16 New-
man also illustrates the difficulty of the issue itself. The court's initial
opinion which upheld the disputed will was withdrawn, a motion for re-
hearing granted,1 7 and a switch of one Justice resulted in a finding of
undue influence. 8
In a subsequent case, Hamilton v. Morgan,9 the decedent's chil-
dren attacked their father's will on grounds of undue influence. That
will, by its terms, virtually disinherited the children and left the bulk of
the decedent's estate to his nephews.2 0 The court once again stated that
duly-executed wills should be given effect "unless it clearly appears
that the free use of a sound mind by the testator was in fact prevented
by deception, undue influence or other means ...otherwise the right
given by statute to dispose of property by will would be thwarted."'"
The court, like the court in Newman, employed a fact-specific analysis
that looked to "(1) the character of the transaction; (2) the mental
condition of the parties; and (3) the relationship of the parties."22 The
facts of the case revealed, in the court's words, that "family relations in
the Hamilton home had long been turbulent and rent by domestic cy-
clones." 3 The decedent had been totally alienated from his children
and had been ignored by them during the period shortly before his
death when he was an invalid. 4 In the court's view, the evidence
showed "conclusively a deliberate purpose on the part of the testator,
actuated by resentment . . . to disinherit the contestants who had be-
come estranged from and neglected him and to make the objects of his
bounty those who had consoled and comforted him in the years of his
15. Id. at 251-52.
16. Id. at 251.
17. Newman, 82 So. at 246.
18. Id. at 252.
19. 112 So. 80 (Fla. 1927).
20. Id. at 82.
21. Id. at 81.
22. Id. at 83.
23. Id. at 81.
24. Hamilton, 112 So. at 81.
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decline and misfortune. '2 5 It is interesting that one of the beneficiary
nephews was a physician and treated the decedent.2 6 The court, how-
ever, apparently felt that this circumstance was of no consequence in
view of the other evidence in the case. In addition, a close examination
of the three-part test used by the court indicated that it was a short-
hand method of categorizing evidence relevant to the issue of undue
influence and the court used the categories in determining if undue in-
fluence was present.
In the 1932 case of Gardiner v. Goertner," the court again em-
ployed a fact-specific approach that looked to the totality of the evi-
dence to determine the presence of undue influence. The three-part test
described in Hamilton was again used to categorize relevant evidence
rather than as a presumption or litmus test. In Gardiner, the court reit-
erated the difficulties of proof by observing that "undue influence is
usually not exercised openly in the presence of others so that it may be
directly proved, hence it may be proved by indirect evidence of facts
and circumstances from which it may be inferred."2 9 The court pro-
vided what may be characterized as relevant facts to be considered in
determining the presence of undue influence.30
The factors to be considered on the issue of undue influence
included:
(1) opportunity to exercise, (2) susceptibility of the testator, (3) a
disposition to (by the beneficiary) exercise it, (4) a result that is
indicative, (5) unnatural disposition, (6) persuasion, (7) solicitation
(even if wife or husband), (8) other acts resulting from demon-
strated undue influence, (9) apparent inequality or unreasonable
testamentary disposition, (10) change in former testamentary dis-
positions, (11) interest or motive of a beneficiary, (12) circum-
stances attending execution of the will, (13) will being drawn by
the beneficiary or at his direction, (14) will drawn by a beneficiary
who stands in a confidential relation, and (15) the relations existing
between the testator and the beneficiary."
25. Id. at 82.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 83.
28. 149 So. 186 (Fla. 1933).
29. Id. at 190.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 190-91.
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The Gardiner court, in recognizing this last factor, made reference to a
presumption of undue influence where a confidential relationship exists
between the beneficiary and the testator." A close reading of the case,
however, supports a conclusion that this merely was dicta. In Gardiner,
the supreme court adhered to and arguably refined the fact-specific to-
tality of the circumstances test first used in Hamilton.
In an even later case, In re Donnelly's Estate,3" the court again
continued adherence to the fact-specific test. Adequate resolution, in
the court's view, still required that:
A very wide range of testimony is permissible on the issue of undue
influence. This is due to the fact that undue influence can seldom
be shown except by circumstantial evidence. It results from the
facts and circumstances and surroundings of the testator and his
associations with the person or persons exercising the undue influ-
ence. For this reason, it is proper to consider the testator's dealings
and associations with the beneficiaries; his habits, motives, feelings;
his strength or weakness of character; his confidential family, social
and business relations; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
the will; his mental and physical condition at the time the will was
made; his manner and conduct; and generally every fact which will
throw any light on the issue raised by the charge of undue
influence.3 4
As in Gardiner, the court referred to other states that utilized pre-
sumptions when a beneficiary stood in a confidential relationship to the
testator. 35 The court did not, however, squarely address that issue.
In summary, the Florida Supreme Court initially used a fact-spe-
cific totality of the circumstances test to determine the presence of un-
due influence. This approach recognized the difficulties inherent in
proving undue influence and allowed a searching inquiry into the char-
acter of the transaction, the mental condition of the testator and the
relationship between the parties.36 When using this test, a confidential
relationship and active procurement of the will did not create a pre-
sumption of undue influence, but were used as relevant factors in the
32. Id. at 191.
33. In re Donnelly's Estate, 188 So. 108 (Fla. 1938).
34. Id. at 113.
35. Id. at 113-14.
36. Id.
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evidentiary equation. 37 Thus, during this initial period, no presumption
of undue influence based on a confidential relationship was developed
or recognized.
III. THE PRESUMPTION EMERGES IN PHASE Two
The second phase of Florida's law on undue influence began with
the 1940 case of In re Gottschalk's Estate.88 This case was the earliest
case to squarely hold that a presumption of undue influence could arise
when a specific factual pattern was demonstrated. In Gottschalk, a
companion of the decedent attempted to obtain probate of a will in his
favor.39 The favorable will represented a total and radical change in the
testatrix' previous will.'0 Not unsurprisingly, the new will omitted all
family members, including her adopted daughter who had been the de-
cedent's constant companion for almost 27 years.' Chief Justice Ter-
rell, writing for the court, observed:
When a total stranger moves into the home with an old lady,
secures her confidence, and shows up after her death with a will to
what she has that none of her lawful heirs know anything about,
and which is surrounded by other suspicious circumstances, the
burden is on him to show he came by it as the free voluntary act of
the testatrix.42
The Gottschalk court seemed to erect the presumption because
"[tihe direct evidence in support of undue influence . . . is not as
strong as such issues are sometimes supported." 43 The facts of the case
would seem, however, to support the conclusion of undue influence even
in the fact-specific approach used in the previously discussed cases.
Factually, as indicated earlier, there was a complete change in testa-
mentary scheme. The new disposition omitted the testatrix' "main sup-
37. For other Florida cases applying a fact-specific totality test, see Marston v.
Churchill, 187 So. 762 (Fla. 1939); Henson v. Deniston, 169 So. 624 (Fla. 1936);
Theus v. Theus, 161 So. 76 (Fla. 1935); In re Starr's Estate, 170 So. 620 (Fla. 1935);
Ziegler v. Brown, 150 So. 608 (Fla. 1933).
38. 196 So. 844 (Fla. 1940).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 845.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
43. Gottschalk, 196 So. at 844.
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port, natural beneficiary, and constant companion,"" and was, there-
fore, unnatural." In the court's view, the later will was itself evidence
of undue influence because it was executed secretly under suspicious
circumstances." The beneficiary's marriage proposal, in view of the
wide disparity in ages, also was a factor of some significance in the
court's opinion." Finally, the court looked to the beneficiary's "ample
opportunity to influence the testatrix."'4" Thus, it could quite convinc-
ingly be argued that considering the shorthand relationship of the par-
ties, the character of the transaction and mental condition of the par-
ties, the totality of the circumstances supported a finding of undue
influence. The Gottschalk presumption itself, therefore, appeared to be
fact specific and, unfortunately, provided no guidance with regard to
which facts would raise the presumption.
Therefore, the Gottschalk presumption offered no guidance to trial
courts or the Bar. Indeed, a broad reading of Gottschalk seems to sup-
port a conclusion that the fact-specific approach, if indicative of undue
influence, was not elevated to a burden-shifting presumption. Unfortu-
nately, the supreme court never addressed the questions raised by the
Gottschalk decision. The court, instead of refining or defining the new
presumption, was to render a decision at that time that would change
the entire focus of Florida law on the issue of undue influence. That
case, In re Aldrich's Estate,'49 will therefore require extended discus-
sion with special emphasis on Chief Justice Brown's concurring
opinion.
The court, in the first phase of Aldrich, affirmed per curium, both
the probate and circuit courts' finding of no undue influence.50 This
would have been unremarkable except for the court's next step. Affirm-
ance, the court observed, was appropriate "even though the burden of
proof on the issue of undue influence was technically on the proponents
of the will, a confidential fiduciary relation of patient and his physician
and his business manager existing between the testator and a leading
beneficiary . . . ."'I Affirmance was appropriate due to record evi-
dence that the beneficiaries "served the physical necessity of the testa-
44. Id. at 845.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Gottschalk, 196 So. at 845.
49. .3 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1941).
50. Id. at 857.
51. Id.
1991]
517
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
tor during a long illness before and after the will was executed and the
testator had only collateral surviving relatives who had not rendered
him service or attention."5 Aldrich, like Gottschalk, recognized a pre-
sumption of undue influence that appeared to be burden-shifting; i.e.,
requiring the proponent of the will to demonstrate the absence of undue
influence. 3 The Aldrich presumption was, however, more clearly de-
fined as it centered on a fiduciary benefitting from the relationship.84
The court did not, unfortunately, stop there, but went on in a majority
concurring opinion to sow seeds of confusion that would blossom until
pruned by Carpenter.
The concurring opinion, by Chief Justice Brown, provided both a
comprehensive discussion of prior case law on testamentary undue in-
fluence and a systematic exposition of an undue influence presumption
based on a confidential relationship. 55
In his opinion, the Chief Justice conceded that prior Florida case
law had not clearly recognized a presumption of undue influence based
on possible abuse of a confidential relationship. 5 The Gottschalk pre-
sumption, to the Chief Justice, was "raised by a set of circumstances
somewhat unusual" and not dispositive.57 The Chief Justice also ob-
served that prior case law had treated confidential relationships as only
"a circumstance which may be considered on this issue." 58
From this historical vantage point, the Chief Justice then devel-
oped what he viewed as the correct test to support a presumption of
testamentary undue influence.59 That test was based on three primary
sources: two treatises and Alabama case law. 60 A testamentary pre-
sumption of undue influence would arise from: 1) a confidential rela-
tionship between the testator and the beneficiary; 2) active procure-
ment of the will by the beneficiary; and 3) substantial benefit to the
beneficiary. 61 The opinion also discussed the impact of the Probate
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 857.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 857-58.
57. Id. at 858.
58. Id.
59. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 861.
60. Id. at 858-61.
61. Bancroft v. Otis, 8 So. 286 (Ala. 1890); Lyons v. Campbell, 7 So. 250 (Ala.
1890); DANIEL H. REDFEARN. WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN FLORIDA (1933).
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Code upon the proposed presumption. - The applicable probate statute
provided that:
In all proceedings contesting the validity of a purported will,
the: burden of proof, in the first instance, shall be upon the propo-
nent thereof to establish, prima facie, the formal execution and at-
testation thereof, whereupon the burden of proof shall shift to the
contestant to establish the facts constituting the grounds upon
which the probate of such purported will is opposed or revocation
thereof is sought.63
In his view, the presumption was consistent with the statute be-
cause it required the opponent of the will to establish the facts that
supported the presumption itself. 4 The resulting presumption was, to
Chief Justice Brown, "one of fact and not of law. Consequently this
presumption may be rebutted by any evidence which shows that the
testator acted freely and voluntarily in making his will and not under
the coercion or the constraint of the person charged with undue influ-
ence." 65 Thus, the presumption did not in the strict sense effect the
burden of proof, but rather operated on the burden of producing evi-
dence which "rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative
of the issue . . . . This burden of proof never shifts during the course
of a trial ... "66
The presumption could then be rebutted factually by an eviden-
tiary showing that,
the testator had independent advice, or the opportunity to avail
themselves of independent advice; or that the beneficiary was not
present at the interview between the testator and the draftsman of
the will, nor present at its execution; nor that the will as made was
not an unnatural will, but such a will as the testator might have
reasonably been expected to make under the circumstances or that
the testator was of sound mind and discussed with his attorney or
the draftsman of the will the amount and character of his property
and the party or parties whom he wished to devise the said prop-
erty to, and, their respective shares, in such a way as to show the
testator was of sound mind and was able to and did, of his own
62. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 861.
63. Id. at 862.
64. Id.
65. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 858.
66. Id. at 861.
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volition, designate the objects of his bounty, giving good reasons
therefor, or that the disposition of his property as made by the will
was a reasonable or natural one under all the circumstances of the
situation.6
Upon this showing the court could determine the issue "in light of all
the evidence, as to whether the weight of the evidence did, or did not,
show that the will was secured by the exercise of undue influence. '68
It would seem then that a fair reading of the concurring opinion
would result in the conclusion that the proposed presumption was a
Thayer or bursting bubble presumption.69 The opinion apparently left
intact the totality of the circumstances test utilized in earlier cases be-
cause, as indicated previously, rebuttal evidence required the court to
determine the issue from all the evidence in the case and not from use
of the presumption.70 In terms of traditional Florida evidence law, the
presumption, when unrebutted, compelled a finding of undue influence.
If such evidence was introduced, however, the presumption vanished
and the issue would be decided by a review of all the evidence."
Subsequent decisions involving a presumption of undue influence
based on a confidential relationship did not follow the approach out-
lined by the concurring opinion in Aldrich. The presumption was, as
subsequent discussion will demonstrate, treated as one that shifted the
burden of proof to the party who stood in a confidential relationship to
the testator; i.e., as one of law not fact. 2
The 1941 case of In re Eustis' Estate 3 demonstrated Aldrich's
immediate impact. In Eustis, the decedent's nephew, an attorney,
67. Id. at 861.
68. Id. at 862.
69. A Thayer or bursting bubble presumption bursts or vanishes from the case
when contradictory evidence is introduced by the opponent. The underlying facts giving
rise to the presumption will, however, still permit the fact-finder to draw a permissive
inference. A Morgan or burden-shifting presumption places upon the adversary the
burden of proving the non-existence of the presumed fact. This latter presumption can
seriously change the course of a trial. See CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE
62-72 (2d ed. 1982); SPENCER A. GARD, FLORIDA EVIDENCE 768-80 (2d ed. 1980).
The impact of Florida's Evidence Code on the presumption of undue influence that
arises from benefit obtained by one in a relationship of trust and confidence to a dece-
dent will be the subject of further discussion.
70. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 861.
71. Id. at 858.
72. Id.
73. 5 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1941).
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drafted the will and was a principal beneficiary .7 The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's findings of undue influence and observed, the
"[legal presumptions that may have arisen against the appellee be-
cause of his fiduciary relations (attorney) to the testatrix were held by
the lower court to have been overcome by the evidence as to the cir-
cumstances preceding and attendant upon the execution of the will
. .. .' 7 Those circumstances included free intentions by the testatrix,
communication of the contents to other persons before and after execu-
tion, a clear showing of competency of the decedent, and close relations
between the testatrix and the nephew. 76 This language would support a
conclusion that the presumption was indeed of the burden-shifting
variety,
Aldrich and the presumption it created also played a prominent
role in the 1945 case of In re Peters' Estate.7 In Peters, the decedent's
long-time physician was a principal beneficiary. 8 The evidence also es-
tablished that the doctor, although present with others when the con-
tents of the will was discussed by the testatrix, was not present when
the will was drafted or executed. 79 The court approved the trial court's
finding that mere presence when the will was discussed did not consti-
tute active procurement." Thus, the presumption did not arise. In addi-
tion, the court approved the trial court's determination that the facts
were sufficient to overcome the presumption even if it was present.8 1
Those facts, in summary, were knowledge and approval of the contents
by the decedent, disclosure of the will to her attorney, the relations
existing between the decedent and her distant relatives, and the natural
nature of the disposition. 82
In re Palmer's Estate8" continued the Aldrich trend. The trial
court in Palmer found factually that the proponent of the will occupied
a confidential relationship with the decedent, actively participated in
the drafting and execution of the will, and was a principal benefi-
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. 20 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1945).
78. Id. at 488.
79. Id. at 491-92.
80. Id. at 492.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Peters, 20 So. 2d at 492. Peters is also notable because its definition of active
procurement was later accepted by the Carpenter court.
83. In re Palmer's Estate, 48 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1950).
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ciary.8 4 The trial court also determined that the testatrix' mental ca-
pacity was impaired and the beneficiary kept the disputed will exclu-
sively in his possession until after the death of the testatrix.85 Based on
the foregoing factual determinations, the court determined a presump-
tion of undue influence was established.86 The presumption placed upon
the will's proponent the burden "to produce evidence . . . to show that
the will was executed freely and without . . . [undue] influence."'87 The
Florida Supreme Court, citing Redfearn and Peters," affirmed and
found "such facts . . . would be universally held to give rise to a pre-
sumption that undue influence was executed on the testatrix . . . [and
that] [i]t then became the burden of the appellant (proponent) to
prove the absence of undue influence .
The post-Aldrich shift reflected in the previously described cases
continued when district courts of appeal began to address the issue of
undue influence. In re Estate of Knight,90 a 1959 First District Court
of Appeal decision, illustrated this development. In Knight, the trial
court entered a summary judgment sustaining a disputed will.9 ' Evi-
dence in the record supported a conclusion that the testator's brother
who enjoyed a confidential relation with his deceased brother was both
active in procuring the will and was a substantial beneficiary.9" In re-
versing, the First District cited Aldrich and Palmer, and held that
under these facts, "a presumption of undue influence arises, and the
burden rests upon him (the proponent) to overcome the presump-
tion."93 Thus, in the First District's view, "a summary judgment cannot
be entered in favor of one who has the burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption of undue influence . . .
The Third District, in the 1962 case of In re Estate of Reid,95
84. Id. at 733.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. id.
88. REDFEARN, supra note 61; Peters, 20 So. 2d 487.
89. Palmer's, 48 So. 2d at 733 (emphasis added).
90. 108 So. 2d 629, (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
91. Id. at 630.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
94. Id. (emphasis added). The Knight court also relied on the 1955 case on
Zinnser v. Gregory, 77 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1955). The court, in Zinnser, held that the
presumption, while one of fact, did place upon the beneficiary the burden of showing
undue influence was not exercised.
95. 138 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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appeared to add an even heavier burden of proof upon a will proponent
when the presumption was operative. In Reid, the decedent executed a
will naming her attorney as a principal beneficiary.96 The will was pre-
pared and executed by the attorney's law partner.97 The evidence also
established that the attorney beneficiary socialized frequently with the
decedent and took part in her business affairs. 8 He also received
money from the decedent, who was many years his senior, for "escort"
service.99 Finally the evidence indicated the decedent viewed the attor-
ney, to use a current phrase, as her significant other. 00
The Third District initially made reference to the presumption of
undue influence created by three factors; a confidential relationship, ac-
tive procurement, and a principal beneficiary. The court then seemingly
expanded the presumption by observing "[a] much higher degree of
proof is required to overcome an inference of undue influence where the
testator is shown to have impaired mental powers or clouded intellect
than where the testator is strong mentally and in good health."'' In
the court's view, the evidence justified a conclusion that the foregoing
situation was present and attendant upon the proffered will. 0 2 There-
fore, the testimony of Mr. Stafford denying the use of undue influence
was apparently insufficient, as a matter of law, "to rebut the presump-
tion . . .[created by] the confidential relationship ...."103 This testi-
mony was, in the court's view, "not enough to sustain the great burden
the appellee had to carry to rebut the presumption of undue
influence."''
Florida decisions in this second phase expanded the presumption of
undue influence, which was first defined in the Aldrich case. As indi-
cated previously, the Aldrich court viewed the presumption as merely
96. Id. at 343.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 350.
99. Id.
100. Reid, 138 So. 2d at 350.
101. Id. at 349 (citing 57 AM. JUR. Wills § 356 (1948)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added); see also In re Estate of MacPhee, 187 So.
2d 679 (FIa. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). The presumption of undue influence from confi-
dential relations, active procurement, and substantial benefit operates to place heavy
burden on proponent to overcome presumption of undue influence. In re Estate of
Smith, 212 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (citing Peters and MacPhee with
approval).
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one that required production of evidence.1"5 The presumption could be
rebutted by any evidence that the testator acted freely. Evidence, if
presented, would then require the court to decide the issue on all the
evidence in the case. Thus, the presumption affected only the burden of
producing evidence and allowed a party to make a prima facie case of
undue influence. Thus, the burden of proof did not shift to the propo-
nent of the will, but rather remained with the party seeking revocation
at all times in the trial. These subsequent decisions, however, treated
the presumption as one which shifted the burden of proof to the propo-
nent of the will. This shift, unfortunately, occurred with little or no
discussion and created an area of uncertainty in Florida law. It would
remain for the Carpenter court to finally resolve the issue of the effect
of the presumption on the burden of proof in will cases.106
IV. CARPENTER AND ITS PHASE THREE PROGENY
Carpenter, decided in 1971, provided the first comprehensive dis-
cussion of the presumption of undue influence since Aldrich. Justice
McCain, writing for the court, first pointed to the reason for the pre-
sumption by observing that,
the difficulty of obtaining direct proof in cases where undue influ-
ence is alleged [has permitted] will contestants to satisfy their bur-
den initially by showing sufficient facts to raise a presumption of
undue influence. If this is done, and the presumption remains unre-
butted, the county judge is required to find undue influence and
deny the will probate. 07
The opinion next provided a systematic and exhaustive definition
of both confidential relationship and active procurement.'
The opinion then turned to the effect of the presumption, once es-
tablished, on the burden of proof.'09 The court initially observed that
previous decisions "consistently held that the burden of proof shifts to
105. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 858.
106. See Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697.
107. Id. at 701 (emphasis added). This is clearly cast in Thayer terms as it is
based on access to evidence and not public policy grounds. The proponent is, on a
common sense basis, the person in the best position to explain the reasons for the sus-
pect disposition. This is entirely consistent with the concurrence in Aldrich.
108. Id. at 701-02.
109. Id. at 702.
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the proponent when the presumption of undue influence arises."' 10 This
effect was, in Justice McCain's view, at variance with the "general rule
in respect to the effect of presumptions on the burden of proof
... ,, To Justice McCain, a presumption that arises in the course
of a case assists a party in discharging their particular burden of
proof." 2 The adversary, in most instances, must then give an explana-
tion so as to avoid the effect of the presumption.1" In this sense, most
presumptions really affect the order of proof and not the burden of
proof." 4 In the case of a presumption that assists a plaintiff, the burden
is on a defendant to produce evidence to rebut the effect of the pre-
sumption." 5 The risk of non-persuasion; i.e., the strict burden of proof
remains; with the plaintiff throughout the trial." 6
This, to the Carpenter court, created two types of presumptions;
the general rule discussed above and the burden-shifting presumption
applicable in will contest cases." 7 In the court's view, this was incorrect
on both policy and statutory grounds." 8
From a policy standpoint, the court recognized the difficulty of
proof of undue influence because "in will contests the testator is not
available as a witness to tell his version of such dealings, that in fact
usually the only person who is available to testify is the confidential
adviser whose self-interest furnishes a motive for him to take advantage
of his superior position."" 9 These considerations were not sufficient to
justify burden-shifting presumption because "it is frequently as difficult
to disprove undue influence as to prove it, the practical effect of shift-
ing the burden of proof is to raise the presumption virtually to conclu-
sive status and require a finding of undue influence .. .. *"I" This re-
sult was also undesirable because "much of the discretion of the trial
judge to evaluate and weigh the evidence before him is lost and with it
one of the most valuable services we call on trial judges to perform in
110. Id.
111. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 703-04.
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non-jury cases." 2
The court also felt this result was compelled by the intent of the
applicable statute then in effect, Florida Statute section 732.31 22 That
intent, in the court's view, required that "the burden of proof in will
contests shall be on the contestant to establish the grounds constituting
the facts upon which the probate of the purported will is opposed."1 13
The practical effect of this approach was threefold:
First, the burden will be satisfied when the beneficiary comes for-
ward with a reasonable explanation for his or her active role in the
decedent's affairs. The precise nature of the explanation will vary
depending on the facts giving rise to the presumption, and the suffi-
ciency of the explanation to rebut the presumption will be for the
county judge to determine subject to review by the appellate court.
Second, when the burden is satisfied the presumption will vanish
from the case and the county judge will be empowered to decide
the case in accord with the greater weight of the evidence without
regard to the presumption. Third, since the facts giving rise to the
presumption are themselves evidence of undue influence, those
facts will remain in the case and will support a permissible infer-
ence of undue influence, depending on the credibility and weight
assigned by the trial judge to the rebuttal testimony.1 2 4
Carpenter was, of course, a pre-Evidence Code case, but it is ap-
parent that the court targeted the Aldrich presumption of undue influ-
ence as a Thayer or bursting bubble type of presumption. This is ap-
parent from the effect of rebuttal testimony in a given case and from
the basis the court gave for the presumption. The court, in reducing the
effect given to Aldrich, was clearly concerned with the obvious diffi-
culty of obtaining direct evidence of undue influence.12 5 Thus, the pre-
sumption's basis is the superior knowledge of the beneficiary who occu-
pied the confidential relationship, was active in the decedent's affairs,
and who drew the benefit.1 26 Viewed in this sense, the Carpenter court
treated it as a device designed to facilitate determination of an action.
In Evidence Code terms, the presumption in Carpenter did not involve
public policy considerations at all. In rejecting a burden-shifting type
121. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 704.
122. Id. at 703-04.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 704.
125. Id. at 703-04.
126. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 704.
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of presumption, the Carpenter court mentioned policy, but a close ex-
amination reveals that these factors such as access to proof are, to most
commentators, ones designed to facilitate an action and are, thus, of
the bursting bubble or Thayer type.12 7
Carpenter, in effect, attempted to correct a perceived imbalance in
Florida case law that had occurred after the presumption, of testamen-
tary undue influence was recognized and defined in Aldrich.12 8 Viewed
in this historical context, Carpenter is totally consistent with Aldrich.
In addition, Carpenter, as Aldrich, recognized a permissible inference
arising from the same three factors that gave rise to the presumption if
contrary evidence was presented. 12 9 As indicated, the weight of the in-
ference was again directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 30
Taken as a whole, the Carpenter decision expresses a preference
for a determination of undue influence from all the evidence in the
case.' 31 The decision also can be viewed as one which places great reli-
ance on the initial fact-finder. 32 Viewed in this context, Carpenter
marks, in my view, an attempted return to the initial approach dis-
cussed previously in this paper; the fact-specific test. This conclusion is
further strengthened by the simple fact that no Florida case has ever
rejected the approach approved and utilized in the pre-Aldrich cases.
In view of the Carpenter court's preference for a broadened role
for the fact-finding process, one might have expected the confidential-
relations presumption to occupy a less central role in subsequent undue
influence decisions. This has not been the case. In addition, with one
exception, appellate decisions have not addressed the impact of the Evi-
dence Code on the role of the presumption in undue influence cases.
The balance of the discussion will, therefore, be devoted to post-Car-
127. Id. at 703. Petitioners urged that policy considerations inherent in the diffi-
culty of proof of undue influence dictate that the burden of proof should shift in this
case. They note that in will cases the testator is not available as a witness to tell his
version of such dealings. That, in fact, usually the only person who is available to tes-
tify is the confidential advisor whose self-interest furnishes a motive for him to take
advantage of his superior position. This rationale, unlike the presumption of innocence
or presumption of the validity of a second marriage, was centered on an access to
evidence basis. Viewed in this context, it remained, to Justice McCain, a Thayer
presumption.
128. Id. at 704.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 704.
132. Id.
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penter decisions and the Evidence Code as it relates to the
presumption.
Clark v. Grimsley,133 In re Siddon's Estate," and In re Estate of
Van Aken, 35 were early post-Carpenter cases involving the Aldrich-
Carpenter presumption. In Clark, the testatrix, a 97-year-old woman
confined to a nursing home, executed a will shortly before her death
which left the bulk of her estate to one daughter. This disposition re-
voked a prior will that allowed the daughters to share equally.' 36 There
was also direct documentary evidence, consisting of letters written by
the testatrix, of undue influence by the beneficiary daughter.' 37 Addi-
tionally, the evidence clearly demonstrated the beneficiary daughter's
involvement in the preparation and execution of the will. 38 Finally, the
record demonstrated that the daughter, due to her dominant role in her
mother's financial affairs, was in a "highly fiduciary capacity."' 139 In
the court's view, these unrebutted facts established a presumption of
undue influence; thus, the court reversed and directed that the prof-
fered will be denied probate. 40
The record in Clark also contained factors that under the pre-Al-
drich fact-specific approach alone would have been probative of undue
influence. Those factors included: the physical condition of the testa-
trix, the unnatural testamentary disposition, a change in testamentary
scheme, solicitation of the challenged will by the beneficiary, persua-
sion by the beneficiary, will drawn for the beneficiary by a fiduciary,
unequal disposition, circumstances surrounding execution, and finally
the obvious interest of the beneficiary.' 4 ' Thus, apart from the pre-
sumption itself, the evidence pattern supported a finding of undue influ-
ence under the fact-specific approach. This aspect of the evidence, due
to the emphasis placed on the presumption and its effect, received no
discussion.
133. 270 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
134. 297 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
135. 281 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
136. Clark, 270 So. 2d at 54.
137. Id. at 55.
138. Id. at 58.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Clark court, despite Carpenter, treated the presumption as burden
shifting. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Carpenter, Knight and Aldrich.
Id. at 58 n.10-12. Knight, discussed previously, so held; Carpenter clearly did not; Al-
drich, when closely read, also did not. Id.
141. Clark, 270 So. 2d at 57.
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In re Siddon's Estate provided yet another example of the contin-
uing dominance of the presumption in probate litigation. The facts in
Siddons established that the beneficiary-brother enjoyed a confidential
relationship with his father, the decedent. The evidence also revealed
that the beneficiary-brother's wife typed the will in question and se-
cured the witnesses. Needless to say, the beneficiary-brother was a ma-
jor devisee under the purported will.14 2
The trial court, in its detailed findings, found the presumption op-
erative but explained by the surrounding circumstances. 14' In affirming,
the Third District Court of Appeal apparently144 accepted the court's
conclusion and affirmed.
A fact-specific analysis produces a less convincing picture. The fol-
lowing additional factors, apart from the presumption, were also pre-
sent: an opportunity to exercise undue influence existed because the de-
cedent lived with the beneficiary; an unnatural disposition occurred
when the beneficiary profited at the expense of brothers and sisters;
unusual circumstances surrounded the execution where the beneficiary
both arranged for and obtained witnesses; and the will was drawn at
the direction of the beneficiary who was in a confidential
relationship. 145
The court found that the record also revealed that the decedent
was cared for in his last illness by the beneficiary and his wife. Further,
the decedent was described as a strong-willed, opinionated and self-de-
termined character.' 6 In addition, the evidence revealed that the testa-
tor-father retained the will and that all involved knew of the will's exis-
tence and its provisions.147
Once: again, however, the presumption occupied center stage to the
exclusion of evidentiary factors that were indicative of possible undue
influence apart from the presumption. In addition, those factors indica-
tive of a reasonable explanation, while mentioned, do not receive a sys-
142. Siddon's, 297 So. 2d at 55.
143. I'd. at 57.
144. The inexplicably characterized opinion states that the actions of the benefi-
ciary and his wife in preparing the will and arranging for its execution are perfunctory
and not active procurement. Therefore, in the Third District Court of Appeal's view,
the presumption was not operative. As further discussion will demonstrate, under a
fact-specific analysis, these facts were of great significance.
145. Siddon's, 297 So. 2d at 55-57.
146. Id. at 57.
147. Id. Under the fact-specific approach, these latter facts would, of course, be
relevant on the issue of undue influence.
19911
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tematic analysis.
In re Estate of Van Aken, noted above, continued the post-Car-
penter trend.148 In Van Aken, the facts revealed that the beneficiary
was active in the decedent's affairs, arranged for execution of the will,
dictated its terms, obtained the attorney who drafted it and was, of
course, the sole beneficiary. 19 The Second District Court of Appeal
had no difficulty in determining that the confidential relation presump-
tion was present and that evidence of family discord was an insufficient
explanation. 50
What is again significant about the opinion is the lack of discus-
sion concerning factors that would clearly support a conclusion of un-
due influence even if the presumption were not present. Those factors
were abundant and consisted of: 1) opportunity-the beneficiary lived
with the testator; 2) susceptibility-the testator was described as a
sick, depressed man who had not recovered from the death of his wife;
3) unnatural disposition-his children were excluded; 4) change in for-
mer testamentary dispositions-children and grandchildren were bene-
ficiaries under prior will; and 5) obvious motive of the beneficiary. Fur-
thermore, the record reveals that after execution of the questioned will
the beneficiary took possession of it.' 5 ' Under a fact-specific approach,
even without the presumption, the evidence of undue influence was
overwhelming.
The pattern has continued in more recent cases. The 1979 Third
District case of In re Estate of Robertson' provided yet another ex-
ample. Both the trial and appellate courts' decisions centered on the
presence or absence of the presumption. The facts in Robertson estab-
lished that shortly before her death, the decedent executed a will that
excluded two grandchildren and left the bulk of her estate to the re-
maining grandchild. 5 The evidence clearly established that while the
beneficiary-granddaughter had a confidential relationship with dece-
148. See In re Estate of Van Aken, 281 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1973). The Van Aken court, as did the Clark court, also apparently misread Carpenter.
The court described the presumption as placing the burden of "overcoming the pre-
sumption" of undue influence on the proponent of the will. Id. at 918.
149. Id. at 917-18.
150. Id. at 918.
151. Id.
152. In re Estate of Robertson, 372 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
see also In re Estate of Lomax, 395 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
153. Robertson, 372 So. 2d at 1139.
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dent, there was no active procurement of the will by the beneficiary. 15
Therefore, both the trial and appellate court found the presumption
inapplicable to the case.155
Once again, salient factors indicative of undue influence received
no extended analysis or discussion. Similarly, countervailing factors
that contraindicated a finding of undue influence were not analyzed. In
addition to a confidential relationship, there was evidence of a change
in testamentary scheme, an unnatural disposition, and an opportunity
to exercise undue influence. Moreover, the record is silent as to the
decedent s relationship with excluded grandchildren, containing no ex-
planation for exclusion of the other grandchildren.1 56
The record also contained evidence showing that the will in ques-
tion was the product of the decedent's own choice in that she selected
the attorney, dictated its terms, and was fully competent. The ques-
tioned will was also publicly made and its execution was videotaped.
Finally, the will was kept in the possession of the attorney and the ben-
eficiary was unaware of its contents until the death of her grand-
mother.157 The result in Robertson is undoubtedly correct, but once
again demonstrated the continued dominance of the presumption.
Williamson v. Kirby, 5 8 a 1980 decision authored by Justice
Grimes, also illustrated both the dominance of the presumption and the
continuing difficulties that its proper application engenders. In Wil-
liamson, a 90-year-old woman conveyed, for no consideration, her
home to a woman who stood in a confidential relationship to her.159 The
trial court found, in detailed findings, that the evidence demonstrated
undue influence both from the presumption and as a whole.' 60
The record amply demonstrated that the trial court applied a to-
tality of the circumstances, fact-specific approach, in addition to the
presumption. The evidence convincingly demonstrated that under both
a totality test and a presumption approach, the trial court's conclusion
was supported by competent substantial evidence.' 6'
Justice Grimes, writing for the court, approved the trial court's
finding that the presumption was applicable. Justice Grimes then set
154. Id. at 1141-42.
155. Id. at 1142.
156. Id. at 1141-42.
157. Id. at 1142.
158. 379 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
159. Id. at 694.
160. Id. at 695.
161. Id.
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forth his view as to the effect of the presumption on a given case by
stating that
the beneficiary then has the burden of explaining his active involve-
ment in the preparation of the will [or gift]. He does not have the
burden of disproving undue influence. If the explanation is reasona-
ble, the presumption vanishes and it becomes the court's responsi-
bility to determine whether the contestant has established undue
influence by the great weight of the evidence. 162
The opinion, in view of the trial court's specific findings on the
evidence as a whole, arguably reweighed the evidence and substituted
the view of the panel for the findings of the trial court. This conclusion
is supported by the trial court's extensive factual findings apart from
the presumption.
In addition, the opinion ignored the permissive inference of undue
influence that remained when the presumption was rebutted. As indi-
cated earlier in this discussion, Carpenter clearly permitted a permis-
sive inference of undue influence to be drawn by the fact-finder even
when the presumption is rebutted. Williamson would, then, appear
both to misapply Carpenter and engage in unwarranted appellate fact-
finding.16
Three more recent decisions illustrated that the presumption con-
tinued its role as the prominent factor in probate litigation in which
undue influence was an issue.
Elson v. Vargas"" involved a housekeeper who was made sole ben-
eficiary of her employer's estate. 165 The trial judge found factually that
the Aldrich-Carpenter presumption was applicable, but that the benefi-
ciary had demonstrated a reasonable explanation for involvement in the
decedent's affairs.1 66 In affirming, the Third District Court of Appeal
noted that while this was a "close case, ' 67 the trial court's finding of
no undue influence, which was based on the housekeeper's explanation
for her role in the decedent's affairs, was supported by record
162. Id.
163. See also Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 392 So. 2d 132, 135 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) ("When that happens, the presumption vanishes, and the trial court is left
to decide the case in accordance with the greater weight of the evidence.").
164. 520 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
165. Id. at 77.
166. Id. at 78.
167. Id.
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evidence."'6
Fogel v. Swann'69 involved testamentary provisions and gifts made
by the decedent to her sister and brother-in-law.1 0 The will in question
was prepared at the direction of the brother-in-law, who was the dece-
dent's attorney. There was also record evidence that established that
the will represented a change in testamentary scheme occurring shortly
before her death."' The Third District approved the trial court's fac-
tual determination that the close family relationship between the sister
and the decedent provided an evidentiary basis for a determination that
undue influence was not present.1 2
In Sun Bank v. Hogarth,'7 3 the trial court found that the chal-
lenged will was the product of undue influence. 74 The record contained
numerous indicia of undue influence apart from the presumption. These
factors, applying a fact-specific approach, would have supported a con-
clusion of undue influence even absent the presumption. However,
neither the trial court's nor the appellate court's opinions discussed this
possibility; rather the case was decided on the basis of the presence and
effect of the Aldrich-Carpenter presumption.7
These latest cases demonstrated that the historical trend begun by
Aldrich has continued to the present. The presumption, therefore, con-
tinues to dominate to the exclusion of other evidentiary factors. This
over-emphasis has, in my view, stilted Florida case law on this issue
and in some instances produced unfortunate results.
V. A CRITICAL LOOK AT CARPENTER AND THE CODE
Carpenter was, of course, decided prior to enactment of the Evi-
dence Code. In view of Codal provisions governing presumptions, it is
necessary to discuss the possible treatment that may be given to the
presumption in the future. That issue remains an open question at this
juncture. What follows, therefore, is an analysis of the Carpenter pre-
sumption from the Evidence Code perspective.
The Code provides for two types of rebuttable presumptions in
168. Id.
169. 523 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
170. Id. at 1228.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1229-30.
173. 536 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
174. Id. at 265.
175. Id. at 266-67.
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civil cases. The first affects the burden of producing evidence and is
designed to facilitate the determination of a proceeding. When unre-
butted, it requires the fact-finder to find the presumed fact. If rebutted,
however, the presumption vanishes from the case. 1' This type of pre-
sumption is described as a Thayer or bursting bubble presumption and,
as indicated, operates in a given case so as to place upon the party best
able to furnish it the burden of producing evidence to rebut the pre-
sumed fact. "7 Even after being rebutted, however, a bursting bubble or
Thayer presumption permits the fact-finder to draw a permissive
inference.
The second type of presumption, which by definition involves pub-
lic policy considerations, operates in a much different manner. 178 The
second type of presumption shifts the burden of proof to the party
against whom the presumption operates. Under this type of presump-
tion, the fact-finder must be convinced that the presumed fact does not
exist. 79 The Code further provides that unless "otherwise provided by
Statute, a presumption established primarily to facilitate the determi-
nation of the particular proceeding in which the presumption is applied
rather than to implement public policy is a presumption affecting the
burden of producing evidence."' 180
Gard, noted previously, has described the operation and effect of
Thayer presumptions in the following manner:
Presumptions which owe their existence only to facilitating the de-
termination of the action actually can be expected to have very lit-
tle to support them on the basis of strong probative value of the
basic facts. Quite the opposite is true of those presumptions which
rest on basic facts so strong as to promote a public policy principle
arising from experience with human conduct.' 8 '
Gard then noted prophetically, "It will be up to the courts to sort
out the presumptions . ".1.."82 The Thayer presumption can be viewed
as a utilitarian device while the Morgan presumption is one reflective
176. FLA. STAT. § 90.302(1) (1989).
177. See EHRHARDT, supra note 69, at § 302.1; GARD, supra note 69, at § 3:05.
178. FLA. STAT. § 90.302(2) (1989).
179. See EHRHARDT, supra note 69, at § 304.1; GARD, supra note 69, at §§ 3:01-
:03.
180. FLA. STAT § 90.303 (1989).
181. GARD, supra note 69, at § 3:05.
182. Id.
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of societal values that require protection.
A close examination of Carpenter reveals that its author viewed
the presumption of undue influence as a procedural utilitarian device.
Justice 'McCain clearly indicated that a burden-shifting presumption
would be an anomaly in Florida case law. He was also concerned that a
policy presumption would be virtually unrebuttable. Finally, McCain
saw the beneficiary accused of undue influence as the person usually
uniquely situated to explain his role with the decedent and thus rebut
the presumption.183 This view was also consistent with the historical
development of the presumption post-Aldrich. That development re-
flected that the presumption, without apparent explanation or analysis,
underwent a metamorphosis from a procedural device to a statement of
public policy; that is, from a utilitarian device to a doctrinal
imperative.
To use a reverse flip, Carpenter viewed the presumption as a but-
terfly which became a caterpillar. This view is also consistent with the
opinion's Sotto Voce major theme. That theme expresses a clear prefer-
ence for comprehensive fact finding in contrast to decisions based on a
rigid, inflexible and, in McCain's view, largely unwarranted legal
device.184
The statutory construction basis advanced in Carpenter for a
Thayer-type presumption appears, in light of the Code today, to be
more questionable. As noted by both Ehrhardt and Gard, the Code en-
visions a judicial determination of the basis and operation of presump-
tions. At least one post-Code case has attempted to classify the Al-
drich-Carpenter presumption along lines envisioned by the Code.
Judge Glickstein, writing for a Fourth District panel, attempted to
address the basis for the presumption of undue influence in the 1983
case of In re Estate of Davis. 85 In Davis, the panel held that on public
policy grounds, "[the presumption [of undue influence] in this case
was non-vanishing because, we believe, a strong social policy exists
when the issue is the alleged exercise of undue influence by one en-
joying, as, here, a confidential relationship with a decedent."1 86 Subse-
quently, the Fourth District Court of Appeal receded from Davis in a
somewhat cryptic opinion which merely held the correct and applicable
principles of law were announced in Carpenter and followed by the
183. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703.
184. See generally id. at 702.
185. 428 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
186. Id. at 776.
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trial court.187
It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the presumption in
view of the Evidence Code. Carpenter, in my opinion, clearly viewed
the presumption as a proof facilitation device. This, in turn, is based on
the common sense proposition that the beneficiary who enjoyed the re-
lationship and procured the will is in the best position to explain those
events and to give the reasonable explanation. Although Carpenter
speaks somewhat in policy terms, the Carpenter decision as well as the
Aldrich decision, rested on the notion that the beneficiary was in the
best position to explain the circumstances of the bequest.188
The public policy grounds supporting a burden-shifting presump-
tion also appear obvious. The law abhors coercion and the basic public
policy considerations must reject testamentary dispositions that are the
result of coercion. Additionally, public policy considerations peculiar to
a confidential relationship are also operative. It is well settled law that
such a relationship imposes the highest duty on the dominant party in
the relationship. These policy considerations would seem to dictate
that, on policy grounds, the presumption of undue influence should op-
erate to shift the burden of proof onto the party who stood in such a
relationship to the decedent. This position is further buttressed by a
factor somewhat unique to Florida, its large elderly population. Unfor-
tunately, in many instances due to illness, death of a spouse, or isola-
tion from extended families in their native states, elderly Floridians are
vulnerable to improper influence in testamentary dispositions. Counter-
vailing considerations do, however, exist.
The public policy of Florida has long supported the right of a per-
son to freely devise his or her property in any way that person desires.
A burden-shifting presumption possibly could be antithetical to that
policy. The very breadth of Carpenter's definition of a confidential rela-
tionship and active procurement make the presumption a rather easy
one to raise in a given case. Thus, the Carpenter court's concern with
the presumption becoming virtually conclusive appears legitimate.
Finally, also militating against a burden-shifting presumption is
187. In re Estate of Davis, 462 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Judge
Glickstein's concurrence in Davis I provides an excellent and comprehensive discussion
of the purpose and effect of presumptions in general and of the presumption of undue
influence in particular. Davis H also appears in conflict with another Fourth District
opinion also authored by Judge Glickstein, Insurance Company of Pennsylvania v. Es-
tate of Guzman, 421 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Guzman recognized
the necessity of evaluating existing presumptions in light of the Code.
188. See Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703; Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 856.
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another sad reality of life: family estrangement. Not uncommonly, eld-
erly people may for one reason or another become alienated from those
who the law might regard as the natural objects of their bounty and
turn to a particularly trusted friend or relative for assistance and sup-
port. This is particularly true in times of illness or disability. The fore-
going would seem to be valid public policy considerations in opposition
to a burden-shifting presumption. Thus, it could be argued that policy
considerations are in rough equipoise. In such a situation, according to
Gard, neither presumption should prevail.189 In the context of this dis-
cussion, then, the Evidence Code may not resolve this issue. Resolution,
in my view, lies with a proper reading of Carpenter and a return to the
more comprehensive approach to fact finding that was employed in the
pre-Aldrich and pre-Carpenter decisions.
The Aldrich-Carpenter presumption of undue influence has be-
come a shibboleth in Florida law. As indicated, it has itself exercised
undue influence over the Bench and the Bar. In this sense, Carpenter
was profoundly correct. The subject presumption grew without analysis
from a sound procedural device that permitted the fact-finder to draw a
permissive conclusion based on experience to an evidentiary runaway
freight train that obliterated the finely crafted decisions that were de-
veloped prior to the historical detour beginning with Aldrich.
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that the distinctions of the law
are founded on experience, not logic. 9 ' Experience in this case demon-
strates that a case-specific approach provides the analytical format that
Carpenter does not provide; i.e., what constitutes a reasonable explana-
tion for a suspect devise. The fact-specific pre-Aldrich approach will
also broaden the evidentiary equation in undue influence cases so as to
focus on all relevant factors that should be considered in determining
whether undue influence invalidates a testamentary disposition. It will
also improve the accuracy of case-by-case determinations by putting
more focus on the total evidence picture and less on a procedural device
designed to facilitate the proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Aldrich-Carpenter presumption is an excellent procedural de-
vice that can assist the fact-finder in determining the issue of undue
influence by requiring that the beneficiary who stood in a confidential
189. GARD, supra note 69, at § 3:55.
190. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1949).
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relationship to the decedent provide a reasonable explanation for the
devise in question. The beneficiary is obviously in the best position to
do so. At present, however, the presumption occupies too central a role
in undue influence cases. To correct this imbalance, Florida courts
should once again use the earlier fact-specific approach to determine if,
apart from the presumption, undue influence exists in a given case.
This would improve the accuracy of probate proceedings in which the
issue of undue influence is present.
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Notes and Comments
Alimony Modification: Awards Based on Ability to
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I. INTRODUCTION
When a marriage is dissolved, and an absolute divorce is granted,
all rights and duties based upon that marriage end-except for ali-
mony.' This single marital obligation continues beyond divorce when
1. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 620 (1988). In its technical sense, "alimony" means nourishment or suste-
nance, and has for its sole object the provision of food, clothing, shelter, and other
necessaries for the wife. See Fort v. Fort, 90 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1956); Bredin v. Bredin,
89 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1956); Floyd v. Floyd, 108 So. 896 (Fla. 1926); see also 25 FLA.
JUR. 2D Family Law § 433 (1981).
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all other obligations have ceased.'
Historically, England and America have differed in their ap-
proaches to alimony and divorce. In England, the ecclesiastical courts
only granted divorces a mensa et thoro, partial divorces, which author-
ized spouses to live apart, but did not free them from the marriage
bond.' The alimony awarded by these courts merely constituted recog-
nition and enforcement of the husband's duty to support the wife which
continued after judicial separation." In contrast, American petitions for
absolute divorces are usually granted.3 Even though the United States
still follows the English model for alimony, requiring one spouse to fi-
nancially aid the other, changes in statutory and constitutional law,
the influence of the women's rights movement, and the changes in the
economic position of women have been reflected in new rules governing
the support obligations of spouses. 7 To facilitate the determination of
2. CLARK, supra note 1, at 642.
3. Id. at 619; see also 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPA-
RATION § 857 (1891) (no court in England had jurisdiction to dissolve marriages until
1858).
4. CLARK, supra note 1, at 619; see also Killian v. Lawson, 387 So. 2d 960 (Fla.
1980) (a husband has a common law duty to support his wife); Floyd v. Floyd, 108 So.
896, 898 (Fla. 1926) ("Alimony is based on the common-law obligation of the husband
to support the wife."); Davies v. Davies, 113 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(money required to be paid by a man to his former wife for her sustenance derives
from the legal duty to support his wife which he assumed when they married); 25 FLA.
JUR. 2D Family Law § 433 (1981).
5. CLARK, supra note 1, at 620. However, the purpose for awarding alimony in
an absolute divorce is less clear because a divorce acts to free two people from the
marital bond. Id. In many instances, the final decree for a dissolution of marriage
marks the beginning of one spouse's obligation to pay alimony to the other spouse. Id.
6. Id. at 619.
7. See Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (the
horse and buggy days are over and women now have a place in the business commu-
nity.); Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (Barkdull, C.J.,
dissenting), review denied, 282 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973). In 1975, 48.3% of married
women in the 25-34 age group participated in the labor force. THE STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 384 (1990). In 1988, that figure was 68.6%. Id. The
corresponding figures for women who were either widowed, divorced or married (spouse
absent) were 67.5% in 1975 and 76.3% in 1988. Id.
In fact, in Florida, the Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1971 expressly provided
that "[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant alimony to
either party, . . . [and] [i]n determining a proper award, . . . [tihe court may consider
any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties." FLA. STAT. § 61.08
(1971). In contrast, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act states:
The court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds
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who shall receive alimony and to what extent it should be awarded,
alimony is divided into the following categories: 1) temporary alimony, 8
2) rehabilitative alimony,9 and 3) permanent alimony. 10 However, only
discussions which concern permanent alimony are the subject of this
comment.
While many wives still do not work, those who do most often do
not earn as much as their husbands." Therefore, as a practical matter,
most support litigation is brought by the wife against her husband.'"
For convenience in terminology, the following discussion refers to the
husband's duty of support. Of course, the principles outlined apply
equally to the less frequent suit by a husband.' 3
Doubts about how much alimony should be given' 4 or about how
that the spouse seeking maintenance: (1) lacks sufficient property to pro-
vide for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to
seek employment outside the home.
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(a) (1987).
8. Temporary alimony is an allowance made to a spouse for maintenance during
the pendency of an action. See, e.g., Floyd, 108 So. at 898; see also 24 AM. JUR. 2D
Divorce and Separation § 521 (1983).
9. "Rehabilitative alimony is a form of alimony designed to place the dependent
spouse in an income generating position, which would [eventually] free the obligor
spouse from [alimony] obligation[s] .... " 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation §
521 (1983); see also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980) ("The
principle purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to establish the capacity for self-support
of the receiving spouse .... ").
10. Permanent alimony is an allowance for the support and maintenance of a
spouse during his or her lifetime. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325, 328-29 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); see also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 624 (1983) (perma-
nent alimony is used primarily for the purpose of distinguishing that allowance from
temporary alimony allowed during the pendency of a suit).
11. CLARK, supra note 1, at 253; see THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 455 (1990) which states that the mean earnings of married husbands
in the 25-34 year age group in 1987 was $25,238; however, the corresponding figure for
married women in that age group was $13,077. Id.
12. CLARK, supra note 1, at 253.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Ray v. Ray, 247 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (the
amount of permanent alimony to be awarded in a divorce proceeding lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court); see also 25 FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 469 (1981)
(collected cases); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Amount of
Money Awarded as Permanent Alimony Following Divorce, 28 A.L.R.4TH 786 (1984).
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long the payments should continue after divorce15 have been the subject
of much litigation. A complex issue is raised when, after divorce, the
obligor spouse's fortunes greatly improve. 6 The question here is
whether the receiving spouse should get an increase in alimony based
on this fact alone. Some cases answer this question in the affirmative. 7
However, this article advocates that those cases were wrongly decided.
A receiving spouse should not be awarded an upward modification in
her alimony simply because the obligor spouse has benefitted from in-
creased financial wealth since the parties' divorce. Once the marital
bond is broken and the relationship between the parties end, the receiv-
ing spouse does not have a right to claim an amount which would
maintain her above that lifestyle which she was accustomed to during
the marriage. 8
In contrast to the author's viewpoint on whether alimony should be
increased based solely on the obligor spouse's increased ability to pay,
is the recently decided Florida Supreme Court case, Bedell v. Bedell.'9
In Bedell, the parties were divorced after thirteen years of marriage.20
At the time of the dissolution, Mr. Bedell had opened his first medical
office. Then, eleven years after the divorce, Mrs. Bedell filed a petition
in the trial court seeking an upward modification of her alimony based
solely on the fact that her former husband had an increased ability to
pay.
15. See, e.g., Friedman v. Friedman, 366 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (former husband's petition seeking modification of divorce decree and terminat-
ing periodic alimony upon showing that former wife had become self sufficient); see
also Comment, Divorce-Alimony-Death of Divorced Husband Terminates his Obli-
gation to Pay Alimony, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1074, 1075 (1954) (as a general rule, ali-
mony terminates on the husband's death unless there is a provision in the settlement
agreement or in the decree that expressly states otherwise).
16. CLARK, supra note 1, at 662.
17. See, e.g., England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), review denied, 381 So.
2d 767 (Fla. 1980).
18. An exception to this would be a situation in which the wife financially sup-
ported the husband while he attended school for specialized training during their mar-
riage, and the parties divorced before the obligor spouse reached his financial potential.
In this situation, the wife should be entitled to share in the husband's success, because
her efforts contributed to that success which he now enjoys. See Moss v. Moss, 264
N.W.2d 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982);
Dewitt v. Dewitt, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
19. 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991).
20. Id. at .1006.
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Thus, Bedell addressed the issue of whether an upward modifica-
tion of alimony should be granted when based solely upon an increase
in the payor's ability to pay without the recipient spouse proving in-
creased or continuing need that was not initially satisfied by the origi-
nal divorce decree.2 1 The Florida Supreme Court held that a significant
increase in the financial ability of the obligor spouse to pay may, stand-
ing alone, justify an order of increased alimony. 2
The purpose of this comment is to critique the Florida Supreme
Court's holding in Bedell. Emphasis is placed on Florida statutory and
case law; however, other jurisdictions are referenced in order to oppose
Florida's position. To this end, the comment is divided into five sec-
tions. The first section discusses permanent alimony because an under-
standing of permanent alimony is necessary for the discussion of Bedell
which follows. 23 The second section discusses the bases upon which ali-
mony modification may be sought.24 The third section presents a chro-
nology of prior Florida cases which lead to the conflict resolved by the
Florida Supreme Court in Bedell. The fourth section of this comment
is a critical analysis of the Florida Supreme Court's rationale as ap-
plied in Bedell. The final section concludes and discusses whether Be-
dell has established a uniform standard which the lower courts must
follow when presented with an alimony modification issue, or whether
the court sidestepped the issue and failed to resolve the conflict.
II. ALIMONY
When a marriage ends, one spouse may be required to financially
support the other spouse via permanent alimony. 5 This obligation owed
by a husband to his former wife was initially regarded by the courts as
a personal duty owed to society.2" An award of permanent alimony 2 by
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1007.
23. The Bedell controversy arose out of a permanent alimony award which was
granted to Mrs. Bedell at the time of the divorce.
24. For an in depth discussion of what constitutes "changed circumstances" for
purposes of alimony modification, see Carol Gilliam Green, Note, Domestic Relations:
Modification of Future Alimony Payments Due to Changed Circumstances, 20 WASH-
BURN L.J. 66 (1980); 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation §§ 699-745 (1983).
25. For definition of permanent alimony, see supra note 10.
26. Howard v. Howard, 118 So. 2d 90, 94 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960). But
see, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
("The necessity of insuring that the divorced wife could not become a public
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the trial court does not become a vested interest to receive alimony 28
and it is always subject to the jurisdiction of the court for modifica-
tion. 9 Because the recipient of permanent alimony does not have an
inherent vested right to receive alimony, the question of whether per-
manent alimony shall be awarded at all, and if so, what the proper
amount of the award shall be, rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court.8 0
Many Florida courts have stated that a divorced wife is entitled to
live in a manner reasonably commensurate with the standard of living
established during the course of the marriage.8 1 Because many women
sacrifice their own careers so that their husbands may maintain theirs,
and tend to the needs of the family and the family home, this author
agrees that a divorced wife should be maintained in the lifestyle which
she enjoyed while the parties were married. However, the amount of
alimony allowed should not be such that one spouse passes from misfor-
charge-is a thing of the past.") (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 194 So. 2d 906, 908-
09 (Fla. 1967) (Roberts, J., dissenting)). Prior to 1971, section 61.08 only awarded
alimony to the wife: "In every judgment of divorce in an action by the wife, the court
shall make such orders about . . . alimony . . . to be made to her, and . . . the secur-
ity to be given therefor, as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the
case is equitable." FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1969). However, The Dissolution of Marriage
Act of 1971 changed so that "[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the trial
judge may grant alimony to either party . . . ." FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1971).
27. Permanent alimony is permanent only in the respect that it is a final provi-
sion for maintenance, contained either in a separate maintenance order or in the final
judgment for dissolution of marriage. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 624
(1983).
28. O'Neal v. O'Neal, 410 So. 2d 1369, 1373 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); see
also Hunt v. Hunt, 394 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (a wife does not have
a vested right in her husband's earnings forever).
29. See, e.g., Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954) (modification
should be based on a clear showing of changed circumstances and the financial ability
of the husband); Ludacer v. Ludacer, 211 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
("The amount of alimony ... is, in every case, a matter of continuing jurisdiction.").
30. Accord Cyphers v. Cyphers, 373 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Shultz v. Shultz, 290 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Ray v. Ray, 247 So. 2d
473 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); McGarry v. McGarry, 247 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1971): see Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980) ("Judi-
cial discretion is defined as [t]he power exercised by courts to determine questions to
which no strict rule of law is applicable but which, from their nature, and the circum-
stances of the case, are controlled by the personal judgment of the court."); see also
Patrick v. Patrick, 399 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (amount of monthly
alimony award is within discretion of trial court).
31. E.g., O'Neal, 410 So. 2d at 1371.
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tune to prosperity, and the other spouse passes from prosperity to mis-
fortune.8 2 "As a general [rule], the amount awarded as permanent ali-
mony must be fair and just under all circumstances of the case." 3 In
situations where both parties maintained careers during the marriage
and neither party was exclusively dependent on the income of the other,
alimony should be denied."'
However, in determining those cases in which it would be fair and
just for one spouse to receive permanent alimony, two factors must be
present.3 First, it is necessary that one spouse demonstrate a need for
the funds.3 6 Second, the other spouse must have the financial ability to
supply the needed funds. 7 Of the two factors listed above, the receiving
spouse's need is the most significant because regardless of whether the
other spouse has the financial wealth to pay a reasonable amount of
alimony, the needy spouse is clearly not entitled to receive it unless her
resources are not enough to maintain her in the same lifestyle that she
was accustomed to during the marriage.3 8 For example, in Anderson v.
32. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1204.
33. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 653 (1983); see FLA. STAT. §
61.08(2) (1989) ("The court may consider any factor necessary to do equity and jus-
tice between the parties.").
34. For example, in Campbell v. Campbell, the evidence showed that the former
wife was able to support herself adequately and to a degree comparable with the stan-
dard of living enjoyed by the parties during their marriage. 432 So. 2d 666, 669 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 453 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1984).
35. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2)(d) ("In determining a proper award of alimony,
the court shall consider . . .[t]he financial resources of each party."); 25 FLA. JUR. 2D
Family Law § 454 (1981).
36. 25 FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 454 (1981); see O'Neal v. O'Neal, 410 So. 2d
1369 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (permanent alimony is used to provide the former
wife with the necessities of life as was established by the marriage between the par-
ties); Johnson v. Johnson, 386 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (permanent
alimony award to wife was proper where she had been a housewife during the parties
twenty year marriage and did not work outside the home); Cyphers v. Cyphers, 373 So.
2d 442 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (amount of alimony award was not excessive
where wife was not in a position to support herself without assistance from her former
spouse); McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (ali-
mony is predicated on the needs of the wife).
37. Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954) (in determining ability to
pay, the court must consider the nature of the obligor spouse's capital assets as well as
his income); O'Neal v. O'Neal, 410 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (the
obligor spouse must be able to meet the needs of the recipient spouse); McAllister v.
McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (alimony is predicated on
the husband's ability to pay it); 25 FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 454 (1981).
38. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 647-48.
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Anderson, the court stated:
In determining the question of what alimony, if any, should be
awarded to the wife in a divorce proceeding, [the wife's] monetary
need must first be met by her own resources-her wage, earning
capacity, and her separate estate-and only then, if they are not
adequate, may the husband be called upon to provide her with such
additional funds as from the circumstances of the parties .... so
Florida Statute section 61.08 further provides that in addition to
the financial circumstances and needs of the parties, the trial court may
take into consideration any factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties, including such factors as the length of time the
parties have been married, the standard of living established during the
marriage, age, health and the conduct of the parties.40 Because every
39. Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
40. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1)(2) (1989) which provides:
(1) The court may consider the adultery of a spouse . . . in determining
.. . the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony .... the court shall con-
sider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) When applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire suffi-
cient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate
employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage . ...
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.
See also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1204 (Fla. 1980) (award of alimony
was proper given the income of the parties, the length of the marriage, the standard of
living enjoyed by the parties, and the education of the wife); Ira Mark Ellman, Note,
The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1989). However, The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act which primarily considers the factors only of the proposed recipient
spouse:
(b) The maintenance order shall be in amounts . . . [as] the court deems
just, without regard to marital misconduct, and . . . considering relevant
factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance . ..
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
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case revolves around a unique set of facts, the consideration of these
additional factors help assure that justice between the parties will be
attained in each case.
III. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
Subsequent to a final judgment for dissolution of marriage which
includes an alimony award, either party may petition for modification
based upon a change in circumstance."' "Changed circumstances may
warrant modification of future payments on the theory that alimony is
a substitute for support, and support [which is] subject to modification,
alimony should [also] be [modifiable].' 2 The authority to modify per-
manent alimony awards based upon the requisite showing of changed
circumstances is usually within the sound discretion of the trial court.' 3
Likewise, in Florida, changed circumstances, may, as a matter of law,
warrant a modification of the amount of existing alimony payments,
either upward or downward, according to the particular facts of each
case." Even though it is not expressly stated in section 61.14, there is a
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(b) (1987).
41. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989). The term "change of circumstance" is
defined as a condition used to show a need for modification of a support order. BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Note, supra note 24, at 69.
43. The authority to grant permanent alimony awards is given to the trial court
by statute in many states. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-122 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-86 (1986); FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989) ("The court has jurisdic-
tion to make orders as equity requires .... "); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp.
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.64 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101 (Supp.
1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.32 (Supp. 1986); see also CLARK, supra note 1, at 655.
But see Pope v. Pope, 342 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("A
petition to modify an award of alimony . . . may not be denied when the change is
clearly shown.") (quoting Chord v. Chord, 209 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1968)).
44. Rogers v. Rogers, 229 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); see,
e.g., Schlesinger v. Emmons, 566 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (where
former wife's need was not originally met, great improvement in former husband's in-
come due to inheritance warranted an upward modification); Waskin v. Waskin, 484
So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (reduction of former husband's financial
condition resulting from voluntary act did not warrant a downward modification of his
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general agreement among the courts that to warrant modification, the
changed circumstances must be substantial"5 and permanent."' Courts
will not ordinarily modify an alimony decree based on a mere expecta-
tion that circumstances will change in the future.'
Many courts have struggled with the concept of what constitutes a
substantial change so as to warrant a modification of the alimony de-
cree. Since each case is unique, a court's decision on whether to modify
an alimony award lies within the particular facts of each case. Some of
the more common grounds for modification in Florida include changes
in the recipient spouse's needs; reduction of the obligor spouse's in-
come; and an increase in the obligor spouse's income without a corre-
sponding increase in the need of the recipient spouse.
A. Changes in the Recipient Spouse's Needs
If the needs of the recipient spouse have increased since the di-
vorce, her alimony may be increased provided that the obligor spouse
has the present financial ability to meet those increased needs."' The
alimony obligations).
45. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (Once
awarded, permanent alimony is subject to modification upon a substantial change of
circumstances.); Bloemendaal v. Bloemendaal, 275 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1973); Cheves v. Cheves, 269 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Note, supra
note 24, at 69; J. Matthew Carey, Note, Reduction in Alimony as a Result of Changes
in Financial Condition: A Guide for the Practitioner, 15 J. FAM. L. 300, 306 (1977)
("The determination of substantiality . . . must be made by evaluating the collective
impact of the alleged change on both parties . . . .") (emphasis in original). The Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act provides for modification "only upon a showing of
changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscion-
able." UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 316(a) (1987). Furthermore, the
spouse petitioning for modification of the alimony decree has the burden of showing a
"substantial change in the material circumstances since the decree was entered." 24
AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 711 (1983).
46. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 463 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Thibodeau v. Thibodeau, 461 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Bish v.
Bish, 404 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Note, supra note 45, at 307.
47. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 712 (1983); see Penland v. Pen-
land, 442 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (alimony may not be modified for
anticipated changes in circumstances).
48. McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957); see Pope v. Pope, 342
So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Howard v. Howard, 118 So. 2d 90 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960); M. L. Cross, Annotation, Change in Financial Condition or
Needs of Husband or Wife as Ground for Modification of Decree for Alimony or
[Vol. 16
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increased need may be due to ill health,"9 a general increase in the cost
of living,50 and other similar factors.51 "In assessing the recipient's need
for increased alimony, the court should not be limited to the bare ne-
cessities of life, but rather should consider the recipient's reasonable
needs in. relation to the obligor spouse's income, just as in the case
when alimony is initially being granted."52 Therefore, if the receiving
spouse is no longer able to maintain the lifestyle she has been accus-
tomed to on the present alimony received from the obligor spouse, then
an upward modification in her alimony should be awarded by the trial
court.
53
However, where the former wife's increased need is "due to a vol-
untary change in her way of life, the courts have been reluctant to
grant her an increase in alimony."" In situations where the recipient
spouse purposefully increased her standard of living, such as when the
alimony recipient obtains employment and becomes self supporting, she
should, at the very least, be required to provide that amount which is
above the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.5 5 This
situation was illustrated in Anderson v. Anderson where the former
husband filed a petition for modification of the divorce decree, seeking
to be relieved from the order requiring him to pay alimony on the
Maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2D 10, 59 (1951).
49. McArthur, 95 So. 2d at 524.
50. Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("[A]
rise in the cost of living is a change of circumstances which may be properly considered
by a trial judge in increasing the financial obligations of a husband . . . [where his]
ability to pay has also increased."); see Annotation, supra note 48, at 10. A.L.R.2D 10
(1951).
51. See, e.g., Howard, 118 So. 2d 90.
52. CLARK, supra note 1, at 661.
53. For example, in Wolfe v. Wolfe, the court stated that "[i]f the party seeking
a modification of alimony cannot 'go it alone,' if he or she is unable to 'be in a position
reasonably to continue to maintain the lifestyle to which the parties had become accus-
tomed during the marriage,' the petition for modification should be granted." 424 So.
2d 32, 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26, 28 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
54. CLARK, supra note 1, at 661; see, e.g., Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
55. CLARK. supra note 1, at 661. Contra Punie v. Punie, 291 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the
former husband a reduction in his alimony obligation, because even though the finan-
cial circumstances of the former wife had improved, the husband's ability to pay had
improved even more substantially than the wife's.).
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ground that his former wife had become self supporting." The trial
court denied his petition, and the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed.5 7
The husband subsequently petitioned unsuccessfully to the Su-
preme Court of Florida for review."' Then, approximately ten years af-
ter filing his first petition for modification, the former husband filed a
second petition asking the court to reduce or terminate his alimony ob-
ligation.59 It is from Justice Roberts' dissent6" that the Third District
Court of Appeal, in reviewing the former husband's second petition for
modification, adopted the following language regarding the capability
of the wife for self support:
[T]he marriage status, once achieved by the wife, does not carry
with it the right forever after to be supported by her former hus-
band in veritable ease and comfort, regardless of her capabilities
for self support. The horse and buggy era when the husband's vow
to take care of his wife 'till death do us part' was accepted by both
parties as a sacred promise and an essential part of the marriage
contract-required, as well, by the mores of the society of that era
and the necessity of insuring that the divorced wife could not be-
come a public charge-is a thing of the past. 1
The order denying the former husband's second request for termination
of his obligation to pay alimony was reversed on the ground that the
former wife had become self supporting, even though he had a much
larger income.6 2
56. Anderson v. Anderson, 180 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
57. Id. at 363.
58. Anderson v. Anderson, 194 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1967) (dismissed for want of
conflict jurisdiction).
59. Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
60. Even though Mr. Anderson's first petition was dismissed for want of conflict
jurisdiction, Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion. Anderson, 194 So. 2d 906 (Rob-
erts, J., dissenting).
61. Anderson, 333 So. 2d at 485 (quoting Anderson, 194 So. 2d at 908 (Roberts,
J., dissenting)).
62. Id. at 488. "Assuming, [however], that a reduction [or termination] of ali-
mony payments is proper where the [recipient] spouse has secured employment, the
court ordinarily will not reduce the payments in the exact amount of earnings, [be-
cause] that may take away an incentive to work." 24 AM. JUR 2D Divorce and Separa-
tion § 715, 707 (1983); see Annotation, supra note 48, at 63-7.
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B. Reduction in the Obligor Spouse's Income
A change in the financial condition of the obligor spouse, if sub-
stantial, often constitutes a change in circumstance so as to warrant a
modification of an alimony award. 3 Florida's modification statute pro-
vides that if "the financial ability of either party changes, . . . either
party may apply to the circuit court . . . for an order decreasing or
increasing the amount of . . . alimony.""' When an obligor spouses's
earnings are reduced to such a point that he is unable to comply with
the alimony payments, an order for a reduction or termination of ali-
mony obligations may be granted.65
However, an abatement of the obligor spouse's earnings must not
have been caused by his own willful actions. 6 "[T]he clean hands doc-
trine prevents a court of equity from relieving a former husband of his
obligation to pay alimony to his former wife where the decrease in the
former husband's financial ability to pay has been brought about by the
former husband's voluntary acts."'67 Thus, an obligor spouse who volun-
63. Note, supra note 24, at 75; see James R. Higgins, Jr., Modification of
Spousal Support: A Survey of a Confusing Area of the Law, 17 J. FAM. L. 711, 730
(1979); Annotation, supra note 48, at 16.
64. FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989).
65. See Rieder v. Rieder, 157 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
66. E.g., Waskin v. Waskin, 484 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (ex.husband's act of hiring someone to rid his ex-wife did not result in a change
of circumstance so as to modify the alimony award when he incurred great expenses in
defending the criminal charge against him); Coe v. Coe, 352 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1.977) (economic hardship due to increased spending by the obligor spouse is
not sufficient to relieve him from his alimony obligation); Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, 299 So.
2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (reduction of alimony was not granted to former
husband, a physician, who did not lack the requisite earning capacity, but allowed his
practice to close down to avoid his alimony obligation); see Note, supra note 24, at 76;
24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 712 (1983); M. L. Cross, Annotation, Hus-
bands Default, Contempt, or Other Misconduct as Affecting Modification of Decree
for Alimony, Separate Maintenance, or Support, 6 A.L.R.2D 835 (1949).
67. Waskin, 484 So. 2d at 1277. However, a problem arises when the obligor
spouse reaches an age where he voluntarily terminates himself from employment in
pursuit of permanent retirement from the workplace. The issue of whether the
postjudgment retirement of a spouse who is obligated to make alimony payments pur-
suant to a dissolution of marriage decree may be considered as a change of circum-
stance in which the alimony decree may be modified, has been a subject of conflict
among the Florida district courts of appeal. E.g., Pimm v. Pimm, 568 So. 2d 1299 (Fla.
2d Dist. C1. App. 1990); Ward v. Ward, 502 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
In Ward, the former husband, age 63, sought a reduction in his alimony obligation
since he had retired from his long-held job and his retirement necessarily resulted in a
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tarily reduces his income may be forced to continue the lifestyle that
existed at the time of the divorce in order to comply with his alimony
obligations.6 8 However, the obligor spouse should not be penalized if
he, in good faith, no longer wishes to maintain that lifestyle, and in-
stead wants to lead a less lucrative life which emphasizes personal val-
substantial decrease in his income. 502 So. 2d at 477. The Third District Court of
Appeal held that "while Ward was . . . entitled to retire from his more than forty
years of steady employment, he was not entitled to have his former wife defray the cost
of his retirement through a reduction of his long-standing obligations to her." Id. at
478. The court noted that at the time of Ward's voluntary retirement, he was fully
capable of working. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that the obligor spouse may have
the amount of his obligation reduced only when the inability to pay is affected by
circumstances beyond the obligor spouse's control-such as ill-health or where the de-
cision to retire was mandated by his employer. Id.
In Pimm v. Pimm, the court refused to follow the ruling in Ward that, as a matter
of law, an obligor spouse "cannot rely on the reduced income at retirement as a change
in circumstances that may be considered on a petition for modification of alimony."
Pimm, 568 So. 2d at 1300. Instead, the court held that an obligor spouse's voluntary
retirement is a factor to be considered in determining whether the obligor spouse is
entitled to a downward modification of his alimony obligation. Id. at 1301. The court
reasoned that even if the parties had remained married, the 65 year old husband more
than likely would have retired, as often people do, and they would have been expected
to live on a reduced income. Id. at 1300. In criticizing the holding in Ward, the court
stated that to follow the Ward decision would "place many supporting spouses in the
position of being unable to retire at any age so long as their alimony obligations re-
mained unchanged." Id.
In acknowledging the conflict between the Ward decision and the Pimm decision,
and in finding the affects of a spouse's voluntary retirement a subject of great public
importance in the state of Florida, the Pimm court certified the following question to
the Florida Supreme Court:
IS THE POSTJUDGMENT RETIREMENT OF A SPOUSE WHO IS
OBLIGATED TO MAKE SUPPORT OR ALIMONY PAYMENTS
PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF DISSOLUTION OF MAR-
RIAGE A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MAY BE CON-
SIDERED TOGETHER WITH OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS AND
APPLICABLE LAW UPON A PETITION TO MODIFY SUCH ALI-
MONY OR SUPPORT PAYMENTS?
Id. at 1301.
Oral arguments concerning this issue were heard by the Florida Supreme Court on
September 5, 1991. Its decision is now pending. See Pimm v. Pimm, No. 76,885 (Fla.
Oct. 12, 1991).
68. Note, supra note 24, at 76; see also David A. Giacalone, The Drop Out Ex-
Husband's Right to Reduce Alimony and Support Payments, 1 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
4065 (1975) (more Americans are choosing a career and lifestyle to better suit their
personal values).
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ues over material ones.6 9 Therefore, a self-induced decline in the obli-
gor spouse's income should, only upon a substantial showing of good
faith or cause therefor, constitute a change in circumstance so as to
provide a basis for modifying the alimony award.
C. Increase in Obligor Spouse's Income Without Increase in
Recipient Spouse's Need
Although a downward modification of alimony may be awarded if
the obligor spouse's financial condition worsens, does it follow that ali-
mony should be increased if the obligor spouse should suddenly pros-
per?7 0 The answer to this question should be no. However, Florida's
modification statute71 reads in pertinent part:
When the parties enter into an agreement for payments for . . .
alimony, . . . or when a party is required by court order to make
any payments, and the circumstances or the financial ability of ei-
ther party changes,. . . either party may apply to the circuit court
. . . for an order decreasing or increasing the amount of. . . ali-
mony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity re-
quires .... 72
It appears from the modification statute's plain language that an
increase in the financial ability of the obligor spouse is sufficient
enough to support a modification of alimony in Florida.7 3 Recently,
however, Florida courts have continued to disagree on this issue when
interpreting the meaning of the modification statute.
1. Florida Supreme Court
In McArthur v. McArthur, the Florida Supreme Court suggested
69. Id.
70. CLARK, supra note 1, at 662. This was the question posed before the Florida
Supreme Court in Bedell. See 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991).
71. FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See id. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act is silent on the issue of
whether a modification can be granted based on a showing of a change in the financial
ability of either party. Section 316(a) provides "[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . .
any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified . . . only upon a show-
ing of changed circumstances .... " UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §
316(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
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that an increase in the former husband's financial condition may, by
itself, warrant an upward modification in alimony payments to his for-
mer wife. 74 The former wife filed a petition for an increase in alimony
alleging, among other things, that the former husband's income had
greatly increased 5.7 Even though the former wife sought an increase in
alimony based upon a change in circumstance of both parties, the su-
preme court expressly stated that the former wife could "have filed a
petition for an increase in alimony on the basis of the change in [the
former husband's] financial condition ....
The supreme court, however, in ultimately deciding this case,
found that there had been a change of circumstance as to both par-
ties.77 This case, therefore, represents the traditionally accepted situa-
tion of a "changed circumstance. '78
2. Second District Court of Appeal
The second district's position on the issue of whether an increase
in the obligor spouse's financial ability is, by itself, sufficient enough to
warrant an upward modification in the alimony decree is well illus-
trated by Terry v. Terry79 and Lenton v. Lenton.8 °
In Terry, the Second District Court of Appeal stated that there
had been a sufficient change in the former husband's financial condition
so as to warrant an increase in the former wife's alimony.81 The court
74. McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957).
75. Id. at 522. The statutory basis for the former wife's petition for modification
of alimony was FLA. STAT. § 61.15 (1955), the predecessor to Florida's current modifi-
cation statute, FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1989). Section 61.15 contained essentially the same
language as the current modification statute.
76. McArthur, 95 So. 2d at 524.
77. See id. The Florida Supreme Court stated:
It seems to us that the changes in circumstances in the financial condition
of Mr. McArthur and Mrs. McArthur's condition of health and inability
to work in themselves constitute sufficient cause to justify an increase in
the amount of alimony which she should receive. The further change in
Mr. McArthur's financial condition . . . might perhaps justify even a
greater increase in the sums which she should receive.
Id.
78. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 660; Annotation, supra note 48, at 59.
79. Terry v. Terry, 126 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 133
So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1961).
80. Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), review de-
nied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980).
81. Terry, 126 So. 2d at 892.
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further noted that the increase in the former husband's financial condi-
tion "must necessarily [have been] contemplated by the language of
[the modification statute]. '"8" However, it is apparent from the facts in
Terry that the former wife's needs had increased since the final divorce
decree. 83 The parties incorporated into their final divorce decree an
agreement made between them whereby the former husband would pay
his former wife $375.00 per month in alimony. Subsequent to their
agreement, the former husband's salary had increased from $600.00 to
$1,000.00 per month and he was also deriving other income from vari-
ous investments. The former wife stated in her petition for modification
that her needs had increased, and that her existing alimony award was
inadequate to meet those needs.84 As in McArthur,8" it is clear that the
change in the former husband's financial ability to pay did justify an
upward modification in the alimony payments because the former wife
also expressed a corresponding need for the additional funds.
However, in Lenton, the former wife petitioned for modification of
her alimony because of a "dramatic improvement in her former hus-
band's financial condition."8 The trial court denied the former wife's
request for an upward modification, based on the fact that her financial
needs had not changed since the dissolution of marriage.87 In reversing
the trial court's decision, the Second District Court of Appeal stated
that "[a] change in circumstances of only one of the parties is sufficient
to justify a modification of alimony." 88
Nevertheless, the facts in Lenton clearly show that the former
wife's needs were not initially met by the original divorce decree, be-
cause the husband had submitted an inaccurate financial affidavit upon
which the; award of alimony was based. 89 The former wife accepted a
82. Id.; see also McArthur, 95 So. 2d at 524.
83. Terry, 126 So. 2d at 891.
84. Id.
85. McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957).
86. Lenton, 370 So. 2d at 31.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 282 So.
2d 877 (Fla. 1973); see also Rogers v. Rogers, 229 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (alimony decree can be modified based on a change of the former wife's circum-
stances without a corresponding change in the former husband's financial ability).
89. At. the time of the divorce, the former wife needed $1,650 per month from
the former husband to maintain the standard of living the parties enjoyed during their
marriage. Lenton, 370 So. 2d at 31. In reliance on the former husband's inaccurate
financial affidavit, the former wife agreed to accept $500 per month for alimony. Id.
1991]
555
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
decrease in her standard of living, because her former husband appar-
ently did not have the financial means to maintain her in the lifestyle
that she had been accustomed to during the marriage. 90 The Second
District Court of Appeal stated that a recipient spouse should not be
held to an agreement where the obligor spouse's financial limitations
were not accurate. 91 Because the needs of the former wife were not
initially met by the original divorce decree, and had continued to be
unmet at the time of her request for modification, the upward modifica-
tion based on an increase in the former husband's ability to pay was
justified.
3. Fourth District Court of Appeal
The leading case in the fourth district on the issue of whether a
substantial increase in the former husband's financial condition can,
standing alone, warrant a modification of the alimony decree, is Eng-
land v. England.2 In denying the former wife's request for an increase
in permanent periodic alimony, the trial court found that the former
husband had the ability to pay additional support, but concluded that
there was no showing of a substantial change of circumstance on the
wife's part so as to warrant a modification.98
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in reversing the
lower court's decision, stated that "to succeed in a motion to increase
an alimony award, it is only necessary for a petitioner to prove either
an increase in need or the ability to pay."194 From this, it would appear
that a court does not have to look at the needs of the recipient spouse
when determining whether to grant an upward modification. An in-
crease in the ability of the obligor spouse to pay would be enough of a
showing to warrant a modification. However, the court contradicted its
earlier statement by stating "[o]f course, alimony should not be in-
creased absent a demonstration of need for increased support and the
other spouse's ability to respond to that need." 95
In the court's view, there was no question that the facts reflected
both, a substantial increase in the former wife's need for alimony and a
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
93. Id. at 701.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 700.
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substantial increase in the former husband's ability to pay alimony.9 6
Therefore, the court ultimately decided this case based on the change
of circumstance as to both parties. 97 Under these facts, the upward
modification was proper.
4. Third District Court of Appeal
In interpreting Florida's modification statute,9 8 case law in the
third district has been erratic. 99 The inconsistent laws in this district
are well illustrated by three cases.
In Sherman v. Sherman, the question presented to the court was
whether "[permanent] periodic alimony can be increased upon a peti-
tion for modification when the only change of circumstance shown was
a substantial increase in the earnings of the former husband."100 Upon
the authority of Florida's modification statute,"0' the Third District
Court of Appeal held that the question presented must be answered in
the affirmative.' However, a strong dissenting opinion written by
Chief Judge Barkdull stated in part:
I have strong convictions that the former wife in the instant matter
is not entitled to a raise in alimony . . . . [Pleriodic alimony ....
is to be awarded for the purpose of permitting the former wife to
live in the manner and custom established by the husband. [Here,
the original alimony award] was commensurate with the scale of
living maintained by the [former husband] during the time the par-
ties were man and wife . . . .Following the majority's opinion to a
logical conclusion, a former wife receiving periodic alimony could
hold her former husband to an increase in alimony upon increased
earnings at any time during the remainder of his life. I do not think
the courts should condone such action.1
0 3
As will become evident, Judge Barkdull's dissent was to followed by
96. Id. at 701.
97. See England, 520 So. 2d at 701.
98. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989).
99. See Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 282 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973). But see Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
100. Sherman, 279 So. 2d at 888.
101. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(l) (1989).
102. Sherman, 279 So. 2d at 888.
103. Id. at 889 (Barkdull, C.J., dissenting).
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other court decisions involving this issue.
Seven years later, in Powell v. Powell, the third district receded
from its prior decision in Sherman.'0' The court noted in a footnote
"[o]f course, an increase in the husband's ability would not itself jus-
tify an upward modification of alimony if the wife's needs are already
fully met either by the existing award or otherwise."10 5 However, the
court's award of an upward modification of alimony rested on the find-
ing that there had been a material increase in the former wife's
needs. '6 Furthermore, the former husband stipulated that his ability to
pay had materially changed for the better.10 7 Therefore, this case sug-
gests that before an upward modification in alimony can be granted,
the recipient spouse must demonstrate that either her needs were ini-
tially unmet by the original divorce decree and continue to be unmet,
or that a substantial change in her needs has taken place since the
original award.' 8
Likewise, the third district's decision in Frantz v. Frantz'0 9 repre-
sents a continued shift away from the Sherman"0 decision. In Frantz,
the court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny the former wife an
increase in alimony."' The court essentially adopted the footnote in
Powell,"2 by holding that "an increase in the husband's ability to pay
would not itself justify an upward modification of alimony if the former
wife's needs are already fully met . . . by the existing award.""' Sev-
eral of the Florida cases analyzed in this comment state that an up-
ward modification in alimony can be granted if there is a substantial
change in the financial ability of only one party; namely an increase in
the obligor spouse's ability to pay."" However, these courts justified
104. Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
105. Id. at 1216 n.6.
106. Id. at 1215.
107. Id. at 1216 n.4.
108. See Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214.
109. Frantz v. Frantz, 453 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) review denied,
459 So. 2d 1040 (1984).
110. Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) review de-
nied, 282 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973).
111. Id. at 430.
112. See supra text accompanying note 105.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957); England v.
England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d
30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), review denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980); Sherman
v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 282 So. 2d 877
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their decisions to grant modification on the basis of the recipient
spouse's demonstrated need for the increased funds." 5
The question, therefore, is still open as to whether a recipient
spouse can request and receive an upward modification in her alimony
based solely on the obligor spouse's increase in his financial ability to
pay. On May 30, 1991, with the decision in Bedell v. Bedell," 6 the
Supreme Court of Florida directly confronted this issue.
IV. BEDELL v. BEDELL
A. Facts
In 1962, Diane Bedell and Robert Bedell were married. During
the parties' eleven year marriage, Mrs. Bedell did not work outside the
home, while Mr. Bedell attended medical school and subsequently ob-
tained a medical degree. The marriage was dissolved in July, 1975, and
at that time Mr. Bedell had just opened his first medical office. Under
the terms of the final judgment, which incorporated a settlement agree-
ment, Mrs. Bedell received $415 per month in permanent alimony.117
Thereafter, on July 12, 1986, Mrs. Bedell filed a petition for modifica-
tion in the trial court, seeking an increase in her alimony.
B. The Lower Courts
After a non-jury trial, the trial court entered an order denying
Mrs. Bedell's request for an upward modification in her alimony." 8
Mrs. Bedell's primary contention for seeking an increase in her alimony
(Fla. 1973); Terry v. Terry, 126 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,
133 So. 2d 321 (1961).
115. See McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957); England v. Eng-
land, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), review denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980); Terry
v.Terry, 126 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 133 So. 2d 321 (Fla.
1961). But see Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 28.2 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973).
116. Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991).
117. Furthermore, Mrs. Bedell received $250 per month in child support for each
of her two children. Id. at 1006. In 1977, Mrs. Bedell relinquished custody of the two
children to the husband and at that time, Mr. Bedell ceased making the child support
payments to Mrs. Bedell. Id.
118. Bedell v. Bedell, 561 So. 2d 1197, 1181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), juris.
accepted, 569 So. 2d 444 (1990).
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was that the cost of living had increased since the time that she and
Mr. Bedell were divorced.119 The trial court found that Mrs. Bedell
"failed to demonstrate that she had been detrimentally effected by the
rise in the cost of living or that such a rise has caused an increase in
her need." 120 Mrs. Bedell appealed to the Third District Court of
Appeal.' 21
The third district considered Mrs. Bedell's appeal en banc because
of the conflict of decisions within the district,122 Mrs. Bedell argued
that she was entitled to an increase in alimony as a matter of law under
Florida's modification statute, and that this entitlement was based
solely on the husband's stipulated substantial upward shift of his finan-
cial capacity since the final judgment. 2
The court admitted that the "[modification] statute authorizes a
recipient spouse to apply for an increase in alimony when the financial
ability of the obligor spouse changes for the better.' 24 However, the
court noted that it was "not required by the statute to grant such a
motion.' 25 The court reasoned that the recipient spouse's needs are the
controlling factor in determining an alimony modification, and to hold
otherwise would grant that spouse a continued interest in the former
spouse's good fortune. 1 The court recognized that the exception to the
119. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5-6, Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla.
1991) (No. 75894) [hereinafter Answer Brief].
120. Initial Brief of Petitioner at 2, Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991)
(No. 75894) [hereinafter Initial Brief].
121. Bedell, 561 So. 2d at 1181.
122. Id. at 1180; see Frantz v. Frantz, 453 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 459 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1984); Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 282 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973).
123. Bedell, 561 So. 2d at 1181; see FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989) The Third
District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida analyzed Bedell under
FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1985). However, FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1989) contains essentially
the same language. Therefore, the 1989 version of Florida's modification statute will be
the one cited to by the author.
124. Bedell, 561 So. 2d at 1181.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1182 (citing Irwin v. Irwin, 539 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1989)). The court stated:
[W]here the financial needs of the recipient spouse, as established by the
standard of living maintained during the marriage, have not substantially
increased since the final judgment, the trial court is justified in denying a
motion to modify upward the alimony award, even though there has been a
substantial increase in the financial circumstances of the paying spouse.
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rule that the recipient spouse must demonstrate an increased need
before a request for an upward modification can be considered is,
the rare case where the recipient spouse's needs, as established by
the standard of living maintained during the marriage, were not,
and could not be initially met by the original divorce decree due to
the then existing financial inability of the paying spouse to meet
those needs, which needs continue to remain unmet at the time the
modification is sought. 127
In affirming the trial court's decision, the district court acknowledged
that its decision stood in conflict with the decision in Sherman,28 but
in support of Judge Barkdull's dissenting opinion in that case. 129 There-
after, the Supreme Court of Florida decided to review the case. 30
C. Supreme Court of Florida
On appeal, Mrs. Bedell argued that the Third District Court of
Appeal's restrictive interpretation of the modification statute was di-
rectly contrary to the express language contained in the statute.' 3 ' In
opposition, Mr. Bedell argued that if a modification can be granted as
a matter of law, based on a change in the financial ability of either
party, namely the obligor spouse, without considering equity principles,
then there would no longer be any such thing as a divorce. 132 Instead,
former spouses would continue to be required to share their increased
income with their ex-spouses, without limitation, for all time.'
The Florida Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging
Id.
127. Bedell, 561 So. 2d at 1182.
128. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887.
129. Bedell, at 1183; see supra text accompanying note 103.
130. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005. The Supreme Court of Florida accepted Bedell for
review because the decision rendered by the Third District Court of Appeal in that case
directly conflicted with the language stated in England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) and Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), review denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980). Id.
131. Initial Brief, supra note 120, at 16. In determining the legislative intent of a
statute, the general rule is, "when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous,
judicial interpretation is not appropriate ...... Citizens of Fla. v. Public Serv.
Comm., 435 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. 1983).
132. Answer Brief, supra note 119, at 13.
133. Id.
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that alimony modification may be granted when the circumstances or
the financial ability of either party changes.134 The court observed the
line of Florida cases that represented the proposition that the recipient
spouse's need, as established by the standard of living during the mar-
riage, should be the first determination made, and only then, if a sub-
stantial need had been shown, could the obligor spouse's ability to pay
be considered.' 35 The court then noted that "at least two courts have
held that in order to succeed with a motion to increase an alimony
award, it is only necessary for a petitioner to prove either an increase in
need or an increase in the ability to pay."' 36 In interpreting the preced-
ing two lines of authority in light of the modification statute's intent,' 37
the court stated that they were not irreconcilable, and that the solution
lied between the two positions. 38
In analyzing the legislature's intent, the supreme court stated that
the "[modification] statute gives an ex-spouse an [unconditional] right
to file a petition for an increase in alimony where the circumstances or
the financial ability of either party has changed."'' 39 However, the court
construed the statute's provision for equitable jurisdiction to mean that
a court is not required to grant an increase in alimony simply upon a
showing of a substantial increase in the financial ability of the obligor
spouse, because equity dictates whether such a modification should be
ordered." O Thus, "a substantial increase in the financial ability of the
paying spouse, standing alone, may justify but does not require an or-
der of increased alimony.' '14
By using the language "may justify" in their holding, the supreme
court equivocated on this issue. The supreme court further stated that
it "would expect that a raise in alimony would be ordered when no
134. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007 (citing FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1985)).
135. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007; see, e.g., Irwin v. Irwin, 539 So. 2d 1177 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Bess v. Bess, 471 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 476 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1985), review denied, 482 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1986);
Frantz v. Frantz, 453 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 459 So. 2d
1040 (Fla. 1984); Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
136. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007; see England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), review denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980).
137. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989).
138. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007.
139. Id.
140. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989) which provides that in a proceeding
for modification "the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires ... .
141. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007.
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increased need was shown only in extraordinary cases where the equita-
ble considerations were particularly compelling.' 4 However, the court
failed to state the type of extraordinary cases that would be "particu-
larly compelling" enough to warrant an increase in alimony when no
concomitant increased need was shown.
Finally, the court concluded that based on these facts, the wife
was entitled to an increase in her alimony because she "clearly demon-
strated an increased need.""" In so holding, the court accepted Mrs.
Bedell's testimony that the original alimony award was sufficient only
because she was receiving $500 per month for child support in addition
to alimony."' In addition, the court also accepted her argument that
because the cost of living had gone up since the divorce, her standard
of living had gone down and she was not living in the manner she was
accustomed to during the marriage. 1 5 Therefore, a substantial increase
in Mrs. Bedell's needs coupled with Mr. Bedell's ability to pay justified
an upward modification of alimony." 6
V. CONCLUSION
In rendering its decision in Bedell, the Supreme Court of Florida
evaded the application of its own precedent on the issue of whether an
upward modification in alimony could be granted based on the sole fact
that the obligor spouse had an increased ability to pay. The court did
not base its decision upon the stipulated finding that the obligor spouse
had a substantial increase in his income. To the contrary, in ultimately
deciding on whether to grant an upward modification, the court found
that a need was demonstrated by the recipient spouse. 11
This decision sends a confusing message to the lower Florida
courts. A clear precedent has not been set because the Florida Supreme
Court did not take a firm stand on the very issue that brought Bedell to
the supreme court. Therefore, the inconsistency among the decisions
rendered from the various district courts in Florida will most likely
continue. It is conceivable that an obligor spouse may be required to
pay an additional sum to a spouse who has not demonstrated a substan-
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1008.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1008.
147. Id.
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tial need solely based on his increase in income. Perhaps Pimm v.
Pimm, which is now pending before the Florida Supreme Court, will
decide this issue.14 8
Helene R. Cohen
148. See Pimm v. Pimm, No. 76, 885 (Fla. Oct. 12, 1990). The issue before the
supreme court in Pimm is factually converse to Bedell. Compare with Pimm v. Pimm,
568 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Pimm involves whether an obligor
spouse who retires and, therefore, no longer has an income can reduce or terminate his
alimony obligation based on that fact alone, and without a corresponding showing that
the recipient spouse's need has decreased, see also supra discussion at note 67.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Beautiful beaches and the tropical climate of Florida have lured
many new residents to this paradise over the past two decades.' Esti-
* The author expresses his gratitude to the firms of Akerman, Senterfitt &
Eidson and Michael M. McMahon and Gregory J. Kelly, Esqs. for the case briefs and
essential reports and for providing an understanding of underlying concepts.
1. The Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, estimated the projected
population growth to be highest from 1988 to 2000 in the following states:
State % Population Growth
Arizona 23.1
Nevada 21.1
New Mexico 20.6
Florida 20.3
Georgia 19.4
Alaska 19.3
Although Florida is not the highest in percentage of population growth among the
states, the raw numbers of population increases in Florida effect county operations.
This comment is centered around St. Johns County, Florida. The Bureau of the
Census has estimated the population change in St. Johns County to be:
1961) (Census) 1970 (Census) 1980 (Census) 1989 (Est.)
30,034 31,035 51,303 84,389
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mates for the year 2000 indicate no relief for Florida, with a projected
increase of 2,639,000 people.' State taxes, bonds and funds3 have sup-
ported infrastructure improvements necessitated by such population
growth in the past. However, regulations and impact fees' are tools of
the present, 5 used to shift the cost of these improvements to those who
%3.3* %65.3* %64.5*
* Percent change in population between the represented years.
2. Calculated from the percentage estimates of the United States Bureau of the
Census.
3.
(I) The district school fund shall consist of funds derived from the district
school tax levy; state appropriations; appropriations by county commission-
ers; local, state, and federal school food service funds; any and all other
sources for school purposes; national forest trust funds and other federal
sources; and gifts and other sources.
St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 641 (Fla. 1991)
(quoting FLA. STAT. § 236.24(1) (1989)).
4. Impact fees are defined as:
[The] charges or fees levied by a governmental unit against new de-
velopment for the purpose of acquiring or recovering some or all of the
cost of providing the public infrastructure facilities needed to support the
new growth or development paying the fees. They are variously referred to
as impact fees, capital recovery fees, capital contributions, development
share charges, municipal utilities system charges, access fees, and a host of
other aliases. The name is never important. The fees are defined, as a prac-
tical matter, by their purpose and effect.
. . . [The] fee system is devised . . . [to require] each unit of growth
or development to pay its pro-rata share of the cost of providing the public
works facilities necessary to support the new development. Any fee struc-
ture designed to accomplish this specific purpose is an impact fee.
E. Allen Taylor, Jr., How to Develop and Use Impact Fees Successfully, 1988 INST. ON
PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN § 11.02 (emphasis added); see also Julian C.
Juergensmeyer & Robert M. Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments'
Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 417 (1981) (Impact fees are
defined as "charges levied by local governments against new development in order to
generate revenue for capital funding necessitated by the new development.") (emphasis
added).
5. See, e.g., Eager v. Florida Builders Ass'n. v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Auth.,
580 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (system development fees were charged
for both "new and existing customers who modify, add or construct facilities which
impose a potential demand on the water system"); City of Hallandale v. ACMAR
Eng'g Corp., 560 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding "that a building
permit does not provide a developer with a vested right to avoid [a] later enacted [im-
pact or reserve capacity] fee"); Babcock Co. v. State, Land & Water Adjudicatory
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created their demand-developers 6  trying to accommodate new
residents.
The issues in St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders
Ass'n,' are centered around the constitutional validity of the St. Johns
County Educational Impact Fee Ordinance. 8 In 1986, the St. Johns
County School Board requested that educational facilities be included
in the county's impact fee program.9 Thereafter, the Educational Im-
pact Fee Ordinance was designed to generate revenue from developers,
and in turn from residents, who "may reasonably be expected to place
students in the public schools of St. Johns County ... ."10 The ordi-
nance stated that the funds collected were to be used to "construct,
expand and equip the educational sites and educational capital facilities
necessitated by new development."' 1 This revenue generated from the
impact fee would be placed in a special trust fund to defray the costs of
Comm'n, 558 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (transportation impact fees);
City of Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corp., 537 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding constitutional rights of the developer were not violated by the assessment of
"developmental impact fees" for sewer, solid waste and traffic control); City of Ormond
Beach v. County of Volusia, 535 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
municipal ordinance exempting properties in municipality from county road impact fee
was invalid). See generally Jerome G. Rose, Development Fees-To What Extent May
Municipalities Shift the Costs of Public Improvements to New Developments, 16
REAL EST. L.J. 356 (1988).
6. "It is a person's status (as the developer of dwelling units that require addi-
tional public facilities capacity) that triggers the requirement to pay impact fees
. .. " Petitioners' Initial Brief at 14, St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders
Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (No. 75,986) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
7. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla.
1991).
8. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 (Oct. 20, 1987).
9. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 4.
10. This ordinance provided that either the developer or residents can be
feepayers because the ordinance defines a feepayer as "a person commencing a land
development activity which may reasonably be expected to place students in the public
schools of St. Johns County and which requires the issuance of a building permit for a
residential building or structure or permit for residential mobile home installation." St.
Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 5(A) (Oct. 20, 1987) (emphasis added). In
addition, section 8(A) states: "The person applying for the issuance of a building per-
mit for accessory structures, additions to and remodeling of existing structures, ...
shall pay the fee .... " St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 8(A) (Oct. 20,
1987) (emphasis added)(the ordinance does not differentiate between whether the de-
velopers or resident homeowners pay the fee).
11. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637 (citing St. Johns County, Fla., Ordi-
nance 87-61) § 10(B) (Oct. 20, 1987)).
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increasing educational facility capacity needed to support the addi-
tional students.12 All funds collected that were not expended within a
six year period would be refunded to the property's current
landowner. 3
In June of 1988, the Northeast Florida Builders Association
brought suit to declare the St. Johns County Educational Impact Fee
ordinance unconstitutional." In April of 1990, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision that the ordinance was
unconstitutional. 15 Judge Harris, speaking for the majority of the Fifth
District, stated that the ordinance "violate[d] the free public school
provision, because as enacted, the impact fee [was] nothing more than
a user fee."'" The court then certified the issue of new development
funding of new school construction to the Florida Supreme Court.'"
Subsequently, in August of 1991, the Florida Supreme Court, in re-
versing the Fifth District, decided that the St. Johns County Educa-
tional Impact Fee Ordinance for new school facility construction did
not violate the "constitutional mandate for free public schools."' 8
The certified question, insufficiently answered by the Florida Su-
preme Court and addressed by this comment, was whether impact fees,
levied for the construction of new school facilities, were a form of con-
stitutional regulatory device or just another twist on taxation?' 9 This
comment advocates that the Florida Supreme Court did not sufficiently
analyze the problems posed by this question. Rather, the court semanti-
12. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 9 (Oct. 20, 1987).
13. Id., § I I(B).
14. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at I (motions for summary judgment were
filed and the appeal decided in favor of the Northeast Florida Builders Association).
15. St. Johns County v. Notheast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 559 So. 2d 363, 363-64
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 583 So. 2d 635 (1991).
16. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. The question certified to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public
importance was: "[W]hether St. Johns County could impose an impact fee on new
residential construction to be used for new school facilities." St. Johns County, 583 So.
2d at 636 (emphasis added). The supreme court determined that the "ordinance did
not create an unlawful delegation of power," and upheld the validity of the ordinance
subject to the removal of section 7(b) and a county-wide agreement to the ordinance.
Id. at 639-42.
19. This question is asked by many authors reviewing the constitutionality of
impact fees in general. See, e.g., Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 4, at 422-27;
John M. Payne, Housing Impact Fees, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 75 (1991); Rose, supra note
5, at 358-59; Taylor, supra note 4, at § 11.04(1).
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cally manipulated the language of a newly accepted method of raising
revenue to cope with other services2 in order to accommodate new
school facility construction.
This comment is divided into four parts. First, part I is a discus-
sion of relevant case history on impact fees and their effect on the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's decision in St. Johns County.2" Part II then ad-
dresses some of the constitutional challenges presented by this case.
The principal argument is that the St. Johns County Educational Im-
pact Fee is an unconstitutional tax masqueraded as a land use regula-
tion, and therefore, that it violates the constitutional mandate for a
"uniform system of free public schools."'2 2 In particular, part II argues
that the removal of section 7(B) 23 from the St. Johns County Ordi-
nance24 will not, in and of itself"6 , cure the constitutional defects2 6 ad-
20. Examples of service increases are the expansion for sewer and waste disposal,
roads, emergency medical services, police and fire protection. See generally Juergen-
smeyer & Blake, supra note 4, at 417.
21. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d 635.
22. "Section 1. System of public education. - Adequate provision shall be made
by law for a uniform system of free public schools and for the establishment, mainte-
nance and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education pro-
grams that the needs of the people may require." FLA. CON T. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis
added).
23. Section seven titled, "Computation of the Amount of Educational Facilities
Impact Fee" states in part:
B. If a feepayer opts not to have the impact fee determined according
to paragraph (A) of this section, then the feepayer shall prepare and sub-
mit to the St. Johns County School Board an independent fee calculation
study for the land development activity for which a building permit or
permit for mobile home installation is sought. The student generation and/
or educational impact documentation submitted shall show the basis upon
which the independent fee calculation was made. The St. Johns County
School Board may adjust the educational facilities impact fee to that
deemed to be appropriate given the documentation submitted by the
feepayer. The County Administrator shall make the appropriate modifica-
tion upon notice of such adjustment from the School Board.
St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 7(B) (October 20, 1987).
24. Id.
25. In addition to section 7(B), sections 7(A)(5), (A)(6) and 5(D) offer a similar
constitutional defect; they resemble a user fee:
(A)(5) If the type of development activity that a building permit is
applied for is not specified on the above fee schedules, the County Admin-
istrator shall use the fee applicable to the most nearly comparable type of
land use on the above fee schedules. The County Administrator shall be
guided in the selection of a comparable type by information provided by
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dressed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. 27 Part III deals with the
need for adopting a "less intrusive alternative means"28 component to
the "dual rational nexus test ' 29 used by the Florida Supreme Court to
evaluate this impact fee. Part IV reviews and analyzes the St. Johns
County Ordinance3" with special attention to the test adopted and ap-
the School Board of St. Johns County. If the County Administrator deter-
mines that there is no comparable type of land use on the above fee sched-
ule then the County Administrator shall request a determination by the
School Board of the appropriate fee.
(A)(6) In the case of change of use, redevelopment, or expansion or
modification of an existing use which requires the issuance of a building
permit or permit for mobile home installation, the impact fee shall be
based upon the net positive increase in the impact fee for the new use as
compared to the previous use. The Count Administrator shall be guided in
this determination by student generation statistics provided by the St.
Johns County School Board.
(5)(D) "Land Development Activity Which May Reasonably Be Ex-
pected To Place Students in the Public Schools of St. Johns County"
means any change in land use or any construction or installation of resi-
dential buildings or structures or any change in the use of any structure
that will result in additional students in the public schools of St. Johns
County.
St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60, §§ 7(A)(5), 7(A)(6), 5(D) (October 20,
1987) (emphasis added).
26. See supra note 10.
27. St. Johns County, 559 So. 2d at 364.
28. See John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for
Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 139 (Winter 1987).
29. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637.
30. The ordinance reads as follows:
An ordinance relating to the regulation of the use and development of land
in St. Johns County, Florida; imposing an impact fee on land development
in St. Johns County for providing new schools and related facilities neces-
sitated by such new development; stating the authority for adoption of the
ordinance; providing definitions; providing findings and declarations of the
board of county commissioners; providing for the payment and time of
payment of an educational facilities impact fee; providing a method of
payment of the fee; providing for the remittal of fees collected and their
expenditure by the school board of St. Johns County for educational capi-
tal purposes; providing for refund of unexpended funds; providing for ex-
emptions and credits; providing for severability; providing for penalties;
providing an effective date.
St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 (October 20, 1987) (preamble) (titled as the
Educational Facilities Impact Fee Ordinance).
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plied by the court, the effect of footnote six8l on the constitutional va-
lidity of the ordinance and the effect this ordinance will have on other
counties throughout the state.3 2
II. FLORIDA IMPACT FEES
Based on recent Bureau of Census reports, Florida municipalities
have felt the effect of population increases in many areas of land devel-
opment. Florida courts have already addressed the needs of growing
communities for the funding of additional infrastructures such as water
and sewer systems 33 roads,3' parks 5 and other recreational facilities,
through impact fees. However, the imposition of an impact fee via a
county ordinance, for the explicit use of constructing new school facili-
31. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640 n.6. The court in this footnote suggests
that age limitations or restrictions entered into by a mutual covenant, as exhibited by
the condominium owners in White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d
346, 350 (Fla. 1979) (where age limitations were for minors under the age of twelve),
would not undermine the position taken by the court. Cf. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d
at 640.
The Florida Supreme Court's position in their objection to section 7(B) of the St.
Johns County Educational Impact Fee Ordinance was that it "permits households that
do not contain public school children to avoid paying the fee . . . [and would] have the
potential of being user fees . . . thereby colliding with the constitutional requirement
of free public schools." Id. It is difficult, if not impossible, to harmonize this position
with the position of the court in footnote six. The only distinction between the court's
previous position in objecting to the section 7(B) adult retirement facilities exemption,
and the one mentioned in footnote six, is the unchangeable future position of the resi-
dence agreement to the land use restriction; i.e., a school child can not later occupy this
residence: which is subject to the land use restriction. However, these distinctions only
strengthen the position that the impact fees are simply user fees directed "primarily
[at] those households that do contain public school children ...... Id. (emphasis
added).
32. Based on figures from the United States Bureau of the Census, counties such
as Osceola with a 98% increase estimated for the period from 1980 to 1989, and other
counties with large population percentage changes, will be effected by this decision.
33. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979); see also City of Tarpon Springs v. Tarpon
Springs Arcade Ltd., 585 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
34. See Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 446
So. 2d 14.0 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 451 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1984);
see also Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
35. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), petition denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983).
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ties, is an issue of first impression 6 in Florida.
Impact fees have gained acceptance in Florida because of their
ability to shift the cost of public service improvements and new con-
struction from the municipality to the developer.37 The intended pur-
pose of many impact fees is to achieve a perfect society, where all its
citizenry are paying their "fair share"3 8 of public services used as cal-
culated by some type of "magic meter."3 9 Obviously, use of such a
36. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 638.
Although municipality designed impact fees are new to the South, the first impact
fee was a 1957 New Jersey fee imposed for new school facility construction. Taylor,
supra note 4, at § 11.03. Albeit the court in Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 129
A.2d 265 (N.J. 1957), decided the invalidity of the impact fee on grounds that assis-
tance for increased municipality population "must come not from the municipality nor
from the courts but from legislature[;]" its ironic that this comment is also based on an
impact fee for new school facility construction and the competing philosophies behind
who should bear the burden of increased facility costs. Id. at 268.
37. Although the county's intent has been characterized as shifting the economic
burden from the municipality to the developer, in actuality, the cost is passed through
to the intended user. This actual intent of the ordinance is evident by the underlying
meaning of sections 5(D) (where only those additions are charged which would change
the land use by generating additional students in public school), 7(A)(6) (where im-
pact fees for modification of existing structures "shall be based upon the net positive
increase in the impact fee for the new use as compared to the previous use") and
I I(B) (which shows an understanding that the impact fee was passed on to the
purchase price of the home and should be refunded to the then "current landowner").
St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60, §§ 5(D), 7(A)(6), I1(B) (Oct. 20 1987)
(emphasis added); see, e.g., Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 321 (The court stated "[t]he cost
of new facilities should be borne by new users. ... ) (emphasis added).
38. "Fair Share" can best be explained by the name given to the Palm Beach
County Ordinance for road improvements: Fair Share Contribution for Road Improve-
ments Ordinance. See Palm Beach County Ordinance 79-7 (1980); cf. St. Johns
County, 583 So. 2d at 640 (where the intended purpose of the St. Johns County Ordi-
nance is "to regulate the use and development of land so as to assure that new develop-
ment bears a proportionate share of the cost of capital expenditures necessary to pro-
vide public educational sites and facilities in St. Johns County.").
39. The term "magic meter," put forth by counsel for the Builders, is an impor-
tant concept in understanding the underlying theory of impact fees. In the area of
public services, the ideal situation would be the ability of having a "magic meter"
calculating the amount of services used by each member of the community. For exam-
ple, if every time you ran your car on a public road the "magic meter" began to tic off
usage time, the county could accurately assess a person's road usage and send them a
bill. If every time a person flushed their toilet the meter ran on their usage of the
sewage system, they could then be assessed a pro rata share of the cost. Interview with
Michael McMahon, Counsel for the Builders in St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla.
Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (July 29, 1991).
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meter is impossible. However, this is exactly what impact fees are
designed to model-the perfect fee assessment.
The purpose of the St. Johns County ordinance parallels a model
impact fee by attempting to distribute the cost of increasing the capac-
ity of school facilities to those who have created their need.' 0 Although
this is a politically laudable gesture by the county, the developers con-
tend that it is at odds with the Florida constitutional mandate for pub-
lic free schools 4' and is therefore inconsistent with the county's power
to raise revenue. 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Home Builders & Con-
tractors Ass'n v. Board of County Commissioners,' has credited Flor-
ida home rule powers" as offering adequate authority for county gov-
erning bodies to implement impact fees. In fact, many counties
throughout Florida have now designed ordinances or regulations to levy
impact fees on developers.' 5 This article focuses primarily on the St.
Johns County Educational Impact Fee Ordinance 87-60 as an example
of these impact fees.
The main assertion in opposition to the constitutionality of the St.
Johns County Educational Impact Fee Ordinance was that it bears a
keen resemblance to a user fee.4" The principal case relied on by the
40. Previous impact fees have been predicated on direct ties between the need
and demand created by new growth. See Rose, supra note 5, at 356.
41. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also Scavella v. School Bd., 363 So. 2d
1095 (Fla. 1978).
42. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 641.
43. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 446 So.
2d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
44. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1) (Supp. 1990).
Home rule power is the power vested in cities and towns as "an inherent right of
local self-government" which is supported by the local government's ability to best pro-
tect their own needs. 1 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. §§ 1.40, .42 (3d ed. 1987). Although
the is no clear distinction between state and local activity, the effect of rapidly increas-
ing local populations necessitates the need for increased local control, because any "ap-
propriate regulation . . . varies in accordance with the density, geographical location,
physical conditions, the needs and conveniences to be furnished and the means to se-
cure them, and the standards of the inhabitants as well." Id., § 1.64. Accordingly, local
government's right of home rule power may be the best manner for serving the people
of that particular region.
45. E.g., Palm Beach County Ordinance 79-7 (1980) (Fair Share Contribution
for Road Improvements Ordinance); see Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So.
2d 606, 607 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (development of county level parks).
46. A user fee is defined as "[ciharges imposed on persons for the use of a par-
ticular facility." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (6th ed. 1990).
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Florida Supreme Court was Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of
Dunedin,4 7 which stands for the proposition that funds collected by im-
pact fees must be "limited to meeting the costs of expansion."'4 8 Al-
though correctly cited for this proposition, the case stands for a much
larger principle; there is "nothing wrong with transferring to the new
user of a municipality [service] a fair share of the [additional] costs
[increased capacity] of the system involves."'49 This principle is the
common thread that weaves through all of the cases involving impact
fees, complicating the distinction between "impact fee" and "user fee."
As a user fee, even the county would have to agree with the Fifth
District Court of Appeal that the fee violated the free public school
mandate.5 0 However, the county identifies the Educational Facilities
Ordinance as a "development exaction" 51 and not a "user fee," with
the distinction that the fee is for increasing facility capacity, not actual
use.52 The reality is that developers of new residential areas are being
charged an additional fee,53 apart from the future payment of ad
valorem taxes. 4 The distinction should not lie in whether one is being
charged for the use of a facility or the expansion of the facility's capac-
ity.55 Rather, it should be determined by a test applicable to the spe-
cific parameters of the needed services created by the new development.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Broward County v. Janis
Development Corp.58 set the stage for the development of impact fee
47. 329 So. 2d 314.
48. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637 (citing Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 320).
49. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 317-18.
50. St. Johns County, 559 So. 2d at 363.
51. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 17.
52. Id. at 18.
53. Assuming that the impact fee is initially charged to the developer will, by the
very nature that "subdividing is a profit-making enterprise," be passed onto the
homebuyers. See Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
54. Ad valorem taxes can be defined as "[a] tax levied on property or an article
of commerce in proportion to its value, as determined by assessment or appraisal." See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990).
55. The impact fees for roads, schools, public buildings, police, fire, emergency
medical services, and parks estimated in the Methodology Study, are the totals for each
specific structural unit. These fees represent a proportional share of the cost to provide
additional facilities. See St. Johns County Impact Fee Methodology, prepared by Dr. J.
Nicholas (Dr. J. Nicholas was the county consultant developing these impact fees.)
[hereinafter Methodology Study].
56. Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
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parameters. In Janis Development, the court rejected an impact fee for
road construction because the "fee was simply an exaction of money to
be put in trust for roads, which must be paid before developers may
build" without stipulating the use for which the funds are collected.57
This same court later, in Palm Beach County, 8 affirmed the validity of
an impact fee ordinance for road improvements, recognizing that the
ordinance followed the lessons expressed by the court in Dunedin69 re-
garding the defects in the Janis Development60 ordinance. The Fourth
District Court stated that a proper impact fee is a fee that assures the
cost of the improvements will exceed the funds collected, and that those
funds will be used to benefit the new development."1 However, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court is now faced not with road improvements or water
and sewer connections, but new school facilities.
In the area of education, the generation of funds for new school
facilities; should come from the populace as a whole, because in actual-
ity it is the populace as a whole which will benefit. However, the St.
Johns ordinance divides the paying population into two constituents:
first, the residents of the new development; and second, only the resi-
dences that would "reasonably" require the service.62 Under previous
fee adjudications, the theory of having the new user pay a "fair share
57. Id. at 375.
58. Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d at 145.
59. 329 So. 2d at 320-21.
60. Id. at 318.
61. Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d at 145.
62. See, e.g., St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 5(D) (Oct. 20 1987)
(where the ordinance defines some land development activity under the criteria of
whether "that [development] will result in additional students in the public schools.").
In addition, in the City of Tarpon Springs v. Tarpon Springs Arcade Ltd., 585 So.
2d 324, the Second District Court of Appeal is now considering under a Water and
Sewer Impact Fee, the problems that arise because "the ordinance fails to direct the
building official as to the method and manner in which credits are to be allowed or
applied in determining whether there is or is not a fee due for the new or expanded use
of a remodeled structure .... " Id. at 326-27. It is quite possible that if section 5(D)
of the St. Johns County ordinance was permitted to remain, problems would arise in
determining what constitutes the meaning of what "will result in additional students in
the public schools," as well as being violative as a direct user fee.
It is this author's opinion that section 5(D) is as detrimental to the validity of the
ordinance as the court feels 7(B) is, where "impact fees have the potential of being
user fees that will be paid primarily by those households that do contain public school
children, thereby colliding with the constitutional requirement of free public schools."
St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640.
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of the costs which new use of the system involves," 63 was appropriate.
However, this is not the case where school facilities are concerned. Im-
pact fees for educational facilities are different from all others because
of Florida's constitutional mandate for a "uniform system of free pub-
lic schools," 6' and the scope of the proposed infrastructure project.6 5
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY OF ORDINANCE 87-60
The main constitutional challenge presented by the St. Johns
County Educational Facilities Impact Fee Ordinance66 is whether it vi-
olates the mandate for a "uniform system of free public schools."6
The application of this ordinance, irrespective of the language in which
it is couched," is violative of the constitutional mandate for a uniform
system of free public schools. There is virtually no difference, except
semantically, between access to public schools being dependent upon
the payment of tuition, or the payment of a fee prior to all construction
that would place a student in the public school.6 9 The basis for this
63. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 318.
64. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; cf. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 4, at 440
(stating "[although a distinction could be made between sewer and water facilities
and education . . . all are necessary services normally provided by local govern-
ments.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
65. It is a fundamental premise that, as municipalities grow, there is a
continual need for the new public improvements as well as for mainte-
nance and expansion of existing infrastructure and public facilities. Local
jurisdictions have traditionally been responsible for the provision of major
infrastructure improvements such as roads, schools, parks, sewage, and
drainage facilities. Financing of these improvements has come from gen-
eral revenues, most notably the real property tax, and through issuance of
general obligation bonds which are repaid from local property tax
revenues.
Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 140.
66. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § 2(A) (Oct. 20, 1987) (the ordi-
nance shall be known and may be cited as the "St. Johns County Educational Facilities
Impact Fee Ordinance").
67. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § I (emphasis added).
68. Justice Harris of the Fifth District Court of Appeal stated that even though
the ordinance is "couched in the broad language of an impact fee, it is ultimately
assessed only against those households that have children in public school." St. Johns
County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, Inc., 559 So. 2d 363, 364 n.2 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (where in footnote two, Justice
Harris offered his objection to section 7(B), listing examples such as retirement homes,
nursing homes and families with children in private schools).
69. Cf St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 639.
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constitutional challenge is created by the interpretation given to the
meaning of "free public schools."
The concerted understanding is that "free" was intended to mean
that a child will not be prevented from attending a public school be-
cause his or her tuition had not been paid.70 The line between paying
for a present use and paying for a future use is thin, and should not be
the justification for determining that the impact fee is not a user fee. A
question posed by this interpretation is: How far from the schoolhouse
door is the county permitted to charge a fee? 71 One conceivable answer
to this question is determined by how far removed payment of the fee is
from being attributed to the homeowner. From this answer it is ardu-
ous to offer opposition to Justice Harris' logical conclusion in the Fifth
District Court's decision that: "Whether the money is paid directly to
the school board as tuition or to the county commission and delivered
to the school board when the family of public school children build or
buy [or remodel] a home in the district seems to have little practical
distinction. ' 72 Although the Florida Supreme Court stated that "St.
Johns County [had] initiated a comprehensive study of whether to im-
pose impact fees to finance additional infrastructure, 73 the methodol-
ogy study examined by the court only appraised one method of meeting
the needed increase in facility capacity, impact fees, and did not ad-
dress other "alternative financing mechanisms. '
A facilities task force was appointed by the Commissioner of Edu-
cation in 1989 to examine the projected education capital outlay needs
for Florida up to the year 2000."6 Specifically outlined was the possibil-
70. Although counsel for the county states this is not the effect of the ordinance,
because "[t]he parent [will be] in the 'pokey' but the child will be in school at no
charge," counsel for the Homebuilders' believes "imprisonment of a parent is a price
no child should have to pay." Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 21; Answer Brief of
Respondents at 24, St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (No. 75,986) [here-
inafter Respondents' Brief].
71. This is one of the many questions raised while discussing the case with Mr.
McMahon. Interview with Michael P. McMahon, Counsel for the Builders in St. Johns
County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (July 29, 1991).
72. St. Johns County, 559 So. 2d at 365.
73. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla.
1991).
74. Facilities Task Force, A Report to the Commissioner, at 7 (February 1990)
(available at the office of Commissioner of Education) [hereinafter Facilities Task
Force].
75. Id.
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ity of providing "alternative funding mechanisms" 6 to meet capital
outlay needs. One of these alternative mechanisms, and the first goal
addressed by the Task Force, was the "maximizing of all existing re-
sources" 77 as a means of reducing capital outlay needs rather than sim-
ply determining a method for funding new school construction. In St.
Johns County, there was no indication that the Florida Supreme Court
reviewed this study or any study emphasizing a reduction in capital
outlay needs. In contrast, there is a methodology study which addresses
a singular means for responding to population growth through mathe-
matical calculations of student population and the required facility
square footage to meet these student needs .7 The court should not be
attempting to determine that impact fees are acceptable methods of
"provid[ing] the capacity to serve the educational needs of . . . [the]
dwelling units,' 79 without first determining whether the municipality
attempted to maximize the potential of their present facilities.8 "
Whether or not St. Johns County has effectively attempted to
maximize facility use should become a factor in determining the valid-
ity of the ordinance. Paralleling the logic used by the Florida Supreme
Court in rejecting the Homebuilder's contention that this impact fee is
nothing more than a tax, is the argument rejecting the imposition of
impact fees to resolve the need for "units of new residential develop-
ment"'" as "too simplistic."8 2 The court should balance the ability of
alternative methods for funding capital outlay projects and not simply
alternative methods of funding these projects.83
Equally important to the logic of the Florida Supreme Court's de-
cision in approving this ordinance 4 is that the fee is charged to the
76. Id. (letter from Chairman, D. Burke Kibler, III of the Task Force to the
Commissioner of Education).
77. Id. at 12.
78. Methodology Study, supra note 55, at 20-24.
79. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 638-39 (emphasis added).
80. Facilities Task Force, supra note 74, at 12-14.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 3.
83. The Facilities Task Force met in 1989 to research the occurring school fund-
ing crisis. The Task Force was organized to recommend funding alternatives for public
education capital outlay needs. See Facilities Task Force, supra note 74. One of the
alternatives recommended to the Commissioner of Education was to consider maximiz-
ing the potential use of the present facilities, an alternative that should have been ad-
dressed by the court. Id.
84. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 642 (with the exception of section 7(B), and
then not unless all municipalities have entered into interlocal agreements, no fee can be
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developer and not the homeowner or facility user.85 The county con-
tends that the homeowner is not economically affected because the
housing market sets the price of the homes.86 Alternatively, if the im-
pact fee is passed on to the homeowner the ordinance could be deemed
a user fee, and therefore violative of the constitutional mandate for
"free public schools."8 As a result, the court recognized the proposed
concerns that the ordinance resembles a user fee, 88 and considered the
severance: of section 7(B) to cure the constitutional defect.
Section 7(B) threatened the validity of the ordinance, because it
enabled the impact fee to be directed at the homes of potential users of
the school facility, and not charged indirectly to the units within the
development as a whole.89 Severance of section 7(B) would also effect
the intended purpose of this ordinance: shifting the cost of newly cre-
ated needs to those who created the needs; namely, the developers. Al-
though the county's position is that "a fair reading of Section seven
(B) ... does not provide for the kind of case by case exemption
pointed to by the Fifth District Court," 90 the Florida Supreme Court
viewed this section as exempting those who could show that they will
not impact school facilities, and therefore, required severance of the
section .91
charged).
85. Cf. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § II(B) (Oct. 20, 1987) (the
ordinance states that if the funds collected are not expended for school facility con-
struction, they will be returned to the present landowner). This statement strengthens
the argument that the impact fee has been passed to the landowner.
86. The petitioners' initial brief in this case states that "logic, common sense and
practical economics suggest that if impact fees are passed through to anyone by a de-
veloper, the likely "pass-throughee" will be the raw land owner ..... Petitioners'
Brief, supra note 6, at 15 n.13.
87. Respondents' Brief, supra note 70, at 12 n.10 (stating from the record that
"empirical studies conclude that impact fees are ultimately paid by the home
buyers.").
88. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640. "[S]even (B) permits households that
do not contain public school children to avoid paying the fee. This means that the
impact fees have the potential of being user fees that will be paid primarily by those
households that do contain public school children, thereby colliding with the constitu-
tional requirement for free public schools." Id. (emphasis added).
89. State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson, 188 So. 351, 352 (1939). "The Constitu-
tion establishes a fundamental policy of making the populace as a whole bear the ex-
pense of an educational system which directly and primarily benefits the populace as a
whole." Respondents' Brief, supra note 70, at 14 (emphasis added).
90. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 19.
91. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 640 (Fla.
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Severance of section 7(B) from the ordinance resulted in the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's perception that "[w]e believe the ordinance, ab-
sent section seven (B), constitutes a workable scheme within the legis-
lative intent." 92 However, in footnote six, which states "[w]hile not
necessary to the validity of the ordinance, we should not find objection-
able a provision that exempted from the payment of an impact fee per-
mits to build adult facilities in which, because of land use restrictions,
minors could not reside," 93 the court demonstrated that it was not sure
of the definition of this "workable scheme." The court's logic used to
find section 7(B) unconstitutional should have also worked to conclude
that the court's position on adult facilities was objectionable, and there-
fore unconstitutional. An appropriate finding would be that, because
the entire county would benefit from an educated community, the
county as a whole should generate the required revenue.
It is understandable that the court feels a homeowner who will
never impact the educational system should not be required to pay the
educational facility impact fee.94 However, this is contrary to the
court's previous position which rejected the Homebuilders' argument
"that because many of the new residents will have no impact on the
public school system, the impact fee is nothing more than a tax insofar
as those residentces are concerned."'95 Covenants and land use restric-
tions placed on the residency of school aged children should not affect
the fees under the court's theory of the case, because the fee is di-
rected at the developer, not the homeowner. Consequently, footnote six
addresses a single group who would be offended by this ordinance,97
and as a result, is destructive to the court's logic that impact fees are
1991).
92. Id. at 640.
93. Id. at 640 n.6.
94. An inference drawn from footnote six is that because of land use restrictions,
there can be no minor residents and therefore there will be no impact on the public
educational system. Id.
95. Id. at 638; see, e.g., Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140, 144 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (where the court dealt
with an amount and use of funds which "smacked more of revenue raising which is
descriptive of a tax."); See generally Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 4, at 423-24
(revenue raised for the expansion of municipal facilities or services is usually classified
as a tax).
96. See McLain Western #1 v. County of San Diego, 194 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct.
App. 1983) (where the court said it is fair to assess developers of retirement
communities).
97. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640 n.6 (retirement home purchasers).
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not user fees.
The Florida Supreme Court's logic becomes conflicting where, in
one discussion the developer is acknowledged as the only entity being
effected by the impact fee,'3 and then in another argument the home-
owner is acknowledged as being effected." A major premise underlying
the claim that only the developer is effected, is the theory that the price
of a home is determined by the market, with no affect by impact fees.
This theory conflicts with the language of the ordinance which provides
for the "impact fee" to be refunded to the current landowner immedi-
ately after six years'00 if the funds have not been used for new facility
construction. 10' Consequently, the ordinance indicates that the land-
owner, and possibly the homeowner, is the fee-payer. 102 The potential
abrogation of constitutional rights in St. Johns County requires the
court to redefine the ordinance's general meaning of "fee-payer."''
Section five of the St. Johns County ordinance illustrates a rela-
98. The impact fee is paid by the developer at the permit stage, which is
designed to "provide the capacity to serve the educational needs of all ... units." Id.
at 638-39.
99. Acknowledging that a homeowner is affected by the imposition of the impact
fee is expressed with disapproval in the court's discussion over the validity of section
7(B), id. at 640, and again in footnote six with the non-objection to an exemption
provision for adult communities, id. at 640 n.6.
100. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 § II(B) (Oct. 20, 1987).
101. "Any refunds not expended . . . following six (6) years from the date the
educational facilities impact fee was paid shall, upon application from the then current
landowner, be returned to such landowner with interest at the rate of six percent (6 %)
per annum . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Returning these unused funds to the current
landowner implies an understanding that the educational impact fees were indirectly
paid by the current landowner. This theory runs contrary to the logic expressed by the
county and that of Justice Sharp (dissenting), that a "way must be found to constitu-
tionally require those who wish to expand Florida's residential facilities [developer] to
shoulder a fair share of the resulting increase in costs of schools." Petitioners' Brief,
supra note 6, at 43 (citing St. Johns County, 559 So. 2d at 366 (Sharp, J., dissenting))
(emphasis and modification in original).
In addition, section 12(A)(1), Exemptions and Credits of the Ordinance, states
that exemptions for expansion of existing buildings only occurs "where no additional
public school enrollment will be produced over and above that produced by the existing
use." St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance 87-60 §§ 12(2)-(4) (Oct. 20 1987) (emphasis
added). Section 12(A)(1) seems to address the logic that the ordinance is intended to
be addressed not at developers, but at those units which will be intended users or mak-
ers of the need for new service increases.
102. However, the developer is not excluded from being the fee-payer at the end
of six years if the land is not sold.
103. St. Johns County, Fla., Ordinance § 5(A) (Oct. 20, 1987).
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tionship between a development activity and the fee-payer, in particu-
lar, section 5(A) makes reference to "a land development activity
which may reasonably be expected to place students in the public
schools. 10 4 This is further defined in section 5(D) as "any change in
the use of any structure that will result in additional students in the
public schools of St. Johns County." 106 The implication is that a home-
owner remodeling his existing home will be charged this fee if addi-
tional public school students will result. This example shows that it is
possible that: 1) the fee-payer is the homeowner, and 2) the impact fee
is related to the attendance of additional students" 6 and therefore, the
fee would be paid only "by those households [where remodelling would
produce additional] . . . public school children. ' 10 7 According to the
court's position, these elements would have "the effect of converting the
educational facilities impact fee into a user fee . . . ."108 As such, this
educational impact fee is violative of the constitutional mandate for
free public schools and beyond the county's power to enact land use
regulations, as provided by the Florida Legislature.109
The Florida Legislature has authorized the implementation of
"comprehensive planning programs to guide and control future devel-
opment."110 Pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive Plan-
ning and Land Development Act ("Growth Management Act"),"' the
Florida Supreme Court has indicated that the legislative intent is to
"facilitat[e] the adequate and efficient provision of schools," in particu-
lar the county's involvement in financing." 2 Granted, the Growth Man-
agement Act defines its intent as "encourag[ing] the most appropriate
use of . . . resources, consistent with the public interest ... ."I" This
definition is an example of the legislature's awareness of the need for
104. Id.
105. Id., § 5(D).
106. Cf. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 639.
107. Id. at 640 (emphasis added) (the term "additional" was added to the quote
by this author to represent the particular example; however, it does not detract from
the court's view that if a fee is directed at the user it will be violative of the constitu-
tional mandate for free public schools).
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (1989).
110. Id., § 163.3161(2).
111. Id., § 163.3161.
112. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 642 (citing FLA. STAT. § 236.012(4)
(1989)).
113. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(3).
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maximizing the capacity of the present school facilities. Therefore, the
Florida Supreme Court should examine other methods of "increasing
school facility capacity" which would also address Justice Sharp's view
that "this state [would face] potential fiscal and social catastrophe
* . ." if impact fees for schools were found unconstitutional.114 The
problem facing the court in determining the best alternative to the im-
position of impact fees is that the dual rational nexus test does not
require this examination by the court.
The Florida Supreme Court in St. Johns County cited the ele-
ments of the dual rational nexus test as: 1) "a reasonable connection
between the need for additional schools and the growth in population
that will accompany new development,"' 15 and 2) "a reasonable con-
nection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the funds col-
lected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision.""' Although the
court stated that the ordinance met the first prong of the dual rational
nexus test, because "the fee [was] designed to provide the capacity to
serve the educational needs of all ...dwelling units [built],"" 7 the
ordinance failed the second prong, because "there was no restriction on
the use of the funds to ensure they [would] be spent to benefit those
who have paid the fee.""11 8 The dual rational nexus test lacked the abil-
ity to insure that "recommended ways to maximize utilization of ex-
isting facilities""' 9 has occurred. Furthermore, the inclusion of a "less
intrusive alternative means" component, established in the needs-nexus
analysis, would perform this function and is the appropriate test for the
validation of educational impact fees.
IV. ANALYZING ORDINANCE VALIDITY
A. Reasonable Relationship to Dual Rational Nexus Tests
The Third District Court of Appeal in Wald Corp. v. Metropoli-
tan Dade County2 ' analyzed the acceptability of two previously ap-
114. St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 559 So. 2d 363, 364
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991) (Sharp, J.,
dissenting).
115. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 638.
116. Id. at 637.
117. Id. at 638-39.
118. Id. at 639.
119. Facilities Task Force, supra note 74, at 1.
120. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist.
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plied tests for determining the constitutional validity of subdivision ex-
actions. These were the "reasonable relationship" and "specifically and
uniquely attributable" tests.12' The "reasonable relationship" test states
that the subdivision exaction requirement be "reasonably related to the
needs of the municipality;" however, the "specifically and uniquely at-
tributable" test further narrows this requirement to one being "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable to the subdivider's activity.' 2 2 The
Third District Court of Appeal outlined the weaknesses of both tests. 28
These tests interchange the burden of proving the nexus between
the new development and the needs created among the developer and
the municipality. The inadequacies of these tests originate from their
inherent inflexibility. While the reasonable relationship test affords mu-
nicipalities almost unchecked powers to impose fees, the "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test would require verification that the de-
velopment is the single reason for the shortage in school facility capac-
ity, and therefore, unreasonable burdening of the municipality. 2
The court in Wald was confronted with an ordinance which condi-
tioned the approval of future development plans on the dedication of
land to be used for a canal system.'2 5 Although the Third District
Court of Appeal stated that this subdivision requirement would be valid
under either the "reasonable relationship" test or "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test, 26 the court, in a well prepared evaluation
of these two tests, determined that a new "rational nexus approach pro-
vides a more feasible basis for testing subdivision dedication require-
ments . . ".., One reason the court found this analysis attractive
was because it "balanced the prospective needs of the community and
the property rights of the developer [and] .. .treated the business of
subdividing as a profit-making enterprise ....,28
Likewise, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Hollywood, Inc.
Ct. App. 1976).
121. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,
801 (I11. 1961) (specifically and uniquely attributable test); Ayres v. City Council of
Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1, 8-9 (Cal. 1949) (reasonable relationship test).
122. Wald, 338 So. 2d at 866.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 866-67.
125. Id. at 864.
126. Id. at 865.
127. Wald, 338 So. 2d at 868.
128. Id.
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v. Broward County,129 in deciding the constitutionality of an ordinance
effecting the county park system, advanced the present form of the
dual rational nexus test applied in St. Johns County.130 In Hollywood,
the court addressed a subdivider's challenge to an ordinance requiring
either the dedication of land, or the payment of a fee in lieu of land
dedication for a county park program."' 1 The court held that the "ex-
actions are shown to offset, not exceed, reasonable needs sufficiently
attributable to the new subdivision residents . . . [and that the] capital
assets will sufficiently benefit those new residents.3 2 However, there are
important factual distinctions between the land dedication exaction in
Wald, and the monetary educational impact fee addressed by the court
in St. Johns County.' The differences between subdivision dedications
and impact fees are important. Two reasons need to be explored: 1)
land is unique, and 2) dedicating land draws a "proper distinction[]
between the individual property-holder and subdivider.' 3 4
First, the land in question might be so unique that even the alter-
natives to land dedication offered by the ordinance in Hollywood, pay-
ment of a fee in lieu of the dedication, 3 5 would not be acceptable. For
example, the land dedicated for new school facility construction should
be central to its related community, enabling students to attend school
without traveling extensive distances. Second, the benefits of property
subdivision accruing to a subdivider may require the dedication of land
to maintain a balance between the community and subdivider, differen-
tiating between the treatment of individual land owners and profit-
making enterprises. 136 The test used by a court in determining the va-
lidity of impact fees should be flexible enough to allow the municipality
room to provide for its growing community; however, it should be strict
enough to insure that the proper method is chosen. In order to provide
for the flexibility required, the dual rational nexus test must be further
developed.
Further development of this test requires a determination as to
whether the ordinance is classified as a "development exaction" or
129. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App.
1983).
130. St. Johns County, 583 So.2d at 637.
131. Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 610.
132. Id. at 614.
133. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637.
134. Wald Corp., 338 So. 2d at 868.
135. Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 607.
136. ld. at 610.
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"user impact fee.' 7 This classification methodology supports a bal-
ance between the equities of the developer and the municipality, by
incorporating and evaluating the type, size and cost of the construction
proposed. The effect of the classification is important to the obligations
and standards applied to the parties by this proposed "needs-nexus
analysis."' 38 The definitions for subdivision exactions and user impact
fees in the needs-nexus analysis are the following:
1. Subdivision Exaction-Traditional construction, dedication, or
in-lieu-fee payment for site-specific needs imposed at the time of
subdivision. These improvements are usually categorized as being
"minor" in scope and cost, and are typically provided on-site. Ex-
amples include subdivision streets, sidewalks, trails, utility ease-
ments, and open space.
2. User Impact Fee-More recent device to fund major, off-site
infrastructure expansion imposed at the building permit stage. Ex-
amples include expansion or improvement of sewage treatment fa-
cilities, landfills, primary roadways, schools, and active recrea-
tional parks.139
The definition suggested for a "user impact fee" conforms to the situa-
tion found in St. Johns County. Although the court there did not dis-
tinguish between subdivision exactions and user impact fees when eval-
uating the application of the dual rational nexus test, it is an essential
component for determining the validity of the ordinance. 14 0 The Florida
Supreme Court should re-evaluate the application of the dual rational
nexus test in the area of education because of the significant substan-
tive differences between the definitions of user impact fees and subdivi-
sion exactions. It is this conflict in definition substance which highlights
137. The Petitioners' initial brief defines the important distinctions between
"user" fees and "development exactions" as follows: "A user fee assumes that capacity
is available and imposes a fee for using the capacity. A development exaction is predi-
cated on the fact that capacity is not available (Section 163.3202(2)(g), Fla. Stat.
(1989)) or the developer should be given the alternative of financing an increase in
facilities capacity." Petitioners' Brief, supra note 6, at 18.
138. Authors Delaney, Gordon and Hess, are concerned about the inability of
courts to distinguish clearly between the tests available. See Delaney et al., supra note
28. The needs-nexus analysis is a test unifying the "reasonable relationship," "specially
and uniquely attributable," and "rational nexus" tests for determining the validity of
impact fees. Id.
139. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 141.
[Vol. 16
586
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/1
1991] Parisi 591
the need for test reform.
B. The Need for Test Reform: "Needs-Nexus Analysis"
The "needs-nexus analysis"141 is the appropriate test for analyzing
the public educational impact fee proposed by the St. Johns County
Ordinance. Because impact fees which focus on educational facilities
reflect complications unique to themselves," the test applied by the
court should reflect an understanding of these problems.143 The "need-
nexus analysis" was designed to examine the validity of both "subdivi-
sion exactions" and "user impact fees."' 44 This test categorizes new
school facility construction as a user impact fee because of the large
estimated project size, and the fact that the fee is exacted at the permit
stage, rather than at subdivision.4 5 However, since the need for in-
141. See generally Delaney et al., supra note 28.
142. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (Constitutional mandate for "uniform system of
free public schools").
143. See Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test,
and the Federal Constitution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 992, 992 n.3 (1989) ("Many states
have resolved these conflicts by adopting some variation of the rational nexus rule
.") (emphasis added).
In addition, although the United States Supreme Court has not expanded the defi-
nition of fundamental rights beyond that which is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution, where the Court in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), held that the differences in expenditures per student from local
property tax funding is constitutional where the procedure is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest, it has considered that issues of public education to require
more than the mere rationality review applied to social welfare interests. See Plyer v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). In Plyer, the level of scrutiny of a Texas statute deny-
ing the funding for public education of illegal aliens was elevated to protect against the
denial of an education:
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitu-
tion. But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguish-
able from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of
education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of
its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction.
Id.
Because the Florida Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between impact
fees for sewer and water facility connections and education, St. Johns County, 583 So.
2d at 638, the court should reevaluate the applicability of the dual rational nexus test.
144. Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 139.
145. Id. (The Educational Impact Fee proposed in St. Johns County contains
elements of both the subdivision exaction determination where the need is "attributable
to [the] subdivision," and also resembles the definition of a user impact fee offered by
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creased new school facilities has been created by the subdivision for the
subdivision, as opposed to the creation of an area wide need, the St.
Johns County ordinance also parallels the needs-nexus test's definition
of a subdivision exaction." 6 Therefore, further development of the dual
rational nexus test should compile elements from tests considering both
categories: subdivision exactions and user impact fees.
The needs-nexus analysis for subdivision exactions is similar to the
dual rational nexus test applied by the supreme court in St. Johns
County.117 Further development of the dual rational nexus test would
require three steps. First, determine whether the need for additional
school facilities is generated by the growth in population created by the
new development. Second, ascertain whether there is a reasonable con-
nection between the fee imposed and the service rendered to the devel-
opment. Third, determine if there are any "less intrusive means availa-
ble" 148 by closely examining legislative intent.
The policy presented by this additional third element is to require
the exploration of all possible methods of financing such large infra-
structure projects, as well as alternative methods for reducing the need
for additional new school facilities."49 The municipality should not im-
plement a revenue raising tool merely because it is unlikely to raise
outrage by municipal residents. Impact fees are directed at a silent
the needs-nexus test.).
146. Id. at 158-59.
147. Although the court stated: "In essence, [we] approved the imposition of im-
pact fees that meet the requirements of the dual rational nexus test adopted by other
courts in evaluating impact fees," the court made no study of its own into the validity
of the test. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637. The court articulated the require-
ments as: 1) the demonstration of a rational nexus between additional facility needs
and the growth in population created by the new developments; and 2) a rational nexus
between the "expenditure of funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivi-
sion." Id. See generally Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 152-53; Juergensmeyer &
Blake, supra note 4, at 431-33.
148. Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 161 (examples for "less intrusive alterna-
tives" are increasing the general tax rate or by the use of general obligation bonds). In
addition, the Facilities Task Force addressed issues for maximizing present facilities,
none of which are politically palatable decisions. See Facilities Task Force, supra note
74, at 12.
It is noted that the three elements defined for the needs-nexus test suggested by
this Comment are a compilation of the components of the nexus prongs offered for both
subdivision exactions and user impact fees with the burden of proof on the government.
It would be the government's burden to show that less intrusive alternatives are not
available. See Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 158-59.
149. Facilities Task Force, supra note 74.
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constituency, 150 those not yet part of the local voting population, 1 5 and
therefore, are politically aesthetic. The addition of the less intrusive
alternative element would require the court to further scrutinize the
previous elements as well as research the effectiveness, not only of the
impact fee, but of alternative methods for financing or reducing the
need for new school facilities.' 52
150. Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 161.
151. [O]wners of undeveloped land, developers, and consumers of new de-
velopment are poorly represented minorities. Their votes are few; many of
them have no vote at all, as they are not (or are not yet) residents of the
[municipality]; their campaign contributions and lobbying efforts are inef-
fectual. The homeowning majority has every incentive to minimize its own
tax burden by developing a source of municipal revenue, the burden of
which falls on these groups.
Note, supra note 143, at 1007; see also Daniel W. Sweet & Lee P. Symons, Pennsylva-
nia's New Municipalities Planning Code: Policy, Politics, and Impact Fees, 94 DICK.
L. REV. 76, 91-2 (1989) stating:
The political question most aptly formulated with respect to impact fees
and related exactions is as follows: "It is easy to understand the genesis for
this type of regulation. After all, elected officials would prefer to tax those
who do not vote. But it is hard to justify this type of requirement as a
matter of law. A decision by a municipal governing body to impose the
cost of the new fire house on the new residents, via zoning regulations, is in
effect a taxation decision." . . . The current Pennsylvania practice of mon-
etary exactions is questionable, both as a matter of law and as a matter of
public policy. These ad hoc deals possess tremendous potential for abuse
and corruption. Impact fee legislation, which is based upon studies by
planners employed by the municipalities that desire to enact the ordi-
narces, threatens to subtly disguise nonuniform taxation.
(quoting 1 R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.3.17 (1981)).
In 1987, the California Newhall School District submitted a resolution for a "spe-
cial tax" to fund capital outlay projects and which included the addition of school-
impact fees. California Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Newhall School Dist., 253 Cal. Rptr. 497
(Ct. App. 1988). "Not surprisingly, the special taxes were overwhelmingly supported
by district voters not subject to the new exaction." Daniel J. Curtin Jr. & Michael P.
Durkee, 'Special' Tax is Still a Tax, 102 L.A. DAILY J. 5 (January 6, 1989) (emphasis
added); See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VIIIA (Proposition 13, passed June 6, 1978, re-
quires a two-thirds voter approval on resolutions).
152. In examining the "less intrusive alternatives available," the authors of the
need-nexus analysis offer the following questions to be considered by a court in their
examination:
-What is the amount of the fee and its likely impact upon the ultimate
consumer when passed through by the developer?
-How healthy is the municipality's assessable base? Is it growing or
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V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court contends that the legislature did not
eroding?
-Is the municipality's tax rate low in comparison to similar situated politi-
cal subdivisions?
-What is the municipality's bond rating? Will increased taxes or borrowing
to fund public improvements jeopardize it?
-Has the municipality's current capital improvements program (CIP) kept
pace with previous programs? How does the current CIP compare to its
predecessors in relation to the current size of the municipality and growth
trends?
-Is the municipality's existing housing stock sufficiently diverse and inclu-
sionary to accommodate a variety of income groups including low and
moderate-income families?
-Is the fee, in reality, a double tax on the consumer? In other words, is
the new-home purchaser, who, like existing residents, pays deductible
property taxes for services, and also must pay a nondeductible impact fee
for the same service (though the increased price of the home), essentially
paying twice?
Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 161-62 (quoting BUILDER AND ASS'N SERVICES Div.,
NATIONAL ASS'N OF HOME BUILDERS, IMPACT FEES: A DEVELOPER'S MANUAL at 4))
(emphasis added).
An additional question posed by these authors is:
-Is the affected property being credited for providing common facilities
that the municipality has provided without charge to other properties in
the service area?
See Delaney et al., supra note 28, at 162 (quoting Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jor-
dan City, 631 P.2d 899, 903-05 (Utah 1981)).
In addition to these questions suggested by Delaney, Gordon and Hess, the court
should consider these additional questions:
-What was the Education Estimating Conference's forecasts (for a period
of 10 years prior to 1989) on "student enrollments, fixed capital outlay
needs, and Florida Education Finance Program formula needs," as the
conference determined was needed for the state planning and budgeting
system?
See, e.g., Facilities Task Force, supra note 74 (where a facilities task force was ap-
pointed by the Commissioner of Education in 1989 to determine the "projected capital
outlay needs of the State of Florida to the year 2000."); see FLA. STAT. §§ 216.134(1),
.136(4)(a) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
-Was a separate account to be known as the "Special Facility Construc-
tion Account," established as part of the Public Education Capital Outlay
and Debt Service Trust Fund to "provide necessary construction funds to
school districts which have urgent construction needs but which lack suffi-
cient resources at present, and cannot reasonably anticipate sufficient re-
sources within the period of the next 3 years, for these purposes from cur-
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intend to limit the ability of municipalities to meet the needs of its
growing community. However, this ability is not without clarification.
The supreme court, in the subsequent clarification of their opinion,
should have considered the constitutional validity of section 7(A)(5),
section 5(D) and the context of footnote six. Inclusion of a less intru-
sive means component to the dual rational nexus test will assist the
court in examining acceptable alternatives prior to the levying of im-
pact fees.
It seems that all logical paths for the understanding of infrastruc-
ture fees define them as either a tax or user fee, or at least the court
has not outwardly suggested another. In the area of education, an anal-
ogy to either of these definitions is fatal to the constitutional validity of
a related impact fee. The distinction between a fee levied for service
use, and the fee levied to increase capacity to serve lies only in seman-
tics. The St. Johns County Educational Impact Fee closely resembles a
user fee for all the reasons presented in this comment, and therefore, it
violates the constitutional mandate for free public schools. Fees for
educational facilities are far different from other forms of on or off site
facility improvements. Within the field of education, we must consider
individual rights founded upon the Florida Constitution and apply a
higher standard of analysis.
Concomitant to the contention that the St. Johns County Educa-
tional Impact Fee is nothing more than a user fee, this comment con-
tends that the dual rational nexus test is inappropriate in analyzing the
constitutional validity of educational impact fees. A requirement for
determining whether there are any "less intrusive alternatives" should
be preeminent in determining the validity of ordinances which either
threaten a constitutional imperative, or are directed at a silent constitu-
rently authorized sources of capital revenue?"
FLA. STA. § 235.435(2)(a) (1989) (emphasis added).
And finally, what is the current status and availability of this account?
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ency, circumventing the legislature6 and the normal political
process. 5
Joseph Livio Parisi
153. (e) The Legislature finds and declares that the subject of the financ-
ing of school facilities with development fees is a matter of statewide con-
cern. For this reason the legislature hereby occupies the subject matter of
mandatory development fees and other development requirements for
school facilities finance to the exclusion of all local measures on the
subject.
CAL. Gov. CODE § 65995(e) (1991).
154. See Note, supra note 143, at 1006-08.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 28, 1982, Robert Shelburne, Scott Turner, David Rice,
and Lisa Fuston drove to the Holiday Inn in Fort Pierce, Florida to go
to the Rodeo Bar located inside the hotel.' When the group arrived and
attempted to park in the hotel's lot, they were instructed by a security
1. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
593
: Nova Law Review 16, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
guard not to park on the lot, as it was reserved for hotel guests.2 In-
stead, the group parked on an adjacent lot owned by Ingram's Fruit
Stand. After several hours in the bar, the group left and walked to-
wards their car. As they were approaching the car, a fight broke out on
Ingram's lot between members of the group and two individuals, Carter
and Bennett. During the fight, Carter shot Turner, Rice, and Shel-
burne, killing Rice.
After the incident, Shelburne, Turner, and Rice's parents sued
Holiday Inns under a negligence theory, and were awarded damages
approaching $5,000,000 for the injuries to Shelburne and Turner, and
for Rice's death.3 On appeal, Holiday Inns argued that as a matter of
law, their duty of care with respect to patrons ended at the physical
boundaries of the hotel's property.4 However, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision, finding
Holiday Inns liable even though the incident did not take place on the
hotel's property.5 This holding represents Florida's recognition of off-
premises liability, because Shelburne was the first case in Florida in
which a landowner was held liable for an injury occurring on adjacent
property not owned by the landowner. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal utilized various factors to support its decision to hold Holiday
Inns liable for the off-premises incident. For instance, the court relied
on the fact that the hotel knew its patrons used adjacent lots for park-
ing, and even suggested that patrons park on neighboring lots." Also,
the court regarded the hotel as having extended its business activities
beyond its legal boundaries by instructing bar patrons to park on adja-
cent property. 7 In addition, the fact that the hotel was economically
benefitting from its rent-free use of the Ingram lot factored into the
court's decision to hold the hotel liable.8 Although the court held Holi-
day Inns liable for the off-premises incident, the court certified a ques-
tion to the Florida Supreme Court as to whether an invitor who has
extended its business activities beyond the premises owned or leased
can be held liable to an invitee who is injured in the extended area.9
2. Id. at 324, 328.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 328.
5. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
6. Id. at 329.
7. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 337. The certified question read, "[w]hen an invitor has extended its
business activities beyond the area actually owned or leased and an invitee is injured in
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In order to answer this question, this article examines the current
state of off-premises liability in Florida, and discusses how other juris-
dictions have approached the off-premises liability issue. Following this
discussion, the article focuses on various factors useful in making an
accurate prediction of the certified question's final determination by the
Florida Supreme Court. The article then discusses the Fourth District's
opinion in Shelburne, and based on the facts of this decision, applies
the five factors to the Shelburne case. The final section is reserved for
determining the future impact of Shelburne on Florida premises
liability.
II. THE HISTORICAL RELUCTANCE OF RECOGNIZING OFF-
PREMISES LIABILITY
An invitor's duty of care with respect to invitees extends only as
far as the scope of the invitor's invitation. 10 Traditionally, most courts
have held that the scope of an invitation ends at the physical boundary
lines of the invitor's property.1" One reason why these courts have used
boundary lines to govern the scope of liability was that if an injury
occurred outside of a landowner's premises, the landowner could not
have had the requisite control over the dangerous situation to prevent
the injury."
Currently, other jurisdictions such as Louisiana refuse to hold a
landowner liable for an off-premises injury unless the landowner cre-
ated the hazardous condition which caused the injury."3 Still other
courts refuse to recognize off-premises liability due to policy considera-
tions concerning the difficulty in drawing the line as to where such lia-
that extended area, can the invitor be liable under a negligence theory?" Id.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 cmt. I (1965).
11. Delvaux v. Langenberg, 387 N.W.2d 751, 762 (Wis. 1986); see also Cothern
v. LaRocca, 232 So. 2d 473, 478 (La. 1970) ("[O]wner owes only to invitees upon his
premises the reasonable care providing a safe place for them upon that property.")
(emphasis added).
12. Rodriguez v. Detroit Sportsmen's Congress, 406 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987); see also Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 757 F.2d 909,
914 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. George v. Western Auto Supply Co., 527 So. 2d 428, 430 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (store owner not liable for a slippery sidewalk because he did not create the
hazard); see Udy v. Calvary Corp., 780 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App, 1989) (land-
owner held liable for the death of a boy hit by a truck after running into the street,
because the accident was caused by the landowner's failure to erect a fence around his
property).
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bility should end."
Prior to Shelburne, the only Florida case dealing with an incident
which occurred off the invitor's premises was Chateloin v. Flanigan's
Enterprises."8 In Chateloin, a patron of a bar was shot by another pa-
tron."' However, the shooting took place several miles from the bar and
"a considerable time" after the patrons had left the bar." The Third
District Court of Appeal refused to hold the bar owner liable, because
the shooting was "too remote as to time and place."'"
Although the facts in Chateloin did not warrant the imposition of
off-premises liability on the bar owner, Chateloin conceivably set the
stage for Florida's recognition of off-premises liability in Shelburne.
The majority in Shelburne distinguished Chateloin , because the shoot-
ing on Ingram's lot took place next door to the hotel and "only minutes
after the individuals crossed the property line,"' 9 as opposed to the
"considerable" period of time which had elapsed in Chateloin. Thus, by
distinguishing Chateloin, the Shelburne court was implicitly saying
that although the facts in Chateloin did not warrant the imposition of
off-premises liability, the facts in the instant case do give rise to off-
premises liability.
Although most jurisdictions today do not adhere to a general rule
holding landowners liable for off-premises incidents, 0 the current trend
14. E.g., Rodriguez, 406 N.W.2d at 210; see Mostert v. C.B.L. & Assoc., 741
P.2d 1090, 1099 (Wyo. 1987) (movie theater was not liable for failing to warn patrons
about flash flooding of streets surrounding the theater property). The policy considera-
tion behind the court's decision in Mostert was the concern that extending liability
would stretch the landowner's duty too far, because it would be difficult to place a
limitation on off-premises liability. 741 P.2d at 1099.
15. 423 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1002. Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on the accident as to
the invitee's distance from the premises, or how long after the invitee left the premises
did the incident occur, If these facts were given, it would have been easier to formulate
a standard for off-premises liability as to time and distance constraints. For example, if
the injury occurred several miles from the invitor's premises, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the invitor should not be held liable for such a distant injury. Similarly,
if the incident occurred hours after the invitee left the bar, then it would have been
difficult for the injured party to prove the proximate causation element needed to re-
cover under negligence.
19. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (construing Chateloin v Flanigan's Enters., 423 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)).
20. E.g., Delvaux v. Langenberg, 387 N.W.2d 751, 761 (Wis. 1986) (tavern
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is that courts will hold a landowner liable for off-premises injuries
when certain factors are present. These factors are: whether an invitee
still had invitee status at the time of the injury;21 whether the land-
owner had control over the adjacent premises where the injury oc-
curred;2 2 whether the activities of the landowner were the legal cause
of the injury on the adjacent property;28 whether the landowner benefit-
ted economically from the adjacent property; 4 and whether the injury
was foreseeable, regardless of where the injury occurred.2 5 These five
factors have been used singularly and in various combinations by courts
in finding landowners liable for off-premises injuries, and are the com-
mon denominator as to when such liability will apply.26
III. SHELBURNE AND THE FIVE FACTORS
A. Status as an Invitee
Premises liability in Florida, as well as most other jurisdictions,
has traditionally been dependent upon the entrant's status as an invi-
tee.2 A business invitee is defined as anyone who enters the land for a
purpose connected with the business;2 8 a possessor of land owes a duty
owner owes no duty to invitees beyond his business premises).
21. Maynard v. Walker, 345 P.2d 478, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
22. Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, 757 F.2d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1985)
("[Wihoever controls the land is responsible for its safety."); Gordon v. Schultz Savo
Stores, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Wis. 1972) (same); Rodriguez, 406 N.W.2d at 210
(same).
23. Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); George v. Western Auto Supply Co., 527 So. 2d 428, 430 (La.
Ct. App. 1988).
24. Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
25. Piedalue v. Clinton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 32, 692 P.2d 20, 23 (Mont.
1984); see Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1983).
26. See, e.g., Ember, 490 N.E.2d at 772-73 (the court used the invitee status
factor in addition to the economic benefit and foreseeability factors); Udy v. Calvary
Corp., 780 P.2d 1055, 1058-59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (court used both the causation
and foresceability factors).
27. Concrete Constr., Inc. v. Petterson, 216 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 1968) (status
as either invitee or trespasser determines whether the party will be able to recover for
negligence); W. PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
62 (1984). This article focuses on invitor/invitee law, thus the classifications of licensee
and trespasser will not be discussed.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
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to exercise reasonable care for the safety of business invitees.2 9 Using
this definition, it is clear that the Shelburne group consisted of business
invitees while they were in the bar, since they entered the hotel's prop-
erty to patronize the bar. But did they lose their status as invitees when
they were walking back to their car by crossing the boundary line be-
tween the hotel's parking lot and Ingram's Fruit Stand?
The general rule is that an invitor's duty of care normally extends
only to the boundaries of its premises.8 ° Hence, under this rule, the
Shelburne individuals would cease to be invitees once they crossed onto
Ingram's lot. However, courts have recognized that there are certain
situations in which a person retains invitee status even when that per-
son leaves the premises owned by the invitor 3 1 One situation where a
person retains his invitee status is when the landowner knows his invi-
tees regularly use an adjacent lot for parking. 2
For example, the Indiana case of Ember v. B.F.D., Inc.33 is similar
to Shelburne in that a tavern owner failed to provide sufficient parking
for his patrons, and knew that patrons customarily used an adjacent lot
for parking. 4 The Ember court held that because the tavern owner
knew its patrons used the adjacent lot, the owner had impliedly ex-
tended his business activities beyond the premises owned.3" As a result,
the tavern was held liable to a patron assaulted on the adjacent lot,
because the court determined that the patron was still an invitee.36
Similarly, in Shelburne, the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn had a prac-
tice of requesting bar patrons to park off the premises in order to pre-
serve the limited number of parking spaces for hotel guests. 37 The hotel
had extended its business activities to include the use of Ingram's prop-
erty. Under this theory, the Shelburne individuals continued to be invi-
tees of the hotel when the incident on Ingram's lot occurred. Therefore,
the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn owed a duty of reasonable care to these
people.
29. Casby v. Flint, 520 So. 2d 281, 282 (Fla. 1988) (There is a "duty of reasona-
ble care owed to the invitee."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 cmt. 1 (1965).
30. E.g., Ember, 490 N.E.2d at 772.
31. E.g., id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 764.
34. Id.
35. Ember, 490 N.E.2d at 764.
36. Id.
37. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
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In addition to the extension of business activities theory, Florida
courts have also extended the scope of invitee status to include means
of ingress to and egress from the invitor's property.38 This would in-
clude approaches to the property which the invitee would be reasonably
expected to use to get to the invitor's place of business.3 9 Similarly,
other jurisdictions have held that a patron does not lose his status as an
invitee by using a means of ingress or egress which the invitor has told
him to use, or which he has been led to believe is the appropriate
means of reaching the invitor's property.4
Applying this logic, because the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn had a
practice of instructing bar patrons to park on adjacent lots, such as
Ingram's, the Shelburne individuals remained invitees for the purpose
of using Ingram's lot as a means of ingress to and egress from the
Rodeo Bar. Thus, Holiday Inn's duty of care to Shelburne and the rest
of his group did not end when they stepped off the hotel's property.
B. Control
Control is a prerequisite to liability of the landowner, regardless of
where the injury occurred."' Generally, an occupier of land is deemed
to have control only over the area which he possesses. 2 However, when
a landowner treats his neighbor's property as an integral part of his
own, he is conceivably exercising control over the adjoining land."3 This
38. Shields v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 106 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1958), cert. denied, 109 So. 2d 168 (1959).
39. Id. In Shields, a supermarket was held liable for the appellant's injuries sus-
tained when he fell off his motorcycle at an entrance to the store's parking lot. Id. at
90. The accident was caused by potholes in the entrance. Id. Even though the super-
market did not legally own the entrance to its store, the court held that the store should
have maintained the entrances to its parking lot, because patrons must use the en-
trances as a means of approach. Id. at 92.
40. See, e.g., Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, 170 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1946)
(restaurant owner held liable for an injury on an adjacent walkway leading up to the
restaurant because the owner knew that many patrons used the walkway to approach
the restaurant). The California Supreme Court determined that the injured patron was
entitled to the protection of an invitee because she was led to believe that the walkway
was an appropriate means of reaching the restaurant. Id.
41. Rodriguez v. Detroit Sportsmen's Congress, 406 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987).
42. E.g., id.
43. Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 757 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir.
1985).
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control may allow an invitee to recover from a landowner for an injury
occurring on adjacent property."
In Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties,5 control over the adjoin-
ing land formed the basis of off-premises liability. A restaurant owner,
in Johnston, had made arrangements with the service station next door
to allow restaurant patrons to park on the gas station's lot." However,
after this arrangement had been terminated restaurant patrons contin-
ued to use the gas station's lot for parking. When a restaurant patron
sued for an injury sustained on the adjacent lot, the California Su-
preme Court found the restaurant liable for the patron's injury, be-
cause the restaurant owner knew his patrons were still using the adja-
cent lot."" Thus, the restaurant was exercising control over the gas
station's lot and was responsible for the injury occurring on that lot.4 8
On the other hand, adjacent lots may be used by the public in
general and not exclusively by patrons of an invitor. This situation acts
as a shield to protect the invitor from liability for patrons injured on
the adjacent lot, since the invitor is not considered to have the requisite
control over an adjacent public lot.4 9 For example, in Gordon v. Sch-
ultz Savo Stores, Inc.,5" a grocery store was held not liable to a patron
for an injury which occurred in the parking lot in front of the store. 1
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that the parking lot was used
by the public in general.6 2 Therefore, because the grocer had little di-
rect contact with the lot, he did not have the level of control over the
public lot needed to hold him responsible for the injury.53 Similarly, in
La Fleur v. Astrodome-Astrohall Stadium Corp.5 4 the owners of the
Houston Astrodome were not liable for an assault on a patron which
44. Id.
45. 170 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946).
46. Id. at 7.
47. Id.
48. Id. Even though the parking arrangement made between the restaurant and
service station had ended, the restaurant continued to control the use of the service
station's lot in the evenings when the station was closed. Id.
49. See, e.g., Gordon v. Shultz Savo Stores, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Wis.
1972); La Fleur v. Astrodome-Astrohall Stadium Corp., 751 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988).
50. 196 N.W.2d 633 (Wis. 1972).
51. Id. at 636.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 751 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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occurred on an adjacent public street corner. In both of these cases,
the corporations had no control over the public property adjacent to
their own property where the injuries occurred. As a result, neither
company was held liable for the off-premises injury.
However, in Shelburne, patrons of the Rodeo Bar were the exclu-
sive users of Ingram's lot when the incident occurred, since the fruit
stand was closed for vacation.56 On this basis, the "public lot" defense
would not work in Shelburne, as applied in Gordon and La Fleur. Also,
Holiday Inns was using Ingram's property as an integral part of its
own, because the hotel regularly "suggested" to bar patrons that they
use adjacent lots, including Ingram's lot, for parking.5 7 Thus, the Fort
Pierce Holiday Inn was exercising dominion and control over the In-
gram lot by treating the lot as if it belonged to the hotel. Under the
control factor, the plaintiffs' recovery against Holiday Inns was justi-
fied, regardless of the fact that the shooting occurred outside the hotel's
boundaries.
C. Causation
Traditionally, courts are more inclined to attach off- premises lia-
bility when the injury was caused by a negligent landowner.5 8 For ex-
ample, in Udy v. Calvary Corp.,59 a child was hit by a truck when he
ran out into a street. 60 The Arizona Appellate Court determined that
the accident was caused by the apartment complex's failure to provide
a fence around its property.61 As a result, the apartment complex
owner was held liable for the off-premises injury because the injury was
caused by an act of negligence on the part of the apartment complex in
failing to provide a fence.62
An owner was also held liable in the Florida case of Holley v. Mt.
55. Id. at 566.
56. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
57. Id. at 329.
58. Udy v. Calvary Corp., 780 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); see Hol-
ley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 782 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (landlord liable because inadequate security caused the murder of a tenant in-
side a unit).
59. 780 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
60. Id. at 1058.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1062.
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Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc.,63 when a woman was raped and mur-
dered inside her apartment."' Normally, a landlord does not owe a ten-
ant any duty of care inside an apartment unit because the landlord
lacks the requisite control over the unit. 65 The Third District Court of
Appeal, however, determined that the incident inside the apartment
unit was caused by the landlord's failure to provide adequate security
for the common areas over which the landlord had control.66 As a re-
sult, the apartment complex was held liable, even though the incident
technically occurred off its premises because the attack took place in-
side a unit. 7
In Shelburne, the legal cause of the harm stemmed from the fact
that the security guard "suggested" to bar patrons that they park next
door.68 This created a duty on the part of the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn
to provide additional security to patrol neighboring lots used by the
hotel's patrons. Thus, Holiday Inns' failure to hire an additional secur-
ity guard was the legal cause of the shooting, since the shooting may
not have occurred if an extra security guard was there to break up the
fight. The Fourth District Court in Shelburne noted that the jury con-
sidered the issue of whether inadequate security was the legal cause of
the shooting, 9 thus making it evident that the causation factor played
a role in Shelburne as well.
D. Economic Benefit
The "economic benefit" factor receives a great deal of attention,
and is heavily weighed in opinions holding a landowner liable for off-
premises injuries.7 Courts often utilize this factor in making a policy
argument in favor of extending liability to include adjacent property. 1
63. 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
64. Id. at 99.
65. E.g., id. at 101.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 102.
68. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
69. Id. ("The jury in the instant case also properly determined the issue of
whether the appellants' alleged breach of duty on its premises was a legal cause of the
shooting off its premises.").
70. See, e.g., Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986);
Davis v. Pecorino, 350 A.2d 51, 55 (N.J. 1975). This is evidenced by the fact that the
economic benefit factor is discussed in depth by courts utilizing this factor in holding
landowners liable for off-premises injuries.
71. Ember, 490 N.E.2d at 773; see Davis, 350 A.2d at 54 (One gaining "coin-
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Such an argument was used in the Indiana case of Ember v. B.F.D.,
Inc. 7
In Ember, a bar patron was assaulted in an adjacent parking lot
used regularly by bar patrons."' The court, in holding the tavern liable
for the off-premises injury, concluded that if a business invitor was not
held liable for off-premises injuries which occur on adjacent property
providing economic benefit to the invitor, then "a business invitor could
invade the public streets for its economic benefit while simultaneously
absolving itself from liability otherwise imposed just a few feet away
under identical circumstances."' 7' Likewise, if a business invitor is de-
riving a commercial benefit from its special use of adjacent property,
then the invitor is deemed to be in the best position to prevent injury to
patrons who venture onto the adjacent land."'
On the other hand, other courts argue that the derivation of an
economic benefit alone should not be enough to impose liability on an
invitor.7" For example, the Illinois Appellate Court in Brunsfeld v.
Mineola Hotel and Restaurant, Inc. reasoned:
If we were to hold that places of business which benefit economi-
cally from the existence of a publicly-owned recreational facility in
close proximity to their premises are liable for the off-premises ac-
tions of their customers ... then, to protect themselves, they
would be forced to ...place appropriate warning signs, and to
monitor and control the actions of all who used those public facili-
ties. We do not believe that the law does or should impose such a
mercial benefit" from his use of adjacent land "is in the best position to be aware of
and guard against any dangerous condition caused by this use.").
72. 490 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
73. Id. at 766.
74. Id. at 773. The term "economic benefit" or its equivalent is used by most
courts in off-premises liability cases to refer to a situation where a landowner is using
his neighbor's property for his own gain, without having to pay rent. See, e.g., Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (the hotel
was using the adjacent property "rent free for their own business purposes"); cf. Brun-
sfeld v. Mineola Hotel & Restaurant, Inc., 456 N.E.2d 361, 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(race track did not benefit economically from an adjacent lake).
75. Davis, 350 A.2d at 54-55. In Davis, a woman was injured when she fell on a
snow-covered public sidewalk in front of a service station. Id. at 52. The court deter-
mined that even though the sidewalk was public, the service station's owner was liable
because the hazard was caused by his special use of the sidewalk as cars drove in and
out of the station, which packed the snow on the sidewalk. Id. at 53, 55.
76. See, e.g., Brunsfeld, 456 N.E.2d at 366.
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heavy burden upon such places of business."
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Shelburne did
not accept this reasoning. The court found that the Fort Pierce Holiday
Inn was directly benefiting from its use of the Ingram lot because the
hotel was using the lot "rent free for their own business purposes. '197
Accordingly, the court utilized the economic benefit factor in holding
Holiday Inns liable for the injury on the neighboring lot.7 9
E. Foreseeability
Foreseeability is the key factor in determining whether an invitor
should be liable for an off-premises injury. 80 Rather than limiting lia-
bility to strictly on-premises injuries, courts are now beginning to use
foreseeability as the standard for finding an owner liable for injuries
occurring off the owner's premises.
Courts utilize the foreseeability factor in a variety of ways. One
common variation of foreseeability used in cases dealing with actions of
third parties is the "prior similar acts" rule.82 Under the prior similar
acts rule, an attack on a patron by a third party is only considered
foreseeable if the premises has a history of prior similar acts.88
This rule has been adopted by Florida courts, as they often look to
whether the premises had a history of problems similar to whatever
77. Id. Brunsfeld involved a snowmobile operator who was injured while operat-
ing his snowmobile on a frozen lake adjacent to the Mineola Hotel & Restaurant. Id.
at 363.
78. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
79. Id.
80. See Piedalue v. Clinton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 32, 692 P.2d 20, 23
(Mont. 1984); Udy v. Calvary, 780 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). As with
the economic benefit factor, the foreseeability factor's utility to courts is evidenced by
the fact that foreseeability receives more attention than any other factor in opinions
holding landowners liable for off-premises injuries.
81. See, e.g., Mostert v. C.B.L. & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Wyo. 1987);
Piedalue, 692 P.2d at 23 (unnecessary that owner control the adjacent property if the
hazard "created a foreseeable risk of harm to business invitees .... "); Udy, 780 P.2d
at 1059 ("foreseeability of harm" is the governing standard once a duty is established);
Bach v. State, 730 P.2d 854, 857 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
82. Gregory A. Eiesland, Attacks in Parking Lots: Driving Home Liability of
Owners, 23 TRIAL 108, 108 (Sept. 1990).
83. Id.
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activity caused the injury at hand.8 However, to date, Florida has only
used the prior similar acts rule in determining whether a landowner is
liable for an on-premises injury.8 5 For example, in Stevens v. Jefferson,
which involved an on-premises shooting at a bar, the Florida Supreme
Court held for the plaintiff because the plaintiff proved the shooting
was foreseeable by demonstrating that the bar "was a rough place with
a history of fights and gunplay . "..."86
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Shelburne was the first
Florida court to use the prior similar acts rule to find a landowner lia-
ble for an off-premises injury. In fact, the court went even further by
allowing evidence of prior dissimilar acts as well.88 The court argued
that it would be against Florida's public policy to limit evidence of
foreseeability to only prior similar acts.89 In fact, the Fourth District
Court allowed as evidence fifty-eight similar and dissimilar criminal
acts committed at the Rodeo Bar prior to the shooting.90
Another variation of the foreseeability factor used extensively in
jurisdictions throughout the country in off-premises liability cases is
whether the invitor knew its invitees were using the adjacent property
at the time of the off-premises injury.91 As previously discussed, an in-
vitor's knowledge of patron use of an adjacent property may extend a
patron's status as an invitee to include the use of neighboring prop-
erty.92 But in addition, an invitor's knowledge is important in determin-
ing whether the off-premises injury was foreseeable. For example, in
Margrabe v. Graves,9 3 the First District Court of Appeal reasoned that
a business invitor cannot be held liable for an injury on an adjacent lot
where the invitor had no reason to believe that his patrons would use
84. Allen v. Babrab, Inc., 438 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. 1983); Stevens v. Jefferson,
436 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1983).
85. Stevens, 436 So. 2d at 35.
86. Id.
87. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 325.
88. Id. at 331.
89. Id. A rule limiting evidence to only prior similar acts would be against public
policy because such a rule would "contravene the policy of preventing future harm
... .Surely, a landowner should not get one free assault before he can be held liable
for criminal acts which occur on his property." Id.
90. Id.
91. Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); see
Cothern v. LaRocca, 232 So. 2d 473, 478 (La. 1970); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 442 (1968).
92. Ember, 490 N.E. 2d at 772.
93. 97 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
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the adjacent lot for parking.9 '
However, in Shelburne, even though it was disputed at trial as to
whether the security guard told Shelburne's group to park on Ingram's
lot, it cannot be disputed that the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn had knowl-
edge that the Ingram lot was being used by its bar patrons, since the
hotel required bar patrons to park on the lots adjacent to the hotel.9" In
fact the Shelburne court noted this on several occasions in its opinion,96
and this knowledge gave rise to liability on the part of Holiday Inns.
In addition, the Shelburne court could also have addressed the is-
sue of foreseeability of patrons using adjacent lots by utilizing the rule
of implied invitation. 7 Under this reasoning, if an invitor impliedly ex-
tends an invitation to its invitees to use an adjacent premises, then the
invitor is deemed to have knowledge of use of the adjacent premises by
its invitees. 98 For example, in Shelburne, even if the hotel did not ex-
pressly invite bar patrons to park on Ingram's lot, the Fort Pierce Holi-
day Inn impliedly extended to bar patrons an invitation to park on the
Ingram lot, because the hotel required bar patrons to park off the
premises. 99 However, by telling patrons to park off hotel property, the
Fort Pierce Holiday Inn was implying that patrons should park on any
of the lots adjacent to the hotel, including the Ingram lot. Thus, under
the implied invitation rule, Holiday Inns would be deemed to have the
knowledge of its patrons' use of the Ingram lot since it was foreseeable
that patrons might park on Ingram's lot. In sum, whichever approach
to foreseeability is used, the shooting on the Ingram lot was properly
labeled by the court as foreseeable.
F. Reconciliation of the Five Factors
In allowing the cause of action giving rise to off-premises liability,
the Fourth District Court in Shelburne utilized the five factors previ-
ously discussed. The Florida Supreme Court should use these factors in
94. Id. at 499. The landowner did not know the invitees were using the adjacent
property. Therefore he was not liable for an injury to an invitee when she fell in a
sunken driveway on the neighboring lot, since this injury was unforeseeable. Id.
95. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328-29.
96. Id. ("[T]he evidence in the present case shows that appellants knew their
patrons customarily used adjacent premises for parking in order to patronize the Rodeo
Bar.").
97. See Cothern v. La Rocca, 232 So. 2d 473, 478 (La. 1970).
98. Id.
99. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
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deciding which way to answer the certified question, and should do an
analysis similar to the above analysis of these five factors. After looking
at these factors, the Florida Supreme Court could only answer the cer-
tified question in the affirmative. This makes perfect sense, because the
Florida Supreme Court should extend premises liability to include off-
premises injuries when an invitor has extended its activities beyond the
boundaries of its property.
IV. SHELBURNE'S IMPACT ON FLORIDA BUSINESSES AND THE
LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY
A. Will Florida Be Able to Place a Practical Limitation on
Off-Premises Liability After Shelburne?
Jurisdictions refusing to recognize off-premises liability have often
reasoned that it would be difficult to determine which off-premises inju-
ries a landowner should be liable for.100 Most assuredly, using a physi-
cal boundary line as a limitation on liability is a simplified, bright line
approach to determining liability. This is why certain jurisdictions still
recognize the property line as the extent of premises liability.101 It is
judicially convenient to do so because it provides courts with a simple
ascertainable standard. However, as an ever increasing number of
courts begin to recognize off-premises liability, a new standard must
emerge to limit the extent of off-premises liability. Fortunately, there
are several workable options available.102
For example, as previously noted, foreseeability has been used ef-
fectively by courts as a limitation on off-premises liability in cases rec-
ognizing liability for off-premises injuries.103 In using foreseeability as
the limiting factor, the scope of the duty of care is determined by
whether the off-premises injury was foreseeable, rather than having the
scope of duty governed by the landowner's property line.10 4 This is a
more fair and reasonable limitation on liability than boundary lines,
100. See, e.g., Mostert v. C.B.L. & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1099 (Wyo. 1987)
(refused to recognize off-premises liability because it would be difficult to place a prac-
tical limitation on such liability).
101. See, e.g., Delvaux v. Langenberg, 387 N.W.2d 751, 761 (Wis. 1986); Rod-
riguez v. Detroit Sportsmen's Congress, 406 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
102. For a discussion of possible factors which could be used to limit off-premises
liability, see supra section II of the text.
103. E.g., Udy, 780 P.2d at 1059.
104. Id.; see also Bach v. State, 730 P.2d 854, 857 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
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because if an injury was foreseeable, the injured party should be able
to recover from a negligent landowner regardless of where the injury
occurred, since the landowner breached a duty owed to the invitee.
105
Causation is another factor that could be used as a new limitation
on liability instead of boundary lines. The Third District Court of Ap-
peal in Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments'°6 hinted at the possi-
bility of using causation as the limitation on liability instead of focus-
ing on where the injury occurred. In Holley, an apartment owner was
held liable for a murder in an apartment unit, because the incident was
legally caused by the landlord's failure to provide adequate security to
patrol the common areas.1°0 Causation in this sense is a more reasona-
ble limitation on liability than physical boundary lines, since a land-
owner who legally causes an injury to someone should not escape liabil-
ity simply because the injury did not occur on the landowner's
property. 10 8 Those who cause injuries should be liable for such injuries
regardless of the ownership rights in the underlying property where the
injury occurred.
B. Will Shelburne Overwhelm Florida Courts With Off- Prem-
ises Liability Actions?
In decisions that chart new areas of the law, courts are often con-
cerned with whether such decisions will impose extra obligations on the
already overburdened judicial system. 09 This is particularly true with
the issue of off-premises liability. 10 The concern in recognizing off-
premises liability is that it would open up the "floodgates" to substan-
tial numbers of cases involving patrons who suffered off-premises
injuries."
105. Udy v. Calvary Corp., 780 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), provides one of
the best examples of why boundary lines are an inequitable standard. In Udy, a child
was killed when he ran into the street and was hit by a truck. Id. at 1058. In a jurisdic-
tion which recognized boundary lines as the extent of liability, the landowner would not
be liable, even though the accident was entirely caused by his negligent failure to erect
a fence around his property.
106. 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
107. Id. at 101.
108. For an illustration of the inequities of using the boundary lines standard,
see supra note 108.
109. See Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986); see also Mostert
v. C.B.L. & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1104 (Wyo. 1987).
110. Gates, 719 P.2d at 197.
111. See Mostert, 741 P.2d at 1100 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
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Shelburne does not necessarily mean that courts will be swamped
with off..premises accident claims. The issue of whether Shelburne will
overburden our court system depends entirely on whether, Florida
courts choose a workable standard to use as a practical limitation on
off-premises liability. As mentioned before, several options exist which
could be used effectively to limit off-premises liability. 12 Florida courts
will simply have to set forth which standard will be applied to off-
premises cases as a limitation on off-premises liability. 13 The most effi-
cient way to set up a standard in off-premises liability cases is simply
for the Florida Supreme Court to determine the standard when it an-
swers the certified question. The Florida Supreme Court could prevent
a wave of inconsistent holdings from Florida's lower courts involving
cases where invitees suffered off-premises injuries.
Furthermore, foreseeability is the most effective standard the Flor-
ida Supreme Court could choose as the governing standard in off-prem-
ises liability cases, because foreseeability provides courts and landown-
ers with a simple ascertainable limitation on liability. A landowner can
easily determine his duty of care with respect to adjacent land by ask-
ing himself whether it is foreseeable that one of his invitees might come
into contact with a hazard on adjacent land which the landowner him-
self created."" In addition, foreseeability could be applied when decid-
ing cases involving an injury that occurred several miles from an in-
ing in part). Expressing concern about the majority's recognition of off-premises liabil-
ity, Justice Thomas argued that a business proprietor will now have to warn invitees of
every risk that they might encounter: even danger that is "remote from the place of
business and over which the proprietor has no control." Id; see also Richard E. Wolver-
ton, Current Trends in Bar-Lounge Liability, 7 TRIAL AD Q. 17 (1988); David G.
Ditto, Comment, Wyoming Extends the Duty of Owners and Occupiers to Warn Invi-
tees of Dangers Beyond the Premises, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 641 (1988).
The "floodgates" argument is that if a jurisdiction adopts off-premises liability,
courts in that jurisdiction would become swamped with all sorts of off-premises cases,
including cases where a person was injured perhaps many miles from a landowner's
property, or several hours after the injured person left the landowner's premises.
112. For a discussion of these options, see supra section III (A) of the text.
113. Although the Shelburne court utilized several factors such as foreseeability,
economic benefit, and extension of business activity in its decision to recognize off-
premises liability, the court never set forth a standard to be used as a limitation to off-
premises liability. This is why the task of choosing such a standard will be the responsi-
bility of future Florida courts.
114. Arguably, the creation of the hazardous condition gives rise to its foresee-
ability. If the landowner created the condition, then notice of such a condition should
be imputed on that owner. Thus, the landowner has a duty to warn invitees of the
hazardous condition.
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vitor's premises, or perhaps several hours after an invitee wandered off
an invitor's premises. The likely result would be that injuries occurring
several miles from an invitor's premises, or several hours later, are
probably unforeseeable and no liability would exist for such injuries.
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court should choose foreseeability as
the standard to be used in off-premises liability cases by expressly set-
ting forth this intention when it answers the certified question. By fol-
lowing this course, Shelburne would not represent an overburdening of
the court system.
C. Shelburne's Effect on Property Insurance of Florida
Businesses
Perhaps the biggest concern of Florida businesses in light of Shel-
burne is that their premises liability insurance rates will soar since they
now have to obtain extended coverage to insure the risk of being held
liable for an off-premises injury to a patron. But in reality, it is unlikely
that businesses will really feel the impact of higher insurance rates.
Shelburne's impact on insurance rates will ultimately be borne by con-
sumers, because economists tell us that the most efficient way for com-
panies to manage increased costs is to pass those additional costs on to
consumers in the form of higher prices. n
Of course, courts are not blind to this elementary rule of econom-
ics.' 16 In Mostert v. C.B.L. & Associates,'1 7 Justice Cardine was par-
ticularly concerned about the impact of the majority's decision to hold
a movie theater liable for an off-premises injury and concluded that:
When the theater must pay expensive insurance premiums to cover
these [off-premises] claims, the money must come from somewhere.
The only place it can come from is theater tickets . . . . It is not
unreasonable to believe that the price of theater tickets might
double or triple if theater owners might be held liable for [off-
115. Perhaps the best example of how increased costs of insurance are passed on
to consumers is in the area of medical care, as the extraordinary costs of medical care
in this country are a direct reflection on the costs of medical malpractice insurance. See
Bruce C.N. Greenwald, Medical Malpractice and Medical Costs in THE ECONOMICS
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1978).
116. See Mostert, 741 P.2d at 1104-05 (Cardine, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986).
117. 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987).
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premises] accidents . . .,.
In the case of hotels and taverns, the extra revenue needed to
cover the increased costs of property insurance of a place like the Fort
Pierce Holiday Inn or the Rodeo Bar would
probably come in the form of higher room rates or more expensive
drinks. The most effective way businesses can keep their insurance
costs from significantly increasing in light of Shelburne is for busi-
nesses to examine their property closely and re-evaluate their duty of
care. Businesses should ask themselves whether it is foreseeable that
patrons will use adjacent property. If the answer is "yes," then that
business should make every effort to satisfy its duty of care with re-
spect to adjacent land, because in light of Shelburne, liability no longer
ends at the property line.
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court should answer the certified question
in the affirmative, which means that Shelburne should become the pre-
cedent case in Florida holding an invitor liable for an off-premises in-
jury as a result of an invitor's extension of its activities to adjacent
land. Florida's recognition of off-premises liability in this type of situa-
tion is a judicial step in the right direction. Shelburne fills a needed
gap in the area of premises liability, because people like Turner, Rice,
and Shelburne deserve compensation under these circumstances.
Bruce G. Warner
118. Id. at 1105 (Cardine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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